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ABSTRACT 
This thesis critiques the performance of judicial reform in international development 
assistance over the past fifty years for the purpose of making it more effective. It 
argues that this endeavour has yet to find its path and has failed to demonstrate 
success. This is due to two principal shortcomings: judicial reform is yet to formulate 
a coherent theory with which to justify its purpose, and there is a lack of any 
established consensus on how to evaluate success. To address these shortcomings, 
the thesis draws on new evidence from the emerging experience in Asia which is 
showcased in three case studies. These studies comprise the Asia Development 
Bank's law and policy reform program between 1990 and 2007, AusAID's Papua 
New Guinea law and justice sector program between 2003 and 2007, and the 
experience of practitioners across the Asia Pacific region over the past decade. 
Building on this evidence, the thesis argues that the theory of judicial reform should 
be realigned to centre on the purpose of improving justice as fairness and equity, 
rather than on promoting economic growth or good governance. While 
acknowledging that there is much ongoing work to complete, it argues that the 
evidence of success of this endeavour should then be measured in terms of attaining 
rights using the universally-endorsed framework of international human rights law. 
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CHAPTER 1 -INTRODUCTION 
Night after night, in the long hours of the pre-dawn, I awake in Port 
Moresby, jolted by panic at the enormity of the justice problems, and what 
at those hours seems the almost laughable insufficiency of $1 00 million to 
fix them. Why is this? Is this normal? Or, am I troubled by something more 
elusive?1 
In this thesis, I search for answers to these questions. I examine the performance of 
judicial reform in international development assistance in order to contribute to and 
improve the discourse. 
I will argue that judicial reform endeavours have yet to find their path and 
demonstrate success. This is due to two principal shortcomings. First, there is to date 
no cogent theory with which to justify its purpose. Second, there is a lack of any 
established consensus on how to evaluate success, stemming in part from the 
confusion over its purpose. To address these shortcomings, I will offer two 
propositions. First, the purpose of judicial reform should be to promote justice as 
fairness and equity. Second, the evidence of its success should be measured using 
the universally endorsed framework of international human rights law. 
This thesis focuses on judicial reform which is a distinct enterprise to assist the 
judicial arm of the state - being the courts, judges and related personnel - to 
adjudicate the law and administer justice. It will shortly be seen that 'judicial reform' is 
often associated - sometimes inseparably - with the more generic endeavour of 
'legal reform,' and is variously described as 'law and development,' 'rule of law' or 
'law and justice sector-wide reform'. It will further be seen that this concept is 
evolving, in terms of encompassing customary as much as formal dimensions, and is 
increasingly seen through a broader political economy lens. This term is therefore to 
some extent imprecise and its boundaries may be contested. Suffice for this 
introduction to highlight that the focus of this thesis is on those efforts which primarily 
focus on supporting the courts and the administration of justice by the state. 
The thesis will present three case studies from the emerging reform efforts in Asia to 
address the mounting criticism in the scholarly commentary on the disappointing 
performance and results of judicial reform over the past fifty years. This 
disappointment is variously attributed to many causes: among them, the absence of 
1 Note from my diary, 23 March 2004, Port Moresby, PNG; below, n 524. In this thesis, money is denoted in US 
dollars ($=USD) unless otherwise specified. 
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systematic accumulation of knowledge about what is needed and what works; 
confusion over stakeholder expectations; and the lack of any coherent theory for 
reform approach,. I will critique that commentary in the context of the reform 
experience in Asia which, with a population of some four billion people, contains 60% 
of the global population, but has received surprisingly little scholarly analysis to this 
point. While endorsing much of that commentary, I will show that the it is itself limited 
by substantial deficiencies in evaluating judicial reform. In effect, deficiencies in 
evaluation affect judgments on deficiencies in performance. 
This thesis will make a number of contributions to the discourse. I will combine an 
analysis of the philosophical justifications for reform with a critique of the available 
empirical evidence of what works in practice as a means of appraising the validity of 
those theories. By combining an analysis of the literatures of judicial reform and of 
development evaluation, I will offer new insights on the nature and causes of the 
perceived deficiencies in practice, and the means to address them. I will then 
contribute a body of original empirical evidence from three case studies on the Asian 
judicial reform experience with which to reappraise the existing academic 
commentary on global reform practice. Finally, on the basis of these contributions, I 
will propose refinements to the theory of this endeavour. 
This research began with my concern about the limited impact of my work as a 
judicial reform practitioner. I believe deeply in the importance of justice; this is my 
vocation. Over the years, however, I have found myself confronting growing doubts 
about the efficacy of most reform activities which seem to miss the injustices that 
have surrounded me in my daily practice. I have observed that p.eople in many 
developing countries in Asia routinely go without justice. In Port Moresby, Papua 
New Guinea, I worked with colleagues whose physical safety was threatened on a 
daily basis by extremely violent crime which regularly fell beyond the control of the 
justice system. In Multan, Pakistan, I encountered litigants whose grandparents' 
dispute remained entangled in the courts for 60 years. In Ramallah, on the West 
Bank, I worked with court staff so poorly paid that they openly procured commissions. 
In Panjshir, Afghanistan, I worked with judges untrained in even the basics of state 
law. In Phnom Penh, Cambodia, I worked with judges who knew that confronting the 
government for stealing land from customary owners had career-terminating 
consequences. In Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, I worked with courts unfamiliar with notions 
of enforcement of contract. In Dhaka, Bangladesh, I worked in court-houses without 
electricity or the wherewithal to keep any records. Justice cannot be administered 
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under these circumstances. While the courts are only one focal point for redressing 
such injustices, and many people in developing societies live in the traditional or 
customary domain beyond the remit of formal justice systems, they are nonetheless 
a key mechanism of the state to do so. Despite increasingly substantial quantities of 
development assistance, I found these problems often continued unabated. The best 
efforts of reform practitioners seemed to go awry; I found myself grappling with the 
question of how to be more effective. While philosophers and political scientists will 
continue to debate the nature of justice and the role of judicial reform, even a four-
year-old child will immediately recognise unfair treatment from its parents and know 
when justice is denied. Realigning my reform practice to this innate sense of knowing 
has impelled the research in this thesis which then embodies the ongoing heuristic 
journey to improve my work as a judicial reformer. 
Arguments - the roadmap 
In this opening chapter of this thesis, I will provide an overview of the arguments 
presented and a roadmap that describes the structure and content of the following 
chapters. 
The thesis is structured in three parts. Part 1, comprising of Chapters 2-5, addresses 
the issue of the purpose of judicial reform. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the 
history of judicial reform efforts over the past fifty years, commencing in Latin 
America in the 1960s with the work of USAID and later that of the World Bank. 
Chapter 3 undertakes an analysis of the nature of these reforms and the commentary 
on performance. Chapter 4 reviews the philosophic foundations for reform to 
examine its theoretical justifications. Chapter 5 then scrutinises the available 
economic evidence on the relationship between justice reform and development as a 
means of assessing the sufficiency of those justifications. 
Part 2, comprising of Chapters 6-7, refocuses analysis on the issue of evaluation. 
Chapter 6 examines the state of development evaluation generally. Chapter 7 
assesses the evaluation of judicial reform in particular for the purpose of drawing 
conclusions on the efficacy of those evaluative efforts. 
Part 3, comprising of Chapters 8-10, presents the empirical segment of the thesis, 
being the evidence from practice found in three case studies from the Asia Pacific 
reform experience. Chapter 8 focuses on the Asian Development Bank's (ADS's) 
3 
law and policy reform program between 1990 and 2007. Chapter 9 deals with 
AusAID's Papua New Guinea law and justice sector program between 2003 and 
2007. Chapter 1 0 reviews the experience of practitioners across the Asia Pacific 
region over the past decade. 
Finally in Chapter 11, I will conclude by gathering the major propositions established 
throughout the chapters and present the consolidated argument of this thesis. 
Reform purpose 
Part 1 of this thesis will establish a number of key propositions to support my 
overarching argument that the purpose of judicial reform should be realigned to 
promote justice which, at its essence, is the promotion of fairness and equity. 
Chapter 2 addresses the question 'What is judicial reform?' through an historical 
survey of the past fifty years which will establish that it has grown from modest 
beginnings to become an increasingly substantial but still exploratory enterprise. 
In that chapter, I will analyse the approaches of USAID and the World Bank which 
serve as exemplars of judicial reform in practice to identify the key features and 
issues of recent reform approaches. While these vary from donor to donor, this 
analysis will reveal that these reforms have acquired an orthodoxy which has 
predominantly focused on promoting 'thin' or procedural notions of reform - as 
distinct from the substantive or 'thick' aspects - which focus on improving the 
efficiency of the judicial function and the administration of justice within the formal 
sector of the state. From the outset, the foundational rationale has been firmly 
grounded in judicial reform providing a means to support economic growth. This 
economic rationale has cast judicial reform in an instrumental role to protect the 
institutions of property and contract as a means of promoting a neo-liberal economic 
model of growth. This instrumental rationale persists and has been variously 
conceptualised. More recently, the notion of promoting good governance through 
accountability has emerged in the political science discourse. The most recent 
rationales for reform aim to promote peace, security and civil empowerment. My 
analysis will establish that there has been a range of justifications for judicial reform 
with economic, political, social and humanistic renderings over this period. 
Sometimes these justifications are conflated and occasionally they compete. I will 
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establish that in this sense judicial reform is still evolving in a formative stage, and is 
yet to formulate a coherent justification or theory. 
In Chapter 3, I will extend the survey of reform experience through an analysis of the 
nature of reform activities. From this analysis, I will demonstrate that up to this point 
there has been a 'standard package' of activities most of which tend to support 'thin', 
efficiency-based improvements to the formal administration of justice, reflecting a 
broad homogeneity in reform approach. I will then move on to provide a synthesis of 
the academic commentary. Building in particular on the works of Trubek, Carothers, 
Jensen and Hammergren, I will reveal a mounting perception of disappointment in 
the performance of these reforms, which I will call the 'performance gap'. I use this 
commentary of disappointment as the hypothesis for this thesis - in effect, judicial 
reform has failed to this point. I will endorse much, but by no means all, of this 
commentary in my analysis in Parts 2 and 3, offering a number of explanations for 
this disappointment. I will not attempt to assess this disappointment many of whose 
causes are managerial and operational. Rather, I focus on and critique those aspects 
of the commentary which relate to the sufficiency of the theory or justification for 
these reforms. In this respect, the commentary finds that a lack of cogent theory has 
confounded judicial reform practice and it calls for a more knowledge-based 
approach. I will then identify the significance of this mounting disappointment as a 
driving force in refocusing reform efforts. There is some emerging evidence that 
judicial reform may now be undergoing a process of reinvention. This new wave of 
reinvention emphasises four themes: empowering the poor; convergence with the 
human rights discourse building on the works of Sen and Alston among others; legal 
pluralism and engagement in informal/customary justice; and a political economy 
approach which integrates justice as a moderating mechanism for competing 
interests. Collectively. I will argue that these overtures offer a potential to transform 
reform approach. 
In Chapter 4, I will focus on the theory of judicial reform. I will address the question 
'What is the purpose of judicial reform?' I will analyse the philosophical justifications 
for this enterprise through a study of classical, Enlightenment and modern 
philosophies. 2 This analysis is foundational in setting the stage for all that follows in 
this thesis. It illuminates the tensions in liberal concepts of the state and the role of 
2 This analysis considers in particular the foundational thinking of Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, 
Mill, Smith, Weber, Rawts, Hayek, North and Sen in the formation of contemporary liberal conceptions of the state, 
justice, constitutionalism and the social contract. 
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justice, and enables me to frame a number of debates which will determine the 
formulation of development policy and practice. 
Most significantly, this analysis will reveal the centrality of the social contract which 
binds the state to maximise the liberty of the individual in a reasoned trade-off for the 
common good. Equally significantly, it will identify justice as a core function -or public 
good - of the state in promoting the Aristotelian concept of the good life. Within this 
liberal conception, justice embodies fundamental notions of fairness and equity which 
have been long recognised as fundamental to civilised society. This idea of justice as 
fairness is not synonymous with equality. Justice as fairness is distinctive in building 
on notions of equity which have long been recognised as having a corrective 
distributional dimension, that is, restoring rights recognised in law which would 
otherwise go awry. Self-interest is also recognised within the liberal tradition as the 
engine of economic growth. This analysis will illuminate the preoccupation of the 
state in its regulatory relationship to the market, economic development and the 
alleviation of poverty. This preoccupation underpins the role of judicial reform in 
development. I will reveal deeply ingrained tensions within the liberal philosophic 
tradition between the collective and individual good, aggregate growth versus 
individual equity, and more particularly, the economic versus the humanistic goals of 
development. In addition, my analysis will position notions of the sovereignty of law, 
separation of powers and the independent function of courts as key precepts in 
political economy analysis. More particularly, constitutionalism will then be identified 
as a pivotal means of moderating the interests of the executive power of the state. It 
is with this understanding that I will then address the issue of defining the role of 
justice and clarifying the purpose of judicial reform. 
Closer analysis will reveal an unresolved quest for an overarching justification or 
theory for judicial reform. This analysis will expose the contest between an economic 
or political instrumentalist justification and a more recent human-centred constitutive 
justification. The prevailing economic or political theory is based largely on the 
thinking of Weber and North and constitutes the 'new institutional economics' model. 
This theory casts the state in the role of supporting the market by providing key 
institutions such as courts to secure property and contract which, according to this 
model, are necessary for investment-based economic growth, and to promote good 
governance. This theory is now being challenged for failing to sufficiently meet the 
needs of the poor by promoting equitable growth. Built on the thinking of Rawls, 
Dworkin and Sen, a more recent human-centred theory offers a rights-based 
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alternative that focuses on the constitutive importance of promoting justice as 
fairness and equity. This theory sees the role of development as providing capacity to 
the poor- people who have rights to freedom and opportunity. 
Central to this thesis, I will argue that there is a need for a paradigm shift in judicial 
reform. I will establish that the goal of development is the alleviation of poverty. 
Over the past thirty years, development has brought unprecedented aggregate 
economic growth, but this growth has been uneven. There has been a demonstrable 
increase in what is termed the 'equity gap'. I will establish that the instrumental theory 
of judicial reform serving economic or political purposes is insufficient, even 
dysfunctional, because it has been unable to create equitable growth. It is thereby 
deficient without the inclusion of the human, constitutive dimension of fairness and 
equity. In addition to being measured using financial metrics such as US$1 per day, 
poverty is measurable using an equitable or distributional dimension. To support this 
understanding of poverty alleviation, judicial reform should constitutively promote 
justice, not only economic growth or good governance. Justice must promote 
outcomes that are fair and equitable; as therefore must judicial reform. This vision 
and the prevailing economic or political justifications, such as they are, are not 
mutually exclusive. They can and indeed must coexist. The right to justice is 
universal. More particularly, as Sen argues, justice is constitutive to development. 
Economics cannot trump justice - though it is remarkable that this has been accepted 
in the discourse to this point - just as much as justice cannot trump economics. 
Finding the balance in this tension between utility and aggregate wellbeing on the 
one hand, and equity and individual wellbeing on the other is at the crux of my 
argument. To the extent that equitable growth may supersede aggregate growth as 
the current mantra of development, judicial reform is lagging behind the discourse. 
In Chapter 5, I will support the argument on the insufficiency of the prevailing 
economic and political theories for reform by demonstrating the fragility of their 
empirical justification. I will first analyse the relationship between development theory 
and practice to understand what is known about the determinants of growth and the 
role of justice and judicial reform. I will then critique the available evidence to show 
that it supports only some elements of the instrumentalist justifications for growth, 
and more significantly, is incomplete, qualified and on occasion contested by its own 
adherents. This lack of evidence creates the space- and, I will argue, the imperative 
- to refine judicial reform theory so that it centres on reforming justice constitutively 
by promoting fairness and equity. 
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The overarching argument of this chapter is that there is no consistent evidence that 
judicial reform has attained its stated goal of alleviating poverty. The global economy 
has grown. As many scholars such as Stiglitz, Sachs and Collier emphasise, there 
has been unprecedented economic growth in many countries in the developing 
world. But there is irrefutable evidence of a growing inequality gap which is 
particularly highlighted in the World Development Report of 2006. The rich have got 
richer, but the poor have either not got richer or they have got richer at a slower rate. 
Once the measurement of growth has been disaggregated, it is evident that the 
promotion of economic growth has failed to alleviate poverty. Indeed, it has had the 
perverse effect of exacerbating inequality. I therefore challenge the orthodoxy of 
development economics and the judicial reform policies which have supported it. 
I will pursue this argument by establishing that economic justifications for 
development policy do not rest on firm empirical foundations. Development 
economics is invariably incomplete, often ambiguous and increasingly internally 
contested. To support this argument, I scrutinise the researches of Dollar and Kraay, 
Knack and Keefer, Djankov, Feld and Voigt, La Porta, North, Rajan and Rodrik. 
Their work has been particularly influential in the formulation of the development 
policy of the World Bank and other major donors. Evidently, there has been extensive 
inquiry to advance understanding of the key relationships between aid, government, 
the institutions of justice and growth. This inquiry validates the existence of some 
significant relationships between justice, good governance and economic growth. 
But, equally, it reveals that many important issues remain contested, numerous gaps 
of knowledge persist, and the available evidence is often ambiguous. A range of 
significant relationships are apparent, but fundamental questions over the chain of 
causation remain unanswered and centrally problematic, with researchers arguing 
over its direction. While Kaufmann, for example, insists that good governance, as an 
institution, is a predeterminant of growth, many such as Arndt and Oman challenge 
the integrity of this claim. Chang presents a counter-argument and states that 
development causes good institutions. A great deal more research is required before 
we can understand the key determinants of the good life, and the role of judicial 
reform in promoting it. Additionally, there is a stark lack of any corresponding 
research into the equitable and distributive dimensions of justice as a determinant of 
wellbeing which is a missing dimension in the empirical inquiry of poverty alleviation. 
I conclude this analysis by observing that the state of our inquiry to this point is like 
torch-beams in the night; most of our view remains in the dark. There is a dearth of 
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research-based evidence to validate the prevailing - or any other - theoretical 
justification for judicial reform. 
Hence, in Part 1 of this thesis, I will establish that judicial reform has demonstrably 
failed to attain its stated economic goals. The evidence of the widening equity gap 
indicates the insufficiency of the prevailing instrumental economic justification for 
reform. This insufficiency creates the space and the need to realign the theory for 
judicial reform to promote justice, being fairness and equity. 
Evaluating endeavour 
In the second part of this thesis, I will argue that there are significant limitations in 
both the theory and practice of development evaluation. These limitations undermine 
judgments on the efficacy of judicial reform. Deficiencies in evaluation practice may 
confound the initial perception of disappointment mentioned in Part 1 of this thesis 
which serves as the hypothesis that the performance of judicial reform endeavour 
has failed. This finding is significant because it indicates that improving the means of 
evaluating judicial reform is a precondition to assessing its effectiveness. In effect, 
evaluating the effectiveness of judicial reform is dependent on first clarifying its goals 
and then devising a systematic means of appraising its attainment. 
In Chapter 6, I will examine the theory and practice of development evaluation at 
large to address the crucial question: 'Does aid work- how is this substantiated?' 
Finding an answer to this overarching question is necessary before refocusing 
analysis to appraise the performance of judicial reform in particular. Without an 
answer to this question, it will be impossible to establish whether the disappointment 
at the lack of results identified in the academic commentary is caused by a deficiency 
in performance due to shortcomings in development practice, or alternatively a 
deficiency in providing evidence of performance due to inadequacies in evaluative 
practice. 
In this chapter, I will examine closely the mounting global concerns about how 
development effectiveness can be improved. Over the past decade, these concerns 
have crystallised an international consensus on the imperative to reduce global 
poverty and demonstrate increased aid effectiveness, notably by attaining the 
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Millennium Development Goals.3 International assistance has entered a new era of 
managing-for-development-results (MfDR) which is reflected in the Paris Principles 
of Aid Effectiveness of 2005.4 To demonstrate aid effectiveness, the tools for 
monitoring and evaluation have been repositioned to the centre of the development 
stage. As a consequence, there has been substantial growth and refinement in 
approaches involving a shift in focus from monitoring the efficient delivery of 
assistance to evaluating impact and results. Development evaluation is now 
becoming professionalised by the OECD-DAC and is approaching a domain of 
standardised practice. 5 But, this practice is still in a transitional state and there is no 
established orthodoxy on how to evaluate development effectiveness. 
I will argue that this transition has profound implications for both the theory and 
practice of development evaluation, which is now highly fragmented in its approach. 
This is largely due to competing rationales of accountability and effectiveness. I will 
argue from an analysis of experience that this rift in evaluation theory is likely to be 
irreconcilable. There are also debates over the purpose and methodology of 
evaluation, sometimes termed a 'paradigm war'. This war is being waged between 
positivists who advocate a scientific approach and constructivists who advocate a 
pro-poor approach over how to answer the question: 'Does aid work?"' Obscuring 
ready answers to this question are a range of philosophical, conceptual and technical 
disjunctions. Notable among these is a formal recognition of the need to demonstrate 
impact. Impact evaluation is however rarely undertaken in practice because it is 
technically difficult, slow and often disproportionately expensive. There are also 
mounting misgivings that the new school of managerialism, or the MfDR approach, is 
. reductionist - asserting that if Activity A is done then Output B will result - and 
cannot guarantee improved effectiveness in evaluation. Fundamental questions in 
establishing causality and attribution remain endemic. I will conclude my critique of 
the current state of development evaluation by arguing that there is a marked 
discrepancy between the rhetorical postures of the Paris Declaration and the state of 
evaluation practice, or an 'evaluation gap'. This evaluation gap is causing confusion 
over the fundamental aspects of the purpose, approach and methodology of 
3 Unfted Nations Millennium Declaration, GA Res 55/2, UN GAOR, 55th Sess, Supp no. 49, U.N. Doc. A/55/49 (2000) 
<http:/Jwww.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm> at 4 December 2009; below, n 360. 
4 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability, 
2005, <http:/lwww.oecd.org/dataoecdf11/41/34428351.pdf> at 25 November 2009; below, n 353. 
5 Development Assistance Committee, Working Party on Aid Evaluation of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD-DAC); below. n 329. 
6 Below, n 396. The paradigm war describes a debate over how evaluation finds truth and contributes to knowledge. 
On the one hand, positivists advocate a highly formalised scientific approach, and are primarily concerned with 
methodological rigour, establishing the validity and reliability of data, adopt experimental methods and counterfactual 
measurements. On the other hand, constructivists are primarily concerned to hear the voice of stakeholders- notably 
the alienated poor - and use participatory methods. The former see the latter as imprecise and lazy; the latter see 
the former as costly, impractical and largely irrelevant. 
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evaluation. Unsurprisingly, this sometimes torrid state inhibits the evaluation of 
development effectiveness in general, and overshadows the formulation of any 
specific consensus in evaluating the performance of judicial reform. 
Chapter 7 will then sharpen the focus of analysis and examine the evaluation of 
judicial reform. In this chapter, I will address a key question of this thesis, 'Does 
judicial reform work?' by deconstructing the question into two components: 'What 
should we measure?' and 'How should we measure it?' By analysing current 
practice in judicial reform, I will establish that there are deficiencies in answering both 
of these questions. To redress them, I will build on my earlier analysis of the purpose 
of reform in Part 1 where I address the 'what' question by arguing that judicial reform 
should aim to improve justice and, at its essence, be concerned with promoting 
fairness and equity. In this chapter, I will argue that this purpose requires a 'thick' 
normative foundation. This foundation, which is to be found in the universally 
endorsed treaties of international human rights law - spanning political, civil, 
economic, social and cultural rights - will provide what I argue is the best available 
answer to the question of 'what' to measure. I will also argue that this foundation will 
in due course provide the means with which to design, implement, monitor and 
evaluate ongoing endeavour, using a combination of both 'thin' and 'thick' indicators 
to systematically answer the question of 'how' to measure effectiveness in a 
meaningful way. 
To reach this conclusion, I will critique the evaluation of judicial reform to argue that 
both judicial reform practice and evaluation are demonstrably deficient. I will 
demonstrate these deficiencies through an analysis of development evaluations 
which found that judicial reform has consistently generated disappointing results, as 
established in Part 1. This may be described as a 'performance gap' between what 
was intended and what was delivered. Next, I will establish through a review of 
judicial reform practice that evaluations are often conspicuous by their absence. This 
may be described as an 'evaluation gap'. Finally, I will establish through an analysis 
or meta-evaluation, of those evaluations which were conducted, that there are 
marked inadequacies in the evaluative method. This may be described as a 'meta-
evaluation gap'. I will deduce from my findings that the perception of the 
disappointing performance of judicial reform found in the literature is in fact muddied 
by the scarcity and limited quality of these evaluations. Hence, I will conclude that a 
deficiency in the evaluative effort has in no small measure affected the perceived 
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disappointment in performance, thereby qualifying the initial hypothesis that reform 
endeavour has failed. 
In order to reach these findings, I will conduct a survey of practice and show that 
there is still a lack of inter-disciplinary consensus over what to evaluate and how to 
evaluate it. This lack of consensus in evaluation method and approach will be 
showcased through a survey of the proliferation of performance monitoring. Over the 
past decade, considerable resources have been devoted by the international 
community of donors to compile the data necessary to monitor and evaluate the 
performance of judicial reform. Most frameworks monitor narrow aspects of judicial 
performance or institutional characteristics of good governance. A closer analysis of 
a selection of leading monitoring frameworks will show considerable diversity in 
purpose, focus, approach and methodology. The fact that each framework performs 
a distinctive function reflects the dispersion of theoretical justifications for existing 
reform efforts. These initiatives are characterised by: different conceptions of justice 
and judicial reform; considerable heterogeneity over what is being measured; an ever 
-expanding array of performance indicators; contention over data and collection 
methodologies; and an overall lack of harmonisation. 
In seeking to answer the 'what' question, these frameworks usually select 
performance indicators of 'thin', formalistic concepts of judicial efficiency or reform -
generally rates of court access, disposal and delay. At best, these measures are 
inferential of the qualitative dimensions of justice. Most monitoring effort generally 
omits 'thick' measures, or substantive dimensions of justice, such as fairness and 
equity, owing to a complex of conceptual, technical and practical difficulties. Of those 
surveyed, the Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative of the American Bar 
Association (ABA-CEELI) is among the oldest and most thorough, enabling tentative 
trend analyses of selective aspects of judicial performance. However, profound 
challenges continue to remain unresolved, which arise from fundamental questions 
about the adequacy, legitimacy and utility of highly reductive rating scales to infer 
meaningful judgments about improving judicial quality. Moreover, causal linkage 
between reform and performance is usually inferential at best. In seeking to answer 
the 'how' question, my analysis will reveal that many of these frameworks use 
qualitative methodologies which aggregate the perceptions of stakeholders. The 
existing practice predominantly relies on subjective appraisals of court performance 
collected from judges, court users, and representatives of civil society, business and 
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media. Triangulation of this subjective data with readily available objective data is 
only occasionally undertaken. 
This proliferation of performance monitoring reflects both the diversity of reform 
purposes and measuring methodologies which are to some extent irreducible due to 
the multi-disciplinary heritage of development endeavour. I will argue, however, that 
until some coherence and consensus are reached on the means of monitoring and 
evaluating judicial reform, judgments on its merit and worth will remain qualified. The 
explosion of frameworks has to date done little beyond substituting the earlier 
insufficiency of data with the new challenge of making sense out of an excess of 
confusing, conflicting and often irrelevant data. Despite the massive recent 
investment and the current proliferation of performance monitoring, lots of monitoring 
means lots of monitoring - without necessarily any assurance of improvements in 
performance. This does not suggest that these frameworks are useless, but rather 
that they are only one step in the ongoing and incomplete quest for evidence of 
success in judicial reform. In sum, I will conclude that we are as yet still unable to 
reliably evaluate or demonstrate effectiveness in judicial reform. 
In reaching this conclusion, I will establish that the evaluation of judicial reform 
performance is itself deficient. The deficient nature of evaluative effort unavoidably 
compromises the assessment of development performance. This is not to claim that 
judicial reform has performed disappointingly; rather it is to demonstrate that the 
perception of disappointment rests on a foundation of inadequate evaluation. I will 
criticise the evaluation of judicial reform on the basis that it is rarely conducted and, 
when it is, it usually lacks rigour. There is considerable technical contention over the 
adequacy and appropriateness of the existing evaluative practice in judicial reform. I 
will provide examples to show that donors continue to limit evaluation to mainly 
monitoring the delivery of outputs, which has recently been overlaid with 
strengthening monitoring capacity. To date, there has been no documented evidence 
of any systemic impact evaluation of judicial reform. More foundationally, I will 
establish that there is a lack of consensus over the theory and practice of the meta-
evaluation of judicial reform evaluation. This practice may be described as patchy, 
and underscores the unresolved state of the entire discourse on reforming 
development evaluation. I conclude that this constitutes an 'evaluation gap' in judicial 
reform. 
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This is a significant finding. It means that judicial reform and development evaluation 
must be attended to simultaneously in order to remedy the perceived poor 
performance of practice. I will propose a conceptual means of redressing this duality 
of deficits. But first the deficiencies in the performance of reform endeavour and that 
of evaluative endeavour must be resolved. To do this, there must be improvements 
in evaluative approach to address the 'how' question. The very first task, however, 
remains the clarification of 'what' judicial reform is required to do. For this reason, I 
will close this part of the thesis by resuming my argument from Part 1 to address the 
'what' question, viz. that judicial reform should aim to improve justice and, at its 
essence, be concerned with promoting fairness and equity. This will require a 'thick' 
normative foundation of rights - in addition to the existing 'thin' conception of reform 
- which is to be found in the universally endorsed treaties of international human 
rights law. While stressing that developing a definitive measurement approach to 
address the 'how' question remains a work in progress at this time, I will conclude 
that this normative framework provides a cogent foundation on which to design, 
implement, monitor and evaluate ongoing reforms. 
In sum, this part of my thesis will be devoted to demonstrating the existence of 
substantial deficiencies in the practice of development evaluation as it has been 
applied to judicial reform. On the basis of this analysis, I will demonstrate the 
existence of both an 'evaluation gap' and a 'meta-evaluation gap' in judicial reform -
i.e. evaluation is rarely conducted, and when it is, it is done inadequately. These 
findings are significant because they qualify the initial hypothesis of a 'performance 
gap' in judicial reform. 
Three case studies of practice 
In the third part of this thesis, I will address the question 'What does the evidence of 
practice tell us about the nature and effectiveness of judicial reform?' I will present 
three case studies of empirical evidence from across Asia and the Pacific during the 
past decade and a half. These case studies are central to the thesis as they provide 
new evidence from practice with which to appraise the academic commentary and 
improve reform endeavour. 
I will use a qualitative, documents-based, inductive case study methodology to 
present substantial bodies of experience which have gone largely unstudied in the 
academic discourse to date. Such an approach is the optimal means by which to 
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contribute empirically-grounded analyses and insights to the ongoing evolution of the 
theory for judicial reform. These case studies will contribute to the available 
knowledge-base and analyses of the judicial reform enterprise. They span the 
multilateral experience of the Asian Development Bank, the bilateral experience of 
Australia's aid agency in Papua New Guinea, and the varied experiences of a 
selection of reform practitioners from across the Asia Pacific region over the past 
decade. 
In this Part, I will contribute a professional narrative to my heuristic journey in this 
thesis. These case studies are drawn from my experience as a practitioner and 
evaluator of judicial reform projects to capture a diverse range of experiences and 
perspectives for the purpose of developing new propositions which have general 
application. I will marshal a body of evidence from contemporary practice in the Asia 
Pacific region and illustrate some distinct aspects of practice across a spectrum of 
issues which are directly relevant to addressing the core questions of this thesis. 
My own participation as a practitioner will weave through the analysis of the 
experiences which are showcased here. I will present a critically reflexive, 
ethnomethodological analysis, i.e. making sense of 'ordinary, routine details of 
everyday life', as defined by Patton to deal with this participatory dimension.7 I will 
outline and justify this participatory methodology, together with the specific 
circumstances of each case study, in Annex B. 8 For the reasons outlined in that 
annex, I will argue that this methodology maximises the ontological and 
epistemological integrity of the research, and its contribution to this thesis. This 
methodology will also enable me to interrogate the 'space' between the evaluand, 
viz. the object under evaluation and myself as evaluator, using my earlier 
professional work as counterfactuals in order to make evaluative judgments. 
In Chapter 8, I will analyse ADB's support of judicial reform during the period 1990-
2007 which was innovative, exploratory and to some extent an unmapped 
experience. I will demonstrate that ADB's championship of judicial reform has as a 
matter of dialectic been largely informal, driven by a conviction of the importance of 
reforming justice systems and, in this sense, a priori. This is reflected in the shifting 
articulation of the justification for judicial reform which has affected how the Bank 
formulated its approach to reform. As a result, it has been difficult for ADB to 
7 Patton M 2002, Qualffative Research and Evaluation Methods, 3rd edn, Sage, Thousand Oaks California, 110. 
8 I outline and justify the methodology for this case study approach in Annex B. 
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demonstrate success: an evaluation of this endeavour has been hampered by a 
continual changing in ADB's goals for judicial reform, which in turn has been 
compounded by an historic under-investment in evaluation. My analysis will reveal a 
mixed picture of the Bank's approach to development effectiveness. While these 
reforms have been generally appreciated by its member states, it will be documented 
that many projects have not been well designed: their objectives were unclear; 
development logic was at times confused; and monitoring frameworks were 
consistently inadequate. Moreover, there has not been any attempt to assess impact. 
As a result, it will be shown that ADB has been unable to demonstrate measurable 
impacts on its objectives in poverty alleviation, good governance or civil 
empowerment. In a recent evaluation of these activities, it was found that these 
weaknesses have made judicial reform under-competitive in the internal quest for 
funds. In sum, I will argue that ADB has made something of a leap of faith in terms of 
investing in judicial and related reforms over an extended period across Asia. 
In Chapter 9, I will present Papua New Guinea's law and justice sector program 
during the period 2003-2007. I will illustrate that AusAID's reform approach has 
undergone a process of continuing refinement in response to global and local 
disappointment in earlier development effectiveness. This process is significant in 
two respects: first, it shows a shift in the focus of reform approach from promoting 
'law and order' in what Sage and Woolcock have termed a 'top-down' approach,9 to 
adopting a more integrated approach to 'law and justice' which has placed more 
traditional notions of restorative justice at the heart in what may be termed a more 
'bottom-up' approach; second, it showcases the first steps in a transition from 
accountability-based monitoring of the efficient delivery of activities to an 
effectiveness-based paradigm of monitoring and evaluating for development impact 
and results. This involved establishing a dedicated monitoring and evaluation 
capacity which supported the building of a sector performance monitoring framework, 
and collecting baseline measures. Together, they provided the first evidence of 
positive crime trends and public confidence. After almost four years, however, 
AusAID remained unable to demonstrate any evidence of measurable impact in 
terms of attaining its stated goals of poverty alleviation and economic growth despite 
generating a proliferation of activities. While evidence of attribution or contribution 
remained elusive, I will argue that these initiatives nonetheless represent potentially 
9 Sage C and Woolcock M 2005, Breaking Legal Inequality Traps: New Approaches to Building Justice Systems for 
the Poor in Developing Countries, World Bank, 11 ; below n 85. 
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transformative steps in eventually establishing a capacity to demonstrate 
effectiveness. 
In Chapter 10, I will analyse the experience of practitioners across Asia and the 
Pacific and describe how judiciaries have responded variously to the need for judicial 
reform to improve the quality of justice over the past decade.10 This body of 
experience will provide empirical evidence of mixed successes in judicial reform most 
of which tended to be limited to efficiency-based procedural reform, such as in 
information technology innovation and delay reduction. It will also identify the 
existence of a number of challenges which are generic to judicial reform: refining 
goals; promoting more proactive leadership; involving the community; balancing 
independence with engagement; developing more sophisticated approaches to 
integrating training in change management approaches; and strengthening 
evaluation capacity in step with demonstrating improved results. As the contributions 
will demonstrate, confusion over goals, under-investment in data, operational 
fragmentation, and a focus on outputs rather than results were characteristic 
weaknesses across the region. 
Of equal significance is the evidence of the need for a normatively-based approach 
which focuses on improving justice in order to promote fairness and equity. An 
example from South-Asia shows some indications that judicial reform has on 
occasion applied a 'thick' conception of justice to address the distributive dimension 
of the equality gap. I will cite some specific cases in which the courts issued 
judgments against governmental actions which enforced citizens' rights to fresh 
water and air, a clean environment, education, shelter, health, free legal aid, and 
speedy trial, thereby measurably improving their wellbeing. 
Generalised findings and key empirical propositions 
From this body of case studied experience, I will argue that the evidence of practice 
establishes a number of generalised findings and key propositions. First, in all case 
studies, there is consistent evidence of the exploratory and evolving nature of the 
judicial reform enterprise in the Asia Pacific region. In particular, this experience 
identified eight characteristic themes or overarching challenges relating to reform 
10 This case study builds on the author's work in Annytage Land Metzner L (eds) Searching for Success in Judicial 
Reform: Voices from the Asia Pacific Experience, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2009. 
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goals, leadership, community, donors, independence, training and capacity-building, 
data and results which are showcased in the third case study .11 
Second, with the notable exception of the South-Asia experience, there is little 
evidence of any clear or overarching pro-poor focus despite increasing rhetoric on 
the goal of civic empowerment of the poor. Overall, the economic growth-based 
rationale for reform subsumed other goals, with judicial reform in the role of 
promoting efficiency and 'thin' procedural improvements to justice. There was also 
often a pronounced conflation of reform policy objectives as epitomised in the ADB 
experience. On occasion, there were conflicting goals, as evidenced in the PNG 
experience, which also illuminated the difficulties of highly bureaucratised 
development systems to engage with the informal sector in promoting restorative or 
customary justice. Overall, these case studies will demonstrate that there is an 
ongoing search for conceptual clarity in the purpose of or rationale for judicial reform, 
impelled by the conviction that it is important. Until the equivocation over the 
justification of judicial reform is resolved, it will not be possible to set clear goals, 
develop coherence in development logic, or set specific targets for performance and 
demonstrate results. As seen at the regional level, judicial reform will continue to 
under-perform in the competition for development resources. 
Third, there is a consistent pattern of evidence of some 'results' which are the 
outcomes of the activities in each case study. These include a broad range of policy 
development, judicial and related training, and organisational and efficiency 
improvements in courts (notably in delay reduction, technical publications and 
institutional reorganisation and new laws). This may give rise to some claims of 
'success', but this success is rare, difficult to substantiate, and tenuous at best in 
terms of attaining any of the stated goals of poverty alleviation, good governance or 
civil empowerment. 
Fourth, the capacity to undertake systematic measurement of the performance of 
reform is still embryonic, as illuminated in the potentially transformative PNG 
experience. When monitoring is extensively undertaken, the universal experience of 
practice confirms that it is invariably limited to auditing the efficiency of 
implementation rather than promoting effectiveness and improving results. 
Continuing under-investment in evaluation remains endemic. With the exception of 
the PNG experience, evaluating impact remains essentially a matter of rhetoric rather 
11 See detailed discussion below from page 266 onwards. 
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than action. Therefore, it is unlikely that we will see compelling evidence of success 
in the foreseeable future. The significance of this evidence is to highlight the time 
required to implement the universally endorsed commitments of the Paris Principles 
to improve aid effectiveness which includes not just evaluation but also 
improvements in aid coordination. In these respects, this qualified picture of both 
development performance and evaluation generally conforms to the global literature. 
Fifth, I will demonstrate through an ethnomethodological analysis of my own 
participation in this body of practice that the quest for value and significance in 
evaluation is affected by context and purpose. I will identify differences between my 
evaluation as a practitioner and my evaluation as a research student, using my 
earlier works in these case studies as counterfactuals. This will illuminate a critical, 
but rarely visible, discretionary space between the evaluand and evaluator. 
Judgments in this space can mean the difference between seeing the reform reality 
as being a 'glass half-full' or a 'glass half-empty'. Both perceptions may be legitimate; 
the difference being determined by context and purpose. The heuristic value of this 
analysis is to emphasise that value judgments are axiomatic to evaluation and 
irreducible in the complex challenge of assessing judicial reform. In effect, I find 
myself, like many commentators in the literature, conflicted in my a priori belief in the 
importance of justice reform, yet knowing that judicial reform should be contributing 
much more to development. 
Drawing these evidentiary threads together, I will argue that the continuing 
explorations of practice are linked to and driven by its patchy performance. The 
experimental nature of this enterprise is unavoidable. Indeed, under these 
circumstances it is desirable, provided it really is 'learning by doing'. Unfortunately, 
however, so long as the purpose of endeavour continues to disregard the evidence of 
patchy performance, these findings indicate a vicious cycle of dysfunctional practice 
where disappointing performance becomes embedded and even systematised. I will 
argue that this dysfunctional nature of performance has been caused by deficiencies 
in three related aspects of judicial reform, viz. deficiencies in development 
performance, development evaluation, and development justification. The first two 
deficits can be resolved at the managerial and technical levels. However, there 
remains an imperative to resolve the fundamental issue of development justification 
by re-examining the prevailing theory of the judicial reform enterprise. 
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Hence, the empirical evidence of these case studies will provide the foundation for 
my argument that it is premature to conclude that the judicial reform enterprise has 
failed. More particularly, I will argue that the available evidence establishes 
deficiencies in both the performance of reform endeavour and the evaluation of that 
endeavour, which are unlikely to be fully redressed for some years to come. But, 
most significantly, I will argue that these case studies provide the foundations upon 
which to build ongoing efforts to redress the major deficiencies identified in this 
thesis. 
Conclusions 
In sum, there are a range of unresolved philosophical, conceptual and technical 
challenges in judicial reform. I will establish, from a survey of the literature and an 
analysis of practice, that there is evidence that both the performance of judicial 
reform and development evaluation are insufficient. Despite massive ongoing 
investment in both judicial reform and evaluative endeavours, we remain unable to 
demonstrate success. The need to address my two key questions, 'what' should be 
the purpose of judicial reform, and 'how' should success be measured, lie at the 
heart of this thesis. 
Finally, in Chapter 11, I will consolidate my arguments which address the deficiencies 
in the judicial reform enterprise. In answering the 'what' question, I will define the 
purpose of judicial reform as being to promote justice as fairness and equity. This 
requires the inclusion of a human-centred, rights-based approach to improving justice 
constitutively. This supplements the deficiency in the prevailing instrumental 
approach to judicial reform with a more 'thick' conception, and provides the poor with 
a means to exercise their substantive rights. This new theory of judicial reform builds 
on the nascent but significant experience emerging from Asia where, as will be 
shown in Part 3, there is some emerging evidence of a potential paradigm shift to a 
rights-based approach of promoting 'thick' aspects of justice. In answering the 'how' 
question, I will consolidate the complementary argument that the evaluation of 
judicial reform can only be undertaken by reference to the universally endorsed 
framework of international human rights law which embodies civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights. While the design of a systematic means to evaluate judicial 
reform remains a work in progress, this normative framework will provide the 
coherence to transform the insufficiency of existing practice and demonstrate 
success. 
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This argument realigns judicial reform to the immanence of justice and the quest to 
promote fairness which has been recognised as elemental to human society since 
Aristotle: 
Man, when perfected, is the best of animals; but if he is isolated from law 
and justice he is the worst of all . . . . Justice which is his salvation belongs 
to the polis; for justice, which is the determination of what is just, is an 
ordering of the political association.12 
Justice and equity are neither absolutely identical nor generically different. 
.... This is the essential nature of equity; it is a rectification of law in so far 
as law is defective on account of its generality .... It is now clear what 
equity is, and that it is just, and superior to one kind of justice.13 
* * * 
12 Aristotle, Politics, Barker, E (ed), 1958, Oxford University Press, London, (1253 a 15), 7. 
13 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Thomson, J (transl), 1955 (Revised 2004), Penguin, London,(1137a- 35) and (1137 
b 25-35), 141. 
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PART 1 -JUDICIAL REFORM ENTERPRISE 
Introduction to Part 1 
In this opening part of the thesis, I will establish a number of key propositions to 
support my overarching argument that the purpose for judicial reform should be 
realigned to promote justice which I will argue has at its essence the promotion of 
fairness and equity. 
After reviewing the history and analysing critical commentary on the subject, I will 
demonstrate that over the past fifty years judicial reform in international development 
assistance has been on a trajectory towards formulating a coherent theory or 
justification. Through this period this theory has variously emphasised economic, 
political, social and most recently human justifications, indicating that the journey of 
judicial reform is dynamic, evolving and still undergoing formation. In this thesis, I will 
argue that some coherence is emerging out of this evolution, but that this process is 
ongoing, characteristically spurred by perceptions of disappointment in the 
performance of reform endeavour. At the same time, it will be seen that the practice 
of judicial reform has been largely homogenous, and that these dimensions or goals 
are often conflated, sometimes confused and on occasion in conflict. More detailed 
analysis of a wide range of judicial reform experiences during this period indicates 
that its overarching justification has been to promote economic growth. Additionally, I 
will show from an analysis of the literature that this prevailing economic justification 
or theory has caste judicial reform in a 'thin' instrumental role, principally to protect 
the institutions of property and contract. 
A core argument in this part of the thesis, which will be established in Chapter 5, is 
that the prevailing economic justification for judicial reform has been insufficient. 
While the growth of the global economy is indisputable during this period, there is 
troubling evidence of endemic or entrenched poverty and, more particularly, a 
widening 'equity gap'. In effect, while there have been unprecedented levels of 
global economic growth over recent years, this growth has been uneven and 
inequitable. The global economy has grown but, in the process, the rich have got 
richer but the poor have either not got richer at all, or they have got richer at a slower 
rate. The inequity gap is growing. In this critical sense, development economics, and 
the policies which rest on it, is heavily contested even within its own ranks and has 
engaged under-effectively in the crucial dimension of social equity. 
22 
In view of this disappointing global state of affairs, I will argue that there is no 
evidence that judicial reform has attained its stated goal of poverty alleviation and 
only patchy empirical evidence to validate the prevailing reform approach. This lack 
of evidence of success is impelling the ongoing evolution of approach. It justifies the 
reframing of judicial reform from its mainly instrumental role in supporting economical 
growth to a more constitutive theory which centres on notions of justice, equity and 
distribution. It also provides a humanistic dimension to this theory. Analysis of the 
available literature reveals that there is now mounting evidence of an emerging 
alternative theory which focuses on the 'thick', equitable and distributive role of 
justice itself. The nature of this theory is still undergoing formation and it is too early 
to claim that any consensus exists on the integration of a justice-centred or rights-
based dimension to judicial reform. Most recently, however there has also been 
greater recognition of the complexity and multidisciplinary nature of judicial reform. 
As a result, judicial reform requires an increasingly integrated political economy 
perspective of endeavour, and the formulation of a more cogent integrated theory of 
law, political science and economics. 14 
Thus, the process of theory-building is ongoing. Within this dynamic context, I will 
argue that the immediate challenge in judicial reform is to integrate equity and the 
redistribution of interests embodied in rights in its theory. These two concepts have 
always been at the core of justice, but have so far eluded the neoclassical economic 
focus on efficiency and aggregate growth. The theory of judicial reform is starting to 
acknowledge that while justice provides the means of moderating the distribution of 
power, that power is held by the state. The evidence of practice shows that judicial 
reform is only now starting to grapple with the challenge of facilitating a more 
equitable distributive function, which by axiom affects the state's power and the 
interests of power-holders. In effect, justice provides a means of moderating the 
distribution of power, and judicial reform must in due course confront this dimension 
of its potential. Finally, I will argue in the next part of this thesis that both the 
theoretical and practical solution to this conundrum can only be found in the 
integration of a normative concept of judicial reform which is universally endorsed in 
the precepts of international human rights law. 
14 Political economy is defined here to generally describe the interdisciplinary study of economics, law, and political 
science in explaining how political institutions, the political environment, and the economic system influence each 
other; see detailed discussion in chapter 3, viz. below, n 151. 
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CHAPTER 2- HISTORY AND CONTEXT 
1 Introduction to Chapter 2 
In this chapter, I will introduce and address the question, 'What is judicial reform?' 
through a survey of its history over the past fifty years. I will establish that judicial 
reform is a recent, substantial, heterogeneous and iteratively evolving endeavour. 
This analysis will provide the context for the overarching arguments of this thesis. As 
a part of this survey, I will showcase two approaches in particular for the purpose of 
identifying key features and issues from recent and current endeavours in judicial 
reform. My discussion will identify some significant aspects of these approaches 
which are influential, if not characteristic of, development endeavour, and lead to a 
more detailed analysis and critique of those issues in the following chapters. 
2 Context and history 
In this thesis, I will treat judicial reform as a distinct endeavour which focuses on the 
central task of assisting the judicial arm of government - the courts, judges and 
related personnel- to adjudicate the law and administer justice. It will shortly be seen 
that 'judicial reform' in practice is often associated, sometimes inseparably, with the 
more generic endeavour of 'legal reform', sometimes described as 'law and 
development', or 'the rule of law', or 'law and justice sector-wide reform'. These terms 
are to some extent imprecise and may be contested in their meaning, scope and 
function. Suffice at this point to highlight that the focus of this thesis is on those 
endeavours which primarily involve the courts and the administration of justice, rather 
than the broader domain of law and justice. 
In this opening section, I will provide a brief review of the history of judicial reform in 
international development assistance since World War II. This history starts after 
post-war reconstruction, and spans the post-colonial period of state-building, the 
thaw of the Cold War bringing democracy, and the 'Washington Consensus' era of 
free markets and structural adjustment, up to the current period of globalisation.15 
This is a period of significant change in world politics and economic development, 
which saw massive increases in judicial assistance as a niche in international 
development assistance. 
15 See discussion of the 'Washington Consensus', n 37. 
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This history illuminates patterns of crisis, fragility, growth and stability which provide 
some explanation about what drives judicial reform in its different renderings. History 
explains these renderings as seeking to make sense of what works, in terms of policy 
making, and interpreting the past as a means of informing the future. As we will see, 
an appreciation of the historical context and its contribution to the allocation of power 
and interests are increasingly informing the political economy analysis. Throughout 
this period, the global political economy- the early 1980s debt crisis, the 1992 end of 
the Cold War and the mid-late 1990s global economic crises, and most recently the 
events of '9/11'- provided the context for a huge sense of uncertainty, instability and 
most importantly 'threat' to the global-US economic order. We will see that the 
promotion of the 'rule of law' appeared as part of a suite of actions designed to instil 
a sense of certainty, not just in contract, but at the highest levels of global 
policymaking. In a sense, this reform was largely US-hegemonic in its overarching 
liberal orientation. I will demonstrate, within this orientation, that there is a tension 
and an ongoing process of adjustment between the collective interest of aggregate 
growth and the individual interest of equitable rights which is yet to find its balance. 
History reveals a number of iterations or trends in judicial reform approaches, and 
explains what happened and why. This historical perspective then provides a 
framework for showcasing the work of two major development agencies, viz. USAID 
and the World Bank, as exemplars in judicial reform. Each is among the largest and 
longest operating bilateral and multilateral agencies in judicial reform. This section of 
the chapter will reveal issues which are symptomatic of this enterprise for ongoing 
analysis.16 
Over the past fifty years, judicial reform has grown steadily and substantially from 
modest beginnings. While it is difficult to provide a comprehensive inventory of the 
size of judicial reform activities, some indications are illuminating. Carothers 
describes this assistance as having 'mushroomed' in recent years, becoming a major 
category of international aid. 17 Hammergren notes that court assistance in Latin 
America in the 1960s was valued in hundreds of thousands of dollars, typically 
climbing to around $5 million by the mid-1990s.18 Biebesheimer reports that by 2001, 
16 This thesis seeks to address the key issues which are most germane to judicial reform without attempting to 
catalogue all of the work of donors because of the sheer volume and ever-expanding nature of that endeavour. This 
approach to USAID and the World Bank is indicative, not exhaustive. Selective reference will be made to other donor 
entities, such as OECD and donors including UNDP, ADB. USAID, DfiD and AusAID, as appropriate. 
17 Carothers, T 2006, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge, Carnegie Endowment For 
International Peace, Washington D.C., 10. 
18 Hammergren, l 2006, ~Latin American Experience with Rule of Law Reforms and its Applicability to Nation Building 
Efforts", Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law vol. 38, pp. 63-93; see also: World Bank 2002, Legal 
and Judicial Reform: Observations, Experiences and Approach of the Legal Vice Presidency, World Bank, 
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the Inter-American Development Bank had conducted some 80 projects in 21 Latin 
American countries, valued at about $461 million; and during the 1990s, it is 
estimated that almost $1 billion was spent in Latin America by the World Bank, the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP). 19 Between 1990 and 2001, the World Bank spent $10.8 billion in 
twenty-one European and Central-Asian countries on legal and judicial reform 
projects; during the same period, USAID spent a further $216 million in 'rule of law' 
assistance in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.20 Since the 
mid-1990s, justice sector reform in sub-Saharan Africa increased seven times in a 
decade.21 In Papua New Guinea, judicial and legal reform rose more than tenfold in 
the decade to early 2000s.22 By 2005, Danino estimated that the World Bank was 
involved in 1,300 justice sector activities and developed 30 loans exclusively 
dedicated to support judicial reform activities and the 'rule of law'.23 In 2006, the 
Bank's worldwide lending for law and justice and public administration was reported 
to have almost doubled from $3.9 billion to $5.9 billion,24 and thematic lending for 
'rule of law' projects rose from $410 million to $757 million.25 A single justice program 
loan on which I worked in Pakistan was valued at $350 million.26 
On any measure, the growth of judicial reform has been recent, rapid and substantial 
-in aggregate, perhaps one hundred-fold in the matter of just one decade or two. 
Washington D.C. eg,: 34 and 55; and Messick, R 2002, 'Judicial Reform: The Why, the What and the How', Paper 
delivered at the Conference on Strategies for Modernizing the Judicial Sector in the Arab World March 15-17, 
Marrakech, Morocco. 
19 DeShazo, P & Vargas, J 2006, 'Judicial Reform in Latin America: An Assessment', Policy Papers on the Americas, 
Volume XVII, Study 2, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., 1. Also: Biebersheimer, C & 
Payne M, Inter-American Development Bank Experience in Justice Reform: Lessons Learned and Elements for 
Policy Formulation, IADB 2001, DC, 3. See also: Bhansali L & Biebesheimer C, "Measuring the Impact of Criminal 
Justice Reform in Latin America," in Carothers T, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: in search of knowledge, 
Carnegie, Washington DC, 2006, 301-323, 303; and Biebersheimer C, Inter-American Development Bank 
Experience in Justice Reform, IADB 2001, DC. 
20 Gupta P, Kleinfeld, R, & Salinas, G 2002, Legal and Judicial Reform in Europe and Central Asia, World Bank, 
Washington D.C; below n 502, 1. See also: United States General Accounting Office (GAO) 2001, 'Former Soviet 
Union: U.S. Rule of Law Assistance Has Had Limited Impact', Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO, 
Washington D.C., 9. 
21 Piron, H 2005, 'Donor Assistance to Justice Sector Reform in Africa: Living up to the new agenda?' Justice 
Initiative, February, Open Society, New York, pp. 4-11,4. 
22 See Chapter 9, below, n 660. 
23 Datiino, R 2005, 'Opening remarks', Delivered at the Workshop on Legal Convergence and Development, Place de 
Droit, Paris, November 15, 5. 
24 World Bank 2006, Annual Report 2006, World Bank, Washington D.C, cited in Harris, V 2007, 'Consolidating 
ideology in law? Legal and judicial reform programmes at the World Bank', Bretton Woods Project, 
<http://www.brettonwoodsproject.orglarticle.shtml?cmdl126l=i-126-31 a143203d1 a6653198cba82eb 7 469ee> 
26 November 2009. 
"World Bank 2006, Annual Report 2006. World Bank. Washington D.C. 57. 
26 ADB 2001, Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Loan to the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Access to Justice Program, ADB Manila. (Program loans 1897/98-PAK for $330 
million, and TA Loan 1899-PAK for $20 million; below, n 599. 
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a Five waves or three moments 
During the past fifty years, the nature of these reforms has evolved. While there are 
discernible differences in the various reform endeavours, I argue that there is an 
overarching continuity of approach in the packaging of reform activities which is on 
an evolving trajectory. 
The commentary on this evolution varies. Jensen, for example, describes its history 
in five waves. He sees the first wave in the context of post-World War II 
reconstruction, driven by modernisation theory and aimed at making public 
institutions work more effectively. The second wave was the law-and-development 
movement which exported American legal institutions and curricula mainly to Latin 
America that reached its peak in the late 1960s, before being heavily critiqued by 
Trubek and Galanter, and Merryman.27 The third wave rose in the 1980s when 
USAID's programs promoted democracy through legal development, judicial 
independence and respect for civil and criminal law. This was succeeded in the early 
1990s by the fourth wave of the post-Cold War renaissance. At this time, the 'rule of 
law' movement became a key element of the 'Washington Consensus' approach to 
social, economic and political change, addressing competing pressures for 
democratisation, globalisation, privatisation, urbanisation and decentralisation. The 
fifth wave then rose in the late 1990s and centred on poverty-focused judicial reform 
programs which included human rights agendas such as social and economic 
rights.28 
This categorisation is to be contrasted with the more cryptic. but arguably more 
illuminating analysis of Trubek and Santos who discern three iterations or, in their 
words, moments. Their first moment emerged in the 1950-60s when development 
policy focused on strengthening the role of the state in managing the economy, and 
law was seen as an instrument for effective state intervention in the economy. In the 
second moment in the 1980s, law moved to the centre of development policy, 
influenced by neo-liberal ideas which stressed the primary role of markets in 
economic growth, and in limiting the power of the state. They then discern a third 
27 See, in particular: Trubek, D & Galanter, M 1974, 'Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis 
in Law and Development Studies in the United States', Wisconsin Law Review, no. 4, pp.1062-1102; Trubek, 0 1996, 
'Law and Development: Then and Now', American Society of International Law Proceedings, Vol. 90, 223-226. 
Trubek, D, 2003, 'The ~Rule of Law" in Development Assistance: Past, Present, and Future', paper, 
htto://www.law.wisc.edu/facstaff/trubek/Ruleoflaw.pdf, at February 2010. See also: Merryman, J 1977, 
'Comparative law and Social Change, American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 25, pp. 457-491. 
28 Jensen, E 2003, 'The Rule of Law and Judicial Reform: The Political Economy of Diverse Institutional Patterns and 
Reformers' Responses' in Jensen, E & Heller T (eds), Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the 
Rule of Law, Stanford University Press, California pp. 336·381, 345 onwards. 
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moment which is still in a formative phase, and contains a mix of policy ideas, e.g. 
that markets can fail, and require compensatory intervention by the state, and that 
development means more than just economic growth and must be redefined to 
include human freedom. 29 The role of judicial and legal reform shifted profoundly 
during this period within the changing political and economic context of development 
and an evolving vision of the role of the state in supporting the market.30 This 
emerging literature of course contains the voices of many others who view the history 
through different lenses. 31 
I will argue throughout this thesis that the critical focus of analysis should remain on 
the central development policy concept of the state, and its role and relationship with 
the market and the individual. As we will shortly see, illuminating this relationship and 
the manner in which it is managed will provide the critical coordinates for tracking the 
trajectory of judicial reform endeavours and its likely future direction. Closer analysis 
of the reform work of USAID, and later the World Bank, in Latin America from the 
1960s until the present, establishes this argument. 
b Early days: USAID's law and development 
Judicial reform has long been an artefact of empire. Transplantation - the reform of 
the laws and justice systems of one country by another - remains visible in the 
enduring influence of Romanic law throughout Europe, as much as Sharia law across 
the Middle-East, and most recently, British, French and Spanish laws across the 
post-colonial world.32 
For the purpose of this thesis, the current history of judicial reform commenced with 
American assistance to Latin American reform in the 'Law and Development' 
movement of the 1960s.33 This assistance was initially provided on a bilateral basis 
by the United States development agency, USAID, to numerous Latin American 
states struggling with problems of political and economic instability during this period. 
This political economy context was important in framing the objectives of the 'Law 
and Development' movement within which judicial reforms were delivered. After 
29 Trubek, 0 & Santos, A 2006, The New Law and Economic Development: a critical appraisal, Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 7. 
30 Ibid. 
31 See, eg, Mcinerney, T 2006, Searching tor Success: Narrative accounts of legal reform in developing and transition 
countries, International Development Law Organisation, Rome, 12. 
32 Judicial and legal reform have more lengthy antecedents, of which some from the colonial era are the subject of 
empirical analysis in the context of the discourse on transplantation and the legal origins debate, below from n 283. 
33 See: Blair, H & Hansen, G 1994, Weighing in on the Scales of Justice: Strategic Approaches for Donor-Supported 
Rule of Law Programs, USAID Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 7, USAID, Washington D.C.; 
Trubeck, D. & Galanter, M, above, n 27. 
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some years, two multilateral agencies, the Inter-American Bank and the World Bank, 
joined this enterprise. 
While this broader assistance was primarily economic and political, Garcia observes 
that the courts throughout the region were chronically needy and became a focus of 
American aid. He attributes the particularly demeaning state of these judiciaries back 
to the 15th century Spanish crown and the colonial institutions set up in its Indies 
territories to minimise competition with the centralised executive authority of the 
state.34 
A defining feature of this initial 'Law and Development' phase was the exporting of 
American legal academics to teach in law schools in Latin America, and the provision 
of scholarships for law students and lawyers to train in the United States: 
The guiding assumption of the law and development movement was that law 
is central to the development process. A related belief was that law was an 
instrument that could be used to reform society and that lawyers and judges 
could serve as social engineers. 35 
The primary goal of 'Law and Development' was, according to Trubek, to transform 
legal culture through legal education and the transplantation of select 'modern' laws 
and institutions, with an emphasis on economic or commercial law and the training of 
pragmatic business lawyers. He saw the movement as having rested on four pillars, 
all of which subsequently crumbled. These pillars were a cultural reform and 
transplantation strategy; an ad hoc approach to reform based on simplistic theoretical 
assumptions; faith in spill-overs from the economy to democracy and human rights; 
and a development strategy that stressed state-led import substitution.36 Trubek's 
potent critique of USAID's hegemonic approach was influential in causing the 
movement to wane for some years. 
c Structural adjustment, the 'Washington Consensus' and poverty 
reduction 
In the ever shifting political economy of the Latin American debt crisis, judicial reform 
was repackaged in the 1980s as a part of larger programs of legal reforms, usually 
34 Garcia, F 1998, 'The Nature of Judicial Reform in Latin America and Some Strategic Considerations', American 
University International Law Review, vol. 13, pp. 1267-1324. 
35 Messick, R 1999, 'Judicial Reform and Economic Development: a survey of the issues,' The World Bank Research 
Observer, vol.14, no.1, pp.117-136, 125. 
36 Trubek & Galanter, above n 27; see also Merryman, above n 27. 
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as a component of what became termed 'structural adjustment'. This described the 
fiscal and monetary policy changes which were implemented by the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank to provide assistance to developing countries 
and promoted state disengagement from the economy. These policy changes were 
conditions, or conditionalities, for financial assistance to ensure that the money would 
be spent in designated ways with a view to reducing the country's fiscal imbalances. 
In general, these loans promoted 'free market' programs aimed at reducing poverty 
by promoting economic growth, generating income, and paying off debt. 
As the years passed, there was mounting disillusionment at the lack of visible 
success of the 'structural adjustment' conditionality which, in due course, was 
reframed in the early 1990s and emerged as what has become known as the 
'Washington Consensus'. a term which is attributed to Williamson. It connotes a 
development approach based on a range of nee-liberal 'free market' policies of 
privatisation, fiscal rectitude and deregulation. These policies were intrinsically 
hegemonic, being promoted by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and 
the US Treasury at that time.37 The language of 'structural adjustment' evolved into a 
new discourse of poverty reduction which increasingly became the 'raison d'etre' of 
development, notably after the 'Asian Financial Crisis' of 1997/8.38 Developing 
countries were now encouraged to draw up poverty reduction strategy papers which 
were intended to increase local participation and greater ownership. A number of 
commentators, such as Porter, argue that the poverty reduction discourse of the 
1990s was little more than the earlier 'structural adjustment' in drag, referring to its 
lack of results and its top-down exclusion of participation which had caused it to be 
discredited.39 
These decades marked an extended period of resumed support for legal and judicial 
reform. This support extended the focus from the criminal courts in Latin America to 
the stimulation and liberalisation of economies, notably to the transitional economies 
of the former Soviet Bloc countries in the 1990s. From this time, judicial reform also 
spread to the Asia Pacific region, from where I will present three case studies in Part 
3 of this thesis. 
37 Williamson J, 1990, 'What Washington means by policy reform,' in J. Williamson, Latin American adjustment: how 
much has happened (pp. 5-20). Washington DC: Institute of International Economics, 5-20, (updated 2002). 
<http:l/74.125.155.132/scholar?q=~che:M 
l4nxaEwJ:scholar.aooal 
See discussion below. n 54 and onwards. 
39 Craig, 0 & Porter, D 2006, Development Beyond Neoliberalism: Governance, Poverty Reduction and Political 
Economy, Routledge, Oxford, 5 and 63-94. 
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d 'Rule of law' revival and democracy 
During this same period, my analysis of the history of USAID's approach to judicial 
reform indicates that it was served as an appetiser of supporting efficiency-based 
improvements in the criminal courts and judicial independence within a broader menu 
of securing the state's function of good order and economic development. 
Significantly, this approach rests on particular notions of the 'rule of law', and is 
associated with promoting democratic notions of good government. 
The United States resumed its engagement in judicial and legal reform in 1981 in El 
Salvador to help the democratic government prosecute human rights abuses in what 
was at the time portrayed as a shocked response to the murder of three American 
nuns. This political economy context explains why USAID assistance sought to 
advance democratic development by exposing human rights violations, increasing 
access to justice, strengthening justice sector institutions and decreasing impunity. 
According to Hammergren, this was due in part to the political, social and economic 
conditions of the region, and in part to the chronically debilitated state of judiciaries 
across the region which she called the 'Cinderella' institutions of government.40 This 
second wave of justice reform then 'spread like wild fire' across Latin America, 
according to Biebersheimer, usually centring on criminal justice reform linked to 
democratic institutions as much as to economic enhancement programs in the 
region. 41 
The mantra of consolidating judicial independence became a key focal point of 
USA I D assistance at this time as it 'lies at the heart of a well-functioning judiciary and 
is the cornerstone of a democratic, market-based society, based on the 'rule of law': 
If a judiciary cannot be relied upon to decide cases impartially, according to 
the law, and not based on external pressures and influences, its role is 
distorted and public confidence in government is undermined. In 
democratic, market-based societies, independent and impartial judiciaries 
contribute to the equitable and stable balance of power within the 
government. They protect individual rights and preserve the security of 
person and property. They resolve commercial disputes in a predictable 
and transparent fashion that encourages fair competition and economic 
40 Hammergren, l 2003, 'International Assistance to Latin American Justice Programs: Towards an Agenda for 
Reforming the Reformers' in Jensen, E & Heller T (eds}, Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the 
Rule of Law, Stanford University Press, California, pp. 290-335; see also Hammergren, L, above n 18. 
41 Bhansali, L & Biebesheimer, C 2006, 'Measuring the Impact of Criminal Justice Reform in Latin America', in 
Carothers T (ed), Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: in search of knowledge, Carnegie Endowment For International 
Peace, Washington D.C., pp. 301-323, 306. See also: Hendrix, S 2002-2003, 'USAID Promoting Democracy and the 
Rule of Law in Latin America and the Caribbean', Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas, vol. 49, 
pp. 277·320. 
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growth. They are key to countering public and private corruption, reducing 
political manipulation, and increasing public confidence in the integrity of 
government. 42 
In a related move, USAID developed an anti-corruption approach as a part of its 
broader governance strategies which focused on strengthening the capacity of the 
courts to serve as accountability mechanisms as well as to strengthen judicial 
integrity itself. This approach addressed three focal points: institutional attributes 
which encourage and allow opportunities for corruption; accountabilities which 
reduce the cost of corrupt behaviour; and perverse incentives in government 
employment which induce self-serving rather than public-serving behaviour. USAID 
defined corruption as: 
[t]he abuse of public office for private gain .... Corruption poses a serious 
development challenge. In the political realm, it undermines democracy and 
good governance by subverting formal processes.... Corruption also 
undermines economic development by generating considerable distortions 
and inefficiency .... and generates economic distortions in the public sector 
by diverting public investment away from education and into capital projects 
where bribes and kickbacks are more plentiful. ... These distortions deter 
investment and reduce economic growth.43 
In the 1990s, USAID then expanded its support for judicial and legal reform into the 
post-Soviet transitional economies of Europe in what has become termed the 'rule of 
law revival'. 44 Carothers argues that this phase rested on the orthodoxy of two 
controlling axioms: that the 'rule of law' is necessary for economic development and 
necessary for democracy.45 To establish this proposition, he defines the 'rule of law' 
as: 
a system in which the laws are public knowledge, and clear in meaning, and 
apply equally to everyone. They enshrine and uphold the political and civil 
liberties that have gained status as universal human rights over the past half 
century. In particular, anyone accused of a crime has the right to a fair, 
prompt hearing and is presumed innocent until proved guilty. The central 
institutions of the legal system, including courts, prosecutors and police, are 
reasonably fair, competent and efficient. Judges are impartial and 
independent, not subject to political influence or manipulation. Perhaps most 
important, the government is embedded in a comprehensive legal framework, 
42 USAID 2002, Guidance for Promoting Judicial Independence and Impartiality (Revised edn) USAID, Office of 
Democracy and Governance, Washington D.C., 6. 
43 USAID 1999, Handbook on Fighting Corruption, USAID, Office of Democracy and Governance, Washington D.C., 
5. 
44 Carothers, above n 17, 7. 
45 Carothers, T 2003, 'Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: The Problem of Knowledge', working paper no. 34, 
Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 6. 
32 
its officials accept that the law will be applied to their own conduct, and the 
government seeks to be law abiding.'6 
Carothers describes this relationship between development of the 'rule of law' and 
liberal democracy as being profound: 
The rule of law makes possible individual rights which are at the core of 
democracy. A government's respect for the sovereign authority of the people 
and a constitution depends on its acceptance of law. Democracy includes 
institutions and processes that, although beyond the immediate domain of the 
legal system, are rooted in it. Basic elements of a modern market economy, 
such as property rights and contracts are founded on the law and require 
competent third party enforcement. Without the rule of law, major economic 
institutions, such as corporations, banks and labour unions, would not 
function, and the government's many involvements in the economy -
regulatory mechanisms, tax systems, customs structures, monetary policy 
and the like- would be unfair inefficient and opaque.47 
For Carothers, this promise to remove the chief obstacles on the path to democracy 
and market economics during an era marked by massive transitions in the global 
political economy explains why Western policy-makers have seized on the 'rule of 
law' as an 'elixir' for countries in transition.48 
e But what is the 'rule of law' orthodoxy- a blind man's elephant? 
Despite the centrality of this concept, there is a peculiar conceptual abstraction 
inherent to the notion of the 'rule of law' which I argue contributes to confused and 
ultimately disappointed expectations. This abstraction is examined by various 
commentators. Upham, for example, argues that aiming to develop a 'rule of law', in 
both developed and developing countries, is an unproven myth which, nonetheless, 
has acquired that status of evangelical orthodoxy. He defines the core elements of 
this orthodoxy: 
The rule of law ideal might be summarised as universal rules uniformly 
applied. It requires a hierarchy of courts staffed by a cadre of professionally 
trained personnel who are insulated from political or non-legal influences. The 
decision-making process must be rational and predictable by persons trained 
in law; all legally-relevant interests must be acknowledged and adequately 
represented; the entire system must be funded well enough to attract and 
46 Carothers, above n 17. 4; see also, Carothers, T 1998, 'The Rule of law Revival', Foreign Affairs. vol. 77, no. 3, 
rP· 95-106. 96. 
Carothers 2006, above n 17,4-5. 
48 1bid, 7; also Carothers, T 1998, ibid, 99. 
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retain talented people; and the political branches must respect the law's 
autonomy.49 
The notion of the 'rule of law' is at its heart both politically evocative and yet so 
technically ambiguous as to sometimes become meaningless. Others have 
attempted to pin down what it is supposed to mean. Kleinfeld-Belton argues that the 
'rule of law' looks 'like the proverbial blind man's elephant- a trunk to one person, a 
tail to another.'50 She discerns a range of definitions that serve different purposes: 
government bound by law; equality before the law; law and order; predictable and 
efficient rulings; and human rights. These purposes- which are manifold, distinct and 
often in tension - are usually conflated and confused in practice. She observes that 
development agencies tend to define the 'rule of law' institutionally, rather than by its 
intended purpose, as a state that contains three primary institutions: laws, judiciary 
and law enforcement This conceptual confusion has encouraged a technocratic and 
sometimes counterproductive approach to reform: 
By treating the rule of law as a single good rather than as a system of goods 
in tension, reformers can inadvertently work to bring about a malformed rule 
of law, such as one in which laws that overly empower the executive are 
applied and enforced more efficiently. 51 
Others, like Kennedy, go further to observe that this ambiguity is no accident It is 
precisely the vagueness inherent in this notion that renders it readily and 
conveniently amenable as a device to bridge over differences in the interests of 
development partners-'2 
In the following section, I will elaborate on the differences between this distinctive 
concept of judicial reform - embedded as it is in promoting the political economy 
notions of the free market, democracy, good governance and the 'rule of law'- and 
the approach of the World Bank. 
49 Upham F 2006, 'Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy', in Carothers, T (ed), Promoting the Rule of Law 
Abroad: in search of knowledge, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, Washington D.C., pp. 75-104, 83. 
Upham also observes: 'If such a model exists, however, I have not found it.' Upham, F 2002, 'Mythmaking in the Rule 
of Law Orthodoxy', working paper no. 30, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, Washington D.C., 8. 
50 Kleinfeld-BeHan, R 2005, 'Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law: Implications for practitioners', working paper 
no 55, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, Washington D.C, 5-6; see also: Kleinfeld-Betton, R 2006, 
'Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law', in Carothers, T {ed}, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: in search of 
knowledge, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, Washington D.C., pp. 31-74. 
51 Kleinfeld-Betton, R 2005, ibid, 28; see also: Kleinfeld-Sefton, R 2006, ibid. 
52 Kennedy, D 2006, 'The "Rule of Law, Political Choices and Development Common Sense', in The New Law and 
Economic Development, A Critical Appraisal, Trubek, D. M & Santos, A {eds), Cambridge University Press, New 
York, pp. 19-73. 
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f Shihata's long shadow -judicial reform at the World Bank 
The World Bank started to support judicial reform later than USAID in Latin America 
in the 1980s. It initially framed its approach narrowly to conform to its mandate as a 
state-centric means of enabling economic development. As we will see, this 
approach has subsequently expanded to become more comprehensive, embodying 
related notions of governance, institutions, safety, security, equity and empowerment. 
As the Bank's chief counsel at that time, Shihata was influential in conceptualising 
the initial approach to reform. He framed judicial reform within the 'rule of law', which 
he treated as a precursor to economic stability, and as the means of protecting 
property rights and honouring contractual obligations. He saw law providing credibility 
to government commitments, and the reliability and enforceability of applicable rules 
leading to favourable market conditions for investors. Law supported the broader 
economic policy framework that guaranteed free competition.53 The Bank adopted 
this economistic approach because of the reading then possible of its charter. 
Shihata wanted to avoid drawing reform activities into what he described as the 'risky 
trap of politicising financial institutions'. Owing to these formal constraints which he 
stressed prohibited engaging in 'political' activities, he directed the Bank narrowly to 
take 'only economic considerations' into account:54 
Included amongst these provisions are the notions that: [t]he Bank and its 
officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall 
they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the 
member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be 
relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed 
impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in Article 1. 55 
As a consequence, the Bank's reform strategy has historically been developed from 
a base of focusing tightly on promoting the 'rule of law' in an instrumentalist, 'thin' 
procedural manner. This base defined the 'rule of law' as: prevailing when the 
government itself is bound by the law; every person in society is treated equally 
under the law; the human dignity of each individual is recognised and protected by 
law; and justice is accessible to all. This concept of the 'rule of law' is built on the 
53 Eg.: Shihata, I 1995, World Bank and Legal Technical Assistance: Initial Lessons', policy research paper 1414, 
World Bank, Legal Department. Washington D.C. Shihata I, 1995, 'Judicial Reform in Developing Countries and the 
Role of the World Bank,' 219-233; in Rowat M, Malik W & DakoUas M, Judicial Reform in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: Proceedings of a Wortd Bank Conference, Wortd Bank; Shihata, 11997, 'The Role of Law in Business 
Development', Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 20, pp.1577 -1588. 
54Shihata, 11992, 'Human Rights, Development and International Financial Institutions', American University Journal 
of International Law and Policy, val. 8, no. 35, pp. 27-37, 37. 
55 Ibid, 30. See also: Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, opened for 
signature 22 July 1944. 2 UNTS 134. art IV. s10. art V. s 6. art 111. s S(b) art V. s 1(g), (entered into force 27 
December 1945). 
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three pillars of rules, processes and well-functioning institutions. It comprised a well-
functioning legal and judicial system which allows the state to regulate the economy 
and empowers private individuals to contribute to economic development by 
confidently engaging in business, investments, and other transactions. This concept 
was seen to foster domestic and foreign investment, create jobs, and reduce 
poverty.56 
The Bank's judicial reform strategy promoted three goals. These were: first to 
establish an independent, efficient and effective judicial system, and strengthening 
judicial effectiveness; second, to support the processes by which laws and 
regulations are made and implemented; and third, to improve access to justice by 
expanding the use of existing services and providing alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms.57 In terminology reminiscent of USAID's earlier rhetoric, the Bank 
described the 'rule of law' as being 'built on the cornerstone of an efficient and 
effective judicial system.'58 This vision positioned judges as the key to an effective 
and efficient legal system. For such a system, judges had to be properly appointed, 
promoted and trained; observe high codes of conduct; and be evaluated and 
disciplined. Activities supporting such initiatives became common features in many of 
the Bank's projects. 
g Governance and institutionalism: from enabling to capable state 
The Bank positioned judicial reform centrally in its emerging conceptualisation of 
good governance. As with USAID, the Bank increasingly framed judicial reform within 
a larger governance dimension of development, usually hinging on notions of 
transparency and accountability. This dimension is relevant not just because judicial 
reform is a means of implementing governance policy by strengthening the capacity 
of the courts as accountability mechanisms; the notion of governance is integral to 
the prevailing institutionalist approach which is concerned with the quality of 
relationships between the citizen, state and market, as we will see in the next 
chapter. 59 
The Bank's definition of governance is broad. It refers to the exercise of power 
through a country's economic, social, and political institutions that shape the 
56 World Bank 2003, Legal and Judicial Reform: Strategic Directions, World Bank, Legal Vice Presidency, 
Washington D.C., 2 and 16-18, among many others. 
57 Ibid 6, and 19. 
58 World Bank. 2003. ibid. 27. 
59 See Chapter 4, in particular: North, 0 1990, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, 
Gambridge University Press, Cambridge; below, n 210. 
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incentives of public policymakers, overseers, and providers of public services. Within 
this approach, judicial reform and strengthening is both instrumentally and 
constitutively relevant. The Bank's Governance and Anticorruption Policy of 2007 
proclaims that good governance is positively associated with robust growth, lower 
income inequality, and improved competitiveness and investment climate. This 
policy posits that a capable and accountable state creates opportunities for poor 
people, provides better services, and improves development outcomes. This 
approach is explained by President Wolfowitz to support the Bank's mandate to 
reduce poverty: 
We call it good governance. It is essentially the combination of transparent 
and accountable institutions, strong skills and competence, and a 
fundamental willingness to do the right thing. Those are the things that 
enable a government to deliver services to its people efficiently. 60 
This approach to governance is grounded in the vision of the capable and enabling 
state, articulated through the Bank's World Development Reports, first issued in 
1978. These reports showcase the Bank's evolving policy approach and have, in the 
view of The Economist, made 'histories in miniature of development.'61 The World 
Development Report of 2002 is of relevance to this thesis in highlighting the role of 
institutions in reform endeavours. It articulated the convergence of governance and 
institutionalism; more particularly, the governance rationale of institutionalism. Of 
particular significance, it conceptualised the institutional role of judiciaries in 
development: 
The judicial system plays an important role in the development of market 
economies. It does so in many ways: by resolving disputes between private 
parties, by resolving disputes between private and public parties, by 
providing a backdrop for the way that individuals and organizations behave 
outside the formal system, and by affecting the evolution of society and its 
norms while being affected by them. These changes bring law and order 
and promote the development of markets, economic growth, and poverty 
reduction. Judicial systems need to balance the need to provide swift and 
affordable - that is, accessible - resolution with fair resolution; these are 
the elements of judicial efficiency ... The success of judicial reforms 
depends on increasing the accountability of judges; that is, providing them 
with incentives to perform effectively, simplifying procedures, and targeting 
resource increases .... 62 
60 Wolfowitz, P 2006, 'Good Governance and Development - A Time for Action', speech, Jakarta, 11 April; World 
Bank 2007, Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on Governance and Anticorruption, World Bank, 
Washington D.C. 
61 Yusuf, S, Dervish, K & Stiglitz, J 2008, Development Economics through the Decades: Critical review of thirty years 
of WDR's, World Bank, Washington D.C; reviewed in 'Fairly Happy Birthday; Development' 2009, Economist, 24 
January, vol. 390, iss. 8615, 66. 
62 World Bank 2002, World Development Report 2002, World Bank, Washington D.C 131-2. 
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This report focused on improving judicial efficiency through the increased 
accountability of judges, simplification of legal procedures and increased resources. 
In this institutionalist approach, judicial reform is integral to good governance which 
requires impartial and fair legal institutions, which in turn requires preserving the 
independence of judicial decision-making against political interference: 
A judiciary independent from both government intervention and influence by 
the parties in a dispute provides the single greatest institutional support for 
the rule of law ... Creating a system of checks and balances also improves 
fairness and integrity. For this, judicial independence needs to be coupled 
with a system of social accountability. 63 
h More comprehensive approach: embracing social and human 
dimensions 
In 1999, as part of its evolving approach, the Bank elevated legal and judicial reform 
to one of the main pillars of its new Comprehensive Development Framework. This 
framework was introduced by President Wolfensohn as a reformulation of the Bank's 
strategy to poverty reduction. This strategy emphasised the interdependence of all 
elements of development- the social and human among the structural, governance, 
environmental, economic, and financial: 
The Comprehensive Development Framework . . . highlights a more 
inclusive picture of development. We cannot adopt a system in which the 
macroeconomic and financial is considered apart from the structural, social 
and human aspects, and vice versa.64 
This new approach strove for a good and clean government, a social safety net and 
social programs, and an effective legal and justice system in which judicial reform 
was reframed: 
[W]ithout the protection of human and property rights, and a comprehensive 
framework of laws, no equitable development is possible. A government 
must ensure that it has an effective system of property, contract ... laws and 
other elements of a comprehensive legal system that is effectively, 
impartially and cleanly administered by a well-functioning, impartial and 
honest judicial and legal system.65 
63 lbid, 129. 
64 Wolfensohn J, 1999, Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework ( Discussion 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/DELETEDSITESBACKUP/O .pagePK:60447-theSitePK:14 
i~~~i_v~~) .~t 26 November 20"" 
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At that point, the Bank described its approach to judicial and legal reform as having 
'evolved significantly' to emphasise empowerment opportunity and security in order 
to promote ways in which judicial programs can 'distribute more equitably the 
benefits of economic growth' to the poor.66 The potential significance of this 
emphasis on the social dimensions to development in the Comprehensive 
Development Framework should not be under-estimated.67 As we have seen, 
Shihata had earlier stressed avoiding the use of the term 'human rights' because of 
the constraining effect of the Bank's mandate which prohibited 'political' reform.68 
Less than a decade later, this position had evolved markedly when Danino, then 
chief counsel, saw judicial reform as an indispensable component of alleviating 
poverty through economic growth and social equity, which included a strong human 
rights dimension.69 He built this argument on a broader interpretation of the Bank's 
'evolving' mandate: 
While governance is a crucial concept, my personal view is that governance 
does not go far enough: we must go beyond it to look at the issues of social 
equity alongside economic growth ... we should embrace the centrality of 
human rights to our work instead of being divided by the issue of whether or 
not to adopt a 'rights-based' approach to development.'0 
This shift was taken further by the next chief counsel, Palacio, who observed in early 
2006 that: 
The Articles of Agreement permit, and in some cases require, the Bank to 
recognise the human rights dimensions of its development policies and 
activities, since it is now evident that human rights are an intrinsic part of 
the Bank's mission ..... 11 
66 World Bank 2004, 'Initiatives in Legal and Judicial Reform', Legal Vice Presidency, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 
5. <htto:l/qo.worldbank.ora/RXE6AGROQO> at 26 November 2009. 
67 The World Bank's overarching poverty reduction approach is currently formulated in the World Development 
Report 2001, <http:l/go.worldbank.ora!L8RGH3WLIO> at 26 November 2009, which is based on Narayan, D 1999, 
Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone Hear Us? Voices From 47 Countries, Poverty Group PREM, World Bank 
<http:/lqo.worldbank.org/LOTTGBE910> at 26 November 2009. See alo in relation to the social capital dimensions 
of poverty: Woolcock, M & Narayan, 0 2000, 'Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research, and 
Policy', World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 15, 2, pp. 225-249. 
68 Shihata, 11997, 'Democracy and Development,' International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 
635- 643. 642. 
69 Danino, R 2006, Legal Aspects of World Bank's Work on Human Rights: Some Preliminary Thoughts', in Sage, C 
& Woolcock, M (eds), World Bank Legal Review: Law, Equity and Development, val. 2, World Bank, Washington 
D.C., pp. 295-324, 305. See also: Danino, R 2005 'Legal Aspects of the World Bank's Work on Human Rights: some 
weliminary thoughts,' in Alston P & Robinson M (eds), Human Rights and Development, OUP, Oxford, 514. 
0 Danino R, 2007, 'The Legal Aspects of the World Bank's Work on Human Rights,' International Lawyer 41, 1, 21-
25, 25. Danino 2005, ibid. 523. 
71 Palacio, A 2006, The Way Fotward: Human Rights and the World Bank, World Bank Institute, 
<http://go.worldbank.ora/RR8FOU4RGO> at 26 November 2009. 
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Towards equity? 
The Bank's policy approach was further refined in the World Development Report: 
Equity and Development in 2006 which squarely re-focused on to the issue of 
inequality of opportunity as a new or more important dimension of poverty reduction. 
This report built on the World Development Report of 2000 on poverty, and in 
particular on the work of Sen which I will analyse closely in the next chapter.72 It 
recommended addressing chronic 'inequality traps' by ensuring more equitable 
access to public goods, including improved access to justice systems and secure 
land rights among other initiatives. With the focus on equity gaps, this report is 
significant in highlighting the constitutive element of equity in poverty. Most 
importantly, it also introduced, however tentatively, the notion of redistribution to the 
current discourse: 
Given that markets are not perfect, scope arises for efficient redistribution 
schemes.... Equity and fairness matter not only because they are 
complementary to long-term prosperity. It is evident that many people - if 
not most- care about equity for its own sake.73 
This report reviewed modern theories of distributive justice to address the lack of 
concern with the distribution of welfare, and to adopt a notion of equity that focuses 
on opportunities.74 It distinguished equity from law and propounded that the 
overarching concept of fairness embodies a multicultural belief that people should not 
suffer before the law as a result of having unequal bargaining power: 
Justice systems can do much to level the playing field in the political, 
economic, and socio-cultural domains, especially when societies press for 
equitable laws and for transparency and accountability in their 
implementation. Legal institutions can uphold the political rights of citizens 
and curb the capture of the state by the elite. They can equalize economic 
opportunities by protecting property rights for all and ensuring non-
discrimination in the market. They can force change in the social domain by 
challenging inequitable practices?5 
This new focus on equity is consolidated by Sage and Woolcock who argue 
compellingly that a rules system that sustains an 'inequality trap' is a constituent 
element of such traps, and can perpetuate inequities. They observe that there is near 
universal consensus that most previous approaches to judicial reform in developing 
72 Chapter 4, below, n 223 onwards. 
73 World Bank 2005, World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development, World Bank, Washington D.C. 74-
75, <http:/igo.worldbank.org/2A5GCSRQHO> at 26 November 2009. 
74 Ibid 78. 
75 1bid, 175. 
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countries have not yielded hoped-for results, and that it is now time to reconsider the 
relationship between law and society: 
Traditionally, the development industry, with its genesis in development 
economics, has based its modus operandi and economic models and 
technical solutions ... (on) markets (that) function without regard for 
differences in opportunities, treatment or circumstances, and their growth is 
measured in aggregate terms, removed from individual circumstances and 
distributional effects.... Yet purely economic understandings of human 
welfare have increasingly been brought into question. Rights-based 
advocates, for example, highlight the disaggregated and/or distributional 
effects of reforms .... Moreover, development approaches have arguably 
failed to achieve promised results after more than 60 years of development 
practice. 76 
This increasing recognition of the equitable dimension of poverty represents a 
potentially major turning point in the formative journey of the judicial reform 
enterprise. Most recently, Sage, Menzies and Woolcock report that the Bank's 
Justice for the Poor ( J4P) program is presently researching a rnore equitably-focused 
approachn This approach is predicated on the basis that justice institutions play a 
role in the distribution of power and rights, and that equitable rules and processes 
can create the enabling conditions for a functioning social and economic net by 
challenging inequitable practices. A large percentage of the community live under 
non-state or customary justice systems that are complex and idiosyncratic. Sage 
and Woolcock separately argue that concepts of justice in such systems are closely 
intertwined with, or embedded in, the social, economic, and political structures.78 For 
these reasons, the Bank's new approach focuses on: 
creating new mediating institutions wherein actors from both realms can 
meet- following simple, transparent, mutually agreed-upon, legitimate, and 
accountable rules - to craft new arrangements that both sides can own and 
enforce. That is, J4P (sic) focuses more on the process of reform than on a 
premeditated end-state.79 
76 Sage, C & Woolcock, M 2006, World Bank Legal Review: Law, Equity and Development, vol. 2, World Bank, 
Washington D.C., 11. See also: Ibid, 9. 
77 Most recently: Sage, C, Menzies, N, & Woolcock, M 2009, Taking the Rules of the Game Seriously: 
Mainstreaming Justice in Development, Justice & Development working Paper Series 51845, World Bank, DC. 
78 Chirayath, L, Sage, C & Woolcock, M 2005, Customary Law and Policy Reform: Engaging with the Plurality of 
Justice Systems, World Bank, Washington D.C. See also Judt who argues that 'rights' describe the space between 
helpless individuals and the all powerful state, and after the collapse of Communism became a key means to address 
the 'Master Narrative of the twentieth century' -being the expectation of social progress; Judt T, 2005, Postwar: A 
History of Europe since 1945, Penguin, New York, 559 and 567. 
79 World Bank 2007, Justice for the Poor Program: Overview, World Bank, Washington D.C, 1; see also: ibid, 26; 
and, World Bank 2006, Justice for the Poor Program: Indonesia, <http://go.worldbank.org/MHG1Y94BMO> at 26 
November 2009. 
41 
r 
f 
j Fragility, safety and security 
Finally, notions of safety and security provide another rendition of the rationale for 
judicial reform. While we have already seen that criminal justice has been a part of 
the reform menu since its inception in the law and development movement, concerns 
over state fragility, failing states, terrorism and the breakdown of the states' capacity 
to control crime have grown over recent years. Most recently, the events of 11 
September 2001 have galvanised the attention of governments and donors to the 
relationship between security and conflict and the development of political, economic 
and social goals. This has led to reform efforts which consolidate the internal 
(criminal) and external (terrorist) capacity of the state to provide security. This 
rendition is evident in the Guidelines on Terrorism Prevention (2003) and the 
Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance (2004) issued by the 
development's umbrella body, the OECD-DAC. These guidelines are explicitly 
directed at overcoming state fragility and conflict by reducing armed violence and 
crime thereby creating a secure environment which would be conducive to other 
political, economic and social developments. This approach aims at achieving four 
intermeshing objectives: (a) establishing effective governance; (b) improved delivery 
of security and justice services; (c) developing local leadership and ownership of the 
reform process; and (d) sustainability of justice and security service delivery.80 
3 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have surveyed the history of judicial reform in order to chronicle the 
evolution of the relevant discourse and to spotlight a range of critical issues for 
analysis. This survey has established the following contextualising propositions. 
First, judicial reform is at a formative phase of endeavour. Its growth has been 
recent, rapid and substantial over the past twenty years, in particular. 
Second, this endeavour has been variously justified on the basis of economic, 
political, social and human rationales. These major justifications, which may be 
theoretically interconnected and conflated in practice, are on occasion ambiguous 
and sometimes in conflict: 
80 OECD 2003, A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention. OECD, Development Assistance 
Committee, Paris, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/4/16085708.odf> at 26 November 2009; OECD 2007, 
Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice, OECD Development Assistance 
Committee, Paris, 21. 
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o Economic - the oldest and most pervasive justification has two 
manifestations: first, the creation of wealth, based on notions such as 'trickle 
down economics' which involves the state supporting the markets to lift all 
boats, even the smallest; and second, more recently, the reduction of poverty, 
based on an alternative notion of empowerment by assisting the poor and the 
disadvantaged. 
o Political - the promotion of democracy has been inextricably linked to 
enabling participation and inclusion in social affairs; freedom of opportunity; 
and self-destination; and more recently, to strengthening the governance and 
integrity of state institutions to oversee the polity through the 'rule of law', 
judicial independence, transparency and accountability. 
o Social - this justification emphasises consolidating state capacity to provide 
the fundamental public goods of civic order, safety and security to citizens 
from internal threats of crime and, notably after 9111, external threats of 
terrorism and state failure. 
o Humanistic- this justification rests on the validation of promoting fairness and 
access to justice based on a concept of poverty as deprivation of opportunity 
and the human rights of the individual. 81 
In sum, this survey of the experience of USAID and the World Bank, the largest and 
oldest donors in judicial reform, demonstrates the variously formed, dynamic and 
evolving nature of this endeavour. From the outset, the universal rationale for reform 
has consistently been to support economic growth. This instrumental justification has 
at times been visibly affiliated to western liberal conceptions of capitalism, viz the 
Washington Consensus, and is in that sense ideologically hegemonic; it remains 
overarching though it has now been largely reconceptualised through the emerging 
political science discourse of good governance. Most recently, we have seen a 
growing recognition of the equitable and potentially distributive dimensions of this 
enterprise which are both instrumental and constitutive in their rationale. In essence, 
there is an emerging recognition that equity is important in development. This 
81 This configuration is articulated in various ways in the literature; see, eg, Samuels, K 2006, 'Rule of Law Reform in 
Post-Conflict Countries: Operational Initiatives and Lessons learnt', social development paper no. 37, World Bank, 
Washington D.C. 
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recognition that equitable growth is both constitutively and instrumentally important is 
starting to reframe the discourse on judicial reform. 
In the next chapter, I will analyse key aspects of these developments more closely to 
argue that they mark the tectonic plates of the core contest over the theory for this 
endeavour. For now, I argue that this history is best seen as a journey which is 
characterised by punctuations of disillusionment that impel ongoing innovation, 
irrespective of whatever rendition is emphasised. Throughout this journey, however 
rendered, the state remains the defining focus of endeavour, being the provider of 
public goods including justice.82 This history reveals the constant process of 
adjustment in the state's moderation of the tension at the core of liberal society 
between the collective and individual interests, whereby theories are formed and 
refined to better understand the past as the means of guiding ongoing endeavour . 
••• 
82 This argument, which rests on institutionalist and new comparative economic notions, most immediately on the 
work of North, will be developed in greater detail in the following chapter; see, in particular, North 0, above n 59. 
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CHAPTER 3- NATURE OF REFORMS AND CRITIQUE 
1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I extend my survey of the reform experience through an analysis of 
the nature of reform activities, and provide a synthesis of the critique of this 
endeavour. In doing so, I will put forward three propositions: first, there has been, up 
to this point, a broad homogeneity of approach in the nature of reforms with most 
activities tending to support 'thin' efficiency-based aspects of justice in the formal 
sector; second, there is a mounting perception of disappointment in the performance 
of these reforms emerging in the commentary; and third, this disappointment is 
impelling a reinvention of this endeavour towards empowerment and a convergence 
with the human rights discourse, engagement in the informal and customary sectors 
of justice, and a more integrated political economy approach. 
2 Nature of reforms - the 'standard package' 
Despite the differences in the evolving conceptualisations of judicial reform of USAID 
and the World Bank outlined above - and in passing reference to those of the 
Department of Foreign and International Development (DfiD) and UNDP- there is a 
surprising homogeneity in the nature and content of these reforms. 
My analysis of these activities indicates that the core of most judicial reform has 
typically consisted of measures to strengthen the judicial branch of government. 
According to Messick, this has generally included making the judicial branch 
independent; increasing the speed of processing cases; increasing access to dispute 
resolution mechanisms; and professionalising the bench.83 Dakolias agrees. She 
documents that the components of reform programs usually include 
independence, appointment and evaluation systems, discipline, 
judicial 
judicial 
administration, court administration, case administration, budgets, procedural codes, 
access to justice, ADR, legal aid and training.84 Projects have commonly focused on 
training judges, introducing case management systems to the courts, and 
occasionally establishing legal aid clinics and legal awareness programs - in what 
63 Messick, above n 35. 
84 Dakolias, M 1995, 'A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience in Latin America', Virginia Journal of 
International Law, Virginia Journal of International Law Association, vol. 35, pp.167-231 ,187 onwards. 
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Sage and Woolcock have described as generally being 'top-down technocratic 
solutions' to institutional deficiencies.85 
Assistance to the judiciaries of Latin America over the past twenty years has 
generally consisted of technical assistance. This has provided expert advisors, 
buildings and infrastructure, as well as computers and information technology. 
Hammergren notes these reforms were generally directed at the organisation, 
operations and resources of the courts. She catalogues this assistance package: 
changes to laws and procedural frameworks; procedural and substantive reform, 
including innovations like conciliation and arbitration; introduction of alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR); and measures to improve access to the poor - usually 
legal assistance, legal information and small claims courts. Ancillary reforms often 
include the creation of new organizations such as public defence, prosecution, 
human rights ombudsman, anti-corruption offices, constitutional courts and 
chambers. Other items in the reform package include investments in equipment and 
infrastructure; increased budgets and salaries; appointment systems and terms of 
service; internal restructures and expanded mandates; modernised administrative 
systems, particularly in case-flow management; and improved public information 
systems.86 
Judicial reforms are classified by Carothers as falling into a class of activities aimed 
at increasing government compliance with law. They involve institutional reforms 
which centre around judicial independence, increased transparency and 
accountability, and making courts more competent, efficient and accountable, often 
involving training.87 In describing judicial and legal reform, Jensen refers to a 
'standard package' of three elements: changing substantive laws; focusing on law-
related institutions; and addressing the deeper goals of governance compliance with 
the law, particularly in the area of judicial independence. Donors have increasingly 
concentrated their assistance on making formal judicial institutions more competent, 
efficient and accountable, often involving projects which provide legal and judicial 
training.88 Porter endorses this 'standard package' of court-centric reforms which he 
notes remain heavily supply-driven, with the focus on training judges, building more 
courtrooms, providing new equipment, and supporting case management; and while 
85 Sage, C & Woolcock, M 2005, 'Breaking Legal Inequality Traps: New Approaches to Building Justice Systems for 
the Poor in Developing Countries', World Bank, Arusha Conference paper, 12. 
66 Hammergren, above n 18 ; see also: Hammergren, L 2002, Uses of Empirical Research in Refocusing Judicial 
Reforms: Lessons from five countries, World Bank, Washington D.C. 
87 Carothers, T 1998, 'The Rule of Law Revival', Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, no. 3, 99-100. 
88 Jensen, E 2003, above n 28, 349. 
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Armytage agrees, he observes that training is often treated as a cure-all for capacity-
building, expressing concerns at an overall disregard for pedagogic effectiveness. 59 
Others adopt alternative categorisations. Santiso, for example, puts rule-of-law 
reform strategies into three main groups which overlap earlier classifications: 
normative, institutional, and comprehensive. Normative reform mainly involves 
changing substantive laws and regulations; institutional reform addresses judicial 
processes and procedures such as public defence and alternative dispute resolution; 
and comprehensive reform approaches the judiciary as a core institution of 
democratic governance. It aims to strengthen the separation of powers and the 
independence of the judiciary within the state, and to alter the incentive structure of 
the political system and the behavioural patterns of politicians and citizens."0 
a 'Thin' or 'thick' reform? 
Reference has already been made in passing to judicial reform being framed by 'thin' 
and 'thick' concepts of justice. This classification is useful in describing the nature of 
reforms to describe the prevalent character of procedural efficiency-based aspects of 
judicial reform. 
Thin' definitions of justice are formal, minimalist and procedural. Raz and Fuller are 
leading exponents of 'thin' formal concepts of justice and thereby judicial reform, and 
argue in essence that rational people need a predictable system to guide their 
behaviour and organise their lives. The precepts of the 'thin' approach are that law 
should be prospective, open and clear, and stable. The 'thin' perspective is more 
common and its answers to the 'what' question of reform emphasises guaranteeing 
the independence of the judiciary; promoting access to the courts, and reducing 
backlog; observing principles of natural justice; and upholding judicial review of other 
powers."1 The emphasis is not on notions based in democracy and morality, but 
rather on property rights and the efficient administration of justice. Reforms must 
89 Porter, 0 2005, 'Access to Justice Revisited', paper delivered to the International Conference on Peace Justice and 
Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific Region, University of Queensland, 1-3 April. Also: Armytage, L 2005, 'Training of 
Judges: Reflections on Principle and International Practice', European Journal of Legal Education, vo.l 2, no 1, 21-
38. There is mounting recognition of the importance to develop social capital within major donors- see, for example: 
Woolcock, M 2001, 'The place of social capital in understanding social and economic outcomes', Canadian Journal 
of Policy Research, 65-88, http://homepages.wmich.edu/-jbiles/woolcock.pdf at 23 February 2010; and Bebbington, 
A, Guggenheim, S, Olson, E & Woolcock, M 2004, 'Exploring Social Capital Debates at the World Bank', Journal of 
Development Studies, vol40, 5, pp 33- 64. 
90 Santiso, C 2003, 'The Elusive Quest for the Rule of Law: Promoting Judicial Refonn in Latin America', Brazilian 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 23. no. 3 (91) pp. 112-134. 133. 
91 Raz, J 1979, The Authority of Law, Oxford University Press, New York., in particular, 214-218. See also: Fuller, L 
1964, The Morality of Law, Yale University Press: New Haven; and Fuller L, 1958, 'Positivism and Fidelity to Law-
A Reply to Professor Hart". Harvard Law Review 71 (4): 630-672, where among other arguments, he distinguishes 
law from morality. 
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provide predictability and stability; they do not necessarily have to be moral or exhibit 
substantive rights-based characteristics. Hence, 'thin' reforms relate to improvements 
in the procedures and efficiency of legal processes. 'Thick' notions, on the other 
hand, equate the 'rule of law' as being elemental to a just society and are linked to 
concepts of liberty and democracy. 'Thick' reforms address substantive goals such 
as enhancing individuals' rights, strengthening political institutions and stabilising the 
economy.92 This concept guarantees basic individual freedoms, and civil and political 
rights while at the same time, requires the power of the state to be constrained. 
Dworkin is a noted proponent of this 'thick' approach, arguing in essence that justice 
and the 'rule of law' include universal moral principles, and are linked to freedom.93 
Some commentators adopt this typology of reform. Jensen, for example, describes 
the 'thinnest' form of reforms is characterised as 'whatever the sovereign utters is 
law' or 'all government action must be authorised by law.' It may also be called 'rule 
by law' because it does not set any limitations on government action. Other 'thin' 
reforms advocate formal legality which requires laws to be general in their scope, 
prospective in their application, clear in their formulation, certain in their application 
and, most importantly engendering predictability. Formal legality is neutral on 
substance and lacks any moral dimension, rendering it at time fatally prone to 
perverse outcomes, classically, Germany's Nuremberg laws of 1935 which ostensibly 
legalised the Holocaust. 94 Clarity and consistency in the application of a law 
describes this formality, irrespective of its nature. In line with this typology, 'thick' 
reforms typically focus on substantive goals, notably strengthening the rights of 
individuals. 95 
In the reform context, the evolving nature of the judicial reform enterprise can be 
discerned through this analytic lens. Initial reforms tended to have a relatively narrow 
focus on legal instruments: laws, codes and procedures relating to courts as well as 
economic development, often supported by training. This then progressed to 
intermediate reforms focusing on promoting efficiency, notably through case-
management, judicial administration and related efforts. Most recently, reforms have 
increasingly sought to consolidate the capacity of the courts as institutions operating 
92 See, eg, Jensen, above n 28, 339. 
93 See eg: Dworkin, R 1978, Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth, London. 
94 Viz: The Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour 1935, and, The Reich Citizenship Law 1935 
(Germany). For commentary, see: Friedlander, S 2007, The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 
1939-1945, HarperCollins, New York. See also: 'Conspiracy' (2001), directed by Mandel L, which recreates the 
Wannsee Conference for the 'Final Solution' convened in 1942, notably in the chilling performance of Colin Firth as 
Wilhelm Stuckart, chief counsel for the Nazi Ministry of Interior. 
95 Jensen, above n 28 ; see also, Jensen E 2007, 'Justice and the Rule of Law' in Call C (ed), Building States to Build 
Peace, Lynne Reinner, Boulder, (manuscript) 8 onward. 
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within a broader governance mantle to promote independence and accountability. 
However evolved, though, these activities have tended to focus on 'thin' reforms that 
promote the efficiency - as distinct from the quality - of the state's formal judicial 
1unction. 
In sum, 'thin' concepts have traditionally prevailed in practice. They are reflected 
both in the focus of reform designs and the selection of performance indicators in 
monitoring frameworks.96 This observation is significant because it highlights the 
point that 'thick', substantive, rights-based reforms have largely been eclipsed to this 
point. This, as we will shortly see, is anomalous with the increasing recognition of a 
more equitable rendition of reform. 
3 Critique of performance - mounting perceptions of disappointment 
In this section, I review the literature to analyse the key critiques of judicial reform 
endeavour in order to distil the appraisals of experts on the effectiveness of practice 
and how it can be improved.97 My review will demonstrate that there is a growing 
range of concerns over the disappointing performance of judicial reform, based on 
evaluations being made by commentators on its performance. Development 
evaluation and, more specifically the evaluation of judicial reform, are major issues to 
be considered in Part 2 of this thesis. At this point, I will temporarily go beyond any 
detailed analysis of the nature of that evaluative process to focus on its outcomes, 
being the judgments made in the commentary in order to substantiate the mounting 
perception of disappointment. 
I argue from this review that there is general and widespread disappointment with the 
performance of judicial reform. Commentators offer a number of explanations which, 
in essence, relate to a conflation of the goals of reform that causes dissipation of 
endeavour and confusion over expectations; the need to adopt a more sophisticated 
understanding of the change process; and ultimately the enduring lack of cogent 
theory that confounds the sense of practice. 
The critique of disappointing performance in the literature reflects two major features: 
first an emerging consensus over the lack of coherency in the theory or justification 
96 Trebilcock, M & Daniels, R 2008, Rule of Law and Development: Charting the Fragile Path of Progress. Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 16-29. 
97 This discussion will also contribute to the evaluation of the effectiveness of judicial reform endeavour to be 
undertaken in Part 2 of this thesis. 
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for reform endeavour and, second, an insufficiency of knowledge to support many 
aspects of that endeavour. In effect, this critique is an indication of mounting concern 
that we don't really know what we're doing. 
As we have already seen, my analysis of reform history has revealed the existence of 
four core rationale: economic, political, social and humanistic. Herein however lie the 
seeds for the conflation of the theory for judicial reform. Carothers, who has been 
catalytic in formulating a 'rule of law' discourse, argues that the four different clusters 
are not always fully compatible and identifies a tension in practice.98 This goes some 
way to explaining why the objectives pursued by donor agencies have diverged in 
practice, and on occasion conflicted. He argues that after thirty years of activity, the 
'rule of law' revival continues to lack a well-grounded rationale, clear appreciation of 
the essential problem, a proven analytic method, or an understanding of the results 
achieved.99 This is due to a surprising uncertainty about the basic rationale for 
promoting the 'rule of law' on the unsubstantiated belief that it is necessary for 
economic development and democracy. Carothers recounts the lament of a 
colleague who had worked in promoting the 'rule of law' for many years: 'we know 
how to do a lot of things, but deep down we don't really know what we are doing.'100 
He refutes as a 'mythical imperative' the presumption that an econometric model of 
the 'rule of law' is vital for a country to prosper, and describes the disappointing 
results as 'sobering'. He criticises the promoters of democracy and the 'rule of law' 
as being often hubristic, over-simplistic and conducting 'cookie-cutter projects' which 
are only superficially adapted to local circumstances.101 Their approach ignores the 
reality that management of the judicial system is often contested by the executive 
and that power-holders resist reform if it threatens their power. Additionally, many 
judges have invested their careers in dysfunctional systems and thus may have an 
interest in foot dragging.102 
A critique of twenty years of judicial reform performance in Latin America is provided 
by Hammergren who acknowledges substantial changes in the sector's resources, 
composition and activities. These reforms have transformed courts which were 
formerly the 'orphans' in the Cinderella branch of government. But she notes that 
these reforms which provided improved salaries, enhanced independence, new 
governance systems, and monies for computers and innovations had not had an 
96 Carothers, T 1999, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning CuNe. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Washington D.C .. 7, 12. and 328. 
99 Carothers, above n 17, 28. 
100 Carothers, above n 45, 5. 
101 Carothers. above n 98, 338/9. 
102 Ibid, 175. 
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automatic impact on the quality of judicial output.103 In fact, these judicial systems 
seem no closer to meeting citizen expectations of justice104 Change is one thing, but 
improvement is another, she stresses. This critique is essentially utilitarian, i.e. these 
reforms have not succeeded in improving the situation. She observes that two 
decades of judicial reform programs have delivered a great deal less than promised. 
Despite some gains, basic complaints such as delay, corruption, impunity, 
irrelevance and limited access do not seem to have dissipated. Public opinion polls 
indicate no improvement in the courts' public image. As for contributions to the goals 
of reducing crime or poverty, or increasing economic growth, the most that might be 
hypothesised is that things would have been much worse without the reform. 105 This 
disappointing performance arises, according to Hammergren, from the 'purely 
deductive conclusion' that there is a connection between market-based growth and 
commercial law. She agrees with Carothers' metaphor that judicial reform has 
become an elixir for curing an increasing number of extrajudicial ills: poverty and 
inequality, democratic instability, and inadequate economic growth and investment: 
[l]t should be evident that (this) contains internal contradictions .... Mix and 
match different objectives; goals relating to costs, access, efficiency, 
efficacv, and basic fairness at some point come into conflict with each 
other. 1b6 
Anyone wishing to contest or simply explore some of these connections risks 
attacking numerous sacred cows and their associated lobbies.107 The theoretical 
discourse on judicial reform is, as Hammergren observes, dominated by economists 
who have a natural predisposition to emphasise the courts' economic role by 
clarifying the rules of the game: enhancing predictability, reinforcing juridical security 
and reducing transitional costs. Political scientists have also focused on the role of 
courts in supporting existing power structures to emphasise their potential 
accountability function in providing checks-and-balances on that power. 108 Certainly, 
it is odd how ineffective lawyers seem to have been in contributing to the theoretical 
discourse. While academic lawyers have clearly produced theories, their contribution 
has been ghettoised in academe. Irrefutably, the main game of articulating the 
theoretical model for judicial reform endeavour has so far been dominated by 
economists and political scientists. 
103 Hammergren, L 2007, Envisioning Reform: Improving judicial petformance in Latin America, Pennsylvania State 
University Press, University Park, 279; see also discussion in Chapter 7. 
104 Ibid, 7. 
105 1bid, 306. 
106 1bid 5 
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Many commentators endorse this critique of the dubious theoretical foundations of 
reform endeavour. Barron, for example, reviews the experience of the World Bank 
and argues it would do well to temper its enthusiasm for promoting the 'rule of law', 
given that many of the factors affecting it seem to be either unreformable or at least 
very difficult to reform.109 He expresses concerns that the Bank lacks explicit criteria 
for establishing success or failure of its judicial reform projects despite the millions of 
dollars being spent every year on them. He goes to the heart of the deficiency of the 
prevailing 'thin' approach: 
Whereas it may be perfectly feasible for the Bank to give the judiciary a 
makeover - things like speeding up the processing of cases with its 
computerised management systems; and constructing new courthouses -
the real 'rule of law' -the 'rule of law' which exists as philosophical doctrine 
and political theory- is of a much more elusive nature.110 
Others describe a crisis in law-and-development. They attribute this crisis to the 
inability of developmental theory to adequately account for reality. Tamanaha and 
Bilder believe its cause is the realisation that the ideals of development theorists 
were less than perfect and less than perfectly realised; that science did not have all 
the answers; and that the law simply cannot of itself solve the many problems 
confronting developing countries, which is causing a sense of mounting impotence. 
After thirty years of law-and-development studies, they observe that modern law is 
necessary, though not sufficient for economic development; that the 'rule of law' is 
helpful though not sufficient for political development; that beyond these minimums, 
the theoretical discourse is not of primary importance, beyond being 'largely a 
Western academic conversation'.111 
Some debate the efficacy of the relationship between judicial and legal reforms and 
development, and challenge the utility of many reforms on empirical grounds. 
Trebilcock and Davis, for example, describe much of the empirical evidence as 
'inconclusive' and argue that this explains why current endeavours are destined to 
have little or no effect on social or economic conditions in developing countries.112 
Others argue that given the diversity of competing definitions and concepts of 'rule of 
109 Barron, G 2005, 'The World Bank and Rule of Law Reforms' working paper no. 05-70 Development Studies 
Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 35. See also: Carothers, above, n 17, n 45 
and n 98; Jensen E & Heller T, above, n 28; and Trubek, D & Santos, A, above, n 29, among others. 
110 Ibid, 34. 
111 Tamanaha, B & Bilder, R 1995, 'The Lessons of Law·and-Development Studies,' American Journal of International 
Law. vol. 89. pp. 470-486. 484. 
112 Davis, K & Trebilcock, M 2001, 'Legal Reforms and Development,' Third World Quarterly, vol. 22, no.1, pp. 21-
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law', serious doubts remain about whether there is such a thing as 'a rule of law 
field'. Peerenboom critiques the law and development industry as having sought 
universal solutions to diverse local problems which have often reflected the latest 
intellectual trend and adopted a 'magic-bullet' approach: first legal education, then 
legislative reform, now institutions and good governance.113 What he terms the 'less 
than spectacular results' of promoting the 'rule of law', calls into question the reform 
function of the 'rule of law': 
Despite a growing empirical literature, there remain serious doubts about 
the relationship, and often the causal direction, between rule of law and the 
ever-increasing list of goodies with which it is associated, including 
economic growth, poverty reduction, democratization, legal empowerment 
and human rights. 114 
In sum, my review of the numerous critical analyses across the literature 
demonstrates the growing concerns over the performance of judicial reform over the 
past thirty years which has variously been described by commentators as sobering, 
less than promised, elusive, in crisis, impotent, inconclusive, less than spectacular 
and in serious doubt. While there are many causes, in the main, these concerns arise 
from an unsatisfactory theoretical justification for this endeavour, and the lack of 
empirical validation for the approaches taken. In short, there is a mounting chorus of 
disappointment on the performance of judicial reform to this point. 
4 Reinvention 
From the early 2000s, this mounting disappointment with the performance of judicial 
reform endeavour has impelled an ongoing reinvention of approach, consisting of 
three major dimensions: (a) convergence with human rights and empowerment; (b) 
engagement in the informal and customary sectors; and (c) a more integrated 
political-economy approach. 
a Convergence with human rights and empowerment 
Over the past decade, there has been some tentative evidence of an emerging 
convergence of the hitherto separate 'rule of law' and human rights discourses, 
leading to the formulation of a bridging discourse on empowerment. 
113 Peerenboom, R 2009, 'The Future of Rule of Law: Challenges and Prospects for the Field', Hague Journal on the 
Rule of Law, vol. 1. pp. 5-14, 13. 
114 1bid, 5. 
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The so-called human rights-based approach to poverty reduction seeks to address 
the multi-dimensional nature of poverty beyond lack of income, and positions access 
to rights at the centre of the 'rule of law'. This approach emphasises empowering the 
poor and disadvantaged so that they would be able to seek remedies for injustice, 
combat poverty, and resolve conflicts. By strengthening linkages between formal 
and informal structures, and countering biases which are inherent in both systems, it 
would give access to justice to those who would otherwise be excluded. According 
to then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan: 
The United Nations has learned that the 'rule of law' is not a luxury and that 
justice is not a side issue ... (w)e must take a comprehensive approach to 
Justice and the 'rule of law' .115 
The human rights-based approach started during the 1990s to redress the perceived 
shortcoming of the structural adjustment era. The UN's Access to Justice approach is 
emblematic of the human rights-based approach to judicial reform. It builds on a 
concept of poverty which is defined as a denial of human rights, and is structured 
around the principal treaties of international human rights law for the guidance of 
signatory states.116 Some of the accompanying paraphernalia of this approach is to 
be found in the UN's Human Development Index and annual Human Development 
Reports. These precursors to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
conceptualised and measured poverty in non-economistic terms. As we will see in 
future chapters, the spread of this approach has been spurred by the thinking of Sen, 
and has on occasion entered the mainstream development discourse, notably in the 
World Bank's Comprehensive Development Framework of 1999 and the World 
Development Report on Equity 2006.117 
The value of human rights has been recognised as a crucial artefact of governance 
ever since the Enlightenment. Locke was the first to declare rights to be inalienable. 
The central notion of rights was adopted in the American Declaration of 
Independence, the French Declaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen, and 
more recently in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.118 Hobbes saw rights as 
115 UNDP 2004, 'Access to Justice', Practice Note 913/2004, UNDP. New York, 2. 
116 The principal treaties comprise: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); International 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CAT); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW); Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), plus optional protocols. The Declaration on the 
Right to Development provides some guidance in linking norms, processes and implementation by addressing 
development as a comprehensive economic, social and political process; below, n 506. 
117 See above, n 64, and n 73 respectively. 
118 Locke, J 1690 'The Second Treatise of Government' in Peardon T (ed) 1952, 'The Second Treatise of 
Government', Liberal Arts Press, New York, 75·79. This was adopted in the American Declaration of Independence, 
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bulwarks against the state.119 Rousseau saw the provision of rights as the state's 
obligation under the social contract.120 More recently, Dworkin described rights as 
'trumps' in the contest between policy and legal claims.121 Rawls' theory of justice is 
a sophisticated balance between equality and liberty rights.122 Over time, as Kinley 
notes, human rights have become firmly accepted as tenets of international law: 
Thus, the foundations of political democracy are located in the protection 
and promotion of such civil and political rights as non-discrimination and 
equality before the law, privacy, the right to vote, and freedoms of 
expression, assembly, movement, thought and conviction; the foundations 
of social democracy are located in the fair and equal access to (or provision 
of) economic and social rights to housing, sustenance, education, health, 
employment and a clean environment; and the foundations of a plural 
democracy are located in protection of rights against discrimination on 
racial, ethnic, religious or other culturally-related grounds. 123 
Despite the increasing accession to the international human rights instruments over 
the past decade, there is considerable debate over the nature of the relationship 
between the discourses on human rights and the 'rule of law'. Alston provides a 
magisterial review of the relationship been discourses on law and development and 
those on human rights. He argues that while the Millennium Development initiative 
has become the single most important focus of international efforts to promote 
human development, they missed the opportunity to integrate these discourses. He 
regrets that 'neither the human rights nor development communities has embraced' 
them. He argues that the MDGs reflect only a partial human rights agenda and have 
settled for half-measures, thereby diverting attention from real human rights issues, 
mechanisms and initiatives. 124 This lack of convergence reflects different 
development agendas, traditions and priorities. Development economists often see 
human rights criteria as abstract and untested. Consequently, donors have 
neglected a crucial factor in the development equation, forsaking human rights 
the French Declaration des droits de /'homme et du citoyen, and most recently in the Preamble to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 
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121 Dworkin, above, n 93; and below, n 221. 
122 Rawls, J 1971, A Theory of Justice, revised edn, 1999, Oxford University Press, Oxford; below, n 220. 
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obligations and standards. 125 Redressing this will require a paradigm shift on the part 
of the development community: 126 
Acknowledgment of the importance of human rights has yet to have a 
systematic impact upon practice on the ground. Statements of policy at 
various levels have been encouraging.... But when it comes to the 
operational activities of many of the key agencies ... the results are far from 
encouraging.127 
To date, adoption of operationally integrated human rights-based reforms has been 
problematic and sometimes contentious. Darrow and Tomas note a patchy record of 
implementation and inadequate popular knowledge of key treaty instruments and 
processes. They believe that a stronger buy-in by development actors is necessary 
to help make rights real in the lives of the marginalised poor. They point out that 
human rights duty-bearers, notably national governments, do not always like to be 
reminded of their duties. They also express concern over the lack of conceptual rigor 
or systematisation of practice in human rights-based approaches to support their 
development rhetoric. 128 
Donors have evidently been reluctant to integrate rights into their reform approach. 
This implies that the relationship between these discourses has been separate, 
fraught and, until recently, often in conflict. At the World Bank, for example, Decker, 
Mcinerney-Lankford and Sage endorse Alston's earlier observations: 
While human rights are based on a set of agreed values, 'perfect' markets 
are inherently valueless - without regard for differences in opportunities, 
treatment or circumstance. Growth is measured in the aggregate, rather 
than in terms of its distribution across different socio-economic groups.129 
As we have already seen, this relationship is now under review. There is some 
evidence of a move for greater convergence in the Comprehensive Development 
125 Ibid, 802. 
126 Ibid, 808. 
127 Ibid, 826. The measurement of human rights and deveklpment is a matter of ongoing discussion within the human 
rights discourse. See, eg, Report on Indicators for Promoting and Monitoring the Implementation of Human Rights, 
UN Doc HRI/MC/2008/3 (2008). See also Stewart et al, who argue that human development (defined as a process of 
enlarging people's choices) goes well beyond the UN's Human Development Index the human development index 
(HOI) which fails to account for the broader measures of human development. Stewart, F, Ranis, G & Samman, E 
2006, 'Human Development: Beyond the Human Development Index', Journal of Human Development, val. 7, no. 3, 
pg. 323-3ss. 324. 
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Framework and the World Development Report of 2006. At the World Bank, for 
example, Decker et al acknowledge the 'growing popularity of alternatives to narrow 
growth-based understandings of development which emphasise equity or social 
justice rather than narrowly economic processes', and see an evolution of 'rights-
based approaches' to supplement the limitations of previous economic 
approaches.130 Others, like Golub, argue that the rights-based empowerment 
movement is entering the judicial and legal reform discourse to address the growing 
criticism that the 'rule of law' approach has neither contributed to the alleviation of 
poverty nor dealt with the needs of the poor.131 
This 'empowerment' approach to reform was boosted in 2008 when the UN 
Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor reported that two in every three 
people - some 4 billion in total - are 'excluded from the rule of law'. Exclusion begins 
with the lack of official recognition of birth. Some 40% of the developing world's five-
year-old children are not registered as even existing. The Commission found that this 
is evidence of injustice. It entrenches poverty by obliging the majority of poor people 
to live, and if possible work, in the informal economy beyond the protection of law. 
The Commission conceptualised four pillars of legal empowerment to redefine 
poverty through a 'legal exclusion' lens: access to justice and the 'rule of law'; 
property rights; labour rights; and business rights: 
The lesson is clear. When democratic rules are ignored and there is no law 
capable of providing shelter, the people who suffer most are those who can 
least afford to lose. Creating an infrastructure of laws, rights, enforcement, 
and adjudication is not an academic project, of interest to political scientists 
and social engineers. The establishment of such institutions can spell the 
difference between vulnerability and security, desperation and dignity for 
hundreds of millions of our fellow human beings. 132 
Some commentators however critique this empowerment approach as being little 
more than an exchange of paradigms with little effect on poverty alleviation. Van 
Rooij, for example, expresses caution over 'bottom-up' approaches becoming the 
new silver bullet. They may replace the traditional 'top-down' court-centric 
approaches without eliminating the usual 'rule of law' movement problems of lack of 
knowledge, method, theory and evidence of success, as we will shortly see: 
130 Decker et al, ibid, 20. 
131 Golub, S 2003, 'Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment Alternative', working paper no. 41, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC. 
132UNDP 2008, Making the Law Work for Everyone, Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, UNDP, New 
York, 2008, ii, <http://www.undp.org/leqalempowerment/reoort/Making the Law Work for Evervone.pdf> at 26 
November 2009. 
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The extent to which the bottom-up approaches help aid the poor is not 
entirely certain. For this more time needs to have elapsed and more research 
needs to be carried out by academics not working directly as evaluators 
employed by donors. Second, while there has been significant critique of the 
lack of knowledge used in existing legal development practices, no one has 
wondered what the knowledge base for the bottom-up approaches is. 133 
Hence, a convergence of the 'rule of law' and human rights discourses is not 
necessarily inevitable. Kinley, for example, is guarded. He describes the World 
Bank's position on human rights as being ambiguous. He detects resistance to the 
notion of institutional engagement with human rights - despite substantial rhetoric 
that appears to embrace this notion - in the Bank's policy statements and public 
comments.134 Describing its engagement as being half-hearted and superficial, he 
sees a 'recurring dissonance between what the Bank purports to be doing with 
respect to human rights and what it actually does': 135 
The World Bank's awareness of and commitment to human rights is patchy 
at best. Essentially it comprises some rhetorical statements from the top; 
some specific, targeted programs at the operational level; and very little in 
the middle. It is fair to say that there is some limited evidence of acceptance 
of the bank's human rights footprint.... But all in all, the evidence in 
aggregate falls far short of a recognition of the breadth and relevance of 
human rights to the bank's functions, let alone any recognition of the 
existence of a legal responsibility for any standard levels of respect for or 
protection, promotion or fulfilment of human rights on the part of the 
Bank.13S 
These misgivings are shared by Rittich. She acknowledges the potential significance 
of the Bank incorporating social concerns in the Comprehensive Development 
Framework into its mainstream agenda of market reform and economic development. 
However: 
So far, their efforts to promote market-centred modes of social inclusion 
and equality are speculative at best and suspect at worst.. .. The debates 
that must now ensue between international financial institutions and those 
that have other ideas about social justice will almost certainly revolve 
around such questions as the relationship between equity and efficiency ... 
and the possibility of overlap or conflict between economic and social, and 
cultural or political objectives can only be evaluated in more specific 
ways.137 
133 Van Rooij 8 2007, Bringing Justice to the Poor· Bottom-up Legal Development Cooperation, 19, 
http:l/ssm.com/abstract=1368185 at 14 December 2009. 
134 Kinley, D 2006, Human Rights and the World Bank: Practice, Politics and Law, in Sage, C & Woolcock. M (eds) 
World Bank Legal Review: Law, Equity and Development, World Bank, Washington D.C., pp. 353-383, 353. 
135 Ibid, 360. 
136 Ibid, 366. 
137 Rittich, K 2006, 'The Future of Law and Development: Second-Generation Reforms and the Incorporation of the 
Social,' in Trubek, D & Santos, A (eds}, The New Law and Economic Development: A critical appraisal, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, pp. 203-252, 247. See also: Rittich, K 2004, 'The Future of Law and Development: 
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The reason for this is that the distributional implications of governance and legal 
reform projects advanced by international financial institutions in the name of the 'rule 
of law' are often underestimated. The distributional effects of efficiency, equality, 
human rights or labour market justice, together with their political trade-offs, are often 
under-considered in the academic commentary. While growth might aid social justice, 
it does not inevitably do so; moreover, the role of the state to enable the market has 
not fundamentally shifted to include this social dimension.138 While human rights are 
now an official end to development, she argues that there is only selective 
engagement with both human rights norms and their institutional implications. Rittich 
detects resistance to the idea of endorsing a rights-based approach to 
development.139 She aligns with Kinley and argues that the actual content of the legal 
reform agenda has changed surprisingly little, and remains centred on concerns 
about the promotion of efficiency and competition through the protection of property 
and contract rights: 
The World Bank and IMF have decisively resisted this move ... arguing that 
economic growth is itself necessary for human rights, thus subverting the 
argument that development and market reform projects should 
automatically be subordinated to human rights norms.140 
Others share similar concerns. Harris, for example, notes that less than 7% of Bank-
supported 'rule of law' projects have any 'access to justice' component.141 Further 
misgivings at the evidence of the Bank's continued 'market fundamentalism' are 
expressed by Trubek: 'Despite the rhetoric of the social (dimensions of 
development), World Bank legal projects still focus primarily on creating the 
conditions for market activity.'142 
In sum, while it is clearly premature to assume the inevitability of convergence, there 
is some evidence of increased proximity between these discourses. It remains to be 
seen what form the result of this ongoing endeavour towards integration will take. 
This debate over convergence with human rights is very significant in this thesis. As 
I will argue in Chapter 4, it delineates the boundaries of a core contest over the 
Second Generation Reforms and the Incorporation of the Social,' Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 26, pp. 
199-243. 
138 Rittich 2006, ibid, 234. 
139 Rittich 2004, above n 137 242. 
140 Rittich 2006, above n 137, 227. 
141 Harris V, Consolidating ideology in law? Legal and judicial reform programmes at the World Bank, 25 July 2007 
<htto:J/www.brettonwoodsoroject.orgtart-554671 > at 26 November 2009. 
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theory for judicial reform. At its essence, this debate is between the instrumental and 
constitutive justifications for this endeavour. It highlights the paradigm gap between 
precepts of aggregate economic efficiency and individual equity. This gap is the 
missing distributional dimension of judicial reform, which I argue is the frontier's edge 
of the current discourse. What is now put in question is whether this paradigm shift 
will remain at the margins of judicial reform or take hold in the mainstream of 
practice. This contest is over the primacy of the prevailing new institutional economic 
theory of reform. I will shortly demonstrate that efficiency provides a useful but 
altogether insufficient means of justifying the relationship between justice and 
development. While efficiency is a central principle in economic analysis, it is not a 
legal principle. Moreover, it is deeply problematic to apply the efficiency criterion to 
judicial reform. Unlike neoclassical economics which is concerned with efficiency -
and economic efficiency may be regulated through competition law, for example, as 
an instrument of policy - justice is concerned with the administration of law using 
principles of fairness and equity. While it would certainly be unwise for law reformers 
to ignore efficiency concerns, efficiency disregards the distributional dimensions of 
reforms. In this crucial sense, I argue that efficiency is insufficient to trump equity in 
providing legitimacy to societal behaviour.143 Core to my argument is the focus of 
equity on the welfare of the individual which is distinct from the focus of efficiency on 
maximising aggregate output. In sum, equity can not be subordinated to efficiency .144 
This distinction highlights the tension embedded in liberalism, between those who 
believe that neutral rules - which are framed in terms of equality, such as equal 
rights - have no bearing on distributive issues, and those who believe state action 
should be used to secure social justice -which involves notions of equity and the fair 
distribution of resources or opportunity. This pivotal distinction is similarly illuminated 
in the 'thin' versus 'thick' debate, as we have already seen. 
b Engagement in the informal and customary sectors 
Mounting concerns over the inadequacy of the traditional state-focused reform 
approach have similarly impelled exploration of a means to increase engagement in 
the informal and customary sectors.145 Reference has already been made, for 
example, to the World Bank's Justice for the Poor initiatives, which acknowledge that 
customary law covers the majority of the world's poor. In many developing 
143 See, eg, Tshuma, L 1999, 'The Political Economy of the Wortd Bank's Legal Framework for Economic 
Development', Social and Legal Studies, vot 8, no. 1, pp. 75-96, 92. 
144 See, eg, Anderson, E & O'Neil, T 2006, 'A New Equity Agenda? Reflections on the 2006 World Development 
Report, the 2005 Human Development Report and the 2005 Report on the World Social Situation', working paper 
265, Overseas Development Institute, 5. 
145 See, eg: Upham above n 49; and, Golub above, n 131. 
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communities, traditional community norms and values prevail over state systems 
which not only lack legitimacy but are seen as mechanisms of control and coercion of 
oppressive regimes. 146 This search for a more 'pro-poor' approach goes so far as to 
suggest that the 'rule of law' model is promoting pathologies of inequality and uneven 
distribution of resources: 
[l)t highlights that the assumption that legal systems are innately just, and 
thus purely need to be strengthened - is fundamentally flawed; it indicates 
that rather than starting from a 'rule of law' model from which deviations can 
be measured and targeted, it may be more helpful - and realistic - to 
'assume anarchy.'147 
Woolcock et al analyse a range of initiatives have explored the pathways of local 
conflict with a view to understanding the characteristics that can support more 
effective reform interventions.148 An alternative line of inquiry focuses on the legal 
pluralism of many reform environments and what Adler, Porter and Woolcock term 
'interim institutions.' This inquiry creates spaces for equitable political contests, or what 
they call 'good struggles', and notions of legal pluralism and non-legal normativity 
where stakeholders can forge legitimate, accessible, and local arrangements to resolve 
disputes in an equitable and effective manner.149 
c Political economy and power analysis 
As we are already seeing, some initiatives are integrating judicial reform within a 
broader political economy analysis which has a potential to reframe this endeavour. 
Political economy analysis is defined by the OECD as being concerned with the 
interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power 
and wealth between different groups and individuals; and the processes that create, 
sustain and transform these relationships over time. 150 It is adopted by a number of 
146 Sage, C & Woolcock, M above n 9 28. 
147 Decker, K, Sage, C, & Stefanova, M 2006, Law or Justice: Building Equitable Legal Institutions, Wortd Bank; 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2006/Resources/477383-
1118673432908/Law or Justice Building Equitable Legal Institutions. pdf> at 26 November 2009. 
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Evidence and Implications from Indonesia', working paper no.19, Social Development Papers, Conflict Prevention & 
Reconstruction Unit, World Bank. See also Adler, D & Porter, D 2007, 'Legal Pluralism and the Role of Interim 
Institutions', working draft 17 March, (unpublished). 
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commentators as being useful in explaining how political institutions and the 
economic system influence each other.151 
Political economy analysis bridges donors' traditional preoccupation with neoclassical 
economics or politics to improve the effectiveness of aid. Britain's foreign aid agency, 
DfiD, for example, uses political economy analysis to study how power and 
resources are distributed and contested in different contexts, and its implications for 
development outcomes. This illuminates the underlying interests, incentives and 
institutions beneath the formal structures that enable or frustrate change. 152 
Both USAID and the World Bank use notions of good governance as a justification 
for judicial reform. This is indicative of the growing importance to donors of 
enhancing the integrity of state functions and service delivery. DfiD, for example, 
adopts a distinctive political economy approach to governance as being about power 
and how it is used: 
Governance is about the use of power and authority and how a country 
manages its affairs ... It is about people, power and politics ... Governance 
therefore is about relationships between citizens and the state.153 
DfiD focuses governance on three issues: state capability, accountability and 
responsiveness.154 Judicial reform constitutes one dimension of its development 
approach to securing peace and security. Security is seen as a precondition for 
development, managed through strategies of building effective states, governance, 
peace and security: 
Whether states are effective or not - whether they are capable of helping 
business grow, and of delivering services to their citizens, and are 
accountable and responsive to them - is the single most important factor 
that determines whether or not successful development takes place.155 
This focus on power as a key determinant of development is part of a broader, more 
sophisticated approach to the interrelationship between law and justice, economics 
and political science. This is evident in DfiD's 'drivers of change' initiative, which 
151 Political economy is defined here to generally describe the interdisciplinary study of economics, law, and political 
science in explaining how political institutions, the political environment, and the economic system influence each 
other; see usage below, and in, eg, Jensen, above n 88, 345. 
152 Department for International Development (DFID), 2009, 'Political Economy How To Note', 
<http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/P058.pdf> at 26 November 2009. 
163 DFID 2007, Governance, Development and Democratic Politics, DFID, London, 6. 
154 Ibid, 14. 
155 DFID 2006, Eliminating World Poverty: Making governance work for the poor, DfiD, London, ix. See also: DFID 
2005, 'Briefing: Using Drivers of Change to improve aid effectiveness', practice paper, November; and, Warrener, D. 
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Unsworth argues is emblematic of the growing recognition of the importance of 
integrating the social, cultural, political and institutional contexts in development: 
Power and 'drivers of change' analysis operates at the cutting edge of 
development. Political economy analysis can contribute positively to 
improved aid effectiveness and relevance by highlighting the risks of 
alternative strategies and investments, and demonstrating how political 
considerations and a more incremental approach can improve 
implementation.156 
There is a need for a more politically grounded approach to development that rests 
on a different model of how development really works. Unsworth, for example, 
argues that political systems create incentives for the productive use of resources. 
These should not rest on traditional notions of transferring institutional models from 
rich to poor countries because these notions are restricted by intellectual barriers; 
institutional incentives that reinforce the status quo; and discourage local ownership 
of the development agenda. She calls for a new form of partnership that rests on a 
better mutual understanding of the political economy of both rich and poor countries, 
rather than being driven by an agenda of financial or technical transfers. 157 Pycroft 
endorses this approach to extol the benefits of political-economy analysis: 
This approach focuses on the institutional change required to achieve 
transformational change. This institutional change is usually political, in that 
changing the way services are provided usually benefits some . . . at the 
expense of others. 158 
In this view, the term 'politics' refers broadly to development's aim to improve the 
quality of people's lives and their access to resources and opportunities, even though 
donors prefer to see themselves as being apolitical and engaged in providing 
'technical' assistance.159 This approach often confronts donors with the dilemma of 
having to secure legitimacy with governments that tend to represent the powerful 
vested interests of elite groups who have an interest in supporting the status quo 
rather than the transformational interests of the majority poor: 
156 Oahl-0stergaard, T. Unsworth, S, & Robinson, M 2005, Lessons Learned on the Use of Power and Drivers of 
Change: Analyses in development cooperation, OECD-DAC Network on Governance, Paris, ii. 
157 Unsworth, S 2009, 'What's Politics Got to do with It? Why donors find it so hard to come to terms with politics, and 
why this matters', Journal of International Development, vol. 21. iss. 6, pp. 883-894 
<http://www.devents.org.uk!Chanqe-unsworth.doc> at 10 December 2009. See also: Moore, M, Schmidt, A & 
Unsworth, S, 2009, 'Assuring our common future in a globalised world: the global context of conflict and state 
fragility', as yet unpublished paper. 
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A political economy analysis with a focus on power and interest may well 
conclude that the government - as protector and promoter of elite and 
powerful interests (and the institutions that defend those interests) - is a 
contributory factor in the slow pace of poverty reduction. 160 
d Realising the political economy potential of judicial reform 
In this thesis, I argue that political economy analysis has the potential to transform 
our understanding of the role of judicial reform. At the same time, I demonstrate that 
the potential of judicial reform is yet to be fully articulated in terms of political 
economy. 
In the next chapter, I will argue that judicial reform should aim to promote justice, and 
that justice is constitutive to development. Before doing so, I now argue that justice is 
integral to the political economy mix and its contribution should not be overshadowed 
by the pragmatism of power analysis. Politics is about the distribution of interests. 
Justice may affect that distribution, in particular that of policy-based 'interests' that 
are enacted by law - which lawyers call 'rights'. Justice is thereby an ingredient of 
politics, or power, whether we are comfortable with this admission or not. More 
specifically, justice has a distributional dimension affecting those interests - in a 
rectificatory sense of enabling rights rather than an executive sense of allocating 
interests. The distributional dimension is guided by notions of fairness and equity. 
Hence justice holds the collective interests of the state to account for individual 
claims to rights by reference to the normative standards of domestic or international 
law. Political economy and power analysis provide us with a potent new lens through 
which to sharpen our vision of the broader political environment within which judicial 
reform initiatives can contribute change. This lens highlights the often incompatible 
institutional interests of judiciaries, where their role as a key agent of change may be 
in direct conflict with their elite vested interest in preserving the status quo. This 
vision also provides insights on why judicial reform outcomes have often fallen short 
of expectations in the past. It calls for a more sophisticated development approach 
with a constitutionalist frame of reference, as I shall outline below. What I argue this 
means for the ongoing discourse is that justice should be admitted to the new 
development high-table of political economy - sitting as a disciplinary equal with 
development economics and political science - as the central mechanism for 
moderating power and resolving competing interests. 
160 Pycroft, ibid 2. 
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This argument begins by repositioning judicial reform within the vortex of the 
distribution of state power. It builds on the proposition that development is 
fundamentally a political matter and is primarily concerned with the form and 
distribution of power, and the manner in which it is used in and through the state. 
Leftwich is an exponent of this analytical approach. He defines power as being the 
capacity of A to get B to do something he would not have otherwise done: 
As understood here, politics consists of all the activities of conflict, 
negotiation and cooperation in the use, allocation and distribution of 
resources, wherever there are two or more people, and not only at the level 
of the state or the formal and conventionally understood domains of 
politics.... Stable states, or effective states, are constituted by a high 
degree of agreement about the rules of the game, the institutional 
arrangements which prescribe how decisions (and often what decisions) 
can and have to be taken about social and economic matters.161 
Political power has increasingly come to be recognised as a critical factor by both 
economists and policy-makers. Leftwich notes, however, that power is difficult to 
identify and even harder to measure, and is one of the most hotly contested concepts 
in political science. The notion of the developmental state affirms the primacy of 
politics and the power of the state in the formation, maintenance and change of 
institutions, especially those governing economic life. Thus, the control of power in 
the state must be a central preoccupation in any institutional account of development. 
This proposition about the overarching concept of power applies equally to the 'rule 
of law' and has already been embraced by Kennedy who refocuses the law and 
justice reform discourse to the issue of distribution. He observes that technical 
assistance experts act politically when they affect the distribution of power or 
positions that may be associated with domestic political contestations. While this is 
seldom explicitly acknowledged, he sees the emergence of the 'rule of law' 
movement as a development strategy that has become an 'unfortunate substitute' for 
engagement with the politics and economics of development policy making. However 
much we may wish to evade this reality, development and growth must ultimately be 
about politics: 
The tools of development policymaking - including the legal tools - are 
distributional. Whether rules of private law or acts of bureaucratic discretion, 
161 Leftwich, A 2007, 'The Political Approach to Institutional Formation, Maintenance and Change,' discussion paper 
no. 14, IPPG, University of Manchester, 23. See also, Leftwich A 1994, 'Governance, the State and the Politics of 
Development.' Development and Change, vol. 25, pp. 363-386. 
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they allocate resources and authority towards some and away from 
others.162 
Legal ground rules are more important to distribution than is conventionally 
recognised. Kennedy describes rules as the 'invisibility of the distributional 
consequences of law'. There are often non-distributive reasons for a rule that would 
prevent us from changing it in order to modify a particular distribution. He describes 
the lack of legal scholarship on this phenomenon as being 'truly extraordinary' .163 
Development strategy requires a detailed examination of the distributional choices 
which are affected by various legal rules and regimes in order to determine their 
likely impact on growth and development in social, political and economic terms: 
The idea that building 'the Rule of Law' might itself be a development 
strategy encourages the hope that choosing law in general could substitute 
for all the perplexing political and economic choices that have been at the 
centre of development policymaking for half a century. The politics of 
allocation is submerged. Although a legal re~ime offers an arena to contest 
these choices, it cannot substitute for them. 1 4 
This 'political' approach to reform is endorsed by Domingo and Sieder. In reviewing 
the Latin American experience, they argue that 'rule of law' reform cannot be 
politically or socially neutral because specific political and sectoral interests will be 
affected by its implementation and this requires the support of the ruling coalition.165 
Hence, I argue that the provision of justice, in all of its manifestations, should be seen 
as lying at the heart of any institutionalist analysis of the political economy of state 
change. It co-exists beside other policy functions such as the promotion of efficient 
economic institutions through the enforcement of property and contract rights. This 
blending of political economy functions, however, creates profound priority-setting 
challenges for development policy. Borner underscores the conundrum of supporting 
an appropriate role for the state- which may itself be as much part of the problem as 
the solution. It is a balancing act: 
162 Kennedy, D 2006, 'The RRule of Law, Political Choices and Development Common Sense', in The New Law and 
Economic Development, A Critical Appraisal, Trubek, D. M & Santos, A (eds), Cambridge University Press, New 
York, pp. 95-173, 170. 
163 Kennedy, D 1991, 'The Stakes of Law or Hale and Foucault.' Legal Studies Forum, vol. XV, no. 4, pp. 327-366, 
332. 
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The problem therefore becomes a dual one. First, the state should have the 
capacity to protect property, enforce contracts and provide public goods. 
Second, it should also be limited to doing essential and legitimate things.166 
e The moderating role of constitutionalism 
At this crucial juncture, I argue that constitutionalism provides the conceptual tools for 
managing the complex challenge of balancing the competing distributional interests 
of power-based state behaviour. 
This conundrum posed by Borner is elegantly reframed by Weingast. According to 
him, the fundamental political dilemma of an economic system is that a state which is 
strong enough to protect private markets is, by axiom, strong enough to confiscate 
the wealth of its citizens. The political foundation of economic markets is critical to 
their success. Markets cannot survive without strong political protections from the 
state itself. This then provides for the role for the constitution, being that set of apex 
societal institutions - the law of the laws - which governs political decision-making. 
By placing an appropriate set of constraints on the state, the constitution limits the 
state's powers to act in certain ways. Hence, a key role of constitutionalism is to 
provide the institutional means to constrain the state in its relationship to the market: 
Thriving markets require not only an appropriately designed economic 
system, but a secure political foundation that places strong limits on the 
ability of the state to confiscate wealth. This requires a form of limited 
government, that is, a state whose institutions credibly commit it to honour 
economic and political rights.167 
Interestingly, while the functioning of the state remains the constant preoccupation of 
the political economy approach, this preoccupation has allowed a lack of conceptual 
clarity in the notion of the 'rule of law' in relation to the state. Specifically, Weingast 
argues that the analysis of state functions in terms of external outputs, such as the 
delivery of justice and economic management, has eclipsed due consideration of 
constitutive internal dimensions of the state - which include the political settlement, 
security and basic administrative structures: 
The political settlement - including the restoration of a functioning and 
legitimate government and of constitutional rules - sits at the core of the 
state building project. This is 'surrounded' by three core functions of the 
166 Bomer, S, Bodmer, F & Kobler, M 2004, lnstftutional Efficiency and its Determinants: The role of political factors in 
economic growth, OECD, Paris, 16. 
167 Weingast, B 1993, 'Constitutions as Governance Structures: the political foundations of secure markets,' Journal 
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state: public administration, security through the establishment of a 
legitimate 'monopoly of violence', and the rule of law .... the next layer 
consists of those key public goods or outputs that a state should provide: 
justice systems and processes (beyond the rule of law, such as 
administration of justice; transitional justice; interaction with non-state 
justice and social norms); management of the economy, and public services 
such as health and education.168 
I now argue that the distinction between the constitutive and functional dimensions of 
the 'rule of law' is equally applicable in the broader context of judicial reform in fragile 
and developing states. This distinction exposes the preoccupation of donors with the 
functional domain of state development through efficiency-promoting measures. It 
also offers an alternative, more enabling, political economy approach to judicial 
reform. Such an approach would focus on equity-protecting measures which would 
restore distributive welfare to citizens by recognising their rights. 
Power analysis also provides a means of explaining why the transplantation of 
judicial and legal reform often fails. By differentiating between what they describe as 
'limited' and 'open' access orders, Weingast joins North in adopting Weber's classic 
definition of the state as holding the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. 169 In 
their description of the social mechanisms of power for controlling violence, powerful 
individuals with an incentive to be peaceful can affect the entire political and 
economic framework. Many developing states are 'limited' access orders where a 
dominant coalition creates peace and stability by creating rents that provide interests 
with incentives to refrain from violence; thus rent-creation provides a solution to the 
problem of violence. This situation contrasts with that of developed states where 
competition, 'open' access, and the 'rule of law' hold the society together because it 
is in the interests of political officials to observe constitutional rules. They argue that 
donor initiatives to introduce the 'rule of law', democracy, 'open' access to resources 
and markets can weaken the rent-creation system that holds the 'limited' access 
order together and, thereby threaten to destabilise the basis of order and the hold on 
violence. This may explain why development policies often fail. Directly applying 
elements of the 'open' access approach - such as judicial independence and the 
'rule of law' - to a 'limited' access order can be counterproductive. Power-holders 
resist such reforms until other incentives to promote change are provided. North, 
168 Fritz V and Menocal A, Understanding State-Building from a Political Economy Perspective: An Analytical and 
Conceptual Paper on Processes, Embedded Tensions and Lessons for International Engagement, Overseas 
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Approach to the Problems of Development', working paper no. 4359, Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank, 7-
8, and 41. Also see: Weber M, in Chapter 4, below, nn 206 and 207. 
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Weingast and others argue that this analysis applies to judiciaries in 'open' and 
'limited' access orders: 
Because delivery of services in limited access orders depends on personal 
connections, courts cannot dispense impartial justice. Instead, courts in 
limited access orders appear to be corrupt: insiders and elites are treated 
differently from others . . . many limited access order judicial systems are 
designed to have sufficient red tape so that they can collect numerous 
bribes that extract nearly the full value of each case. 170 
A demonstration of this illuminating analysis is played out empirically in the reform 
experience of transitional Eastern Europe which aimed at promoting judicial 
independence during the 1990s. Magalhaes' analysis of this experience identifies 
that new judicial institutions in emergent democracies were shaped primarily by the 
strategies of dominant political actors who attempted to maximise the congruence of 
the judiciary with their interests in political survival. From these findings, he argues 
that the self-interested actions of politicians provide the most robust empirically-
testable theory to explain the institutional treatment of judiciaries at the political level. 
He applies a distributional benefits approach to institutional choice based on the 
proposition that political actors pursue their individual self-interest to maximise 
power: 
In periods of democratic transition and constitution drafting, political parties 
will have preferences over judicial institutions and policies that maximise 
the congruence of the judiciary with their interests and the responsiveness 
of judges to their priorities.171 
While it remains to be seen whether a political economy analysis of the state can 
provide a comprehensive theory of law, Trubek argues powerfully that in 
development it is the changing vision of the role of the state that has cast law in 
different roles. In the law and development movement of the 1960s, the role of law 
was to empower the state on the assumption that private markets were too weak to 
ensure growth; the state needed to play a commanding role in the economy; and law 
should strengthen the powers of the state. This 'developmental state' orientation led 
to an emphasis on public law and regulation, with sweeping legal reforms of 
traditional economic sectors. By the 1980s, this approach was in retreat, driven by 
disillusionment with the results of state-led growth, and replaced with the 
'Washington Consensus' notion of law which empowered the private sector. Now the 
110 Ibid 28. 
111 Magalhaes, P 1999, 'The Politics of Judicial Reform in Eastem Europe,' Comparative Politics, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 
43-62. 47. 
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state was seen as a barrier to such empowerment and the role assigned to law was 
to curb the role of the state and facilitate private ordering. In this vision of the 'small 
state', neo-liberal thinkers cast the independent judiciary in the role of the watch-dog 
of this relationship, leading to a massive investment in judicial reform. Trubek 
comments that the spate of current initiatives are becoming characterised by the 
emphasis on an 'empowering state' to enable the private sector. This approach 
acknowledges that state intervention may be needed to empower the private sector 
by stimulating entrepreneurship, subsidising knowledge creation, and reducing risk. 
New initiatives are often carried out though a close partnership between the state 
and the private sector, and are often based on experimentation and constant 
program revision. In sum, there is now a strong movement in legal thought that seeks 
to envision new forms of governance and law that are more experimental, 
participatory, flexible, multi-level, and revisable.172 
Others are less sanguine. Heller, for example, sees a need for more work to 
articulate the political economy explanation of 'rule of law' assistance. At present, this 
explanation is consistent with a set of functions that describe the fundamental 
elements of a market-based economy and a democratic polity. But what is absent is 
a particularised account of the roles and structures of legal institutions in the political 
economies that are the objects of reform, or the dynamics of transition that will affect 
the process: 
It is as if rule of law goals are fed into 'a black box' whose hidden workings 
give little guidance about whether effective reform will emerge.173 
Evidently, applying this new political economy vision to judicial reform remains a work 
in progress. For this reason, Faundez's call to academics of political science and law, 
together with development practitioners, to integrate their respective approaches is 
timely. Legal and political processes are so closely intertwined that one cannot be 
properly understood without understanding the other.174 
The contemporary critique of practice converges on the call for greater knowledge. 
In closing this review, I propose that the political economy analysis be extended to 
172 Trubek, 0 2009, 'The Political Economy of the Rule of Law: The Challenge of the New Developmental State,' 
Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, vol. 1, pp. 28-32. See also, Trubek, 0 & Santos, A, above n 29; and Trubek, D & 
Trubek, L 2007, 'New Governance and legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation', Columbia 
Journal of European Law, vel. 13, no. 3, pp. 539-564. 
173 Heller T, 2003, 'An Immodest Postscript,' in Jensen E & Heller T (eds), Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical 
A/1proaches to the Rule of Law, Stanford University Press, California pp. 382-417, 393. 
1 
" Faundez, J 2005, 'The Rule of Law Enterprise - Towards a Dialogue between Practitioners and Academics', 
CSGR working paper no. 164/05, University of Warwick. 
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incorporate the restorative distributional dimension of justice and constitutionalism as 
key components of the new vision. To realise this, however, it is clear that reform 
endeavour will need to adopt a considerably more nuanced approach in order to 
consolidating judicial independence among its other objectives. 
5 Conclusions 
Despite the insufficiency of existing knowledge, there is now an increasingly 
substantial body of experience and critique from which certain observations can be 
made. 
While donors' justifications for judicial reform have been diverse, the nature and 
content of their activities have been fairly uniform. Their reform packages have 
generally promoted 'thin' procedural aspects of the administration of justice in the 
formal sector of the state. These reform endeavours have predominantly supported 
the instrumental role of courts as protectors of property and investment for the 
overarching purposes of economic growth. 
My analysis of the evolution of this endeavour across the period has revealed that it 
is characterised by iterations of disappointing results followed by phases of 
experimentation and reinvention. The present mounting perceptions of 
disappointment over the failure to alleviate poverty and deepening global inequalities 
falls within this pattern and has led to the present phase of reinvention of approach. 
This disappointment in performance is spurring renewed exploration of the 
boundaries of judicial reform. Three significant new dimensions are presently being 
explored: empowerment and possible convergence with the human rights discourse; 
engagement in the informal and customary sectors of justice; and a more 
sophisticated political economy approach which centrally integrates justice s as a 
constitutional mechanism to moderate competing interests through reform. These 
overtures are currently revitalizing our understanding of the roles that justice, the 
courts and judicial reform may play in development. Collectively, they offer a potential 
to transform endeavour. 
In the next two chapters, I will extend this analysis to the theoretical justifications for 
reform approach and the extent to which these justifications have been validated 
through empirical inquiry. My analysis will establish that the existing instrumentalist 
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approach to judicial reform is demonstrably insufficient, opening the space to explore 
a more humanistic approach which aims to promote justice as fairness and equity . 
• • • 
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CHAPTER 4- THEORIES OF REFORM 
1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, I established that judicial reform could be conceptualised in four 
principal justifications which are based on the various economic, political, social and 
human theories of development. These justifications are still evolving, often 
conflated and on occasion in collision. In this chapter, I will analyse these theoretical 
justifications more closely to address the questions: What is the purpose of judicial 
reform? and What are its objectives? 
In essence, I argue that judicial reform is an evolving practice in search of a coherent 
justification and compelling theoretic discourse. Over the years, judicial reform theory 
has been assigned a variety of justifications or goals, with foundations in the 
epistemologies of disparate disciplines, predominantly: development economics; the 
political and social sciences; and law and justice. As practice has evolved, these 
justifications have become increasingly multi-disciplinary. They have been conceived 
on a swirling convergence of legal, economic and political philosophies, and are 
evolving as we have already seen into what may be termed a political economy 
approach.175 
In this thesis, I use a theory/practice dichotomy to argue that the domains of theory 
and practice exist within a continuous cycle, each responding to the other.176 Theory 
is generally defined as a system of ideas held as an explanation of a group of facts or 
phenomena, and a statement of what are held to be general laws, principles or 
causes of something known or observed.177 More particularly, Patton defines the 
domain of theory as denoting a set of concepts which are related through statements 
of relationship into a conceptually ordered framework that explains some relevant 
social or other phenomena. 178 These statements of relationship explain who, what, 
when, where, why, how and with what consequences an event occurs. Thus 'theory' 
175 See earlier discussion on political economy analysis in chapter 3, where political economy is defined to describe 
the interdisciplinary study of economics, law, and political science in explaining how political institutions, the political 
environment, and the economic system influence each other; above, n 151. 
176 In this thesis 1 use 'dichotomy' {which is defined as the division of a genus into two mutually exdusive parts: 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rc~ Ed., 1987, Clarendon Press, Oxford), as a polemical device to describe tension 
between two key ingred~nts in a relationship under study. Examples of my use of dichotomies in this thesis include 
the overarching tension of western notions of liberalism between the interests of the individual and the collective 
state, which may be seen as a tension between equity and utility; the philosophic tension between the economistic 
and the humanistic functions of the state; the heuristic tension between theory and practice; and the evaluative 
tension between positivism and constructivism, among others. My use of this device is to highlight the existence of 
crucial relationships and the critical nature of the balance of key qualities in those relationships, rather than to 
~ostulate the superiority of either ingredient. 
77 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3m Ed., 1987, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
178 Patton, above n 7, 487. 
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offers an explanation for phenomena that are related to development policy and 
empowers governments and donors to address specified questions. This is held in 
contradistinction to 'practice' which describes the domain of action, performance, 
doing and observation.179 Theory is important because it may inform practice and 
practice is important because it may refine theory in a perpetual cycle of 
improvement. Hence, a study of theory is valuable in illuminating what does or should 
drive practice, just as a study of practice is valuable in revealing the sufficiency of 
that theoretical approach. Within this dichotomy, empirical research endeavour is 
crucially concerned to measure this relationship and investigate the integrity of 
theoretical hypotheses by reference to the observable evidence of practice. 
Within this understanding, I appraise the coherence of these theoretical justifications 
against the body of available empirical research in this and the next chapter. In this 
chapter, I survey the philosophical discourse to reveal that there are three 
foundational elements of the liberal tradition which set the stage for justifying judicial 
reform: first, the political function of the state and its social contract with its citizens to 
support the 'good life'; second, the pivotal relationship between the state and the 
market in pursuit of economic development and the alleviation of poverty; and third, 
the responsibilities of law to define the governance of these relationships and the 
responsibility of justice to protect these values with fairness and equity. 
Analysing these philosophic underpinnings is crucially important in setting the stage 
for all that follows in next chapter. It provides an understanding of the tensions in the 
liberal philosophic tradition, enabling us to identify the key debates which define 
development policy and practice. More specifically, my analysis reveals that there are 
two principal theoretical approaches, or justifications, for judicial reform. Each builds 
on the classical and Enlightenment thinking on the precepts of justice, the role of the 
state, and the functional nature of the social contract. The first and arguably 
prevalent justification has its origin in the thinking of Weber and North. Central to this 
justification is the importance of reforming courts so that they can provide the means 
to secure property and contract to enable investment-based economic growth. The 
second and more recent approach has evolved from the thinking of Rawls and Sen. 
It offers a normatively rights-based alternative which centres on the constitutive 
justification of promoting human welfare. 
179 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, above n 177. 
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In this chapter, I establish the foundations for the core argument of this thesis that the 
prevailing instrumentalist approach has not provided a robust justification for judicial 
reform. In the next chapter, I will demonstrate that this approach lacks any adequate 
empirical validation and has failed to promote equitable growth. I will then argue on 
the basis of these insufficiencies that this theory needs to be realigned with a 
constitutive 'thick' restorative equitable dimension that promotes justice as fairness 
and equity. 
In sum, this chapter provides the philosophic underpinnings of the central argument 
of this thesis, viz. the need to reframe the justification for judicial reform in terms of 
promoting justice as fairness and equity. 
2 Theorists - philosophy and justification 
The foundations of the role of law in society and, more specifically, the theories 
relating to the role of the state and the application of judicial reform in development 
are, I argue, to be found in the classical, Enlightenment and modern concepts of 
liberal philosophy. Proponents of various policy approaches, notably the prevalent 
school of new institutional economics, build from these philosophic foundations. Most 
proponents generally agree on the central role of the liberal state in providing a 
system of law and justice to serve a variety of societal and developmental goals. As 
we will shortly see, however, there is considerable debate over the nature and 
parameters of that role. At its heart, this debate reflects a deeply ingrained tension 
over the balance between the economic and the humanistic goals of development. 
In this foundational section, I traverse the thinking of Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, 
Montesquieu, Rousseau, Mill, Smith, Weber, Rawls, Hayek, North and Sen to 
establish the theoretical justifications for judicial reform. This survey will synthesise 
the theories that have and continue to be influential, if not determinative, as the 
conceptual underpinnings for judicial development practice today. In essence, it will 
establish the philosophic foundations for the current contest over whether judicial 
reform, as a key public good and core function of the state, should primarily serve 
instrumentalist ends of supporting economic development or constitutive ends of 
promoting human welfare. 
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a Foundations of classical thinking: justice, equality and equity 
Within the liberal Western tradition, the concept and functions of the modern state 
may be traced to the seminal thinking of Aristotle who examined the nature of the 
'polis,' or civil republic. In the Politics, Aristotle formulated the basis for Western 
government and constitutionalism, and provided the earliest available formulation of 
a doctrine on the sovereignty of law. He proposed that the panoply of precepts of law 
are sovereign on every issue; that governments are servants of the law; that lawful 
rule or the 'rule of law' is preferable to arbitrary rule or tyranny - the ideal being a 
society governed by reason not passion - and that people have the right to 
collectively elect their ruler and to call them to account: 
The rule of law is therefore preferable according to the view we are stating, 
to that of a single citizen ... law, as the pure voice of God and reason, may 
thus be defined as reason free from all passion.180 
Aristotle saw the essence of the polis to be fundamentally for moral or spiritual 
causes. To attain these causes and enable self-sufficiency for the purposes of the 
good life, the state must provide food, arts and crafts, arms, property, service of the 
gods, and a system of deliberation to promote issues of public interest.181 The polis 
contained all the resources necessary for complete human development, including 
the establishment of a common system of justice: 
Man, when perfected, is the best of animals; but if he is isolated from law 
and justice he is the worst of all ... Justice which is his salvation belongs to 
the polis; for justice, which is the determination of what is just, is an ordering 
of the political association.182 
Aristotle saw justice as a political good. His doctrine involved the notion of equality 
and the distribution of equal amounts to equal persons. In other words, justice 
involves a notion of proportionate equality and has a distinctively distributive 
dimension.183 Justice is considered to mean equity, but does not invariably mean 
equality because justice is relative to persons being equal and a just distribution is 
one in which the relative values of the things given correspond to those of the person 
180 Aristotle, above n 12, 46; see also 169 and ixi. 
181 Ibid 299. 
182 Ibid, 7. 
183 1bid 129. See also: Aristotle, above n 13. In the Ethics, Aristotle contemplates the object of life, moral goodness, 
other moral and intellectual virtues, including justice. Justice, which is concerned with evenness. is either distributive 
or rectificatory (at 118). In Book v: x, he defines justice as meaning being either lawful or fair, and introduces the 
notion of equity or fairness to correct any deficiencies in the law: Justice and equity are neither absolutely identical 
nor generically different. This is the essential nature of equity; it is a rectification of law in so far as law is defective on 
account of its generality (at 140-1 ). 
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receiving them.184 In this crucial sense, 'equality' and 'equity' are convergent but 
critically distinctive notions - the latter is rectificatory of the law and involves 
distributive dimensions which do not necessarily require sameness. This crucial 
distinction is highlighted in the Ethics where Aristotle's definition of justice 
distinguishes between law and the notion of equity: justice and equity are neither 
absolutely identical nor generically different: 
This is the essential nature of equity; it is a rectification of law in so far as 
law is defective on account of its generality. It is now clear what equity is, 
and that it is just, and superior to one kind of justice.185 
The fundamental proposition that the state exists for the purpose of providing the 
means to attain a 'good life' is the foundation for all subsequent Western concepts of 
liberalism. This has not just stood the test of time; it remains as relevant today as it 
was then in providing the means to moderate competing interests in any political 
economy analysis of the state and in balancing the interests of the collective and the 
individual. This precept was subsequently distilled and advanced by the philosophers 
of the Enlightenment and is directly relevant to my argument for the realignment of 
the theory for judicial reform. 186 
b Visions from the Enlightenment of the state and individual 
The many years of the 'Dark Ages' were to pass before Hobbes resumed this 
discourse in 1651. In Leviathan, he formulated the revolutionary doctrines of 
republicanism and social contract theory which were to provide the mezzanine for the 
modern concepts of the state and legitimate government. To escape war and life in 
nature outside the state, which he described as 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short,' Hobbes argued that people in the state of nature surrender their freedom and 
accede to a social contract, thus establishing a civil society.187 He saw peace as the 
first law of nature; individuals divest certain natural rights for the sake of peace and 
protection in society. He extolled the unlimited will of the sovereign in his belief that a 
strong central authority was needed to restrain the freedoms of the individual in order 
to avoid the discord of the then recent civil war. He saw any abuses of power by that 
authority as being the price of peace. 
184 Aristotle, above n 12,117. 
185 Aristotle, above n 13, 141. 
186 Aristotle, above n 12, 234. 
187 Hobbes T 1651, Leviathan, Plamenatz J (ed) 1962 Collins, Glasgow, 143, and in Chapter xiii, generally; above, n 
119. Hobbes defined twetve principal rights or powers of the sovereign, including: to prescribe the rules of civil law 
and property, to be judge in all cases, and to punish with corporal or pecuniary punishment or ignominy. 
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In relatively short order, Locke then extended the thinking on the social contract 
between the citizen and the state in Two Treatises of Government, published in 
1690. In the Second Treatise, in particular, he propounded the rules that bind the 
social contract in his theory of liberty, civil society, property and civilisation. The only 
legitimate governments are those which have the consent of the people. Unlike 
Hobbes, he argued in favour of the social contract limiting sovereign power and 
preserving the natural rights to life, liberty and property. He proposed that these 
rights be guaranteed by three conditions: law agreed to by consent; independent 
judges to resolve disputes pursuant to law; and the executive power to sentence. 
People choose to enter the state of society in order to avoid the state of war, and to 
protect their property .188 
Building on these emerging republican notions of popular sovereignty and the 'rule of 
law', Montesquieu then published The Spirit of the Laws in 1748. He advocated 
constitutionalism based on the notion that a government should be set up so that no 
man need be afraid of another. Also at odds with Hobbes, he consolidated the 
argument for a clearly defined and balanced separation of powers as the key 
institutional constraint on executive power in order to preserve civil liberties and the 
'rule of law' .189 
Shortly afterwards, in 1762, Rousseau propounded the supremacy of man-made law. 
In the Social Contract, he built on both Hobbes' and Locke's notions and outlined the 
elements of a political community based on popular - as opposed to monarchic -
sovereignty. Immortalised for the opening lines: '[m]an is born free, and everywhere 
he is in chains,' he argued that by joining together in civil society through the social 
contract and abandoning claims of natural right, individuals can both preserve 
themselves and remain free. He saw the social contract as legitimising the 
submission of the individual to the authority of the general will of the people because 
it safeguarded individuals against the wills of others. It also ensured that they obeyed 
the law because they are, collectively, the makers of the law.190 
In 1776, Smith refocused this discourse in An Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations 
which established the foundation of free market economics based on the division of 
labour, pursuit of self-interest and competition, and the freedom of trade. The Wealth 
188 Locke, J 1690 'The Second Treatise of Government' in Peardon T (ed) 1952, 'The Second Treatise of 
Government', liberal Arts Press, New York, 79. 
189 Montesquieu C, Baron de Secondat, 1748 The Spirit of the Laws, Cohler A. Miller B & Stone H (eds), 1989, 
Cambridge University Press, 1-6. 
190 Rousseau, JJ 1762, The Social Contract & Discourses (Cole G trans, rev ed, 1973) Dent, london, 181. 
78 
of Nations which is generally seen as the first comprehensive defence of free market 
policies, argues that the free market, while appearing chaotic and unrestrained, is 
actually guided by a so-called 'invisible hand' to produce the right amount and variety 
of goods. If, for example, a product shortage occurs, its price rises thus creating a 
profit margin that creates an incentive for others to enter production, eventually 
eliminating the shortage. If too many producers enter the market, the increased 
competition among manufacturers and plentiful supply lowers the price of the product 
to its production cost, or the natural price. Smith argued that competition in the free 
market would benefit society as a whole by keeping prices low while still preserving 
an incentive to provide a wide variety of goods and services. Harking back to his 
earlier Theory of Moral Sentiments, he saw self-interest as being socially beneficial. 
This vision of what would now be described as 'incentives' has become foundational 
to modem economic thinking: 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that 
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We 
address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never 
talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. 191 
Mill resumed the political reasoning in On Liberty, published in 1859. In it, he 
advocated the 'harm principle' on which he defined the limits of the state's power 
over an individual. This principle held, in essence, that the individual has the right to 
act as s/he wants, so long as these actions do not harm others. If the action only 
directly affects the person undertaking it, society has no right to intervene, even if it 
involves self-harm: 
The only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any 
member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.192 
He went on to argue that government was a struggle between liberty and authority. 
This struggle was resolved by: setting limits on the power which the ruler should be 
suffered to exercise over the community; defining certain political liberties or rights; 
and establishing constitutional checks for the community. These precepts have been 
influential in all ongoing Western concepts of liberalism.193 
191 Smith A 1776, An Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations, Cannan E (ed; 5tn ed.) Metheun & Co, London, Vol. 1, 16. 
Smith had earlier argued that there are some principles of nature, such as moral sentiment and benevolence, where 
even the greatest ruffian derived sorrow from the sorrow of others, which may explain why human nature appears to 
be simultaneously self-regarding and other-regarding: Smith A, 1759, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Haakonssen 
K (Ed) 2002. Cambridge University Press. 
"' Mill JS, 1859, On Liberty, Shields C (ed) 1956, Library of Liberal Arts, New York, 13. 
193 Ibid, 122. 
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In 1789, Bentham propounded the 'greatest happiness principle' which was seminal 
in establishing the foundations for utilitarianism.194 This principle, which offered to 
assess the merit of actions by their consequences rather than by abstract or 
contentious moral judgments, has been influential in justifying the subsequent 
preoccupation of neoclassical economics with efficiency and aggregating growth as a 
means of maximising social wellbeing. As we shall shortly see, I will build on Rawl's 
'difference principle' to argue that one of the crucial challenges in any liberal 
approach to development is to find the right balance between utility and equity, being 
the metric of fairness which moderates the tension between collective and individual 
wellbeing. 
The fulcrum of liberalism 
As demonstrated above, the thinking of the classical and Enlightenment philosophers 
was seminally influential in providing the theoretical foundations of modern notions of 
liberalism. Liberalism is distinguished by the importance it attaches to the civil and 
political rights of individuals.195 Liberalism springs from a vision of society which is 
crucially composed of individuals rather than classes, in a voluntary relationship with 
government, and stresses their liberty as the primary social good.196 Liberals demand 
a substantial realm of personal freedom which the state should not intrude upon, 
except to protect others from harm. A liberal state does not seek to resolve conflicting 
beliefs, but rather provides a neutral framework within which citizens can pursue their 
various concepts of the good life. Liberalism as defined in this way is the only 
humane response to the inevitable pluralism and diversity of modern societies. At its 
essence, liberalism enshrines free choice - resting on core concepts of individual 
rights, liberty and equality of opportunity - which is the dominant discourse in the 
modern, Western, democratic tradition. 197 In political science, this classical concept of 
liberalism, connoting notions of autonomy and the self-governing state, is the fulcrum 
in the contest over the relationship between the individual and the collective. In my 
argument, liberalism provides the ultimate yardstick with which any justification for 
judicial reform should be measured. 
194 Bentham, J 1789, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bums, J & Hart, HLA (eds) 1970, 
Athlone, London. 
195 Honderich, T 1995, Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 483. 
196 Bullock, A & Trombley S (eds) 1999, New Fontana Dictionary of Modem Thought, HarperCollins, London. 
197 A note on terminology: in Europe a 'liberal' generally refers to a defender of the free market: in the US, this term 
may refer to a defender of the welfare state, sometimes Godless and/or immoral. In this thesis, I adopt the fanner 
meaning. 
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ii Tipping point of neo-liberalism -and the contest over economics 
This classic concept of liberalism has of course been variously adapted, and must be 
clearly differentiated from what has recently been termed nee-liberalism. 
Nee-liberalism, or neo-classical liberalism, espouses economic liberalism as a means 
of promoting economic development and securing political liberty. It has both 
economic and political connotations. Government control over the economy is 
perceived as inefficient, corrupt and undesirable. Nee-liberalism sees human well-
being as best advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills 
within an institutional framework with strong private property rights, free markets, and 
free trade. It emphasises the significance of contractual relations in the market place. 
The state is held responsible for creating and preserving an institutional framework 
appropriate to such practices, but should not extend beyond these functions. The 
thinking of Hayek, in particular, has been influential in creating the notion of the 
'night-watchman' state whose minimalist core functions comprised national defence, 
civic policing and market liberalisation.198 
Nee-liberal thinking gained ascendancy during the 'World Debt crisis' of the 1980s 
and the Soviet collapse of the early 1990s. Based on the thinking of Friedman and 
the 'Chicago School' of economics,199 it became the hallmark of the 'Washington 
Consensus'. This philosophy is distinguished from that of Keynes who had earlier 
emphasised a more active economic role for the state extending, for example, to 
social welfare. Keynesian economic thinking promoted a mixed economy where both 
the state and the private sector had important roles. He asserted that aggregate 
demand for goods was the driving factor of the economy, especially in times of 
downturns. Government policies could then be used to promote macro level demand 
to fight high unemployment and deflation, as it was done in the 1930s. Thus the 
solution to the Great Depression - and increasingly applied in current fiscal and 
monetary policy - was to stimulate the economy by reducing interest rates and 
increasing government investment in infrastructure. 200 While it would be foolhardy to 
reduce this discourse to a polarisation of competing liberal economic philosophies 
between Friedman and Keynes, it may be seen that competing notions of the role of 
the state and the market may be found at the heart of this economic policy debate. 
198 Hayek, F 1960; The Constitution of Uberty, Routledge, London; and Hayek, F 1944, The Road to Serfdom, 
Routledge, London, 42 onwards; below, n 209. 
199 See, eg: Friedman M 1969, The Optimum Quant;ty of Money and Other Essays, MacMillan, London , among 
many others. 
200 See, eg: Keynes, JM 1973, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money MacMillan, CUP, London, 
among many others. 
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Thus, various neo-liberal concepts of the 'small state: free market' model of 
development characterised the 'Washington Consensus'. It also epitomised the 
Reagan and Thatcher administrations' policy approaches which provided the 
dominant orthodoxy to global economic development during the 1980-2000s. 
By the late 1990s, the pre-eminence of nee-liberalism was tarnished by mounting 
concerns over the unevenness of economic development, marking an end to what 
has become termed 'the grand narrative of market triumphalism'.201 More and more 
exponents of nee-liberalism have disavowed it. Notably, Greenspan, former chairman 
of the US Federal Reserve, now admits to having been mistaken in presuming that 
the self-interests of organisations would protect their own shareholders and their 
equity in the firms.202 Nee-liberalism is now labelled 'market fundamentalism' by its 
critics for glorifying untrammelled self-interest in the market, masking an ideological 
justification for capitalism and promoting atomistic individualism at the expense of the 
collective interest. Stiglitz, for example, has been trenchantly critical of the failure of 
globalisation to promote equal growth.203 Harvey provides a similarly caustic critique 
that the supposed 'freedoms' embodied in the nee-liberal state reflected the interests 
of private property owners, businesses, multinational corporations and financial 
capital at the expense of all others. He argues that nee-liberalism was, from the very 
beginning, a project to restore class power, defined in terms of the entrepreneurial 
caste. He sees its main achievement as the promotion of inequality by redistributing 
rather than generating wealth and income with the critical backing of the state. 204 
Ultimately, as I will establish in the next chapter, the failure of the 'Washington 
Consensus' was not in failing to create growth - because aggregated measures of 
global wealth rose to unprecedented levels during this period - but rather in its 
unevenness. The lack of equity in distribution that resulted not just in the poverty 
traps documented by Sachs but also in the inequity traps documented by Collier and 
201 See, eg.: Bunting, M 2009, 'Market dogma is exposed as a myth: Where is the new vision to unite us?' Guardian, 
28 June, <http://www.guardian.eo.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/28/societv~values~moralitv-political-vision?> at 10 
December 2009. 
202 Clark, A & Treanor, J 2008, 'Greenspan -I was wrong about the economy. Sort of Guardian, 24 October, 
<http://www.guardian.eo.uk/business/2008foct/24/economics-creditcrunch-federal-reserve:areenspan> 10 December 
2009. This admission of the self-destructive nature of market interests conforms, as we shall see later in this chapter 
with Polanyi's prescient critique of unregulated markets; Polanyi, K 2001, The Great Transformation: The Political 
and Economic Origins of Our Time, 2"d edn, Beacon, Boston, below, n 241. 
203 Stiglitz, J 2002, Globalization and its Discontents, Penguin, London; below, n 250. 
204 Harvey, 0 2005, Neo/iberalism: A brief history, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 7, 16, 159, 204. See also, Harvey 
D (n.d.), Neoliberalism and the Restoration of Class Power, 
<http://www.princeton.edu/-sf/workshops/neoliberalism/classrestore.pdf> at 26 November 2009. 
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Harvey is now increasingly apparent to the earlier subscribers of these development 
policies, notably the World and Asian Development Banks, among others.205 
The significance of this critique, I argue, lies in its highlighting the volatility and 
sensitivity of the relationship of the individual to collective interests, in any concept of 
liberalism. As we will see in the next chapter, the state's relationship to the market is 
critical in determining the distribution of wealth. In this thesis, my most potent critique 
of nee-liberalism, as distinct from classical liberalism, is in the equitable or distributive 
dimension in which it has demonstrably failed to deliver. Getting the balance right is, 
however, not just difficult, but a constant challenge. Owing to the ever-shifting 
political economy within which development endeavour is framed, there is a constant 
need to reinvent development approaches. Hence, my critique is not so much that 
nee-liberalism may have failed, but rather that judicial reform endeavour within that 
broader suite of development strategies is yet to adapt to address the particular 
challenges of promoting justice and equity. In this sense, this is a critique of the 
trajectory to date: judicial reform has yet to attain its equitable rationale. 
iii Significance of liberalism 
The importance of this liberal philosophic tradition is that it provides the overarching 
conceptual foundation and justification for judicial reform. 
First, it explains and justifies the notion of the social contract and the 
conceptualisation of state power as being duty-bound to provide social services, or 
public goods. These notions are now embedded beyond refute in the discourse of 
political science. Second, the interpretation of justice as a core function of the state, 
embodying dispensations of equity and notions of distribution, has been 
conceptualised from the inception of Western philosophy. Third, the liberal tradition of 
demarcating the domain of state power, which is in tension with the earlier precept, 
has been particularly influential in the prevalent 'free market' policies of the 
'Washington Consensus' of development. Fourth, the power of self-interest is a tenet 
of classical economics and prevalently seen as the engine of growth-based 
development. Fifth, the doctrine of separation of powers has become foundational to 
modern constitutionalism and the political economy approach. As we will see, it 
20
f> Eg World Bank's World Development Reporl: Equity and Development, 2006, above n 73; also, Asian 
Development Bank below, n 563. 
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justifies the focus on the judiciary as a key developmental institution, and explains 
the importance of consolidating its independence. 
c Contest of modem philosophy 
Building from the convergence of these liberal foundations, a number of thinkers in 
the past century have been directly influential on the formulation of the development 
approach to judicial reform. I now argue that these thinkers may be classified into two 
major and competing schools, one of institutionalism and the other of humanism. 
Institutionalism 
The first and prevalent approach is the institutionalist school of development which 
casts judicial reform in an instrumental role supporting economic growth. This 
approach is informed particularly by the thinking of Weber, Hayek and North. 
Weber is significant in this thesis for having established a linkage between legal and 
economic theories by arguing that law as a sociological phenomenon supports the 
development of capitalism. Building on Smith's foundations of a free market 
economic precept, he saw law as being fundamentally related to but not determined 
by economic factors. For Weber, rational law is a precondition of capitalism because 
it provides the necessary certainty and predictability which are essential for 
entrepreneurs to pursue their profit making enterprises.206 Rational law describes a 
social system of rules and procedures derived in such a way that they constitute a 
logically clear, internally consistent and theoretically coherent system of rules under 
which all situations are logically subsumed. He considered the concepts of the state, 
law and economic interests and examined their relationship to the 'free market', 
notably through the provision of rights in contract and property. Of particular 
relevance to this thesis, Weber's sociology of law has been formative to the 
institutionalist discourse. It rests on a notion of legitimate order, where 'order' is 
called 'law' when it is guaranteed by the state, with the likelihood that coercion -
aimed at bringing about conduct in conformity with that order or at avenging its 
206 Weber, M 1954, Law in Economy and Society, Rheinstein, M (ed) & Shils, E (transl), Harvard University Press. 
Cambridge Massachusetts, among others. See also: Tshuma who argues that the reason why the World Bank has 
chosen the procedural and institutional version of the rule of law is because it is supposed to guarantee stability and 
predictability which are essential elements of a climate where business risk may be rationally assessed and the cost 
of transactions lowered. This argument was advanced by Weber who argued that the predictability and calculability in 
the manner in which the legal system operates were important for capitalist development. Weber saw the 
predictability and calculability of the way the legal system operated as a function of the rationalization and 
systematization of law. Tshuma, L 1999, 'The Political Economy of the World Bank's Legal Framework for Economic 
Development', Social and Legal Studies, voL 8, no. 1, pp. 75-96, 84. 
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violation -will be exercised by that state. This sociology establishes Weber's classic 
definition of the state: 
Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that 
(successfully} claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory. 207 
This thinking is foundational to the school of new institutional economics. Weber has 
been directly influential on the formulation of judicial reform approaches. He stands 
for the key developmental proposition that the modern legal doctrines of property and 
contract enforced by a politically independent and technically competent judiciary are 
the best means of managing the risks of transactions with strangers. 208 This 
proposition has become central to the economic justification for promoting courts as 
key institutions of the state to protect the market. It has created a major conceptual 
link between the earlier seminal work of Smith, discussed above, with the more 
recent work of North, discussed below. 
As we have already seen, Hayek then extended the libertarian economic school of 
thinking. He argues that the central role of the state is to maintain the 'rule of law' 
with as little arbitrary intervention in the economy as possible. Within the global 
political economy contest of the time between capitalism and communism, he 
extolled the workings of the free market and called for a society which is organised 
around a market order. In this order the apparatus of the state is employed largely to 
enforce the law, enabling a market of free individuals to function and ensuring the 
free flow of economic information within society. 209 
ii North's rules ofthe game 
Most recently, North has integrated the combined thinking of these legal and 
economic philosophers to build an overarching theory of development which is based 
around the key notion of institutions. North defines 'institutions' - not to be confused 
with organisations - as: 
207 Weber, M 1918, 'Politics as a Vocation' in Gerth, Hand Mills, C Wright (eds) 1948, From Max Weber: Essays in 
Sociology, Routledge, London. 77-128.78. 
208 Weber, M 1954, Law in Economy and Society, Rheinstein, M (ed) & Shils, E (transl), Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge Massachusetts. 
209 Hayek, F 1960; The Constitution of Uberty, Routledge, London; and Hayek, F 1944, The Road to Serfdom, 
Routledge, London, 42 onwards; above n 198. 
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the rules of the game in a society, or, more formally, the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence, they structure 
incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic. 210 
North integrates Weber's insights on the link between law and development. He 
positions the legal 'institutions' of property and contract, as defined by Weber, in 
comprehensive markets. For this thesis, North is most relevant for his contribution to 
'new institutional economics' and 'institutional political economy'. which apply 
economic theory and quantitative methods to explain why some societies have 
historically prospered while others have not. His research focuses on understanding 
the role of human-made institutions in shaping economic behavior. The central tenet 
of his thinking is that economic performance hinges on institutions. 
North argues that 'institutions matter' and, more specifically, that they matter in 
poverty reduction.211 By providing structure to everyday life and serving as a guide to 
human interaction, institutions reduce uncertainty so that opportunities for interaction 
in a society can be determined. These institutions enable human cooperation which 
is essential for political, social and economic order. They are founded on shared 
common beliefs and norms that direct complex relationships between members of a 
society. Trade in modern markets is a notable example: 
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints 
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal 
rules (constitutions, laws, property rights). Throughout history, institutions 
have been devised by human beings to create order and reduce uncertainty 
in exchange.212 
North's work is based on three key economic assumptions which are relevant to 
development: (a) technical progress is under the control of societies; (b) private 
individuals will invest resources in trying to discover new techniques which make a 
profit; and (c) the rewards of technical progress are dependent on social institutions. 
In effect, only if society has a mechanism to give property rights to the entrepreneur 
or inventor will there be much private reward. From these assumptions, North draws 
the conclusion that if technical progress does not occur, it must be because the 
necessary social institutions to reward investors in knowledge or innovation had not 
been established. Thus, he argues, institutions are the key to innovation, and hence 
210 North, above n 59, 3. 
211 See, eg, Anderson, M. R 2003, 'Access to justice and legal process: making legal institutions responsive to poor 
~ople in LDCs', working paper no. 178, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton. 
12 North, 0 1991, 'Institutions,' The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 97-112, 97. See also, North, 
D 1999, Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Institute of Economic Affairs, London. 
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to economic growth.213 Through an historical analysis of developed economies, he 
points out that growth has occurred within the institutional framework of well-
developed, coercive polities. Crucially, this vision of institutionalism, which was 
conceived within Smith's capitalistic paradigm of economic development, has led 
North to highlight the importance of judicial reform in consolidating the capacity of the 
state to protect investment- notably the institutions of property and title. 
North's theory of economic development and institutional change has been 
uncontrovertibly influential in providing the precepts for the prevailing schools of new 
institutional economics and institutionalism. It has become a pivotal element of the 
'Washington Consensus' based approach to economic development and poverty 
reduction which focused on state deregulation, market liberalisation, and enterprise 
privatisation.214 Moreover, it is likely to remain influential long after the demise of that 
consensus. The earliest justifications of the World Bank's approach, as articulated 
by Shihata and others, show that it has become central to the dominant economic 
and political justification for judicial reform in development. 215 It is also broadly 
endorsed in the current commentary on the subject. Davis and Trebilcock, for 
example, endorse the notion that legal institutions play an independent and 
significant role in development.216 Islam likewise endorses this market-based reform 
approach, arguing that all societies need institutions to settle disputes, and 
mechanisms to enforce property rights and contracts as a means of promoting 
economic activity. 217 Garcia goes further and describes North's conceptual 
framework of institutions, organisations, and institutional change as 'a major 
contribution' in explaining the economic performance of societies based on the 
evolution of institutions. 218 
Despite the extraordinary power and influence of North's theoretical thinking, it is not 
without qualification. Rodrik, as we will shortly see, argues forcefully that while there 
is empirical evidence to show that institutions do indeed matter, we have as yet little 
understanding of how they matter for the purpose of formulating development 
policy.219 More particularly, it is now argued that the dominance of the institutionalist 
explanation for judicial reform is becoming increasingly contested by an alternative or 
213 North, D & Thomas, R 1973, The Rise of the Western World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
214 North D, above n 210, 14. 
215 Above, n 55, and onwards. 
216 Davis, K & Trebilcock, M, above n 112. 
217 Islam, R 2003, 'Institutional Reform and the Judiciary - Which Way Forward?' working paper no. 3134, World 
Bank. 12·13. 
218 Garcia, above n 34 1272. 
219 Below, n 300, and n 301. 
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supplementary theory which is based on a fundamentally different justification for 
judicial reform. 
iii Humanism, rights, fairness and the distributional dimension of justice 
Recently, a more humanist school of development has emerged. Based particularly 
on the thinking of Rawls, Dworkin and Sen, it casts judicial reform in a constitutive 
role. Its central concern is the welfare of the world's poorest and the most needy. 
The concept of justice as fairness was powerfully expounded by Rawls in A Theory of 
Justice. This concept builds on Aristotle's notions of justice, and more recently on the 
notion of the social contract of the Enlightenment philosophers, in particular, Locke 
and Rousseau. Rawls argues that the principles of justice form the basic structure of 
society and are, moreover, the object of the original social contract. In effect, 
questions of justice precede questions of happiness, or, what is right precedes what 
is good. This he calls 'justice as fairness', which is based on the idea that people 
were originally shrouded in a veil of ignorance, but were motivated by rational self-
interest to collectively maximise opportunity to attain the good life. The concept of 
justice as fairness is embodied in Rawl's 'difference principle': 
i. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of basic 
rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme 
for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those 
liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value. 
ii. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first they 
are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of 
fair equality of opportunity; and second they are to be to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged members of society. 220 
In this thesis, I argue that Rawls' normative approach to 'rights' is foundationally 
important in providing a contemporary notion of justice which is then adapted by 
Dworkin to ultimately link with the discourse on human rights, as envisaged by Sen. 
Dworkin asserts that rights are paramount, and that the state must treat its citizens 
as equals. This proposition is a key intermediary in this alternative discourse in which 
moral, political and legal theory should be rights-based, and not goal- or duty-based. 
In this discourse, principles and rights should be upheld over policies and collective 
220 Rawls, J 1971, A Theory of Justice, revised edn, 1999, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 13. See also, Rawts, J 
1985, 'Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical', Philosophy and Public Affairs, val. 14, no. 3., pp. 223-251; 
Rawls, J 2001, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Rawls, J, 1978, 'A 
Theory of Justice,' in Arthur, J & Shaw, W. H (eds), Justice and Economic Distribution, Prentice Hall, Englewood 
Cliffs NJ. 
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goals. Dworkin's analysis of political morality has three ingredients: justice, fairness 
and procedural due process. Justice incorporates both individual rights and collective 
goals; fairness refers to those procedures that give all citizens roughly equal 
influence in decisions that affect them; procedural due process relates to the correct 
procedures for determining whether a citizen has violated the law. He argued that it is 
only 'law with integrity' which presents a suitable defence against the advance of 
instrumentalism upon individual rights and general liberty. This supposes that the 
constraints of law benefit society, not just by providing 'thin' notions of predictability 
or procedural fairness, but significantly by securing a 'thicker' kind of equality among 
citizens. It is this kind of equality that makes their community more genuine and 
improves its moral justification for exercising the political power it does. In Dworkin's 
view, laws and morals are inextricably entwined; in other words, deciding what the 
law is depends inescapably on moral-political considerations. Ultimately, rights trump 
other considerations, and should be recognised as part of the law. 221 
At this point, I now argue that Sen makes a profound and transformative contribution 
to the development discourse at large and to judicial reform in particular. Sen returns 
to the foundations of liberal philosophic thought. Basing his argument on the work of 
Aristotle among many others, he asserts that development should be seen as a 
process of expanding people's real freedoms and rights. Often working closely with 
Nussbaum, Sen examines how we may try to find adequate criteria for assessing the 
quality of life. The 'capability' of a person refers to the various alternative 
combinations of functions that a person can choose to have. In this sense, the 
capability of a person corresponds to the freedom and the opportunity that a person 
has to lead one kind of life or another, and is to be distinguished from the narrower 
concepts of wealth and poverty. 
Sen is cardinally important in this thesis for redirecting the development discourse 
away from the prevailing utilitarian paradigms with their economic concerns. With 
Nussbaum, he criticises these paradigms as having failed to address the 
distributional aspect of growth and as having legitimised slavery so long as it is 
'efficient'. Sen and Nussbaum offer a human-centred capability approach which 
builds on resources rather than wealth or income. At its most simple, they define 
capability as being the freedom to lead different types of life, as mentioned above.222 
221 Dworkin, above n 93; Dworkin, R 1985, A Matter of Principle, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts; and Dworkin, R 1981, 'What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
vol. 10. no. 3, pp. 185-245. 
222 Nussbaum, M & Sen A {eels), The Quality of Life, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 3. See also, Nussbaum, M 2006, 
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Sen in particular sees the role of development as providing capacity to the poor, i.e. 
people who have rights to opportunity but are generally deprived of them.223 In a 
critique of what he describes the more traditional rationale for development 
economics, Sen argues that development requires the removal of major sources of 
'un-freedom': poverty as well as tyranny; poor economic opportunities as well as 
systematic social deprivation; neglect of public facilities; intolerance or the over-
activity of repressive states.224 At its heart, Sen's view builds on Aristotelian notions 
of distributional equality.225 He advocates focusing on real freedoms as opposed to 
the prevailing narrower focus on the growth of gross national product, the rise of 
personal incomes or social modernisation. 
The ground-shifting significance of Sen's work for my thesis rests on its potential to 
go beyond the prevailing nee-liberal, market-based rationale for judicial reform 
advocated by Weber and North. His advocacy of rights-based development 
supplements the theory for judicial reform and places the human being - rather than 
the state, the market or the development agency - as the key actor in the 
development process. Sen argues that economic development cannot sensibly be 
treated as an end in itself. Development has to be more concerned with enhancing 
the lives we lead and the freedoms we enjoy.226 For this fundamental proposition, he 
invokes Aristotle's rationale for the polis to contribute to the good life of its citizens: 
(Pursuit of) wealth is obviously not the good that we are seeking, because it 
serves only as a means - for getting something else. 227 
Hence, building on the works of Rawls and Dworkin, among many others, Sen 
argues that the traditional economic focus on aggregate income and wealth shows a 
distributive indifference to notions of equality and a neglect of rights. He sees the 
development of human capability and its potential to lead a worthwhile life compatible 
to - but not subordinated by - Smith's vision of economic science. His core 
posits ten central human capabilities comprising life, health, bodily integrity, senses imagination and thought, 
emotions, practical reason, affiliation, other species, play and control over one's environment. See also: Sen, A 1980, 
'Equality of What?', in McMurrin, S (ed), Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
m Sen, A 1999, Development as Freedom, Random House, New York; Sen, A 2009, The Idea of Justice, Penguin, 
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224 Sen, A 1983, 'Development: Which Way Now?' The Economic Journal, vol. 93, no. 372. pp. 745-762. 
225 Sen argues that the most powerful conceptual connections of this approach rest on the Aristotelian view of the 
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proposition is that enhancement of human freedom is both the main object and the 
primary means of development.228 Within this vision, markets are then centrally 
important in providing social opportunity - the basic freedom of transaction. 229 For 
Sen, justice is significant to the creation of social opportunities and the expansion of 
human capabilities because it contributes directly to the quality of life and to its 
flourishing.230 
Sen applies this vision squarely to judicial and legal reform endeavour. He calls for a 
more integrated view of legal development. Judicial and legal reform is important not 
only for legal development, but also for development in other spheres, such 
economic and political development, which are constitutive parts of development as a 
whole: 
We don't ask: which kind of human development: economic, social, political or 
legal? Rather human development encompasses them all, and they can be, 
in this perspective, together, not in isolation from each other .... It is hard to 
think that development can really be seen independently of its economic, 
social, political or legal components. We cannot very well say that the 
development process has gone beautifully even though people are being 
arbitrarily hanged, criminals go free while law-abiding citizens end up in jail, 
and so on.231 
Sen proposes a justification for legal and judicial reform which is altogether 
independent from the more traditional economic rationale: 
The basic claim here is this. Legal development to stick to that example first 
is not just about what the law is and what the judicial system formally accepts 
and asserts. Legal development must, constitutively, take note of the 
enhancement of people's capability, their freedom to exercise the rights and 
entitlements that we associate with legal progress. Given this need for 
conceptual integrity (in this case, the need to see legal development not just 
in terms of legislation and laws but in terms of effective freedoms and 
capabilities), all the instruments that causally influence these freedoms must 
be taken into account in assessing what progress is being made in enhancing 
the development of a successful legal and judicial system.232 
228 Sen, A, above n 226, 53; and at 294, endorsing Smith A 1776, An Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations, Cannan E 
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In his seminal work, Development as Freedom, Sen builds on Rawls to position 
justice as a fundamental factor in improving the quality of life. This links closely with 
his view of the state's role to supply public goods such as health, education and 
effective institutions for the maintenance of local peace and order. In his most recent 
work, The Idea of Justice, Sen extends his theory of justice based on notions of 
liberty, equality and equity beyond what he terms 'utopian transcendental 
institutionalism' or an absolute, perfect justice which is unattainable in the absence of 
a global sovereignty, to a notion which is measurable in terms of remediable injustice 
and comparative enhancement to human lives, freedoms, capabilities and wellbeing. 
At this point, Sen critiques Rawls' theory of justice as fairness as being concerned 
primarily with just institutions. This critique should, I now argue, be understood as 
primarily seeking to reframe the discourse from the hegemonic strictures of its 
preceding western liberal conceptualisation which we have discerned in Chapter 2. 
He integrates an imposing global philosophic discourse to then extend the notion of 
justice pluralistically beyond what he argues are the positional limitations and 
parochial confines of that discourse to advocate focusing on assessments of social 
realisations and comparative aspects of enhancing justice.233 
The major implication of this path of reasoning from Aristotle to Sen is that it 
introduces a 'constitutive' justification for judicial reform, with the rights of the 
individual as its focus. This reasoning is profound in reconsidering the theory of 
judicial reform. First, it provides an alternative paradigm to the institutionalist 
approach to judicial reform. Second, it visibly influences the evolution of endeavour in 
the rights-based and access-to-justice approaches such as that of United Nations 
agencies, and the more recent justice-for-the-poor initiatives of the World Bank. 
Underpinning both approaches is a reform rationale which is based on the notion of 
empowerment, a notion now being taken up by numerous commentators. 234 
As we have already seen in Chapter 2, legal empowerment, which involves the use 
of formal and informal approaches to increase the disadvantaged population's control 
over their lives, is increasingly important as a means of adopting this humanistic 
concept of judicial reform in practice. Golub, for example, advocates Sen's 
233 Sen, A 2009, The Idea of Justice, Penguin, London, variously, see, eg., 92-106. 
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capabilities approach to strengthen the capacities of the poor through legal 
empowerment of civil society. He proposes a blueprint to implement Sen's freedom-
centred model for judicial reform which concentrates on empowering the 
disadvantaged rather than reforming state institutions, and provides a practical 
strategy for implementing a rights-based approach to development. 235 There is now 
some evidence that the empowerment approach is moving towards what may be 
described as a more justice-centred approach to reform. Golub argues that justice far 
exceeds the 'rule of law' and is about fair treatment and fair results. This 
empowerment approach then repositions judicial reform endeavour in a broader 
political, cultural and economic analysis of poverty.236 Similarly, as we will see in a 
case studied segment of this thesis in Part 3, Dias and Gopal advocate, from their 
South Asian experience. the need to focus on justice as a standard of human 
conduct and on justice-orientated reform.237 
Hence, building on what we have already seen in Chapter 2, a number of initiatives 
are presently being trialled by development practitioners. These initiatives often find 
their justification in this new humanism theory for judicial reform, to explore what 
Trubek has described as the current Third Moment' resurgence of inquiry which is 
reinvigorating reform endeavour. 238 This involves mixing different ideas for 
development policy and exploring reform in the informal sector; the role of the state in 
development; and rights-based empowerment approaches. 
3 Conclusions 
A central argument in this thesis is that the practice of judicial reform is riven by an 
unresolved contest in its theory. This is illustrated by the divergent justifications 
proposed by donors for their development endeavours notwithstanding the 
homogeneity of their activities. On the one hand, the traditional approach with its 
predominant focus on the instrumentalist, economic justification is prevalent among 
some major donors. notably the World Bank since Shihata's time. On the other 
hand, the constitutive humanistic justification has been adopted more recently by the 
235 Golub, S 2003, 'Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment Alternative', working paper no. 41, 
Carnegie Endowment For International Peace. See also, Golub, S 2006, 'House Without Foundation', in Carothers, T 
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UN and related agencies. This may be alternatively framed as one of the core 
tensions within western notions of liberalism, sourced in Bentham's notion of utility 
and Rawl's notion of fairness. The boundaries of this contest are usually not clearly 
delineated. In practice, there is of course blur and conflation. As we have already 
seen in Chapter 2, the World Bank is currently driving what may become a new 
frontier of bottom-up, pro-poor, human-centred reform in its Justice for the Poor 
initiatives. At the same time, other donors who are focusing their endeavours on 
more traditional, court-centric, institutional strengthening are also including the 
promotion of human rights and engagement of civil society somewhere in their 
activities. 
There are different ways of describing this phenomenon. This contest may be viewed 
purposively, i.e. judicial reform may be seen externally, or instrumentally, where its 
purpose is to support economic growth. Or it may be seen internally, or 
constitutively, where its purpose is to support justice and rights. Alternatively, it may 
be viewed philosophically, i.e. the contest reflects the tension between the two 
approaches which are inherent in a liberal society, i.e. the tension between the 
individual as the repository of rights, and society as the repository of the collective 
interest. Thus, it may be argued that this debate is between the purposive and 
philosophic aspects of judicial reform, which may at various points over-lap. How this 
struggle plays itself out is, as we will see in the next chapter, always a dynamic part 
of societies undergoing Polanyi's 'great transformation', involving debates over who 
decides how resources or opportunities are allocated, who enjoys the benefits, and 
who (what institutional forms, market, state or 'other') determines these questions on 
behalf of the citizens.239 Moreover, to some extent, the justification for judicial reform 
may be definitional. Any vision of judicial reform may be justified purposively or 
philosophically. In this way, justice as fairness and equity may be defined as the 
good oil for economic growth, or it may be defined as an intrinsic public good, 
valuable in itself. In the latter sense, on which I focus mainly in this thesis, this notion 
of fairness is not synonymous to equality. While aiming to restore equality, justice as 
fairness builds on notions of equity which have long been recognised as having a 
rectificatory distributional dimension, that is, restoring rights recognised in law which 
would otherwise go awry. 
239 Polanyi, K 2001, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, 2"" edn, Beacon, 
Boston; below n 233 onwards. 
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As I said at the beginning of this chapter, dichotomies are useful dialectic devices 
which enable distinctions to be highlighted; however, they also risk polarising the 
nuance of reality, and should not be permitted to oversimplify the manifold 
complexities of development practice. For this reason, I have used the instrumental 
and constitutive rationale of reform in this thesis to highlight alternative theoretical 
approaches to reform endeavour. This is also useful in illuminating what I argue is 
the missing constitutive dimension in reform purpose. But it is important to stress that 
I am not arguing that the instrumental dimension is wrong; only insufficient. What is 
critical to this argument is not the prevalence of one or the other dimension, but the 
states of tension and equilibrium which should exist between them which, as will 
shortly be pointed out by Polanyi, is inherent in any nuanced concept of liberalism. 
Similarly, this tension may be describes as finding the right pivot point between 
utility's concern to maximise aggregate wellbeing and equity's concern to promote 
individual wellbeing through fairness. Within this context, I argue that the contest 
between the 'economic' and the 'humanistic' justifications for reform serves as a 
powerful dialectic device for the purposes of this thesis. Dichotomies highlight the 
divergence in approaches which build from the discourse on theory, and are useful in 
analysing the critical issues under debate. How this contest is being played out will 
be assessed shortly. 
In the next chapter, I will demonstrate that this tension has been unbalanced in 
development evidenced in the disharmony between collective wellbeing, or utility, 
and individual utility, or fairness, which has resulted in the growth of global inequities, 
or what the World Bank calls poverty gaps and inequality traps. As we shall see, 
many issues must be dealt with in the complex, multidisciplinary inter-relationship 
within the judicial reform enterprise whose foundations are found in political science, 
justice and development economics. 
But first, there is a need to consider how well these theories stand up to the test of 
practice. How this tension plays itself out in any particular society cannot be 
foreseen. Empirics unavoidably always reflect history and political economy, rather 
than the disciplining effect and pretensions of policy. That said, the next chapter 
assesses the extent to which empirical endeavour has been able to find past 
evidence to validate the robustness of the theories outlined above . 
• • • 
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CHAPTER 5- EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
1 Introduction 
In the last chapter, I examined the philosophic foundations for judicial reform to argue 
that they set the stage for an analysis of the key issues in judicial reform policy and 
practice. In this chapter, I extend this analysis to the commentary in the economic 
literature for the purpose of considering perceptions on the sufficiency of 
development performance. I then move on to examine the relationship between 
theory and practice, with a view to gauging what we know about what works in the 
real world. This analysis will provide a means to validate or refine the policy 
approach. Finally, I offer my critique on the adequacy of this approach and how it 
may be improved. 
In the opening section, I focus on the empirical quest for evidence. I examine the 
relationship between the different philosophic justifications for judicial reform by 
analysing the ongoing empirical endeavour. I explore, validate and refine that body 
of theory to gain further insights on the contest of liberalism between the individual 
and society, and to refine policies on judicial reform. 
Empirical endeavour seeks to understand the determinants of development. It 
assesses fundamental propositions relating to economic growth, and the existence 
and nature of key institutionalist relationships. These relationships involve the state 
and the courts, and their roles in securing property and contract as means of 
promoting economic growth. They also include a range of formal and informal 
institutions which are embodied in the underpinning theories of Weber and North. 
This expanding body of empirical endeavour has been used in recent years to test, 
validate and clarify our understanding of these relationships, and to inform and refine 
reform approach and the theory on which it is based.240 
In this chapter, I will establish the following key propositions: first, the aggregate 
evidence indicates that development has reduced global poverty; second, endemic 
poverty persists and, more particularly, there is evidence of a widening 'equity gap' 
which measures the disparity of well-being between rich and poor; third, while 
240 This terminology is distinguished from the more generic definition of 'empiricism' which describes the philosophy 
or theory that all knowledge is based on experience derived from the senses; and the adjective 'empirical' which is 
defined as being based on or concerned with, or verifiable by observation, experiment and experience rather than 
theory or pure logic. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3m Ed., 1987, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
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development economics has determined the nature, direction and role of judicial 
reform over recent years, analysis reveals that it is an incomplete and on occasion 
highly contested field; fourth, while this evidence validates certain elements of the 
institutionalist theory, much of the research remains ambiguous, qualified or 
incomplete; fifth, in the absence of a consensus on the empirical validation of the 
institutionalist approach, it is both legitimate and necessary to develop the 
alternative, humanistic justification for judicial reform to reduce equity gaps more 
effectively. 
In particular, my analysis will establish that over recent years judicial reform has been 
appropriated by development economics to perform what is described as an 
instrumental role in supporting economic development. At one level, the empirical 
aspects of this relationship are reassuring because they validate the theoretical 
justification with which to guide and refine ongoing endeavour. But, at another level, it 
reveals a range of gaps which are under-persuasive and disconcerting. This analysis 
will establish the foundational role of development economics in the formation of 
development policy approach. At the same time, it will reveal a discipline which is 
internally contested by many of its leading proponents who openly acknowledge the 
incompleteness of their understanding of the role of justice and judicial reform in 
reducing poverty. 
2 Sufficiency of the economic justification for development 
My overarching argument in this chapter is there is clear evidence that development 
economics has worked; there has been an unprecedented level of global economic 
growth over recent years. But, it has worked unevenly. The global economy has 
demonstrably grown. In doing so, the rich have got richer. But the poor have either 
not got less poor at all, or they have got less poor at a slower rate. As clearly 
indicated in the World Development Report of 2006, there is a growing inequity gap. 
In this critical sense, I argue that development economics, and the policies which rest 
upon it, have been under-effective. My core argument is about the deficiency of 
economic policy to promote equity. This asserts that the prevailing economics-based 
approach has had limited effectiveness in alleviating poverty, as demonstrated by the 
persistence of inequity. I then challenge the primacy of the economic justification for 
judicial reform. Instead of supporting an economic development approach which 
yields inequitable outcomes, I assert that judicial reform should be based on an 
alternative justification which promotes justice and equitable outcomes. While at this 
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time there is a dearth of any empirical inquiry on the efficacy of this alternative 
justification, the equal paucity of empirical evidence for the prevailing 'economic' 
justification supplies the imperative to formulate an alternative justification and launch 
an empirical inquiry to monitor its efficacy in due course. 
The justification for the prevalence of development economics is the overarching 
assertion that it works. This justification rests on the assumption that economics is an 
epistemological, theoretically justified and empirically validated discipline which is 
capable of steering policy interventions towards both economic growth and the 
alleviation of poverty. Parts of the assertion that development economics works are 
endorsed by key exponents, including Stiglitz, Sachs, Easterly and Collier. These 
experts confirm that the evidence of recent history shows marked global economic 
growth and improvements in the levels of global poverty. This assertion is also 
affirmed by major international organisations responsible for monitoring these 
conditions, notably the World Bank, the United Nations, and the Asian Development 
Bank. For the purpose of this thesis, therefore, I will refer to this assertion as the 
premise that justifies the primacy of ongoing economic development endeavour. 
Notwithstanding this assertion, however, I will now provide compelling empirical 
evidence in this chapter to refute the sufficiency of this assertion as a comprehensive 
justification for judicial reform endeavour. 
a Role of empirical evidence in the theory: practice dichotomy 
In this chapter I argue that empirics can only reflect history and cannot predict the 
future. Therefore, empirics are unable to provide a comprehensive, compelling 
justification for promoting well-being into the future. This argument, once established, 
will prove that there is a misfit between the various contesting 'theories' of 
development, and what actually happens in the real world of development practice. 
This misfit illuminates the dynamic tension in the dichotomy of theory and practice, 
each of which is recursive of the other, as the past is interpreted as the best available 
means to guide the future, however incompletely. Within this dichotomy, I argue that 
the insufficiency of the empirical evidence of practice discredits the asserted primacy 
of economic growth theory to justify the instrumental purpose of reform. This 
displacement then re-opens the space to promote a more integrated political 
economy approach to the theoretical discourse in which justice as fairness and equity 
is a constitutive element in liberal society. 
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b Historical evidence of market economy 
My search for evidence begins by focusing on the tension between the collective and 
individual interests in liberal society. How this struggle plays itself out is always 
unpredictable and, as Polanyi points out below, is formative in societies undergoing 
the 'great transformation'. 
Polanyi's empirical analysis of the economic, political and social histories of Britain, 
and to a lesser extent, Europe and the United States provides the frame for the 
opening proposition for this argument. This analysis posits that there is an 
overarching and perpetual tension in the crucial relationship between the state and 
the market. It is this tension which serves as the critical threshold for the current 
discourses on new comparative economics and institutionalism. Polanyi's 
contribution is his proposition that the pervasive liberal notion of a self-regulating 
market, which finds its foundations in the works of Smith and Mills among others, is 
intrinsically self-destructive: 
Our thesis is that the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia. 
Such an institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating 
the human and natural substance of society; it would have physically 
destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a wilderness.241 
Using economic history to study the impact of the Industrial Revolution, in particular, 
Polanyi found that the major achievements of the market economy had been brought 
at the price of great harm to the substance of English society.242 He discerned a 
clash between the organising principles of economic liberalism and social protection 
- being what he saw as the two vital functions of a society - which led to a deep-
seated, institutional strain which ultimately resulted in the catastrophe of the First 
World War and the Great Depression.243 At that point, he argued, society restored a 
'corrective' against the pure market economy because of its inhumane and 
unacceptable environmental consequences. This precipitated what he described as 
an inevitable counter-movement of the second transformation of government 
intervention and regulation. He described this process using the terms of 
Enlightenment thinkers such as Hobbes and Locke: 
241 Polanyi, K 2001. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, 2nd edn, Beacon, 
Boston, 3. 
242 Ibid 195. 
243 1bid 140. 
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Inescapably we reach the conclusion that the very possibility of freedom is 
in question. If regulation is the only means of spreading and strengthening 
freedom in a complex society, and yet to make use of this means is contrary 
to freedom per se, then such a society cannot be free. 244 
Polanyi's illuminating analysis posits an historical pendulum movement from tightly-
regulated to deregulated market economies which reflect policy movements driven by 
shifts in sentiment over the relationship between the state and the market. He argues 
that the 'great transformation' was an inevitable consequence of adopting a pure 
market economy because of its harsh and unacceptable consequences on the poor 
in Britain in the 19th Century. Crucially, he identified the perpetual tension between 
the state and market, and the historical tendency to self-correct. This theory provides 
a prescient explanation for the present demise of the neo-liberal mantra of 
deregulation, free trade and privatisation of the 'Washington Consensus'. In a fully 
self-regulating market system, Polanyi argued that: 
control of the economic system by the market is of overwhelming 
consequence to the whole organisation of society: it means no less than the 
running of society as an adjunct to the market. Instead of economy being 
embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the 
economic system. 245 
As an empirical rather than theoretical inquiry, Polanyi marshals the actual evidence 
of European economic history to refute the core belief of market liberalism that 
human society should be subordinated to the self-regulating market. Not only did he 
consider this subordination to be morally wrong, but utterly impossible. The state 
must play an ongoing role in adjusting money supply and credit to avoid the dangers 
of inflation and deflation, and also in managing employment and the production of 
food. Real markets need the state to play an active role in managing markets. The 
state's role requires political decision-making, which cannot be reduced to a technical 
or administrative function.246 Polanyi adopted Aristotle's argument on 'house-holding' 
in Politics to argue that 'Aristotle has taught that only gods and beasts could live 
outside society, and man was neither':247 
The outstanding discovery of recent history and anthropological research is 
that man's economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships. He 
does not act so as to safeguard his individual interest in the possession of 
material goods; he acts so as to safeguard his social standing, historical 
244 1bid 266. Re Hobbes, above notes 119 and 187; re Locke, above, notes 118 and 188. 
245 1bid 60. 
246 Ibid xxiv - xxvi. 
247 Ibid 56. 
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claims, his social assets. He values material goods only in so far as they 
serve this end.248 
This argument, presented in 1944, is all the more compelling for its explaining the 
demise of the so-called 'Washington Consensus'-era of free market triumphalism. As 
we have already seen, key exponents of this approach such as Greenspan and 
Stiglitz, now acknowledge the socially-destructive nature of the free market global 
economic growth which lies at the heart of the critiques of Easterly, Collier and 
Harvey to be outlined shortly below. 249 
c Development's failure to ensure equitable growth 
I now resume my foundational argument that the failure of development to deliver 
equity is broadly acknowledged by the leading exponents of the discipline. 
Prominent in the field of development economics, Stiglitz acknowledges that there 
has been substantial global economic growth over recent years. He propounds many 
of the tenets of new institutional economics, notably the need for effective 
governments and strong independent judiciaries to support economic 
development.250 But, of equal significance, he endorses Polanyi's thesis that self-
regulating markets are utopian and never work, and that the doctrine of 'trickle-down' 
economics - that all, including the poor, benefit from growth - have little historical or 
empirical support. While he affirms that the economic evidence of the last 25 years is 
unequivocal in demonstrating that development does work,251 Stiglitz refers to 
Polanyi's analysis to explain what he describes as the disastrous results of the 
'Washington Consensus shock therapy' which transformed Russia in the 1990s, 
reducing its economy by almost half, and increasing those in poverty from 2% to 
close to 50%:252 
Today, there is no respectable intellectual support for the proposition that 
markets, by themselves, lead to efficient, let alone equitable outcomes ... 
We have moved, by and large, to a more balanced position, one that 
recognises both the power and the limitations of markets, and the necessity 
246 lbid 48. 
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that government play a large role in the economy, though the bounds of that 
role remain in dispute. 253 
As part of this critique, Stiglitz explains that issues of equity were abrogated to the 
province of politics, not economics. Economists were encouraged to focus on 
economic notions of efficiency - on the basis that the best way of helping the poor 
was by growing the economy- and the 'Washington Consensus' policy prescriptions 
were expected to deliver on that. While he argues that it is morally important for 
countries to focus on equity because it ensures that the fruits of growth are widely 
shared, he also argues that it is necessary if there is to be sustained growth.254 
Stiglitz acknowledges that the World Bank's comprehensive development approach 
of 1999 necessarily involved strengthening markets, but stresses Sen's recognition 
that people are at the core of development. He further argues that a successful 
development strategy requires a more integrated approach to markets, government, 
individuals and communities. Stiglitz is deeply sceptical of the process of economic 
globalisation which, he argues, has failed to reduce poverty despite repeated 
assurances to the contrary.255 This criticism directly challenges the 'Washington 
Consensus' model of development economics - cardinally, market liberalisation, 
deregulation and free trade: 256 
Globalisation has helped hundreds of millions of people attain higher 
standards of living beyond what they, or most economies, thought imaginable 
but a short while ago. . . . But for millions of people globalisation has not 
worked. Many have actually been made worse off, as they have seen their 
jobs destroyed and their lives become more insecure.257 
This critique of globalisation is centrally relevant to this thesis not only in establishing 
that development efforts are failing, as evidenced by expanding poverty, but also in 
providing expert evidence on the ensuing deterioration of social equity. It is all the 
more trenchant when it is recalled that Stiglitz was Chief Economist of the World 
Bank during part of this period. Stiglitz argues that globalisation has failed to raise the 
standards of living for many or most citizens of the world. In fact, it has worsened 
inequality for most in the world, where some 40% of the world's 6.5 billion people 
now live in poverty, up from 36% in 1981.258 
253 Ibid, viii. Block, for example, argues that for Polanyi, the deepest flaw in market liberalism is that it subordinates 
human purposes to the logic of an impersonal market mechanism. Block, F 2001, 'Introduction' in Polanyi, K, The 
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Stiglitz is no lone voice. Many authorities endorse this critique. The World 
Commission on the Social Dimensions of Poverty 2004, for example, found that 59% 
of the world's population were living in countries with growing inequality. This figure 
further supports the argument that: '[t]hese global imbalances are morally 
unacceptable and politically unsustainable.' Even in most of developed countries, the 
rich were getting richer while the poor were often not even holding their own. 259 
The World Bank's World Development Report of 2006 makes similarly caustic 
findings on the unsustainability of development without equity, as we have already 
seen in Chapter 2.260 Stiglitz goes further to argue that development policy has failed: 
There may be growth but most of the people may be worse off. Trickle 
down economics which holds that so long as the economy as a whole 
grows everyone benefits has been repeatedly shown to be wrong. 261 
My argument on the deficiency of development policy to address the equitable 
dimensions of poverty is further supported by Sachs who led the UN's Millennium 
Development Goal initiative to alleviate poverty. Sachs similarly acknowledges the 
extent of global economic growth, but highlights the widening gaps between the 
world's rich and poor in what he describes as endemic 'poverty traps'. There are now 
unprecedented gaps between rich and poor: one sixth of the global population lives 
in extreme poverty. He is stridently critical of the performance of development 
economics, and argues that economists have overlooked urgent problems involving 
poverty traps and a host of other pathologies that undermine economic 
development. 262 
Next, the experience of post-War development economics is described by Easterly 
as an 'audacious quest' to discover the means by which poor countries in the tropics 
could become rich like the rich countries in Europe and North America. He likewise 
confirms the evidence of economic growth, but expresses an overwhelming 
disappointment in failed panaceas: 
We economists have tried to find the precious object, the key that would 
enable the poor tropics to become rich. We thought we had found the elixir 
many different times. The precious objects we offered ranged from foreign 
aid to investment in machines, from fostering education to controlling 
259 Cited in Stiglitz J 2006, Making Globalisation Work, Norton, NY, 8. 
260 Above, n 73. 
261 Stiglitz, above n 254, 23. 
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population growth, from giving loans conditional on reform to giving debt 
relief conditional on reforms. None has delivered as promised.263 
Easterly observes that the challenge of making poor countries rich has been much 
more difficult than expected.264 There are no magical elixirs.265 Development is 
determined by incentives, which is a fundamental principle of economics: 'People do 
what they are paid to do . . . (they) respond to incentives; all the rest is 
commentary .'266 He stridently critiques the international development model which 
disregards this principle, and uses the examples of Japan and China to illustrate that 
foreign aid is not essential to economic growth. He also uses Latin America and the 
Soviet Union to illustrate that it is more likely to damage economies rather than 
strengthen them.267 
The failure of development policy to deliver equity growth is also highlighted by The 
Economist, which notes that the alleviation of global poverty has been 
unprecedented over the past twenty-five years. The number of people living on less 
than $1 a-day has decreased by some 400 million worldwide, literacy rates have 
doubled and life expectancy has increased substantially in low-income countries. 
These are unprecedented achievements. But, they are uneven: 
In spite of this remarkable leap in living standards, the scale of death and 
deprivation that still plagues many poor countries is alarming. Around the 
world 3,000 children die from malaria every day and 3,000 more succumb 
to diseases like whooping cough, diphtheria, measles and tetanus. AIDS 
kills 8,500 a day. And nearly 16,000 people perish from diarrhoea and 
respiratory infections. Between 1981 and 2001, the number of Africans 
living on $1 a day nearly doubled from 164m to 313m. Unless the pace of 
growth accelerates, the number of poor people on the continent is expected 
to rise to 340 million in the next ten years (italics added).268 
The failure of development economics is reframed by Collier as the poverty crisis 
which exists in about 50 failing states - what he terms the 'bottom billion' of the 
world's population. These states, which are inhabited by some 20% of the world's 
population, are falling into an absolute decline in living standards. The aggregated 
economic growth over the past 25 years has been unprecedented at 4-4.5%. But, the 
bottom billion has not had any growth, and was poorer by the turn of the millennium 
263 Easterty, D 2002, The Elusive quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics, MIT 
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than it had been in 1970. He explains that this problem has tended to be masked by 
the statistics on global growth which need to be disaggregated. 269 These failing 
states are caught in four traps - the conflict trap; the natural resources trap; the 
landlocked or bad neighbour trap; and the bad governance trap. Here, the problem 
has not been fixed automatically by global growth and aid: 270 
Aid alone is really unlikely, in my view, to address the problems of the 
bottom billion ... (though it) has made the difference between stagnation 
and severe cumulative decline. Without aid, cumulatively the countries of 
the bottom billion would have become much poorer than the!, are today. Aid 
has been a holding operation preventing things falling apart. 71 
This critique from the foremost ranks of development economics is hardly a 
confidence-inspiring endorsement of its efficacy. To the contrary, the world's 
foremost economists are candid in admitting that development economics has not 
worked: it has failed to redress its stated goal of eliminating global poverty through its 
failure to deliver equitable growth. 
d Conviction, ideology and the selectivity of empirical validation 
I now resume the earlier historical analysis of long term development trends to 
scrutinise the linkage between the available empirical evidence on the determinants 
of growth and the subsequent formulation of development policy. I argue that this 
linkage is often highly selective. More particularly, I argue that this selectivity is often 
driven by ideology or apriorism rather than empiricism.272 This is not to refute the 
legitimacy of ideology, but rather as a matter of dialectic to clarify the source and 
nature of the knowledge being relied on. 
To support this argument, I rely on the work of Ha-Joon Chang who appraises the 
empirical evidence of European and American economic development over the past 
three hundred years. In so doing, he challenges the integrity of the key elements of 
the prevailing development approach. Chang focuses on 'good governance' which, 
as we have already seen, is an increasingly crucial element of the current 
development discourse. This element of the discourse promotes institutions such as 
democracy, bureaucracy, an independent judiciary, private property rights and 
269 Collier, P 2008, The Bottom Billion, Oxford University Press, 11. 
270 Ibid xii. 
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corporate governance.273 Core to this critique, Chang argues that the empirical 
evidence refutes the 'good governance' discourse. In spite of the historic evidence 
which discredits the 'good governance approach', developed countries nonetheless 
apply policies out of self-interest to advocate free trade and expand their own export 
markets, using ideological mantras such as 'good institutions'. These 'good 
institutions' are essentially transplantations of those of developed countries. 274 
Crucially, there is a lack of empirical evidence to show a positive association 
between the courts and the economy to validate this justification for judicial reform. 
Chang emphasises that the experts are qualified, equivocal and divided over the 
nature and even the existence of causality. Even more important, his analysis 
indicates the likelihood of a reverse causation, viz. un-attributable economic 
development drives institutional reforms, rather than institutional reform drive 
economic development: 
The process of institutional development, and the role that it plays in overall 
economic development, is still a poorly understood subject . . . Most of the 
institutions that are currently recommended to the developing countries as 
parts of the 'good governance' package were in fact the results, rather than 
the causes, of economic development of the now developed countries .... 
[T)he dominant view - orthodoxy - about one set of 'best practice institutions' 
is 'highly problematic (italics added).275 
The uncertain direction of causation is the uninvited ogre hogging the development 
armchair. As we will shortly see, the empirical difficulty in identifying this direction in 
the factors associated with growth is deeply problematic for researchers. These 
difficulties tend, however, to be minimised at the policy-making level where postures 
of certainty is greatly needed, with the result that policies of doubtful empirical 
provenance are promoted. 
The existence of this core dilemma in the discourse on judicial reform is first 
addressed by Messick. He questioned the assertion of any historical causal 
relationship between judicial reform and development. He saw this assertion as an 
oversimplification and argued that the historical evidence suggests the 'relationship is 
probably better modelled as a series of on-and-off connections, or of couplings and 
de-couplings.m6 This critique of the economic justification for judicial reform is later 
endorsed by others.277 Some, like Dakolias, have sought to rely on Sherwood to 
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justify judicial reform on the basis that, by enforcing property rights, checking abuses 
of government power and upholding the 'rule of law', it will significantly improve 
economic performance. But this assertion is flimsy and readily refuted, resting as it 
does on an un-validated estimation. 278 
The significance of this survey of the economic commentary is to establish that there 
is general acknowledgement of the unprecedented aggregate growth of the global 
economy, but simultaneously mounting consternation at the entrenchment and 
exacerbation of inequity. Once this crucial distinction between aggregate and 
equitable growth has been made, I have also presented evidence of an emerging 
consensus that the policy of development economics has failed by exacerbating the 
inequitable dimensions of poverty. Recognition of the widening poverty gap 
underpins the World Development Report of 2006, which has been formative in 
refocusing the development discourse on chronic 'inequality traps'. This report 
acknowledged that 'equity and fairness matter', and introduced the notion of 
redistribution to the current discourse on judicial reform.279 In my argument, this 
displaces the primacy of the economic justification for judicial reform. 
3 Justice and development- a synopsis of the empirical determinants 
I now move on to argue that the empirical foundations of development economics are 
internally contested from within the ranks of its leading exponents, and are 
characterised by ambiguity, gaps and on occasion open disagreement. I substantiate 
this argument through my critique of the emerging school of new comparative 
economics which has sought evidence of the key determinants of growth and in 
particular the existence of relationships between institutions and development with 
which to inform, validate and refine development policy. As we will see, this body of 
empirical research has a direct bearing on illuminating the nature and extent of the 
critical relationship between justice and growth. 
In this section, I analyse the ongoing inquiry to demonstrate that we find it hard to 
establish an empirical relationship between judicial reform and economic growth and 
poverty alleviation. I will argue that this may be indicative of the central conceit of 
276 Sherwood estimates 'Although we can offer no support for the figure, we feel it would not be surprising to 
eventually find that countries attempting economic liberalization suffer at least a 15% penalty in their growth 
momentum if their judicial systems are weak . .' Sherwood, R, Shepherd, G & de Souza, C 1994, 'Judicial Systems 
and Economic Performance', Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, vol 34, annual, pp. 101-116, 113. 
Despite its approximation, this has not stopped some at the Bank relying on this estimate; see eg: Dakolias, M 1999, 
'Court Performance Around the World: A Comparative Perspective', Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal, 
vol. 2. 87-142, 87. footnote 2. 
279 World Bank, above n 73. 
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research on judicial reform to this point, namely that the development logic is flawed. 
I will establish on the basis of available empirical evidence that while there is some 
empirical evidence to validate selected aspects of the prevailing instrumentalist 
approach, there are equally as many aspects which remain contested or under-
supported. If this is so after so much empirical endeavour, then perhaps there is no 
relationship to be found? Moreover if, like Rajan and Rodrik, the discourse is at the 
cusp of admitting that 'we just don't know what makes effective institutions', the slate 
on which the primacy of the economistic justification has been writ is cleared for 
redevising the theory for judicial reform endeavour. 
To support this argument, I present below a synopsis of the most significant findings 
of empirical research which have been influential in the subsequent formulation of 
development policies. Without attempting to be exhaustive, my synthesis highlights 
the major works of prominent researchers including Dollar and Kraay, Knack and 
Keefer, Rodrik, La Porta, Djankov, Feld and Voigt, among others. This body of 
research is seminal to the emerging school of new comparative economics, and has 
been visibly influential in informing development policy. On the basis of my critique of 
this research, I will argue that there is clearly empirical validation for the existence of 
certain relationships between judicial development policy approach and economic 
growth, as previously posed in theory. But, at the same time, there are numerous 
gaps in knowledge and many important issues which remain under contest in 
practice. In effect, the domain of empirical inquiry is incomplete and does not provide 
any comprehensive validation of the institutionalist approach. 
Of foundational significance to this institutionalist approach to reform, Burnside and 
Dollar established from an analysis of economic performance that aid had a positive 
impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary and trade 
policies. But, it had little effect in an environment with poor policies. While they found 
that on average, aid had little impact on growth, they did find that: 
[A)id has had a more positive impact on growth in good policy environments 
.... Our results indicate that making aid more systematically conditional on 
the quality of policies would likely increase its impact on developing country 
growth.28~ 
This research has been highly influential in validating ongoing policy-focused reform 
which builds on North's notion of 'institutions' to enable economic growth. 
280 Burnside, C & DollarD 2000 'Aid, Policies, and Growth,' The American Economic Review, vol. 90, No.4, 847-868, 
864. 
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Significantly, however, it has been narrowly qualified by Easterly who has critiqued 
these findings as being technically 'fragile'. Easterly expresses 'disquieting' concerns 
over the reductive proposition that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing 
countries with supposedly good policies, and lambastes the way donors have 
selectively used these findings to advocate for more aid: 
Clearly, the empirical links from aid to economic growth are far more fragile 
than the drumbeat of media and development agency references to the 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) paper suggested.281 
Next, Dollar and Kraay then found good 'rule of law' and fiscal discipline were factors 
which benefit the poor as well as the whole economy. These researchers reviewed 
the relationship between the income of the bottom fifth of the population and per 
capita GDP in 80 countries over four decades. They argued that policy-induced 
growth is as good for the poor as it is for the overall economy. 282 These findings have 
been used to justify the policy-reform package of supporting private property rights as 
a means of increasing the income of the poor. However, as we have already seen, 
the legitimacy of using their findings to endorse 'trickle down' economics have been 
strongly contested by Stiglitz among others. 
a Transplantation and 'legal origins' debate 
Central to the quest for validating the prevailing judicial reform approach, a significant 
body of empirical research has analysed the effects of reform approaches with legal 
origins. It seeks to ascertain whether certain legal systems are more conducive to 
economic growth, and whether the transplantation of judicial and legal systems 
affects growth. While the empirical evidence is mixed, this research tends to suggest 
that common law systems of law and judicial independence may be more conducive 
to growth. There is, however, another debate over whether it is the manner of 
transplantation rather than the nature of the transplanted system that may be the 
most influential factor. This research is relevant to judicial reform, but it potentially 
calls into question the utility of the cut-and-paste method of development- i.e. cutting 
and pasting Western concepts of justice into non-Western environments -which has 
been a feature of development since the early law-and-development movement. This 
body of 'transplantation' research was initiated by La Porta et al who analysed the 
281 Easterly, W 2003, 'Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?', Journal of Economic Perspectives, val. 17, No. 3, pp. 23-48, 
30; see also Burnside & Dollar, ibid. 
282 Dollar, D & Kraay, A2000, Growth Is Good for the Poor, World Bank, Washington D.C., 27; 
<http:/Jsiteresources.wor!dbank.org/DEC/Resources/22015 Growth is Good for Poor.pdf> at 27 November 2009. 
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origin and effect of court enforcement rules protecting shareholders and creditor 
rights in 49 countries, to argue that: 
The results show that common law countries generally have the strongest, 
and French civil law countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, 
with German and Scandinavian civil law countries located in the middle.283 
While these findings were generally endorsed by Acemoglu, he argued that it is not 
so much the identity of the coloniser or legal origin that matters, but whether 
European colonialists could safely settle in a particular location: where they could not 
settle, they created worse institutions.284 Pistor et al then joined this debate on the 
determinants of effective legal institutions using data from 49 countries. She argued 
that rather than the supply of law from the common or civil systems, it was actually 
the way that the law was initially transplanted and receil(ed that was more important. 
She found evidence that where immigration accompanied transplantation of Western 
law under imperialism and colonization there was a stronger positive correlation with 
development than when that law was externally imposed. This highlighted the 
significance of receptivity in the transplantation process enabling adaptation of the 
foreign formal legal order, which emphasises the crucial importance for reform 
strategy of domestic demand and an appreciation of the needs for local adaptation.285 
b New comparative economics and good governance 
New comparative economics has played an increasingly central role in assessing the 
empirical validity of the key tenets of the institutionalist approach to development. 
This burgeoning body of research has illuminated some significant relationships 
between development and growth, including the origin of legal systems, colonial 
transplantation, the rise of the regulatory state, and the transition from socialism. 
Of seminal significance to the policy discourse on good governance, Mauro found 
empirical evidence to support North's theoretical arguments that malfunctioning 
government institutions - such as courts - constitute a severe obstacle to economic 
283 La Porta, R. Lopez-de-Silanes, F, Shleifer, A & Vishny, R, 1998, 'Law and Finance', The Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 106, no.6, pp. 1113-1155, 1113. See also, LaPorta, R, Lopez-de-Silanes, F, Shleifer. A & Vishny, R 
1999, 'Quality of Government', The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol.15, no.1, 222-279; see also: La 
Porta, R, lopez-de-Silanes, F, and Shleifer, A 2008, 'The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, Journal of 
Economic Literature, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 285-332, 327. 
284 Acemoglu, D, Johnson. S & Robinson, J 2001, 'The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical 
Investigation', American Economic Review, vol. 91, no. 5, pp. 1369-1401, 1373. 
28
!\ Berkowitz, 0, Pistor K & Richard, J 2003, 'The Transplant Effect', American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 51, 
pp. 163-190, 190. See also: Berkowitz, D, Pistor, K & Richard, J 2003, 'Economic development. legality, and the 
transplant effect,' European Economic Review val. 47 pp. 165-195. 
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development. From a cross-country analysis of 70 countries between 1980 and 1983, 
he argued that corruption lowers investment and thereby economic growth.286 
Building on North's findings, Kaufmann and Kraay then built an imposing doctrinal 
discourse around the World Governance Indicators (WGI) which is based on the 
empirical proposition that corruption is directly correlated with low growth.287 They 
argue that the relationship between governance and development is more than 
correlational; it is causal.288 Once again, however, the empirical base of this 
discourse is internally contested. Many challenge the conceptual as well as the 
technical integrity of the methodology of Kaufmann's findings. Grindle, for example, 
finds the empirical research to be equivocal, though she does find evidence of a 
linkage between governance and development. She cites China and Vietnam as 
examples of countries that have made major economic gains in the presence of 
many characteristics of bad governance, notably the absence of secure property 
rights and contracts.289 Arndt and Oman then deliver a potent criticsm of a range of 
problems associated with the likelihood of correlation errors in Kaufman's data 
sources which 'significantly limits' their statistical legitimacy. They question the even 
more fundamental central inferences of causality in the relationship between 
governance and growth.290 Other criticisms, from Thomas for example, relates to the 
construct validity of these indicators which represent a complex, atheoretical and as 
yet poorly articulated hypothesis with no evidence. In particular, they stand as an 
elaborate, untested hypothesis about the nature of governance. Reliance on such a 
hypothesis for any purpose would consequently be premature.291 While Kaufmann 
steadfastly refutes all of these criticisms, it must be fairly observed that a range of 
fundamental conceptual and technical aspects of this research are openly and 
directly contested.292 
The WGI's exemplify the conflicting duality of purposes which is inherent in the 
design of performance indicators, which we have also already seen in the MDGs. At 
286 Mauro, P 1995, 'Corruption and Growth,' Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 110, no. 3, pp. 681-712, 682. 
287 See: Worldwide Governance Indicators, Annex A. 
288 Kaufmann, D & Kraay, A 2002, Growth without Governance, World Bank, Washington, D.C; see related 
discussion in Chapter 7 on performance monitoring frameworks. 
289 Grindle, M 2005, 'Good Enough: Governance Revisited', report to Department For International Development, 
(unpublished). Hewko notes this relationship has not however been easy to confirm in empirical studies, and that 
recent research on the causality of these relationships are not as straightforward as initially assumed. Hewko, J 
2002, 'Foreign Direct Investment: Does the Rule of law Matter?' working paper no. 26, Carnegie Endowment For 
International Peace. See also Chang, above n 274 onwards. 
290 Arndt, C & Oman, C 2006, Use and Abuse of Governance Indicators, OECD Development Centre, Paris, 49-58. 
291 Thomas M 2009, 'What Do the Wor1dwide Governance Indicators Measure?' European Journal of Development 
Research, <http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1007527> at 27 November 2009. 
292 Kaufmann D, Kraay A & Mastruzzi M 2007, 'The Wor1dwide Governance Indicators Project: Answering the Critics', 
Wor1d Bank, <http://siteresources. worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/17 404 79-
1149112210081/2604389-1167941884942/Answering Critics.pdf> at 27 November 2009. 
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the political level, there is an obvious need for simple, clear measures of complex 
phenomena on which evaluative judgments can then be based. But, at the technical 
level, excessive reduction erodes the validity and integrity of these measures and 
impedes the development of any consensus. This endemic tension has yet to be 
resolved in the discourse. 
Djankov and La Porta then use empirical research to find that many institutions are 
designed to serve the interests of incumbent rulers and the political interests that 
support them. While emphasising that empirical validation of reform strategies 
remains in its infancy, they adopt a political economy analysis to argue that these 
findings shed light on the role of government regulation as an enforceable strategy to 
secure law and order. They find that inefficient regulatory intervention hinders growth, 
and then argue that excessive regulation, such as that found in judicial procedures, 
also counters growth.293 These findings have been significant in providing an 
empirical basis for the World Bank's 'doing business' approach in promoting a 
business climate by minimising government regulation. This policy application is, 
however, curiously contradictory to the Bank's other empirically-asserted discourse 
on good governance which promotes the instrumental and institutional role of law, 
regulatory accountability and transparency.294 
c Are institutions trumps? 
As I have already foreshadowed, review of the empirical literature validates certain 
aspects of North's theory of institutions. In assessing the relationship between 
governance and growth, La Porta et al conclude for example that the importance of a 
good government for growth appears to be a 'well-established' empirical 
proposition.295 They investigated the determinants of the quality and performance of 
governments in a cross-section of 152 countries. They found that North's theory that 
property rights and courts promoted growth was valid when the social benefits of 
building these institutions exceed the transaction costs of doing so. Hence private 
land rights promote growth when land becomes scarce and when the costs of 
293 Djankov, S, La Porta, R, lopez-de-Silanes, F, & Shleifer, A 2002, Appropriate Institutions, World Bank, 
Washington D.C., 22. See also, Djankov, S, La Porta, R, Lopez-de-Silanes, F & Shleifer, A 2003, 'Appropriate 
Institutions', Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, World Bank. Washington D.C., pp. 283-
298, 293; Djankov, S, Glaeser. E. La Porta, R. lopez-de-Silanes, F, Shleifer, A (n.d), The New Comparative 
Economics, World Bank, 13-14. <http://www.doinqbusiness.ora/documents/new comparative economics.pdf> at 27 
November 2009. 
294 See, in particular, Kaufmann & Kraay above n 288, and in Chapter 7 below. 
295 La Porta R, lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A, Vishny R, 1999 ~The Quality of Government", Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization, April, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 222-243, 223. 
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enforcing such rights fall below the benefits.296 Refining the focus of this inquiry, 
Knack and Keefer then found evidence which validated North's theory that 'the 
inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the 
most important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary 
underdevelopment in the Third World.' They concluded that institutions which protect 
property rights are crucial to economic growth and investment: 
Few would dispute that the security of property and contractual rights and 
the efficiency with which governments manage the provision of public 
goods and the creation of government golicies are significant determinants 
of the speed with which countries grow. 97 
The economic effects of secure property rights and well-functioning legal systems 
were then found by Barro to be positively associated with growth. This evidence 
suggests that a higher level of civil concepts of the 'rule of law' generates a higher 
rate of economic growth. 298 But, these conclusions are also contested by Rajan who 
calls for 'a dose of realism' to moderate the application of the institutional approach 
to development. He argues forcefully that economic theory has yet to fully 
understand what makes an effective institution in developing countries, and virtually 
concedes that 'we just don't know' how the puzzle of institutions works: 
Institutions are all the rage. The absence of institutions - such as efficient 
and impartial judiciaries (and) legal systems ... is offered as an explanation 
for some of the central puzzles in development economics, including why 
so many countries don't grow fast enough to vanquish poverty. But, 
unfortunately, economic theory offers us little guidance on how strong 
institutions are created and nurtured (italics added).299 
This equivocation over the empirical evidence is echoed by Rodrik who addresses 
what he describes as the greatest question in economics, viz. why does the income 
level in the world's richest and poorest nations differ by a factor of more than 1 00? 
He found that 'the quality of institutions trumps everything else.' For example, 
property rights and the 'rule of law' are always correlated with growth.300 But, 
understanding the nature of this relationship is extremely complex. Rodrik goes on to 
296 Ibid, 222. 
297 Knack, S & Keefer, P 1995, 'Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative 
Institutional Measures', Economics and Politics, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 207-227, 207. 
298 Sarro, R & Sala-i-Martin, X 2003, Economic Growth, 2nd edn, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
299 Rajan, R 2004, 'Assume Anarchy? Why an Orthodox Economic Model might not be the Best Guide for Policy', 
Finance and Development, September, pp. 56-57, 57, 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubslftlfandd/2004/09/odf/straight.pdf> at 27 November 2009. 
300 Rodrik D, Subramanian A & Trebbi, F 2002, 'Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and 
Integration in Economic Development', working paper no. 97, Center for International Development, Harvard, 4. 
Problems of endogeneity and reverse causality plague any empirical researcher trying to make sense of the 
relationships among these causal factors (at 3). 
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warn that the research on institutional quality is severely limited on the key issue of 
causality; an issue which he says 'plagues' the field. Crucially, he aligns with Polanyi 
and Chang, to argue that high-quality institutions are as much a result of economic 
prosperity as they are their cause: 
Many of the policy implications drawn from this (empirical literature on 
institutions) are at best irrelevant and at worst misleading .... The difficulty 
with the empirical analysis of institutional development has been that 
institutional quality is as endogenous to income levels as anything can 
possibly be. Our ability to disentangle the web of causality between 
prosperity and institutions is seriously limited.301 
To further emphasise the extent of this equivocation over causality, Rodrik admits to 
The Economist that he remains unclear of the meaning of the 'rule of law' and how it 
supports growth: 
"Am I the only economist guilty of using the term [rule of law) without having 
a good fix on what it really means?" asks Dani Rodrik of Harvard University. 
"Well, maybe the first one to confess to it."302 
Even Friedman, the economic architect of much of the 'Washington Consensus' 
approach, described the rule of law as critical to the journey from a central command 
economy to a free enterprise society, but admitted that how this worked was 'not an 
easy topic.'303 
Evidently, the challenge of distinguishing correlation from causality is endemic to the 
empirical literature and deeply problematic because it only establishes evidence of a 
relationship, but not of its causation.304 This fundamental qualification on the utility of 
most empirical inquiry for policy purposes underscores the limited extent of our 
existing understanding of the significance of property rights, using Russia and China 
as examples: 
What matters is that investors feel safe, regardless of how that safety is 
achieved. The empirical literature does not tell us how that safety is 
attained, only that it matters a lot!05 
'" Rodrik. D 2004. 'Getting Institutions Right'. DICE Report. Harvard. pp. 10-16, 10. 
<http:l/www.ifo.de/pls/questci/download/CESifo%2001CE%20Reoort%202004/CESifo%2001CE%20Report%202/200 
4/dicereport204-forum2.pdf> at 27 November 2009. 
302 The Economist, 15 March 2008, vol. 386, iss. 8571, 83. See also: Rodrik 0 et al, Institutions Rule, above, n 300. 
303 Friedman, M 2002, 'Economic Freedom Behind the Scenes: Preface,' in Gwartney J, Economic Freedom of the 
World: Annual Report, xviii. http:/lwww.freethe.wor1d.comt2002/0EFW02fmtmttr.pdf> at 30 June 2009. 
304 See, eg, Chakravarti A 2005, Aid Institutions and Development: New approaches to Growth, Governance and 
Poverty, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 4. 
305 Rodrik, D 2004, above n 30113. 
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Despite endorsing much of North's theory, Rodrik strongly cautions against an 
oversimplification of the available empirical evidence. The mantra that 'institutions 
rule' has become a form of property-rights reductionism. What the evidence in fact 
suggests is that large-scale institutional transformation is hardly ever a prerequisite 
for getting growth going. While it is true that sustained economic convergence 
eventually requires high quality institutions, 'in the short-run, large-scale institutional 
reform is rarely necessary to accelerate growth.'306 These causative difficulties are 
then reinforced by Rigobon and Rodrik who emphasise the empirical difficulty of 
ascertaining causality. They argue that the 'rule of law' can be- and probably is-
both a cause and an effect in economic growth.307 Finally, Alesina and Rodrik studied 
the relationship between politics, distribution and economic growth. They showed 
that inequality in land ownership and income is negatively correlated with subsequent 
economic growth.308 
Hence, as we can see, this body of empirical evidence at first blush seems to 
establish much of the institutionalist theory for development. But, on closer scrutiny, 
we can readily discern that this is by no rneans straightforward for policy purposes. 
Much of this research is highly qualified and often contested. Evidently, the 
institutional relationship between trust, civic cooperation and growth is extremely 
complex, and the multi-dimensional nature of this relationship remains to be more 
fully researched before it can provide authoritative justification for development policy 
prescription. 309 
d Precepts of independence - checks and balances 
A parallel body of empirical inquiry has focused on ascertaining the relationship 
between the courts and economic development. The findings appear to validate 
some of the theories discussed in Chapter 4, and have become central to justifying 
support for judicial independence as a means of enabling growth. 
""Ibid. 13. 
307 Rigobon, R & Rodrik, 0 2005, 'Rule of Law, Democracy, Openness, and Income: Estimating the 
interrelationships', Economics of Transition, val. 13, no. 3, pp. 533-564, 534. 
308 Atesina, A & Rodrik D 1994, 'Distributive Politics and Economic Growth,' The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 
109, no. 2 pp. 465-490,465. 
309 See, eg, Knack, S & Keefer, P 1997, 'Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country 
Investigation', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 112, no. 4 pp. 1251-1288, 1284. See also: Arrow K, 'Gifts and 
Exchanges,' Philosophy and Public Affairs, I (1972), 343-362, 357, who argues that 'virtually every commercial 
transaction has within itself an element of trust. certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be 
plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual 
confidence.' 
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For example, an empirical analysis of constitutional rules in 71 countries has found 
that judicial independence and constitutional review are associated with greater 
economic and political freedom. La Porta et al have found that judicial independence 
matters most for economic freedom, and constitutional review for political freedom. 
These findings generally validate Locke and Hayek's theories that judicial checks and 
balances are crucial guarantors of freedom. More specifically, they found that 
increased levels of judicial independence in countries with a legal origin of common 
law systems account for some of the positive effects on measures of economic 
freedom. 310 
In further research, La Porta et al others found that inadequate incentives and overly-
complicated procedures, rather than inadequate resources or excessive access, are 
the causes of judicial stagnation and inefficiency. They use these findings to argue 
that judicial reform should be promoting judicial efficiency and independence, and 
call for simplifying judicial procedures and improving incentivesa11 
Similarly, an empirical analysis of the relationship between court performance and 
procedural formalism in 109 countries has established that higher procedural 
formalism is historically associated with colonial inquisitorial systems, less efficient 
judiciaries, and poorer countries.312 In research which again conflicts with some of 
the other empirical researches, notably those of La Porta, Acemoglu and Pistor 
above, Djankov found that legal formalism is systematically greater in civil law -
especially French civil law - countries than in common law countries. It also 
suggested significant inefficiencies. He found that there was no evidence that 
formalism- per se- secured justice.313 Most significantly: 
[O]ne cannot presume in economic analysis, especially as applied to 
developing countries, that property and contract are secured by courts. 314 
Further research on the relationship between judicial independence and economic 
reform has found that only de facto judicial independence is positively related to real 
GDP growth per capita, and that de jure judicial independence does not have an 
310 La Porta, R, Lopez-de-Silanes, F. Pop-Eieches, C, Shleifer, A 2004, 'Judicial Checks and Balances', Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 112, no. 2, pp. 445-470. 
311 La Porta, R, Botero, J, Lopez-de-Silanes, F, Shleifer A, & Volokh A 2003, 'Judicial Reform,' World Bank Research 
Observer, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 61-88,78. 
312 Djankov, S, La Porta, R, Lopez-de-Silanes, F, & Shleifer A 2003, 'Courts', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 
118. no. 2. pp. 453-517. 
313 Djankov defines formalism as the extent to which regulation causes dispute resolution to deviate from the 
neighbour model. Procedural formalism gives the sovereign more control over the outcomes provides the means by 
which the sovereign retains an interest in how the dispute is resolved. Ibid 455-7. 
314 Djankov, et al, ibid, 511. 
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impact. Using these findings, Feld and Voigt observe that an independent judiciary 
may be interpreted as a mechanism to turn promises - for example, to respect 
property rights and abstain from expropriation - into credible commitments. This is 
consistent with and tends to validate parts of North's theory of institutions and the 
instrumental role of courts to engender investor confidence.315 Similarly, judicial 
independence and accountability have been found to be highly significant to 
economic performance. 316 
The quality of judicial institutions has also been empirically shown to affect 
contracting behaviour and the economic performance of small firms. Chemin's 
examination of the quality of the judicial system in India found that having a slower 
judiciary is associated with more breaches of contract, among other things. He uses 
these findings to argue that 'courts do matter' for economic performance.317 Most 
recently, in 2009, Chemin found tentative evidence of a relationship between judicial 
reform and an increase in GOP which may be attributable to improved judicial 
efficiency in Pakistan, though this research is yet to be peer reviewed. 318 
This survey of the empirical inquiry on the determinants of growth, and the 
relationship of justice to growth, reveals the nascent and equivocal state of 
endeavour and the insufficiency and often contested state of this inquiry. These are 
hardly robust empirical foundations from which to assert primacy of a theoretical 
justification for the purposes of development policy-making. 
e Empirical inquiry- torch beams in the night 
As a result of synthesising the existing empirical inquiry, I argue that this review 
generally validates the pivotal nature of a liberal relationship between the state and 
the economy, as theorised by Smith and Mills. However, as we have seen, the 
idealistic nature and role of this relationship has been fundamentally contested by 
Polanyi and Chang, and questioned by the likes of Rajan and Rodrik. Most recently, 
building on Polanyi's concept of the 'great transformation', Stiglitz highlighted the 
critical tension - or a pendulum effect - that exists between the state and Smith's 
315 Feld, L & Voigt, S 2003, 'Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set 
of Indicators', European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 19, pp. 497-527. 
316 Voigt, S 2008, 'The Economic Effects of Judicial Accountability: Cross-country evidence', European Journal of 
Law and Economics, vol. 25, pp. 95-123, 96. 
317 Chemin, M 2007, Does the Quality of the Judiciary Shape Economic Activity? Evidence from India, Universite du 
Quebec a Montreal, 1, <http:I/132.203.59.36/CIRPEE/cahierscirnee/2007/files/CIRPEE07-25.Pdf> at 27 November 
2009. 
318 Chemin M 2009, 'The Impact of the Judiciary on Entrepreneurship: Evaluation of Pakistan's 'Access to Justice 
Programme~,· Journal of Public Economics, (in press: doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.05.005); see also below n 559. 
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concept of the market, and the critical importance of the extent of regulation. At the 
time of this writing, this pendulum had discernibly started to turn back from the 
extremities of the 'free market: small state' model of the 'Washington Consensus' 
period which was lambasted by Harvey, and highlighted in the World Development 
Report of 2006, for increasing inequity. The evolving discourse on good governance 
is nudging the pendulum towards an emerging new notion of 'the capable state'. 
During this period, development economics has generated unprecedented aggregate 
global growth, but at the same time it has entrenched and extended inequity - most 
simply, the rich have got richer while the poor have often got poorer. As Greenspan 
acknowledges, there have been mistakes. Principally for this reason, development 
economics is internally contested by its leading exponents such as Sachs, Collier 
and Easterly who now openly express their disappointment at its failure to effectively 
address the equitable dimension of poverty alleviation. 
It requires little prescience to anticipate that further changes in economic policy 
approach are underway. The Economist, for example, describes the reputation of 
what it terms 'the dismal science' as taking a beating in the wake of the biggest 
economic calamity in 80 years: 
The (economics) profession itself is suffering from guilt and rancour. In a 
recent lecture, Paul Krugman, winner of the Nobel prize in economics in 
2008, argued that much of the past 30 years of macroeconomics was 
'spectacularly useless at best, and positively harmful at worst.'319 
The recent and substantial interventions of central banks around the world and 
government investment in ailing businesses reveal much more than just fiscal and 
monetary policy adjustment. I argue that what is visible is symptomatic of another 
fundamental shift in the overarching relationship between the state and the market. 
The Polanyian pendulum is swinging, from the prevailing Chicago-school style of 
free-market economics towards some kind of reversion to the earlier Keynsian 
approach of the development state. Where this swing will actually settle remains to 
be seen, though expert commentators like Trubek have already forecast a new 
approach to the 'rule of law' based along the lines of a state-market partnership 
approach. 
Meantime, The Economist is chastening in its latest assessment that it seems 
'economic growth remains a mystery', despite the World Bank's best efforts; no one 
319 The Economist, 18 July 2009, vol. 392, iss. 8640, 11. 
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really knows why some countries sustain it over decades and others do not. 320 This 
may perhaps be a bit harsh. As we have just seen, the burgeoning school of new 
comparative economics has conducted extensive, substantial and significant 
empirical inquiry to advance our understanding of the key relationships between aid, 
government, the institutions of justice and economic growth. It does, however, clearly 
remain early days. Much has been illuminated by recent empirical inquiry but, equally 
much is contested or remains unclear about the determinants of growth and, more 
particularly, about the role of law and the courts in promoting either financial or other 
aspects of well-being. 
Beyond that, what can be said is that recent research has empirically validated a 
number of the key tenets of new institutional economics, as notably propounded by 
North, building as he does on Locke and Weber, among others. Significantly, these 
findings confirm positive relationships between good governance and economic 
growth, though this is evidently not supported without dissention. Fundamental 
questions remain unanswered over the directional chain of causation. Additionally, a 
body of research also supports the broad institutionalist proposition that independent 
courts tend to secure property and contract which are necessary for investment and 
growth. However, the significance of these findings remains obviously qualified by 
the examples of China and Vietnam which present many unanswered questions 
about the scope and adequacy of this theory. 
In summarising the key elements of the findings which I have outlined, I now argue 
that there is sufficient empirical evidence to establish the following propositions: 
• Institutional development may contribute to growth, and growth may 
contribute to institutional development, multi-directionally. 
• Good governance contributes to investment and growth; however, aid erodes 
governance, and is not correlated with democracy; and corruption is 
associated with ineffective government and low growth. 
• Growth and investment are increased in the presence of institutions which 
protect property and contract rights, and aid assists growth where there are 
good policies, though this relationship is described as small and fragile. 
• Efficient, independent and accountable judiciaries are associated with growth. 
320 The Economist, 24 January 2009, Vol390, Iss 8615, 66. See also: 'My feeling is we got pretty damn close to it all 
coming apart ... Western nations could have come apart in the way they did in the Great Depression.' Clarke, A 2009, 
'How the Collapse of Lehman Brothers Pushed Capitalism to the Brink'. The Guardian, 4 September, 
<http://www.guardian.eo.uk/business/2009/sep/04/lehman-brothers-aftershocks-28-days> at 12 December 2009. 
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• Domestic demand for change is more important than the origin of reform. 
The centrally unresolved issue of causality, however, remains the ogre hogging the 
development armchair, as already mentioned: econometric evidence of correlation is 
evidence only of an association; it is not causal. As Rodrik warns, until causality is 
confirmed, much of the available evidence remains of qualified value for the 
purposes of its application in development policy. 
In closing this chapter, I argue that the above empirical findings are significant in 
validating only some elements of the prevailing institutionalist approach to economic 
growth. As we have seen, many of these findings are qualified or contested, and 
many gaps remain in our knowledge and understanding of the complex and often 
multidimensional aspect of the key relationships which promote growth. For this 
reason, it is all the more troubling that there is a significant absence of any empirical 
inquiry into other explanations of growth; such explanations could serve to validate or 
refine other theoretical justifications for judicial reform as discussed in Chapter 3. For 
whatever reason, this inquires have not yet been extended. As a result, the empirical 
evidence is still limited, and much work remains before we can further develop our 
understanding of the determinants of the good life. 
In the meantime, the indeterminacy of the existing empirical evidence creates the 
need for further research and alternative theories to inform reform approach. 
4 Conclusions - towards an alternative theory 
In sum, having critiqued the philosophic and empirical discourses on judicial reform in 
this opening part of the thesis, I have revealed and on occasion validated key 
elements in the theoretical justification for judicial development. In essence, these 
elements establish the fundamental justification for the overarching social contract 
which binds the state to maximise liberty in a reasoned trading-off for the safety and 
the common good of its citizens. This understanding explains the central liberal 
preoccupation with the state and its enabling regulatory relationship with the market, 
economic development and the alleviation of poverty. 
More particularly, my analysis establishes the philosophic foundations for 
constitutionalism as a coherent justification for judicial reform. There are a number of 
key precepts which are fundamental to this approach: the sovereignty of law; the 
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separation of powers and the independent function of courts in supporting economic 
institutions of property and contract; and most directly the notion of justice as a public 
good, embodying dimensions of equity and distribution. This analysis identifies the 
liberal tradition of political thought and the foundations of free-market economics. 
Taken together, these overarching, but divergent theories provide the foundations for 
the prevalent institutionalist approach to the development vision of courts as 
protectors of the economic institutions of property and contract. 
I have established through further analysis of these philosophic underpinnings that 
there are two principal theoretical approaches, or justifications, for judicial reform. 
These find their basis in the classical and Enlightenment thinking on the precepts of 
justice, the role of the state, and the functional nature of the social contract. The first 
and prevalent justification, which is founded on the theories of Weber and North, 
sees the importance of reforming courts to enable investment-based economic 
growth by providing the means to secure property and contract. The second and 
more recent approach branches from the thinking of Rawls and Sen. This approach 
offers a normatively rights-based alternative which centres on the constitutive 
justification of promoting human welfare. 
Throughout this thesis, I argue that the domain of practice is riven by an unresolved 
contest over the theory or justification for judicial reform. The traditional approach of 
major donors, initially articulated by Shihata, focused primarily on adopting a 'thin', 
efficiency-based and instrumentalist economic justification. The other, more recent 
human-centred empowerment approaches focus primarily on a 'thicker', constitutive 
justification for. reform. At a critical point, this tension, which is core to western 
concepts of liberalism, may be described as being between utility or aggregate 
wellbeing and equity or individual wellbeing. In practice, the boundaries of this 
contest are of course not necessarily clearly delineated. There is much blur and 
conflation in approach which renders it imprudent to over-affiliate organisational 
positions to either of these theoretical justifications. Nonetheless, this is a useful 
dialectic device to enable a critical analysis of experience. 
As I have demonstrated, the empirical inquiry validates only some of the tenets of the 
dominant institutionalist approach. There is much qualification and even contest over 
the evidence. Moreover, the empirical story is like torch-beams in the night, casting 
narrow shafts of light across Kleinfeld-Belton's proverbial blind man's elephant to 
illuminate selective insights of the relationship of the 'rule of law' to economic growth. 
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Economic historians, Polanyi and Chang, are deeply circumspect about the chain of 
causation between institutionalism and development. Empirical researchers such as 
Easterley, Rajan and Rodrik, are leery of over-simplifying the policy implications of 
the empirical evidence, and are candid in admitting their limits of understanding of 
this relationship. Meantime, Nobel Laureates, Stiglitz and Krugman, openly 
contemplate the failure and harmful of recent policy approaches. Troubling, 
systematic inquiry into the equitable and distributive dimensions of justice is starkly 
absent. More than anything else, my survey reveals the tentative nature of the 
economic development policy approach based as it is on such fragile empirical 
foundations. 
Given the uncertainty and the incompleteness of our knowledge, how can we 
philosophically, conceptually or morally accept the ongoing primacy of the 
institutionalist approach, challenged as it is by the emerging evidence of entrenched 
poverty and expanding inequity? I have argued that this is untenable, based on my 
critique of both the theoretical and empirical evidence. This is not to refute the 
institutionalist endeavour, aspects of which have been validated empirically; but 
rather, it is to identify the imbalance between collective wellbeing or utility with 
individual wellbeing or equity. This imbalance establishes the insufficiency of the 
existing approach as a liberal policy prescription for the Aristotelian good life. This 
opens a space to elevate an alternative, humanistic justification for judicial reform. 
Building on the philosophies of Aristotle, the Enlightenment philosophers and most 
recently Rawls, Dworkin and Sen, I now argue that justice is elemental to the good 
life, and cannot be subordinated to the economic creation of wealth or the alleviation 
of poverty. In this theoretical sense, I argue that justice is now increasingly 
recognised as being constitutive of development, and must co-exist with economic 
development rather than be subordinated to it. This vision of justice is concerned with 
fairness and equity. So long as alleviation of poverty remains the apex goal of 
development, justice must embrace the distributive dimension of poverty alleviation 
through the exercise of rights, and judicial reform should be realigned to support that. 
Noting the persistence of poverty the alleviation of which is development's enshrined 
goal and, more particularly mounting inequity, I now argue that the contested and 
incomplete nature of current empirical research provides the space and the obligation 
to develop an alternative humanist approach to judicial reform to supplement the 
prevailing instrumental institutionalist approach of development economics. 
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Hence, to conclude this part of the thesis, I have established a number of key 
propositions to support my overarching argument that the purpose of judicial reform 
should be realigned to promote justice being, in its essence, the promotion of 
fairness and equity. 
First, I have established that while there are various purposes or justifications for 
judicial reform, the oldest and most prevalent is economic. This justification casts 
judicial reform in an instrumentalist role to support economic growth as the means of 
alleviating poverty, which is the overarching goal of development. Second, I have 
established that poverty is increasingly recognised as comprising an equitable 
dimension. Third, it is now widely recognised that over the past thirty years 
development has brought economic growth but this growth has been uneven. 
Significantly, there has been an increase in what has become known as the 'inequity 
gap'. In this crucial sense, therefore, I have established that the instrumental role of 
judicial reform in development has been insufficient in promoting equitable growth. 
I then argued that there is widespread criticism in the literature of the performance of 
judicial reform, variously described as being disappointing, elusive and inconclusive. 
This critique is utilitarian, i.e. judicial reform has not worked very well. This is 
because judicial reform lacks a clear and compelling justification or theory. I 
demonstrated from a review of liberal philosophy that justice has long been 
recognised as being primarily concerned with fairness and equity. I then argued that 
the explanation for the disappointing performance of judicial reform is in essence that 
it has been tasked to do something inappropriate: that is, to support economic growth 
when it should be tasked to support fairness and equity. I then examined the 
available empirical evidence to find validation of the relationships between the 
various theoretical justifications for judicial reform and evidence from the real world. 
While this empirical evidence validates some elements of the prevalent 
instrumentalist justification for economic growth, it is incomplete, qualified and on 
occasion contested; moreover, there is no empirical inquiry on the alternative 
justification of promoting equity. On this basis, I concluded that there is a lack of 
compelling empirical validation for the prevalent economic justification. 
Having established these propositions, I argued that the persistence of inequity 
creates an opening and imperative to elevate the alternative equitable justification or 
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theory for judicial reform in development, and the need to extend empirical inquiry to 
understand, validate and refine its application in practice. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I have defined justice as fairness and equity. This 
may be described as a substantive, normative or 'thick' definition, in contrast to other 
more formal definitions which may rely on the existence of an independent and 
impartial judiciary, or more functional definitions which may emphasise procedural 
qualities such as predictability of process.321 As we have seen, these definitions are 
sometimes reduced to a discussion of 'thick' and 'thin' concepts of justice. 322 Equity 
and equality are not to be confused within this definition of justice. Since Aristotle's 
time, it has been recognised that justice has rested on distributional notions of 
equality but, as Rawls has argued, equity may at times differ from equality where the 
interests of restoring fairness are invoked.323 More recently, Kennedy has focused on 
the distributional aspects of justice, though these are to be distinguished from the 
political distribution of interests and rights which is the prerogative of the executive 
branch of government.324 Hence, I have established that this equitable notion of 
justice is distributional in a restorative sense, which distinguishes it from the more 
general concept of equality. 
My argument about the distributive dimension of justice is not aimed at providing a 
comprehensive theory of justice. That would go well beyond the less ambitious 
bounds of this thesis. Rather, I make this argument to supplement the prevailing 
instrumental economic justification for judicial reform. My argument emphasises the 
need to justify judicial reform endeavour, at least in part, in promoting the equitable 
dimension of justice. This dimension is distributive to the extent that this reform 
endeavour should seek to redress rights or interests - as framed either domestically 
in the constitution, statute or other means, or internationally in endorsed human 
rights treaties. This distribution is to restore injustice - whether procedural ('thin') or 
substantive ('thick') - that would otherwise result. This argument conforms to the 
constitutional precept of separation of powers and, importantly, does not intrude into 
the executive or political prerogative of allocating interests in society. At this point, it 
will be seen that justice building on constitutionalism offers a centrally moderating 
role in any political economy analysis of power. This vision of justice focuses on 
rectifying established rights where they would otherwise be violated; thus it is 
321 For a useful discussion of the application of these definitions to development, see Stephenson, M 2009, Rule of 
Law as a Goa/ of Development Policy, World Bank, <http:l/go.worldbank.ora/DZET J85MDO> at 27 November 2009. 
322 Above, n 91 onwards. 
323 Rawl's 'Difference Principle', above n 220. 
324 Kennedy, 0 2006, above. n 162. 
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essentially concerned with enabling rights, not creating or changing them. This 
establishes my argument that: judicial reform should focus - in addition to other 
instrumental purposes - on promoting equity through rights as a means to improve 
justice. 
Justice is an immanent right which is fundamental to any notion of civilised society. 
This has been recognised since the earliest records of Western philosophy, and is 
now globally endorsed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 325 
Rights bring justice into action to protect the citizen from the predations of the state 
and the Hobbesian brutishness of life in nature. Because rights may nonetheless be 
socially contested, I argue that the right to justice must coexist with the right to 
economic growth. Justice is as constitutive of the good life as economic well-being. 
This argument refutes the prevailing assertion that economic growth trumps justice. It 
asserts that the right to growth without equity is unsustainable and the right to equity 
without growth is non-feasible. To the extent that there is some emerging evidence of 
donor recognition of the need for equitable growth, as seen in the World 
Development Report 2006: Equity & Development, the significance of my argument 
is that judicial reform is lagging behind this recognition. 
In the next part of this thesis I will provide a means of ensuring the integrity and 
accountability of this enterprise and the means with which to evaluate its 
effectiveness. 
As we have already seen in part 1 of this thesis, I have argued that judicial reform 
has demonstrably failed to attain its stated economic goal. The widening equity gap 
provides a utilitarian means of demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the prevailing 
instrumentalist justification for judicial reform. I have also argued that the academic 
commentary on judicial reform reflects a mounting perception of disappointment in 
the performance of this endeavour. In the absence of any consistently compelling 
empirical evidence to validate the instrumental approach, classic and Enlightenment 
philosophy provides us with an alternative, constitutive justification which will promote 
justice, i.e. fairness and equity. The notion of rights provides a normative means to 
justify this endeavour. 
Significantly, however, the academic commentary does not as yet discern whether 
the mounting perception of disappointment over the lack of results reflects a deficit of 
325 Entered into force on 23 March 1976; UNGA Resolution 2200 A (XXI). 
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theory, a deficit of performance or a deficit of evaluation. Refinement of analysis into 
this perception of disappointment is the focus of the next part of this thesis. 
END: PART 1 . 
• • • 
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PART 2- EVALUATION 
Introduction to Part 2 
In this part of the thesis, I refocus on the issue of evaluation. I address the central 
question of this thesis, 'Does judicial reform work?' by deconstructing it into its key 
components: 'What should we measure?' and 'How should we measure it?' In 
Chapter 6, I address these questions through an analysis of the general state and 
nature of development evaluation. Then in Chapter 7, I sharpen the focus of this 
analysis by scrutinising and critiquing both the evaluation of judicial reform and the 
meta-evaluation of that evaluative practice. 
In Chapter 6, I will argue that it is first necessary to appraise the efficacy of 
development evaluation before it is possible to evaluate the effectiveness of reform 
endeavour. As a matter of dialectic, it is not feasible to assert judgments on the 
performance of judicial reform before one has first justified how to assess the merit or 
worth of that endeavour- though, as we have just seen in Part 1, this is actually what 
has happened in the academic commentary. 
Mounting global concerns to improve development effectiveness frame this analysis. 
Over the past decade these concerns have raised the importance of evaluation and, 
in the process, changed and repositioned this function as a key element in a new 
approach to managing-for-development-results (MfDR). In this context, I find that 
during this period there has been both substantial growth and a potentially profound 
refinement in approach, involving a shift in focus from monitoring the efficient delivery 
of assistance to evaluating its results. At the same time, however, I find that 
development evaluation is in a transitional state, and I argue that at the present time 
there is no established orthodoxy on how to evaluate development effectiveness. 
This transition has major implications for both the theory and practice of development 
evaluation. In essence, the theory of evaluation is now torn between rival 
justifications of accountability and effectiveness. From an analysis of the evidence of 
practice, I argue that these justifications are largely irreconcilable. I will also argue 
that practice is now characterised by a number of fundamental debates over its 
purpose and methodology, labelled a 'paradigm war', over the key question: 'Does 
aid work?' Obscuring a ready answer to this question is a range of philosophic, 
conceptual and technical challenges which include the need to demonstrate impact. 
In practice this is rarely undertaken because it is technically difficult, slow and often 
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disproportionately expensive. This transitional state, I argue, has caused 
fragmentation in the approach to development evaluation. I conclude this general 
analysis by finding that there is a marked 'evaluation gap' between the new rhetorical 
posture of the international community and the state of its evaluation practice, with 
ensuing confusion over fundamental aspects of purpose, approach and methodology. 
Unsurprisingly, I conclude that this confusion generally inhibits the evaluation of 
development effectiveness, and risks infecting the formulation of any specific 
consensus over the means of evaluating the performance of judicial reform. 
In Chapter 7, I will then refine this analysis to find answers to the more specific 
questions of 'what' to evaluate in judicial reform and 'how' to evaluate it. To address 
these questions, I analyse the practices of judicial reform and its evaluation, both of 
which I find to be deficient. Evaluations of practice are rarely undertaken. When they 
are, they consistently demonstrate that judicial reform has generated disappointing 
results. However, an analysis or 'meta-evaluation' of those evaluations (that is, an 
evaluation of those evaluations) reveals marked deficiencies in their method. I 
therefore conclude that the initial perception that judicial reform yields disappointing 
results, as found in Part 1 of this thesis, is further muddied by the scarcity and limited 
quality of evaluation. I find that the evaluation of judicial reform endeavour is qualified 
by considerable philosophic, conceptual and technical difficulties in selecting 
appropriate performance indicators, developing consensus over the design of 
monitoring frameworks, demonstrating causal relationships, establishing attribution 
and demonstrating results. Hence, as foreshadowed, I find that deficiencies of 
evaluative effort have contributed to the broadly-held perceptions of deficiency in 
performance. 
Spurred by the global political imperative to attain the targets of the Millennium 
Development Goals, as supported by the Paris Principles of 2005, the international 
community of donors has addressed this chronic deficiency in evaluation with a 
substantial investment in performance monitoring. Over the past decade, this has led 
to a proliferation of substantial performance monitoring frameworks around the 
developing world which variously monitor justice, judicial reform, the rule of law and 
governance. I argue that this growth has in fact done little to promote progress on the 
key issue of evaluation to date. Instead, it has diverted attention and resources by 
substituting an earlier insufficiency of data with a new challenge of selecting which, if 
any, framework may be useful for the purpose of evaluating judicial reform 
endeavour. 
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My analysis of this proliferation of frameworks reveals considerable diversity of 
purpose, approach, focus and methodology. Most frameworks adopt relatively 'thin' 
formalistic conceptions of reform to answer the 'whaf question by measuring justice 
in terms of its efficiency because of difficulties in measuring the substantive 
qualitative aspects of justice. An analysis of these measures reveals that many are 
inferential at best of the qualitative dimensions of justice, which leave the 
assessment of 'thick' substantive improvements in justice, fairness and equity 
unanswered. Accordingly, I find that we are as yet no closer to either evaluating or 
demonstrating effectiveness in judicial reform, however conceptualised. 
My analysis then extends to a critique of the evaluation of judicial reform. This 
critique will establish two propositions: the evaluation of judicial reform is deficient 
because it is rarely undertaken - which I will call an 'evaluation gap;' second, when it 
is undertaken, there is a discrepancy between what that evaluation is and what it 
should be- which I will call a 'meta-evaluation gap.' Collectively, these deficiencies 
in evaluation qualify the initial hypothesis of failure, being the perception of 
disappointment in judicial performance in Part 1 of this thesis -which I have already 
called a 'performance gap.' 
I conclude this analysis by arguing that the existing answers to both the 'whaf and 
'how' questions in evaluating judicial reform are deficient. Finally, to redress this 
unsatisfactory situation, I offer my best-reasoned efforts to contribute to the discourse 
by plugging the major gaps of theory and practice which have now been identified 
above, and which continue to plague any demonstration of success in judicial reform. 
As already outlined, I address the 'whaf question by arguing that judicial reform 
should aim to improve justice and, at its essence, be concerned with promoting 
fairness and equity. To be meaningfully measurable, I will argue that this purpose or 
rationale for reform requires a 'thick' normative foundation in addition to its existing 
'thin' conceptualisation. Building on my conclusions in Part 1 of this thesis, I will now 
argue that this additional dimension is to be found in the universally endorsed treaties 
of international human rights law - spanning as they do political, civil, economic, 
social and cultural rights. While development of a definitive measurement approach 
remains a work in progress, this normative framework provides the conceptual 
means with which to design, implement, monitor and evaluate ongoing endeavour, 
using target and result indicators to systematically answer the question 'how' to 
measure effectiveness in a meaningful way. 
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CHAPTER 6 ·DEVELOPMENT EVALUATION 
1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I examine the general theory and practice of development evaluation 
to ask the question: 'Does aid work?' 
I argue from a survey of theory and practice that there is no established orthodoxy on 
how to demonstrate development effectiveness because evaluation is presently 
undergoing a substantial transition. This transition arises from the professionalisation 
of this nascent discipline, and its repositioning as a key tool in managing-for-
improved-development-results as part of the Paris Declaration of 2005. Despite 
substantial growth and refinement, analysis reveals development evaluation is a 
discipline which is internally riven by a 'paradigm war' over methodology, unresolved 
conceptual and technical debates, and mounting misgivings that the new approach 
may not improve results. 
I demonstrate that this transitional state has created a marked 'evaluation gap' 
between the new rhetorical posture of the international community and the state of its 
evaluation practice. Unsurprisingly, this gap inhibits the evaluation of judicial reform 
which I will address in the next chapter. 
2 Key concepts 
Development evaluation is an important element in this thesis because it provides the 
means for accountability as well as improvement in the reform enterprise. To perform 
these functions, evaluation requires clear and consistent answers to both the 'whaf 
and 'how' questions of this thesis: 'what' is judicial reform supposed to do, and 'how' 
is success to be measured. More specifically, evaluation provides the answer to the 
general question: 'Does aid work?' and to the more central question 'Does judicial 
reform work?' 
Evaluation is generally seen as the action of working out the value of something.326 It 
is the process of assessing the value or worth of an endeavour in terms of its 
effectiveness in accomplishing its goals or results.327 In the development context, 
326 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3'd Ed., 1987, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 689. 
327 The New Collins Dictionary, London: Collins, 1986, 340. 
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evaluation is a form of disciplined inquiry which results in 'merit' and/or 'worth' 
constructions or judgments being made.328 According to the Development Assistance 
Committee, Working Party on Aid Evaluation of the Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC): 
Evaluation is the systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or 
completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and 
results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, 
development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. An 
evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling 
the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision- making process of 
both recipients and donors. 329 
An important aspect of this function is that it is inescapably a normative process, 
depending as it must on the framework of values within which it is conducted. It is not 
possible to conduct an evaluation without having first defined the purpose of that 
evaluation. Evaluation is dependent on normative criteria being applied in making 
judgments about activities, and determining their value or merit. 330 It is more than just 
gathering data. Evaluation fits within the context of a model with criteria relating to 
quality, value, worth and effectiveness. 331 
In development practice, evaluation is frequently associated with monitoring. While 
these activities are often contiguous, they differentiate separate functions. Monitoring 
is the process of observing and reporting on something over a period of time.332 It is 
generally recognised as being management's continuous examination of progress 
achieved during the implementation of a development project to track compliance 
with the plan and to take necessary decisions to improve performance.333 Monitoring 
is defined by OEDC-DAC as being: 
A continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified 
indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an 
ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent of 
326
_Guba E & Uncoln Y, 'Guidelines and Checklist for Constructivist Evaluation,' Evaluation Checklist Project, 
University West Michigan, http://www.wmich.edu/evalctr/checklists/constructivisteval.pdf I at 8 December 2009. 
329 OECD 2002, Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-based Monitoring, OECD, DAC, Paris. OECD-DAC 
is an international forum. Members include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Commission, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, African 
Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, UN 
Development Programme, International Monetary Fund. 
330 Armytage, L 1996, Educating Judges, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 186. 
331 United Nations Evaluation Group 2005, Norms for Evaluation in the UN System, 6, 
<http:/lwww.uneval.org/normsandstandardslindex.jso?doc cat source id=4> 25 November 2009. 
332 Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10m Ed, 1999, Oxford University Press, New York, 920. 
333 United Nations Evaluation Group, Norms tor Evaluation in the UN System, 2005, 5. 
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progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of 
allocated funds. 334 
While there has always been a close link between monitoring and evaluation (M&E), 
it is generally accepted that the monitoring function focuses on enabling managers to 
track what is happening with their projects, and to check on progress towards the 
achievement of objectives. Evaluation is a more purposeful activity which is 
concerned with learning lessons from past experience for the future and providing 
accountability. 335 
Thus, it is important to maintain a clear distinction between monitoring, which is 
mainly concerned with the tracking of efficient delivery of 'inputs' and 'outputs', and 
evaluation which is mainly concerned with assessing the worth of 'outcomes' and 
'impacts'. Donors need to both monitor the performance of their contractors and 
evaluate the performance of their assistance. The former has an audit or 
accountability purpose, while the latter has a learning or effectiveness purpose. While 
both may co-exist, their distinction is often muddied in practice. 
In this thesis, evaluation is seen as being primarily concerned with assessing the 
worth or merit of assistance. This is a contextualised, purposeful, normative function, 
which usually builds on data supplied by the preceding monitoring function. 
3 Purpose and models 
Evaluation serves a variety of purposes. These purposes may be classified in various 
ways. Leeuw, for example, identifies five major purposes: to provide accountability, 
improve results by promoting learning, supply evidence, accreditation, and facilitate 
management. 336 In the present development context, the most important of these 
are accountability and effectiveness. I will shortly argue from an analysis of practice 
that these purposes are divergent and possibly irreconcilable. 
The significance of this divergence is not necessarily apparent from the outset. In 
1991, the OECD-DAC formulated the Principles for Evaluation of Development 
Assistance, based on a consensus of the world's major development agencies. 
These principles specified the purposes for evaluation as being to improve future aid 
"'OECD, above n 329. 
335 Cracknell, B 2000, Evaluating Development Aid: Issues. Problems and Solutions, Sage, London, 161. 
336 Leeuw. F & Furubo, J 2008, 'Evaluation Systems: What Are They and Why Study Them?' Evaluation, vol. 14, no. 
2. pp. 157- 169. 161-164. 
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policy and programmes through feedback of lessons learned; and to provide a basis 
for accountability, including the provision of information to the public.337 Many 
commentators endorse various conceptualisations of these goals. 338 Picciotto, for 
example, in reviewing the World Bank's experience of evaluation, observes: 
In a nutshell, feedback and follow-up were central to the conception of (the 
Office of Evaluation and Development) OED from day one. Feedback is 
about learning and follow-up is about accountability. They are two sides of 
the same coin .... 339 
In this thesis, I argue that these purposes are not necessarily spokes on a 
continuum, as often grouped by these commentators. Rather, the evidence of 
practice demonstrates that they are distinct and at odds. I will demonstrate that the 
major purposes for audit and accountability on the one hand, and learning and 
improvement on the other, may not be compatible because they operationalise the 
evaluation function using different data, methodologies and incentives. There is 
already some OECD-DAC evidence to support this argument: 
There is growing concern whether and how results based management 
systems can simultaneously and adequately serve both of these key 
uses.340 
The divergent purposes of evaluation affect how evaluations are undertaken. This 
may be illustrated through a review of the variety of models of practice. 
Commentators discern these models in various ways. Norton, for example, analyses 
the functional nature of evaluation to put forward eight different models: systems 
analysis, behavioural objectives, needs-based, art criticism, accreditation, 
adversarial, transactional and decision-making.341 Evaluations can also be classified 
in others ways, for example, operationally. This is usually done by reference to their 
sequence and the time when they are conducted: ex-ante or 'preliminary' 
assessment (often of needs); ongoing or 'formative' evaluations during the 
implementation of the activity or assistance which may coexist with monitoring, and 
337 OECD-DAC 1991, Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance, OECD, Paris, 5; see also: OECD-DAC 
1992, Principles for Effective Aid, OECD, Paris. 
338 See, eg, Stufflebaum, D 2007, CIPP Evaluation Model Checklist, 
<http://WNW.wmich.edu/evalctr/checklists/checklistmenu.htm> at 30 November 2009; Crawford, P, Perryman, J, & 
Petocz, P 2004, 'Synthetic Indices: a method for evaluating aid project effectiveness' Evaluation, val. 10, no. 2, pp. 
175-191. 
339 Picciotto, R 2002, 'The logic of Renewal: Evaluation at the World Bank (1992-2002)', speech delivered at the 
OED: The First 30 Years, Washington, 23 September. See also: Picciotto, R 2003, 'International Trends and 
Development Evaluation: The Need for Ideas' AmenCan Journal of Evaluation, vol. 24 no. 2, pp. 227- 234. 
340 Binnendijk, A 2000, Results-based Management in Development Cooperation Agencies: a Review of Experience, 
OECD·DAC, Paris, 20. 
341 Norton, J 2001, 'International Financial Institutions and the Movement towards Greater Accountability and 
Transparency: the case of legal reform programs and the problem of evaluation' International Lawyer, vol. 35, pp. 
1443-1479, 1447. 
133 
are sometimes called mid-term review; final or 'summative' evaluation which is 
sometimes described as an exit review; and ex-post evaluation which usually takes 
place after a period of time to assess outcomes, results or impact of the intervention. 
The significance of these classifications is to highlight the existence of a variety of 
purposes, models and approaches to development evaluation. In this thesis, I argue 
that we are at a transitional point where the rhetoric or theory of development 
evaluation has moved from an accountability or audit approach to an effectiveness or 
learning approach - emblemised in the Millennium Development Goals, 2000, and 
the Paris Principles of Aid Effectiveness, 2005, to be discussed shortly. This 
transition is however far from seamless. I will shortly demonstrate both a lag in the 
reorientation of evaluative systems and procedures, and a collision in the modelling 
of evaluative approach which reveals an unresolved contest over the purpose for 
development evaluation. 
What this means is that despite the rhetoric suggesting some preordained trajectory 
in development evaluation, the outcome of this contest over evaluative purpose in 
fact remains unclear to this point. 
a Professionalisation 
In this section, I establish that development evaluation is an as yet incomplete, 
nascent, evolving discipline undergoing growth and professionalisation. 
Professionalisation is the process of formalising a domain of occupational practice 
with the view to promoting the knowledge and skills expected of a profession.342 The 
incomplete state of this process is significant in explaining the continuing lack of 
established orthodoxy in many of the features of development evaluation. I will 
illustrate this shortly in the ongoing debates over the purpose and methodology of 
evaluation which pervade this arena of practice and overshadow the evaluation of 
judicial reform. 
The incomplete nature of evaluation as a professional discipline is illustrated by a 
review of its history. Guba and Lincoln classify this history into three generations: 
measurement, description and judgment. The initial generation of measurement 
originated in psychological research in the period leading to the First World War. The 
second generation of description occurred between World Wars I and II to focus on 
342 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3'd Ed., 1987, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1680. 
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the achievement of defined objectives by pupils in educational programs. The current 
generation of judgment originated in the 1950s to focus on merit and value, based on 
external standards or criteria. 343 Cracknell describes evaluation as being one of the 
fastest growing disciplines in the world. He attributes its origins to the introduction of 
mandatory evaluation procedures in many federally/state funded social welfare and 
educational schemes in the United States during the period 1960-1979. The recency 
of this discipline is illustrated by the fact that the first international conference on 
development evaluation was convened in Vancouver in 1995; the journal Evaluation 
was launched in the same year; and the International Development Evaluation 
Association was established as recently as 2002.344 
Over recent years, the OECD-DAC has undertaken a leadership role in this 
professionalising process. In 1991, the OECD formulated the DAC Principles for 
Evaluation of Development Assistance which, although in no way binding, have 
become universally endorsed and increasingly foundational to the ongoing 
development of the field. These principles focus on the management and institutional 
set-up of the evaluation systems within development agencies and remain the 
benchmark against which OECD members are assessed in peer reviews. They 
enshrine impartiality and independence, credibility, usefulness, participation and 
cooperation as the principles of development evaluation. Importantly, they embody 
five criteria which have become widely applied in ensuing donor practice: relevance, 
effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability.345 In 2006, the OECD-DAC 
introduced its Evaluation Quality Standards as a voluntary guide to good practice to 
harmonise the conduct of development evaluations. These standards relate to 
purpose and objectives, scope,. context, methodology, information sources, 
independence, ethics, quality assurance, relevance of results, and completeness.346 
These principles, criteria and standards have been broadly adopted by donors and 
now serve as the generally recognised benchmarks for development evaluation. 347 
Other bodies contributing in the formalisation of development evaluation at the global 
343 Guba, E & Lincoln, Y 1989, Fourth Generation Evaluation, Sage, California, 1989, 25-32. 
344 International Development Association 
<http://www.ideas-int.org/home/index.cfm?navi0-1&itemiD-1&CFID=269577&CFTOKEN-94530462> 
at 25 November 2009. 
345 OECD, DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance 
<http://www oecd.orqldocument/22/0,2340 en 2649 34435 2086550 1 1 1 1 ,OO.html> at 25 November 2009. 
346 OECD-DAC, 2006, DAC Evaluation Quality Standards (for test-phase application), OECD, Paris. 
347 See, eg, the case studies in this thesis: notably ADS's first ever thematic evaluation of judicial reform, 2009; and 
AusAID's evaluation of its law and justice reform program in PNG, 2007, both of which use the OEDC-DAC template 
criteria- in part 3. See also Baker, above n 388. 
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level include the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), 348 and the American 
Evaluation Association (AEA).349 
b From Paris to Accra - Improving development effectiveness 
Over the past decade, the international community has taken steps to reposition 
evaluation to the centre of the development stage as a means of promoting 
development effectiveness and attaining the United Nations' Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). These steps have been taken in a series of 
conferences or 'roundtables' at Monterrey (2002), Rome (2003), Marrakech (2004), 
Paris (2005), and most recently Accra (September 2008) and Doha (December 
2008). Together, these roundtables have significantly realigned the rhetoric on 
evaluation in international development assistance. 
In 2002, the international community of 189 United Nations states, comprising both 
donors and developing countries, signed up to what has become known as the 
Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development. This consensus addressed 
mounting concerns over dramatic shortfalls in resources required to achieve the 
internationally agreed development goals contained in the MDGs. It 'urged' 
developed countries to make concrete efforts towards the target of 0. 7 per cent of 
gross national product as overseas development aid to developing countries. 350 This 
consensus was described by Picciotto, then head of evaluation at the World Bank, as 
a 'watershed,' which created a new development paradigm framed on attaining the 
MDGs. This paradigm emphasised results, partnership, coordination and 
accountability, and introduced a new agenda which emphasised learning and 
continuous feedback at all phases of the development cycle.351 Monterrey marked a 
new focus on managing-for-development-results (MfDR) which led to the 
consolidation of principles of country ownership, donor harmonisation and alignment 
at the Rome Declaration on Harmonization in 2003 and the Second International 
Roundtable on 'Managing for Development Results' in Marrakech in 2004. 352 
348 United Nations Evaluation Group 2005, Standards and Norms for Evaluation in the UN System. 
349 American Evaluation Association, Guiding Principles for Evaluators (2004). 
<http://www.eval.ora/GPTraining/GPTrainingOVerview.asp> at 8 December 2009. 
350 Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development, as contained in Repolt of 
the lntemational Conference on Financing for Development, Res 1, UN Doc AICONF .198/11 (22 March 2002). 
351 Picciotto, R 2002, 'Development Cooperation and Perfonnance Evaluation: The Monterrey Challenge', Working 
Paper, World Bank Operations Evaluations Department, Washington D.C. 1 and 7. 
352 Rome Declaration on Harmonisation {2004) <http:/lwww.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/50/31451637.pdf> at 25 November 
2009. Also: OECO 2004, Second International Roundtable on 'Managing for Development Results' 2004, Marakech, 
DCD/DIR{2004)4. See also: OECD & World Bank 2008, Emerging Good Practice in Managing For Development 
Results: Sourcebook. OECD, World Bank, Paris and Washington D.C. 7. 
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Arguably the most important roundtable was then convened in 2005 to formalise the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. This Declaration is significant for embedding 
five principles as being core to ongoing development approach, hereafter known as 
'the Paris Principles': 
• Ownership - primacy vests in the developing countries for the leadership of 
their policies and strategies and the co-ordination of development actions, 
• Alignment - donors will base support on partner countries' national 
development strategies, institutions and procedures, 
• Harmonisation - donors' actions will be more harmonised, transparent and 
collectively effective, 
• Managing for results- all parties will manage resources and decision-making 
for improved results, and 
• Mutual accountability - all parties are jointly accountable for development 
results with initial targets set by the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs).'53 
A central feature of these principles is their emphasis on improving performance i.e. 
ensuring that both government and donor activities achieve desired results. In 
response to concerns about 'aid fatigue' and growing pressures on donors to show 
results, these results must now be demonstrable.354 As we shall shortly see, this new 
emphasis reflects what is called 'managing-for-development-results' (MfDR). 
Indicator 11 of this declaration, for example, instils a requirement to establish results-
oriented reporting and assessment frameworks that monitor progress against key 
dimensions of the national and sector development strategies, and track a 
'manageable number of indicators for which data are cost-effectively available'. 355 
c Millennium Development Goals 
As we have seen, the imperative to attain the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) has impelled the repositioning of development 
evaluation. In 2000, the MDGs were agreed by 189 countries as the overarching goal 
to reduce global poverty. They are now emblematic of the imperative to improve 
development effectiveness. The MDGs embody eight goals to eradicate extreme 
353 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability, 
2005, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf> at 25 November 2009. 
354 See, eg, Binnendijk, above n 340, 4. 
355 The principles recognise the need to keep measurement and reporting simple, cost-effective, and as user-friendly 
as possible. Paris Principles, Paragraph 44, Indicator 11. 
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poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality 
and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat 
HIV/AIDS and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability, and develop a 
global partnership for development. These gaols are supported by 18 measurable 
time-bound targets with 48 performance indicators which now provide the 
overarching focus of all development assistance. As such, they are a classic artefact 
of MfDR and are constantly monitored to gauge progress. Numerous UN and other 
multilateral agencies monitor and report on attainment of all or some of these goals 
by 2015 and thereafter. 356 
The significance of the MDGs at the pinnacle of international development cannot be 
overstated. They have uncontrovertibly galvanised global attention to meeting the 
challenge of poverty alleviation. The MDGs are, however, not without their problems. 
Many hold serious misgivings about the MDGs as an effective development 
mechanism - significant among them being the UN's own flagship Human 
Development Report which views them as being severely debased due to the non-
delivery of pledges.357 Others, like Alkire, debate their conceptual integrity as an apex 
metric of poverty.358 Saith argues that their selectivity eclipses dimensions of 
inequality and is problematic in enabling politicians to turn a blind eye to the high, 
and generally rising, levels of inequality within their respective countries.359 Of 
greatest relevance for this thesis, law and justice are not among these development 
goals, targets or indicators, other than by passing reference.360 This raises the 
dilemma of the MDGs: just as they highlight certain goals, so they also eclipse 
others. This has left justice outside the big tent of apex measures of development, 
and created some of the challenges which I am striving to address in this thesis. 361 
Despite these difficulties, the Paris Principles have unquestionably galvanised a 
global focus on delivering results to meet the MDG targets of 2015, and developing 
the capacity to monitor their delivery within this timeframe. Consequently, there is 
now a heightened emphasis on monitoring and evaluation to support delivering 
356 The UN themed its annual Human Development Report on the MDGs in 2003, and produces an annual Human 
Development Index which is, like many development indexes, based in part on the MDGs. See also: World Bank 
2008, Global Monitoring Report 2008: MDG's and the Environment, World Bank, Washington D.C. 
357 UN 2005, Human Development Report 2005, UNDP, New York, 40. 
358 Alkire, S 2003, 'A Conceptual Framework for Human Security,' Working Paper No. 2, Centre for Research on 
Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, Oxford; Alkire S 2007, 'The Missing Dimension of Poverty Data: An 
Introduction,' Working Paper, Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, Oxford; see also, below, n 446. 
359 Saith, A 2006, 'From Universal Values to Millennium Development Goals: Lost in Translation', Development and 
Change vol. 37, no. 6 pp. 1167-1199, 1196. See also Collier who argues that this problem is concealed in 
disaggregated statistics; Collier, above n 269, 8. 
360 United Nations Millennium Declaration, GA Res 55/2, UN GAOR, 55tn Sess, Supp no. 49, U.N. Doc. AJ55/49 
~2000) <htto://www.un.ora/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm> at 4 December 2009. 
61 See discussion on the purpose of reform above in Chapters 2 and 4, and discussion on selection of performance 
indicators below in Chapter 7. 
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development results. This shift reflects the sentiment that aid had not sufficiently 
demonstrated its results in the past, and is now preoccupied with what Van den Berg 
pithily describes as 'results, results, results and results. <362 
Progress has however been both mixed and slow. In 2008, the OECD conducted a 
mid-point evaluation of implementation which found that unless countries 'seriously' 
gear-up efforts, the Paris targets to enable partner countries to achieve their own 
development goals would not be met. It found uneven progress, and 'an enormous 
change of pace' as being required.363 This was endorsed at the most recent 
roundtable convened in Accra in September 2008. Its appraisal of the 
implementation of the principles was sober: 'we are making progress, but not 
enough .... [a]chieving development results- and openly accounting for them- must 
be at the heart of all we do.'364 
The explanation for this slow progress in implementing the Paris Principles is seen by 
many to be a need for evaluation capacity-building.365 For this reason, a growing 
number of governments and donors are working to improve their performance by 
creating systems to measure and help them understand their performance. But, it is 
generally recognised that there is as yet no 'best' model of what a government 
monitoring and evaluation system should be.366 In practice, evaluation capacity-
building is often confined to training. This trend has been critically appraised by 
Shiavo-Campo who argues that assistance should aim to improve the four 
dimensions of institutional, organisational, technological and human capacity-
building. 367 
In sum, over the past five years, the international community has refocused the 
rhetoric of development assistance to results, and on providing the means of 
monitoring and measuring those results. This is potentially transformational. While 
progress to date has been limited, it is notable that for the first time measures are 
362Van Den Berg, R 2005, 'Results Evaluation and Impact Assessment in Development Co-operation' Evaluation, vol 
11. no. 1, pp. 27-36, 11. 
3630ECD 2008, Survey on Moniton·ng the Paris Declaration- Effective aid by 2010? What will it take? 13. 
364 Third High level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 'Accra Agenda for Action', Ghana, Ministers' Statement, 4 
Sep1ember 2008. 
365 MacKay, K 2002, 'The Wor1d Banks ECB Experience' New Directions for Evaluation, no. 93, Spring, pp. 81-99, 81. 
See also: MacKay, K 1999, 'ECD: A Diagnostic Guide and Action Framework', Working Paper Series No 6, World 
Bank Operations Evaluation Department, Washington D.C. 
366 Mackay, K 2006, 'Institutionalization of Monitoring and Evaluatton Systems to Improve Public Sector 
Management', Working Paper Series No 15, World Bank Independent Evaluation Group and Thematic Group for 
Poverty Analysis, Washington D.C, 15; see also: MacKay, K 2007, How to Build M&E Systems to Support Better 
Government, World Bank, Independent Evaluation Group, Washington D.C. 2. 
367 Schiavo-Campa, S 2005, 'ECD: Building Country Capacity for Monitoring and Evaluation in the Public Sector: 
Selected Lessons of International Experience', Working Paper Series No 13, World Bank, Operations Evaluation 
Department, Washington D.C. 2-3. This is endorsed by Armytage, above, n 89. 
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being put in place - both in respect to the MDGs and the Paris Principles - which 
may enable more systematic monitoring and evaluation of development 
effectiveness. 
d Managing-for-development-results 
As we have already seen, since Monterrey, the notion of managing-for-development-
results has been adopted by the international development community as its 
overarching means to assure improved development effectiveness. MfDR is central 
to the new development order to implement the Paris Principles and thereby attain 
the MDGs. 
MfDR is a management approach which aims at achieving important changes in the 
way that organisations operate, with improved performance in terms of results as the 
central orientation. The OECD describes the elements of this approach as focusing 
the dialogue on results throughout the development process; aligning programming, 
monitoring and evaluation with results; keeping measurement and reporting simple; 
managing 'for not by results,' and using results information for learning and decision 
making. MfDR provides a management framework and tools for strategic planning, 
risk management, performance monitoring, and evaluation. Its main purposes are to 
improve organisational learning and to fulfil accountability obligations through 
performance reporting. 368 Within this context, the OECD defines results as being the 
output, outcome or impact of a development intervention, and results-based 
management (RBM) as a management strategy focusing on performance and 
achievement of outputs, outcomes and impacts.369 
MfDR is an artefact of New Public Management (NPM) and in commercial settings 
has sometimes been labelled the 'results-based management approach'. A key 
component of this approach is performance measurement, which is the process of 
objectively measuring how well an agency is meeting its stated goals or objectives. 
This approach to achieving better results rests on a construct of managerial 
components. According to Binnendijk, these components include identifying 
measurable objectives aided by logical frameworks, selecting indicators to measure 
progress towards each objective, setting explicit performance targets for each 
indicator, developing a performance monitoring system to regularly collect data on 
368 OECO and World Bank 2006, Emerging Good Practice in Managing for Development Results: Source Book, 
Washington D.C. 8·14. 
369 OECD, above n 329. 
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actual results, reporting on and reviewing those results, and integrating evaluations 
to analyse and advise on performance.370 Others, such as Kusek and Rist, find the 
key elements include baselines, indicators, data collection, stakeholder perceptions, 
systemic reporting, strategic partnerships, evidence of success/failure, and propose a 
ten-step methodology to building, maintaining and sustaining a results-based 
monitoring and evaluation system. 371 Overall, there is consensus that MfDR places a 
distinctive emphasis on performance measurement which rests on three core 
notions: 
(a) the logic model of evaluation, usually called the 'logframe' at the operational 
level, which aims to ensure the integrity of linkage between objectives and 
results. 
(b) selection of performance indicators to reflect changes connected to an 
intervention, or to help assess the performance of a development actor. 
(c) review of performance data which requires the periodic collection and 
analysis of progress typically comparing actual results with planned targets. 
I shall critique each of these core components of MfDR to demonstrate that it 
provides a false assurance of improving development effectiveness. In this chapter, I 
will argue that the logic model is a useful planning tool, but is of limited usefulness for 
evaluation. In the following chapter, I will then argue that the notion of performance 
indicators is also contentious and fraught with philosophic and technical difficulties 
which confront the measurement of highly qualitative public goods such as 
improvements to justice. Finally, I will argue in both this and the next chapter that the 
models and methodologies for gathering and evaluating performance data remain 
contested in the development arena. 
Based on this reasoning, I will establish that the theory and practice of development 
evaluation, framed as it increasingly is on MfDR, is problematic and far from assured 
in delivering development results. 
370 Binnendijk, above n 340, 4. 
371 Kusek, J, & Rist R 2004, Ten Steps to a Results-based Monitoring and Evaluation System, World Bank, 
Washington D.C. 17. 
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e Critique of MfDR 
I open this section with a general critique of MfDR to establish that it will not 
automatically accomplish what it asserts to accomplish, i.e. provide an assured 
prescription to improving development effectiveness. In overview, my critique will 
establish that MfDR is prone to weaken rather than strengthen the evaluation 
function. Its central tool, the 'logframe', is methodical but limited and ungainly, torn by 
simultaneous expectations to supply retrospective accountability and prospective 
learning. Additionally, requirements for independence and integration compete in 
operational practice with the effect that learning is largely excluded from the 
development management cycle. In sum, MfDR cannot deliver what it promises. 
As we have seen, the focus of MfDR on performance reporting is a form of providing 
accountability for delivering results. In this sense, it is consistent with the classic 
purpose of evaluation. But, I argue that there are a number of tensions which exist in 
how this accountability is to be provided. 
First, the emphasis which MfDR places on the performance monitoring function 
implies a relatively straightforward complementarity with the associated evaluation 
function, which relies on monitoring to provide much of the data required to assess 
value or worth. As we have already seen, monitoring and evaluation are 
complementary management tools in the MfDR process, each capable of contributing 
to the goals of performance reporting, accountability, management learning and 
decision-making. But, at times, these functions compete. As Binnendijk illustrates, 
for example, when USAID established its performance management and 
measurement systems in the 1990s, the size of USAID's central evaluation office 
staff and resources declined considerably, as did the number of evaluations 
conducted by its country operating units.372 This illustrates that evaluation resources 
and activity may in practice decline - at least in some agencies - as a perverse 
consequence of the emerging pre-eminence of performance monitoring taking a 
larger slice from the overall M&E cake. In such cases, MfDR may demonstrably 
weaken the distinctive purpose of evaluation viz. the promotion of understanding of 
development effectiveness. 373 
372 Above n 340, 14. 
373 Ibid, 24. 
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Second, MfDR places emphasis on the attainment of outcomes, results and impacts 
in what often becomes a bureaucratised practice of checking the 'logframe' and 
ticking the box at innumerable stages of project management. I will argue shortly that 
human-centred change is invariably complex, and often non-linear and unpredictable. 
This is particularly the case in assessing the qualitative dimensions of reforming 
justice where multi-dimensional political-economy factors are irreducible to the 
simplistic cause-effect relationships of a logframed approach. Demonstrating 
attribution is increasingly difficult for higher-order political economy outcomes which, 
in practice, obliges managers to focus and report at lower results levels. This pits the 
accountability aspect of 'logframe' reporting, which is retrospective in its orientation, 
against the improvement aspect of managerial planning, which is prospective in its 
orientation. Each purpose requires different data and analysis. Yet, as we shall see, 
the 'logframe' is invariably used simultaneously for both purposes and, by straddling 
both of these functions, becomes ungainly. 374 
Third, I argue that in practice there is often a direct competition between the 
requirement for independence and impartiality which lie at the heart of the evaluation 
function, and the need to integrate an effective cycle of organisational learning at the 
operational level of both donors and developing governments. Balancing these 
competing interests is a growing concern and remains an unresolved challenge. 
Recent consolidation of the evaluation function has been detrimental to developing 
effective learning systems, procedures and practices. In other words, accountability 
reporting and management improvement compete, as frequently evidenced in larger 
donor agencies where, at the operational level, learning development lessons often 
remain systemically limited, usually in departmental silos.'75 
Having posed these core arguments, it is important to acknowledge that there is a 
general endorsement in the theoretical notion of refocusing endeavour on 
development results. The resurgence of performance measurement is an important 
component of any evaluation strategy. Some, however, hold misgivings. Perrin, for 
example, recalls earlier vogues of 'management by objectives' and 'management by 
results' which rested on similar notions in the 1970s and 1980s, but have 
disappeared because they did not serve their intended purposes. He warns against 
repeating the mistakes of the past. He sees the cause of this failure in the focus on 
outcomes, or what he terms management by numbers which is conditioned by the 
374 Ibid, 16. 
375 Ibid, 20; this is similarly my professionally observation. 
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philosophy of the audit. By this he means counting only what can be counted results 
in the tendency for more attention to be given to issues of efficiency rather than 
effectiveness, diverting attention from what is really important, though more difficult to 
quantity. This failure to deliver results caused the private sector to move towards a 
broader approach that sought to assess factors that are more difficult to measure, 
such as innovation and learning. In the real world, however, unrelenting pressures of 
accountability often impose top-down demands for simplistic tables and charts of 
results, causing more detailed evaluative data to be routinely ignored: 
In essence, measurement-based approaches do not of themselves 
necessarily lead to any increase in performance or a focus on outcomes. 
Used in isolation, performance measurement does not provide value for 
money, meaningful accountability or accurate outcome information .... but 
the tragedy is that they frequently appear to do so. Too often the seduction 
of numbers takes on a life and reality of their own, even when they are 
meaningless (italics added). 376 
For these reasons, there is now mounting disquiet over MfDR. For example, Van 
Thiel and Leeuw argue that while results-based management places a high priority 
on measuring outputs and outcomes, evaluation studies demonstrate that there is no 
empirical correlation with results and, moreover, that it generates unintended effects 
which they term the 'performance paradox'. This paradox refers to a weak correlation 
between performance and performance indicators caused by the tendency of 
performance indicators to run down over time so that the relationship between actual 
and reported performance declines. 377 As I will argue is the case for judicial reform, 
where public policies often have many, sometimes contradictory goals, performance 
indicators can lack neutrality, and become ambiguous and contestable. Additionally, 
performance indicators can unwittingly cause dysfunctional effects, driving 
endeavour to generate good reports as distinct from good outcomes.378 
MfDR can also promote perverse consequences. For example, it encourages a 
systemic focus on easier more visible aspects of performance at the lower level of 
tangible activities rather than at the higher level fields of consolidated policy. This 
creates the illusion of having better performance on controllable matters which are of 
relatively less societal significance. Bouckaert and Peters, for example, reinforce this 
critique by arguing that there is generally a marked asymmetry on the information on 
376 Perrin, B 1998, 'Effective Use and Misuse of Performance Measures' 19(3) American Journal of Evaluation val. 
19. no. 3. 367-379. 377. 
317 Van Thiel, S & Leeuw, F 2002, 'The Performance Paradox in the Public Sector' Public Performance & 
Management Review vol. 25, no. 3, 267-281, 271. 
378 Ibid 272. 
144 
the costs and benefits of performance measurement and management; costs are 
usually more visible than benefits which raises political problems. There are a range 
of difficulties in measuring notions of quantity and quality, caused by quality being 
invariably compromised by price/quality trade-offs, whereas quantity has a stable 
relationship with costs. Thus, measuring quality is politically difficult and often 
contentious.379 Finally, some argue that the emphasis on monitoring actually builds 
from disillusionment with conventional evaluation because it is usually not available 
at the time that decision-making is required. Hence, Neilson and Ejler discern distinct 
tensions between the monitoring and evaluation functions, which they describe as a 
'profound challenge' and warn that investing in monitoring may actually replace 
investment in evaluation.380 
In sum, the introduction of MfDR evidently risks promoting monitoring at the expense 
of evaluation. Secondly, as we enter this new era of monitoring, we must unstintingly 
confront the illusion of developmental certainty which accompanies the new edifices 
of often meaningless, irrelevant or misleading performance data which are prone to 
being misunderstood and misused. Given the needs of policy-makers and managers 
for real-time development results which have spurred the migration from earlier M&E 
approaches to MfDR. there is now a heightened need for evaluation to reassert its 
relevance from the encroachment of monitoring. Evaluation must add value through 
practical analysis to the managerial process. This will require a pragmatic approach. 
As we shall, however, shortly see, this proposition opens the door to one of the most 
heated and divisive debates in development evaluation: the 'paradigm war' between 
positivism and constructivism, outlined below. 
4 Arenas of debate 
My critique of the emerging direction of development evaluation within the framework 
of MfDR now extends to more particular analysis of the key elements of this 
approach, notably its reliance on the logical framework and issues of methodology 
associated with evaluative modelling. 
379 Bouckaert, G & B. Peters, G 2002. 'Performance Measurement and Management: The Achilles' Heel in 
Administrative Modernization' Public Performance & Management Review, vol. 25, no. 4, 359-362, 361. 
380 Nielsen, S & Ejler, N 2008 'Improving Performance?: Exploring the Complementarities between Evaluation and 
Performance Management' Evaluation, val. 14, no. 2, 171-192, 172. 
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a Project management and the logical framework approach 
First, I argue that the logical framework is an all-pervasive tool of development 
planning and monitoring which, while clearly useful, risks oversimplifying the manifold 
challenges of development management. This is notably the case in qualitative and 
human-centred change arenas such as judicial reform where I argue it is of quite 
limited utility for the purposes of monitoring and evaluation. 
As we have already seen, the logical framework approach is an integral element of 
MfDR. This framework, or '/ogframe', was first introduced to development as a tool of 
project cycle management by USAID in the early 1970s. Prior to that time, project 
objectives were seldom clearly specified, and it was rarely clear what projects were 
specifically intended to achieve except in the most general terms. As one 
commentator observed: 
Trying to evaluate (projects without objectives) was like trying to ride a 
bicycle with loose handlebars! 381 
The OECD-DAC defines the logical framework as a management tool used to 
improve the design of interventions, most often at the project level. It involves 
identifying strategic elements - usually termed inputs, outputs, outcomes, impact -
and their causal relationships, indicators, and the assumptions or risks that may 
influence success and failure. It thus facilitates the planning, execution and 
evaluation of a development intervention. 382 
The 'IOgframe' is widely used by project designers to plan interventions, by 
implementers to guide their work, and by evaluators to assess actual achievements 
against the targeted indicators.383 It usually comprises a matrix which deconstructs a 
project or program into its component parts, namely inputs, resulting in activities, or 
outputs, immediate objectives, or project purpose, and wider objectives, or project 
goal, together with the risks and assumptions involved and indicators of progress 
towards the achievement of objectives. The underlying logic of this approach is that if 
certain inputs are supplied and activities are undertaken, then intended outputs will 
result, given certain assumptions, which will make a contribution towards the 
achievement of certain wider objectives - sometimes termed the means-end 
381 Cracknell, above n 335, 94. 
382 DECO above n 329. 
383 Department for International Development 2005, Guidance on Evaluation and Review tor DFID Staff, 
<http://www.dfid.gov .uk/Site-search/?q:::guidance+evaluation+ 2005> at 25 November 2009. 
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relationship or vertical logic. The key functions of this tool are to ensure a clear 
statement of objectives, introduce indicators against which progress towards 
objectives will be measured, and identify assumptions or risks to maximise the 
control of project management. 
The conceptual rationale for this approach lies in what is often described by donors 
as a 'results chain' which links the intervention's inputs to immediate outputs, and 
then to outcomes and final impacts or results. Most recently, mounting concerns over 
development effectiveness have emphasised the need to demonstrate the effects of 
an intervention, shifting the ultimate focus of both monitoring and evaluation from the 
development process to its results.384 Evaluations are then supposed to more readily 
focus on the efficacy of all or part of this results chain, and in practice are commonly 
concerned with appraising the pivotal relationship between 'inputs' and 'outputs'. On 
any reflection, I argue, this is a prosaically mechanistic approach to evaluation's 
quest for the appraisal of value and worth. 
The 'logframe' has become pervasively influential on the design, implementation and 
evaluation of the development activities of most if nor all donors over the past 15 
years under one name or another.385 It is described by DfiD, Britain's aid agency, as 
the most common planning, monitoring and evaluation tool used to chart the 
anticipated chain of cause and effect in development interventions. Most aid project 
designs are founded on the orthodoxy of logic-based models and while this method 
has received criticism for its apparently rigid 'blueprint' approach to bringing about 
social changes, it has nevertheless predominated in the aid industry.386 
The prevalence of the 'logframe' has been attributed to an explosion of audits, with 
their focus on accountability. This evaluative approach uses largely quantitative, 
single measures, and is predicated - somewhat depressingly - on low levels of 
systemic trust, discipline, ex-post control and the use of experts.387 It is sometimes 
also described as theory-based evaluation, which means that the evaluation method 
is based on assessing each link in a theory of change underlying an intervention, 
together with its associated assumptions or risks, in order to interrogate both the 
364 This rationale for focusing on results rests on the original Tylerian model that sound (originally educational) 
management requires the setting of objectives being linked through a logic or results-chain by indicators from 
activities or outputs to outcomes to impacts and results. Tyler RW, Basic Principles of Cu"iculum and Instruction. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949. 
365 For example: GTZ has refined the Project Tree Approach (ZOPP); USAID has now adapted its use of the 
'logframe' to now use the PRISM (program performance infonnation for strategic management) system. 
386 Crawford, P, Perryman, J & Petocz, P 2004, 'Synthetic Indices: a method for evaluating aid project effectiveness' 
Evaluation vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 175-192. 
387 Cracknell, above n 335, 27. 
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coherence of this underlying 'theory' about how and why a program will work and the 
progress of implementation through its various implementation steps.388 
The 'logframe' has many exponents who extol its use in exerting a much needed 
rigour in clarifying the objectives of a proposed intervention, clarifying the coherence 
of the expected causal links, and facilitating the monitoring of progress through 
performance indicators at each stage in the logic chain. For these reasons, it is used 
heavily as both a planning and monitoring tool.389 Yet, for others, troubling questions 
remain: is it adequate and useful? Can the 'logframe' simultaneously steer, manage 
and monitor complex change comprehensively and effectively? Despite the ubiquity 
of this approach, there is a quite startling lack of accompanying theory concerning its 
evolution or analysis of its application.390 
In my professional experience, the 'logframe' works much better in planning reform 
targets and monitoring their attainment than as an evaluative tool of managerial 
learning. So, my answers to these questions are qualified by my years of practice. I 
have found this tool to be useful for the method and rigour that it imposes on 
planning what may be termed the development logic of a proposed approach. I have 
also found that it encourages a systematic approach to ensuring a standardised 
implementation of activities which are amenable to monitoring. But I have substantial 
reservations about its ability to address any of the difficult questions which usually lie 
at the heart of the evaluative function. These questions usually relate to ascertaining 
and exploring the existence and nature of key relationships in complex change 
management processes.391 I have found the 'logframe' to be inadequate and at times 
even dangerous as an evaluation tool because of the false assurance of linear 
change that it promises. Notwithstanding, I have observed that 'logframes' have 
pervaded the planning and management of projects and have, in practice, assumed 
an overarching utility. While this evaluation tool usually only measures indicators of 
process and efficiency, it has then allowed many actors at the operational level to 
focus on ticking the boxes on the 'deliverables' in the 'logframe' as the day-to-day 
means of assuming developmental effectiveness. As a consequence, many donors 
rely on the logical framework in conjunction with rating scales for evaluation 
purposes. This has led to the sometimes bizarre spectacle of donor evaluations 
368 Baker J 2000, Evaluating the Impact of Development Projects on Poverty: a Handbook for Practitioners, World 
Bank, Washington D.C., 12, <htto://go.worldbank.org/8E2ZTGBOIO> at 25 November 2009. 
389 See, eg, OECD & World Bank 2004, M&E: Some Tools Methods Approaches, World Bank, Operations Evaluation 
Department, Washington D.C. 
390 See, eg, Bell, S, 2000 'Logical Frameworks, Aristotle and Soft Systems: A Note on the Original Values and Uses 
of Logical Frameworks In Reply To Gasper' Public Administration and Development vol. 20, pp. 29-31, 30. 
391 See related discussion in the case study of AusAID's project management model in PNG, below, n 689, and 
surrounding. 
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cheerily asserting glowing project success, as blinkered by the numbers in the boxes, 
oblivious or indifferent to the unchanged reality which surrounds the process.392 
These concerns are endorsed across the literature. Cracknell, for example, observes 
that management by 'logframe' degrades into a ritualised fill-the-box routine that 
encourages summary fetishes rather than complex truths, deadens thought, and 
enforces orthodox views at the expense of stimulating reflection and debate in the 
process. 393 
At the heart of the problem, 'logframes' are seductively convenient over-
simplifications of complex change management phenomena which distort 
development reality. The problem of their limited reliability has caused Gasper to 
observe that they are overused by donors. He argues that 'logframes' can become 
seriously limiting as an evaluation tool owing to three principle difficulties. First, there 
is often an illusion of logic created by the framework being superimposed at a 
technical level after the project has been formulated at the political level, which he 
calls the /ogic/ess frame. Second, the framework is often too simple, omitting critical 
dimensions in the change management process, which he calls the Jackframe. 
Finally, the framework becomes fixed, out-of-date and irrelevant to any dynamic 
ongoing reform process, which he calls the Jockframe. 394 
This critique goes to the heart of the logical framework approach and extends to the 
fallacy of MfDR which asserts that if Activity A is done, Output B will result. Among 
the most potent proponents of this critique, Ramalingam argues that development 
reality is characterised by its complexity and the dynamic of chaos. He criticises the 
prevalent development approach as being trapped in a paradigm of predictable, 
linear causality, maintained by mind sets that seek accountability through top-down 
command and control. The management of aid then becomes problematic because it 
denies or is oblivious to the reality of a world of messy and unpredictable change. He 
offers what he terms 'complexity science' as a means of describing a contrasting 
world of understanding. This vision of change requires potentially radical political, 
professional, institutional and personal shifts for the development model to become 
392 There are other reasons for this disjunction. including the perverse incentives of organisational survival discussed 
later in this chapter; see, eg, Centre for Global Development 2006, When Will We Ever Learn: Improving fives 
through impact evaluation, Report of the Evaluation Gap Working Group, Washington D.C., 28. 
393 Cracknell, above n 335,114,117-121. 
394 Gasper, 0 2000, 'Evaluating the Logical Framework Approach: Towards learning orientated development 
evaluation' Public Administration and Development, vol. 20 17-28, 21-22. 
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effective. He argues against reductionist models of understanding that assume a 
predicable and orderly universe of over-simplistic, linear cause-effect chains. 395 
I endorse this criticism of the logical framework approach because it reflects my 
experience of the real world of practice which is characterised by its noise and 
disorder. The 'logframe' has utility as a planning tool, but has limited utility in 
evaluation because it conflates efficiency with effectiveness. As a tool of 
management, it is too readily misused to imply that the sum of efficient inputs must, 
at some future time, lead to intended development results. My experience of practice 
indicates that it is never as simple- nor development change as linear- as the logic-
model asserts. 
b Paradigm war over evaluative models 
While there are a number of arenas of debate to be traversed in addressing the 
question: 'Does aid work?', the major debate centres on the issue of the evaluative 
model. The significance of this debate reveals the contested means of answering this 
question, and challenges the pre-eminence of the positivist approach to 
demonstrating impact and results. It also highlights the mounting dissatisfaction of 
many professionals in the development community who are resorting to an altogether 
different model with which to assess development merit and worth. 
This central debate over evaluative modelling has been described by some 
commentators as being a 'paradigm war'. 396 This debate pits those who may be 
called positivists against constructivists. At its essence, it is concerned with the 
issues of how evaluation finds truth and contributes to knowledge. On the one hand, 
positivists advocate a highly formalised scientific approach, often used in 
econometrics. They are primarily concerned with establishing the validity and 
reliability of data, adopt experimental methods and counterfactual measurements, 
and are preoccupied with the overarching need for methodological rigour. On the 
other hand, constructivists are primarily concerned to hear the voice of stakeholders, 
notably the alienated poor. They use participatory methods, case-studies and 
observations and refute the scientific approach as being costly, impractical and 
irrelevant.397 This debate is described by Cracknell as a contest between the 
395 Ramalingam, B & Jones, H 2008, 'Exploring the Science of Complexity', Working Paper No. 285, OVerseas 
Development Institute, London, iiv. 
396 See, eg, Cracknell, above n 335,47. 
397 Cost in certainly significant: White recounts that in the experience of the Independent Evaluation Group of the 
Wortd Bank, rigorous impact evaluation is expensive, costing between US$ 300,000 and US$ 500,000 per study. 
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scientific, objectives-based project management model and the empowerment and 
'pro-poor' stakeholder participatory model. 398 Other learned commentators, such as 
Woolcock, refute the framing of this debate, counter-arguing that the core contest 
over modelling is being fought out on an intra-positivist basis: 
It just isn't correct, in my view, to argue (p. 311) that we have Bane~ee/Duflo on 
one side and Guba/Cracknell on the other of a "paradigm war": in political 
economy terms, that would be pitting twenty Goliaths against an infant David. 
No; ninety-five percent of the empirical evaluation debate in major development 
agencies is an intra-positivist one, with qualitative types wheeled in as deemed 
necessary to refine the survey instrument or provide some notional inputs on 
'context'. 
I do not however altogether share that view. Instead, I rely on the evidence that I will 
present in Part 3 of this thesis being, first, my justification of the participatory 
methodology outlined in Annex B and, second, the ethnomethodological analysis of 
the practice of development evaluation evidenced in the PNG case study in Chapter 
9. This evidence from my actual practice establishes and demonstrates the empirical 
application, utility and relevance of the constructivist approach to combine with and 
qualify the prevailing positivist approach. 
The outcome of this debate is very significant because it determines the overall 
approach to development evaluation, its methodologies and the nature of the data to 
be relied on. 
c Positivist approach to impact 
Over recent years, the positivist approach has prevailed in development evaluation. 
This approach seeks to understand the social world by uncovering universal laws 
through the measurement of the 'constant conjunction of events' between two or 
more phenomena. These 'laws' are empirical generalisations which are seen to be 
mainly independent of time or space and are neutral and value-free. For positivists, 
the observation that two variables are strongly correlated is often understood to 
signify a causal relationship. Prouse explains that positivists discover empirical 
generalisations by setting up and testing hypotheses in a deductive manner, with 
hypotheses being extrapolated to a wider range of cases. In this respect, positivism 
White, H 2006, 'Impact evaluation: the experience of the Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank', MPRA 
Paper No. 1111, World Bank, Washington D.C, 23. Other commentators express concerns that it is either too difficult 
or impractical under development conditions; see, eg: Van Den Berg, above n 362, 30. See below, n 416. 
398 Cracknell, above n 335, 349. Below, see also: Woolcock, M Examiner's Report on (this) PhD Thesis of Armytage 
L. dated 11 July 2010. 
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is a form of naturalism, based on a belief in the unity of the natural and social 
sciences, and hence it attempts to replicate in social research the requirements and 
methods of the physical sciences, such as prediction, closed experimentation and the 
separation of research findings from interpretation. 399 
The attraction of positivism is its offer to provide a much-needed assurance of 
certainty to the business of development, which over recent years has become 
fraught with the lack of results. 400 As we have already seen in Part 1 of this thesis, 
Burnside and Dollar are exemplars of the positivist approach; they established that 
development aid does work in what they term a good policy environment, leading to 
faster growth, poverty reduction and gains in social indicators.401 Their 
groundbreaking empirical findings were based on historical cross-country 
econometric analysis. They have been immensely influential in development policy, 
providing the empirical justification for the mantra on good governance which 
emphasises that aid can nurture development, though the quality of spending is as 
important as its quantity.402 
Positivism has been pervasively influential in MfDR through the realignment of the 
development discourse towards results and improving effectiveness. It promises to 
prove that aid really does work by scientifically demonstrating the counterfactual. 
This is an empirical technique for measuring change over time by using either 
before/after measures to identify the effects of the intervention on a separate control 
group. Significantly, positivism raises the notion of impact evaluation to prominence 
by framing the counterfactual question: 'How would individuals who participated in 
the program have fared in the absence of the program?'403 Impacts, whether positive 
and negative are defined by OEDC as primary and secondary long-term effects, 
produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or 
unintended.404 At a more technical level, the World Bank defines impact evaluation 
as a counterfactual analysis of the impact of an intervention on final welfare 
outcomes where the counterfactual is a comparison between what actually happened 
399 See, eg, Prowse M 2007, Aid effectiveness: the role of qualitative research in impact evaluation, Background 
Note December 2007, Overseas Development Institute, London. 
400 Flint et al observe that 'Assessing Aid' has had considerable influence among the donor community. Flint M. 
Cameron, C, Henderson, S, Jones, S & Ticehurst, D 2002, How Effective Is Df/0?, Evaluation Report EV 640, 
Department for International Development London, 58. 
401 World Bank 1998, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why, Oxford University Press, New York, 14. 
See also: Burnside, C & Dollar, D. above n 280. 
402 These empirical findings and related research laid the foundations to the schools of development economics 
known as New Institutional Economics (NIE) and New Comparative Economics (NCE). 
403 Duflo, E 2003, Does Development Aid Make a Difference?, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington D.C., 1. 
404 OECD, above, n 329. 
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and what would have happened in the absence of the intervention.405 The goal of 
im\)act e\laluation is generall-y seen as attributing im\)acts to one \)roiect and to that 
\)roiect alone~~~<> 
Exponents of positivism, like Banerjee, argue that development evaluation is 
generally 'lazy' and requires the more rigorous and frequent use of randomised 
control trials to increase efficiency and efficacy. 407 He is joined by the more 
moderating voice of Duflo who argues that the best way to estimate the impact of a 
broad class of development programs is through a randomised impact evaluation.408 
She argues persuasively that rigorous systemic evaluations have the potential to 
leverage the impact of international organisations well beyond their ability to finance 
programs.409 She is 'carefully optimistic' about demonstrating development results by 
advocating a greater focus on impact evaluation to answer this counterfactual 
question, though her ambivalence is noteworthy from an advocate whom The 
Economist has labelled a 'randomista'.410 Others, such as White, call for improved 
rigour in evaluative method which often, though not invariably, conflates with the 
positivist preference for quantitative method411 
Recognition of the evidentiary supremacy of the positivist position is, however, far 
from assured. Many, including Kenny, argue that the empirical evidence is equivocal 
and that demonstrating a causal relationship between development policies and 
growth is fragile and often statically insignificant. The ambivalence of the evidence is 
acknowledged not just by Duflo but also by the World Bank, at least at the technical 
level: 
Given that a number of the traditional arguments for why there might be a 
link between aid flows and economic growth appear to be empirically weak 
... it should come as some comfort that the majority opinion in the aid and 
405 White, above n 397, 1. 
406 World Bank 2006, Impact Evaluation and the Project Cycle, Wortd Bank, Thematic Group on Poverty Analysis, 
Monitoring and Impact Evaluation, Washington D.C., 1. 
407 Banerjee, A 2007, Making Aid Work, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. A randomised control trial is an 
evaluation of a public policy inteiVention structured to answer a counterfactual question: how would participants' 
welfare have altered if the intervention had not taken place? This can involve 'before and after' and 'with and without' 
comparisons. Extract at <http·/fiis~db stanford.edu/evntsf4741/MakinqAidWork.pdf> and Brookings Institution, 2009, 
What Works in Development? Thinking Big and Thinking Small, 
<http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/0529 global development.aspx> both at 4 December 2009. 
406 Duflo, E 2003, 'Scaling up and Evaluation', Paper prepared for the ABCDE in Bangalore, May 21-22. 
409 Duflo, E & Kremer, M 2003, 'Use of Randomization in the Evaluation of Development Effectiveness', World Bank 
Operations Evaluation Department Conference on Evaluation and Development Effectiveness 15-16 July. 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass; Duflo, E 2003, Does Development Aid Make a 
Difference?, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C. 
410 International Bright Young Things; Emerging Economists', 2009, The Economist, Jan 3, vol. 390, iss. 8612,59. 
411 White, H 2005, 'Challenges in Evaluating Development Effectiveness', IDS Working Paper no. 242, Institute of 
Development Studies, Brighton, 5. 
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growth literature appears to be that aid, at least in certain circumstances, 
can promote growth (italics added). 412 
From a positivist perspective, it could be argued that any evaluation which omits an 
assessment of impact and results might be seen as being deficient in terms of best 
practice in the post-Paris environment. Yet, the reality is that impact evaluations 
remain relatively rare. In essence, this is because they are difficult, expensive and 
slow. Technical difficulties abound in applying the positivist approach to 
development. As Cracknell observes, while the counterfactual approach seems 
compelling, it is 'well nigh impossible' to set up a robust experimental control in 
development settings.413 Despite the billions of dollars spent on development 
assistance each year, Baker observes that there is still very little known about the 
actual impact of projects on the poor. He notes that evaluations have been criticised 
because the results come too late, do not answer the right questions, and/or were not 
carried out with sufficient analytical rigour often as the result of the limited availability 
and quality of data.414 While experimental designs are theoretically regarded as being 
the most robust and rigorous, he acknowledges these are often non-feasible in 
practice.415 In addition, they are often disproportionately expensive. White estimates 
the cost of impact evaluations at the World Bank in the order of $300-500,000 which 
will exceed the total value of some niche interventions. Other common difficulties 
arise from limitations in the quality and availability of reliable data in many 
development settings, and the shortage of available time to demonstrate results. 
These factors may explain why impact evaluations have never been undertaken in 
the area of law and justice.'16 
The insurmountability of these essentially practical difficulties with the positivist 
model is impelling practitioners to find alternative evaluation approaches which 
balance the search for evaluative knowledge with what is feasible in the development 
environment. For Bamberger, the challenge is for development evaluation to realise 
its potential as a tool for learning - what works, what does not, and the reasons 
why/why not - as well as institutional accountability. He sees the answer lying in the 
412 See, eg, Kenny, C 2006, What is Effective Aid; How Would Donors Allocate It?, Wortd Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 4005. Also: Worid Bank 2004, Annual Review of Development Effectiveness Wortd Bank, Operations 
Evaluation Department, Washington D.C. 
413 Cracknell, above n 335, 128. 
414 Baker, above n 388, vii. 
415 lbid. 
416 White, above n 397, 23. The World Bank also reports that 'OED itself has conducted about 23 rigorous impact 
evaluations since 1980: 6 in agriculture; 2 in industry; 3 in education; 3 in water and sanitation; 2 in urban; 1 in 
transport; 2 in HNP; and 4 others.10 In recent years, the cost of these has ranged from $400,000 to $500,000 each. 
Given that QED's budget is around $23 million per annum, it has not generally been possible to conduct more than 
one rigorous impact evaluation each year.' World Bank, OED and Impact Evaluation: Discussion Note, 4. 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/O menuPK:336998-pagePK:149018-piPK: 
149093-theSitePK:336992 OO.html> at 4 Oecember 2009. 
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quality and rigour of impact evaluation, and the reliability of their methods, findings 
and recommendations. To bridge the gap between theory and practice, however, he 
explores trade-offs between evaluation rigour and budget, time and data which are 
available in these 'real world' contexts to balance quality with feasibility. 417 
The problems with the positivist approach to development evaluation are not 
confined to technical difficulties, cost and time. In the next section, I argue that 
deeper ontological concerns are also contributing to impel the exploration of an 
alternative, which may be described as the constructivist or participatory model. 
d Constructivism and participatory evaluation 
Over recent years, mounting dissatisfaction with the philosophic and conceptual 
deficiencies of positivism has impelled a search for an altogether different model of 
development evaluation. Guba and Lincoln are leading exponents of the need for a 
constructivist approach: 
In the past, the methodology employed in evaluations has been almost 
exclusively scientific, grounded ontologically in the positivist assumption 
that there exists an objective reality driven by immutable natural laws, and 
epistemologically in the counter assumption of a duality between observer 
and observed that makes it possible for the observer to stand outside the 
arena of the observed neither influencing it nor being influenced by it. 418 
Constructivists assert that even when robust positivist evaluations are feasible, they 
are often either irrelevant or misleading: 
Over the past 30 years struggling with formal positivist evaluations, 
problems of comparability, unknown causal linkages and magnitudes, 
multiple causality, and the counterfactual, not to mention the costs and 
shortcoming of questionnaires and their analysis ... Some very experienced 
evaluators are now doubtful whether it is ever possible, with people-centred 
projects, to establish causal linkages between development interventions 
and possible outcomes.419 
Guba and Lincoln propose an alternative model which they term 'fourth generation 
evaluation'. This model places a new emphasis on full participation, political parity 
417 Bamberger, M, Rugh, J & Mabry, L 2007, 'ReaiWorld Evaluation: Working Under Budget, Time, Data and Political 
Constraints,' Professional Development Workshop 10, 6 November, 23, 
<http://www.realworldevaluation.org/ReaiWorld Evaluation resour.html> at 4 December 2009; World Bank 2006, 
'Conducting Quality Impact Evaluation under Budget, Time and Data Constraints,' World Bank Independent 
Evaluation Group and the Thematic Group for Poverty Analysis, Monitoring and Impact Evaluation, Washington D.C. 
22. 
4111 Guba & Lincoln, above n 343, 12. 
419
- Cracknell, above n 335, 129. 
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and control. Guba and Lincoln address the defects of earlier generations of 
evaluation which they classify as focusing on measurement, description and 
judgment. This model focuses on negotiation, or what they term a 'hermeneutic 
dialectic', to determine what evaluation questions are to be asked and what 
information is to be collected. It also has a 'constructivist methodology' to carry out 
the inquiry process within the ontological and epistemological presuppositions of the 
constructivist paradigm.420 
Beneath this verbiage, this model is important because it reframes the discourse by 
refuting what it sees as the false assurance of positivist evaluation and by providing a 
coherent alternative. In essence, Guba and Lincoln advocate a paradigm of 
evaluation criteria which substitutes credibility for internal validity, transferability for 
external validity, dependability for reliability, and confirmabi/ity for objectivity.421 The 
model acknowledges an asymmetry of power in the evaluation transaction which is 
endorsed by Cracknell as being 'the great unmentionable in evaluation theory.'422 It 
redresses this asymmetry through a shift to participatory monitoring and evaluation 
by local people.423 Participatory evaluation is defined as an evaluation method in 
which representatives of agencies and stakeholders, including beneficiaries, work 
together in designing, carrying out and interpreting an evaluation. 424 Significantly, 
this paradigm shift rests on Guba and Lincoln's argument that by staying detached, 
the evaluator merely ensures that s/he can never really understand what is going on 
in terms of the beneficiaries themselves and their aspirations. In effect, the evaluator 
'must' become involved and participate. While this model collides directly with 
positivistic notions of objectivity, detachment and impartiality, it has received much 
endorsement. Cracknell, for example, supports this shift as 'a giant leap into new 
territory' on the basis that classic notions of neutrality are a fiction. 425 Patton goes 
even further: '[t]o claim the mantle of objectivity in the post-modern age is to expose 
oneself as embarrassingly na"ive.'426 
420 Guba & Lincoln, above n 343, 83-4. The authors critique the eartier managerial phase of evaluation as being 
disempowering, unfair, disenfranchising, cozy and collusive (at 32+). 
421 Guba & Lincoln, above n 343, 249. 
422 Cracknell, above n 335, 88: s/he who determines what is to be evaluated has power; as does the evaluator, 
whereas the classical evaluand is relatively powerless. 
423 See, eg World Bank 1996, Participation Source Book, Washington D.C. Also: OECD & World Bank 2004, M&E: 
Some Tools Methods Approaches, World Bank, Operations Evaluation Department, Washington D.C. 17. 
424 OECD, above n 329.See also: Department for International Development 2005, Guidance on Evaluation and 
Review for DFID Staff. <http:l/www.dfid.qov.uk/Site-search/?g=guidance+evaluation+2005> at 25 November 2009; 
Forss, K. Kruse, S, Taut, S & Tenden, E 2006, 'Chasing a Ghost?: An Essay on Participatory Evaluation and 
Capacity Development,' Evaluation, val. 12, no. 1, pp.128-144. 
425 Some commentators insist on objectivity and are fierce critics of the participatory approach which does not seem 
to allow any scope for it; others however are willing to substitute objectivity with honesty, critical distance, integrity 
and avoidance of conflict of interest. Cracknell argues that it is undeniable that evaluators in the past did not really 
possess absolute objectivity in any case owing to pre-conceived ideas and acquired values: Cracknell, above n 335, 
333-336. 
426 Patton, above n 7, 50. 
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Many in the development community are moving towards notions of participatory 
evaluation, and stakeholder analysis, which recognise that implementing a people-
centred development project is an iterative, continuous learning process. This 
recognition conceives the change process as being flexible and needing to be 
adaptive, rather than linear and rigidly directed targets.427 This shift involves notions 
of empowerment, social democracy and popular participation, requiring fundamental 
changes in approach including, as Cracknell observes, 'shifts of role from evaluator 
to facilitator, of style from judgment to learning, of mode from extractive to 
empowering, and of focus from one-off to ongoing process.'428 
While donor rhetoric increasingly reflects participatory notions, the actual practice of 
participatory evaluation, however, remains limited if not rare. This may be because 
there is still little uniformity of understanding about what participatory evaluation 
involves or how it will be put into practice: 
The disturbing thing is that for all their brave words in favour of more 
participatory methods of evaluation, most donor agencies are still 
conducting their evaluations in a way that very much diminishes the 
possibility of this actually happening.429 
In sum, while it is not yet clear how this alternative model will work, it is clear that 
development evaluation is now undergoing a paradigmatic shift and is in a state of 
transition. The incomplete and unresolved nature of this transition is presently 
causing may be termed the 'development evaluation gap' in practice. 
5 Meta-evaluation of practice -and the 'development evaluation gap' 
Four meta-evaluations - being evaluations of development evaluations - reveal a 
dynamic but uneven picture of practice which is characterised by a number of 
427 Cracknell, above n 335, 318. Toope & Brunee consider the application of constructivism to the legal discourse to 
challenge the dominant positivist explanations of law in international legal theory, and call for a shared research 
discourse with the school of constructivist international relations. See also in relation to discussion on evaluation in 
Part 2: Toope, S & Brunee, J 2001, 'International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of 
International Law, 39 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, val. 19, 19-74; above n 470. 
428 Ibid, 27. White, contests this, arguing that the participatory impact assessments which became popular in the 
1990s may no longer pass muster for some of the most critical observers of aid effectiveness. White, H 2008, 'Of 
Probfts and Participation: the use of mixed methods in quantitative impact evaluation,' NONIE Working Paper 6; 
White, H 2002, 'Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches in Poverty Analysis,' World Development 30, 3, 
511-522. See also: Center for Global Development, 2006, When Will We Ever Learn: Improving lives through impact 
evaluation, DC. 
429 Cracknell above n 335, 320; see also: OECD-DAC,1997, Evaluation of Programs Promoting Participatory 
Development and Good Governance- Synthesis Report, OECD, Paris, 1. 
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unresolved issues.430 These issues - which relate in particular to the lack of 
evidence of impact and attribution, patchy standards of methodological rigour and 
collisions between goals of accountability and learning - reflect the transitional state 
of development evaluation as outlined above. 
In 2006, Savedoff and Levine reviewed the overall practice of development 
evaluation and found the quality of evaluation studies to be mixed. There was a lack 
of knowledge about effectiveness and what really works, and a weak base of 
evidence for future decision-making which they described as a development-wide 
'evaluation gap': 
[A)fter decades in which development agencies have disbursed billions of 
dollars for social programs ... it is deeply disappointing to recognize that we 
know relatively little about the net impact of most of these social 
programs. 431 
Although donors have allocated substantial sums to evaluations that are useful for 
monitoring and operational assessments, they argue that too few impact evaluations 
are being carried out and those which are lack rigour, may be methodologically 
flawed, and fail to establish attribution. They also found the existence of perverse 
incentives against conducting good impact evaluations which run the risk of findings 
that undercut the donor's ability to raise funds and can lead to pressuring 
researchers to soften, modify or suppress unfavourable studies. 432 
In the following year, Liverani reviewed the OECD-DAC members' evaluation 
systems. She found that evaluation often remained a tool limited to checking projects' 
outcomes against stated objectives, and 'all too often little attention is given to its 
relevance for policy considerations, or its potential role for advocacy and 
education.'433 In many instances, the independence of evaluation systems was still 
lacking from operational management. In some cases evaluation units had actually 
relinquished parts of their independence. This was 'a major challenge,' which arose 
from the tensions between competing internal and external goals for evaluation, 
430 OECD-DAC defines meta-evaluation as the term used to denote the evaluation of an evaluation to judge its quality 
and/or assess the performance of the evaluators. OECD, above n 329.Meta-evaluation is defined by Stuffebeam as 
the process of delineating, obtaining, and applying descriptive information and judgmental information - about the 
utility, feasibility, propriety, and accuracy of an evaluation and its systematic nature, competent conduct, 
integrity/honesty, respectfulness, and social responsibility- to guide the evaluation and/or report its strengths and 
weaknesses. Stufflebeam, D 2001, 'The Meta-Evaluation Imperative,' American Journal of Evaluation, vol. 22, no. 2, 
P,\'· 183-209. 185. 
1 Centre for Global Development, above n 392, 1. 
432 lbid 28. 
433 Liverani A & Lundgren H 2007, 'Evaluation Systems in Development Aid Agencies: An Analysis of DAC Peer 
Reviews 1996--2004." Evaluation. vol. 13. no. 2. pp. 241·256. 252. 
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being organisational learning on the one hand and aid agency accountability on the 
other: 
Although independence is crucial, evaluation systems need a degree of 
functional integration within the agency's decision-making, policy and 
operational departments. Striking the right balance between independence 
and integration is therefore a &'"erequisite ... [But] evaluation systems are 
often defective in this respect.• 
In a third review of the effectiveness of Britain's development agency, DfiD, Flint 
found numerous teething problems in its monitoring and evaluation systems. While 
finding evidence that development assistance has made a contribution to progress, 
the relationship between development assistance and development outcomes was 
extremely complex. He cautioned that no single evaluation method or metric was 
sufficient, and that claims of simple relationships between aid and development were 
likely to lack plausibility: 435 
[A]ttribution is the major problem for ... all development agencies that have 
adopted the Millennium Development Goals as the focus of their work .... 
Demonstrating the causal link between DFID's activities and changes in any 
of the MDG indicators is virtually impossible.... A consistent finding of 
evaluation reports is that impacts on poverty and other development 
outcomes are inherently hard to assess .. . The general problem 
nevertheless remains: the evidence on development impacts is patchy. 436 
Finally, in 2007, the evaluation practice of numerous OECD donors was further 
reviewed by Foresti, who similarly found a mixed situation: 
Impact evaluations are an area of increasing interest, with some agencies 
already carrying these out, or at least highlighting impact as a key feature ... 
internal feedback and learning often remain very weak; there are some 
systematic efforts to improve dissemination and learning, though these 
remain few.437 
Significantly, she found that while evaluation units are not usually subordinated to 
management or operational departments, sitting outside these departments creates 
risks of isolation from operational units, confirming the existence of tension between 
the need for independence in evaluation and the need for integration of its other 
institutional learning functions. Additionally, there was a disconnect between the 
434 Ibid 249. 
435 Flint M, Cameron, C, Henderson, S, Jones, S & Ticehurst, D 2002, How Effective Is Df/0?, Evaluation Report EV 
640, Department for International Development London, 41. 
436 Ibid 5 and 37. 
437 Foresti, M 2007, 'Evaluation Policies and Practices in Development Agencies', serie Notes Methodologiques no. 
1, December, Agence Fran~aise de Developpement, Paris I 001, London 9. 
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donors' endorsement of the growing importance of development evaluation and the 
practice in many development agencies, confirming the existence of a development-
wide 'evaluation gap'. Overall, she found that development evaluation was partway 
through a journey of moving from a relatively straightforward model of project 
evaluation for purposes of accountability, towards a more complex model for learning 
and policy development which requires new skills, roles and organisational 
arrangements. She concluded: 
The evaluation function within development agencies emerges as a function 
'in search of identity'. In some cases the search is quite advanced; in others 
this is a work in progress.438 
These meta-evaluations demonstrate that the rhetorical consensus of the Paris 
Principles is yet to be fully implemented in practice. While this may hardly be 
surprising, there is very little time remaining to consolidate the capacity to 
demonstrate attainment of the MDGs by 2015. Developing this capacity will ultimately 
require resolution of the outstanding major issues relating to reconciling the goals 
and modelling of evaluation between accountability and learning, demonstrating 
impact and establishing attribution, and setting uniform standards for methodological 
rigour. Until then, the development-wide 'evaluation gap' will inevitably persist in 
practice. 
6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have argued that we first need to appreciate the state and limitations 
of development evaluation b.efore we can address the key question 'Does judicial 
reform work?' in the next chapter. Hence, I have surveyed the field of development 
evaluation because this analysis is foundational in any assessment of development 
effectiveness to answer the overarching question 'Does aid work?' 
To sum-up, this analysis has established that development evaluation is a new, 
increasingly important and still evolving discipline which is characterised by a number 
of significant unresolved debates and unanswered questions. Over the past decade, 
in particular, we have seen the OECD-DAC provide concerted leadership as a 
professionalising agent in formalising a distinctive epistemology of development 
evaluation concepts, principles, norms and standards. Significant challenges, 
however, still remain before development evaluation, as a bounded professional 
438 1bid 9. 
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discipline, will attain the capacity and standing to address the manifold expectations 
of the international community to assess development effectiveness. For the 
present, development evaluation is internally contested over fundamental aspects of 
its purpose and approach; substantial technical challenges exist in demonstrating 
causality and attribution; divisive, unresolved disciplinary debates simmer over 
methodology and rigour; and practice is consequently fragmented by competing 
orthodoxies over independence and integration. 
In the meantime, it is clear that development has entered a new era of results-based 
management. This has repositioned the tools of monitoring and evaluation to the 
centre of the development stage. The shift in focus to measuring effectiveness 
embodied in the Paris Principles involves a profound transition for both donors and 
developing countries. As we take stock of the remarkable progress in development 
evaluation over the past decade, having reached the halfway point to the Millennium 
Development Goals of 2015, it remains uncertain whether sufficient capacity will 
have been established in evaluating and addressing the difficult question of 
eliminating global poverty. More likely, as a matter of pragmatism rather than 
pessimism, the international community will find itself on a continuing journey. 
That said, I conclude that this survey of development evaluation establishes the 
following key propositions for this thesis: first, development evaluation is still a young 
practice which, over the past decade, has become significantly more functionally 
important as a key tool in implementing the international consensus to improve 
development results. Mounting disillusionment at the perceived failure of aid to 
redress the 'poverty gap' has extended to the perceived failure of traditional 
accountability-based evaluation approaches. Despite the billions of dollars spent on 
development assistance each year, it is sobering that there is still very little known 
about the actual impact of development assistance on the poor. This realisation has 
galvanised a major transition in development approach, resulting in substantial 
growth and refinement, and heightened emphasis on demonstrating effectiveness 
through monitoring and evaluating for impact. 
Second, putting this transition into practice has, however, met with a range of 
substantial issues and challenges, many of which are yet to be resolved. 
Consequently, development evaluation is in an as yet unresolved state as a bounded 
professional discipline. This is particularly evident in the fundamental debate on the 
choice of evaluative model which has riven the discourse in a bitter debate between 
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the previously pre-eminent positivists and the emerging constructivists, described as 
a 'paradigm war' .'39 This debate is ultimately a contest over the 'theory' of 
development evaluation, and originates in a collision of disparate disciplinary 
traditions: in particular, the converging disciplines of development economics, the 
political and social sciences, financial management and audit, and the physical 
sciences as a legacy of development's earlier focus on infrastructure. Evidently, the 
OECD-DAC is persevering in laying the foundations for a unified professional 
practice and standardised approach. But, it remains to be seen whether this will 
resolve the contest over paradigm. This unresolved state is likely to simmer for some 
time, and it is likely that consensus over methodology and rigour shall remain a 
distant prospect. 
Third, as we have seen, managing-for-development-results has emerged as the new 
development construct in the post-Paris setting which ultimately embodies a shift in 
focus from monitoring the efficient delivery of outputs to monitoring impact and 
evaluating the effectiveness of results. To date, impact evaluations generally remain 
rare owing to technical difficulty in development environments and their 
disproportionate cost. Notably, they have never yet been undertaken in the focus 
arena of this thesis viz. judicial reform. This shift to MfDR is, however, problematic, 
and has provoked a substantial and vigorous critique on the basis that, in essence, it 
utters a false promise to improve results. While MfDR has led to substantial 
investment in designing monitoring frameworks, the tendency to favour efficiency-
level monitoring at the expense of evaluating effectiveness persists. More seriously, 
the emphasis on the mechanistic data-collection aspects of monitoring diverts finite 
resources from the more difficult but more important function of evaluating 
development effectiveness. Additionally, the seductive convenience of the 'logic 
model' to steer all aspects of change is reductionist and risks over-simplifying any 
meaningful evaluation of the nuance, complexity and non-linearity of human-centred 
change which make up the political economy environment and are characteristic of 
the arena of judicial reform. 
Fourth, and as a consequence of the above, there is still a development-wide 
'evaluation gap' between the theory and rhetoric of the Paris Principles and the real 
world of evaluation practice. While there is universal consensus on the need to 
refocus evaluation to effectiveness and impact, meta-evaluation reveals that the 
"
39 As we have seen positivists such as Bannerjee characterise qualitative method as lacking rigor and being 'lazy', 
above n 407; while constructivists such as Guba charge that the 'scientific' approach as being disempowering, unfair, 
disenfranchising, cozy and collusive, above at n 418, and surrounding. 
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present state of practice is deeply confused, in particular between providing its 
traditional insulated audit-based accountabilities, and reintegrating itself into the 
hurly-burly of operational management as part of the learning cycle. This is a 
confusion of purpose which ultimately arises from the competition over the theory of 
development evaluation. At its most simple, this is a contest between accountability 
(in essence, an audit rnodel) and effectiveness (in essence, a learning model). This 
contest is being visibly fought out organisationally in the positioning of the evaluation 
function either independently of management for accountability or integrated in 
management for learning and improvement. 
Addressing these challenges - only some of which are transitional in their nature -
will require time. Some, such as the realignment of donor systems, are relatively 
straightforward and may be expected shortly. Others, such as implementing the new 
paraphernalia of MfDR, will clearly require more time to design frameworks and 
collect data which are sufficient for trend analysis and the like. Yet others, such as 
the simmering disjunctions of the 'paradigm war', may persist behind uneasy 
interdisciplinary truces. In the meantime, the expectations of the international 
community for evaluation to deliver practical insights in promoting development 
effectiveness, notably relating to the MDG's, are unlikely to abate in the near term. 
This setting provides a somewhat torrid background to addressing the key question 
of this thesis, 'Does judicial reform work?' The transitional lack of orthodoxy of 
purpose, approach and methodology means that, at least for the moment, it is difficult 
to evaluate the effectiveness of this endeavour with any likelihood of consensus. 
This creates an imperative for this thesis to consider a range of immediate, specific 
and practical solutions so that development evaluation does fulfil this purpose. I shall 
address this imperative in the next chapter . 
• • • 
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CHAPTER 7 ·EVALUATING JUDICIAL REFORM 
1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I build on the earlier analysis of the purpose of reform from Part 1, 
and our understanding of development evaluation reached in the preceding chapter, 
in the search for the answers to the key questions of 'what' to evaluate in judicial 
reform and 'how' to evaluate it. 
I have provided an answer to the 'whaf question in Part 1 of this thesis by arguing 
that judicial reform should be measured in terms of its improvement of justice in 
promoting fairness and equity, and should be defined in both 'thick' and 'thin' terms. I 
now answer the 'how' question by arguing that in order for evaluation to be 
systematic, it requires a normative foundation. This foundation of norms is to be 
found in the universally endorsed treaties of international human rights law -
spanning a wide spectrum of political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights. 
These treaties provide a paradigm through which to conceptualise the objective of 
development which is embodied in any Aristotelian notion of social well-being and the 
state's role to promote the good life, which overarches the goal of poverty alleviation. 
Not only are these treaties extant and broadly comprehensive, they are also the best 
available global measures for justice, and are already endorsed by most states. 
Thus, I address the question 'how' to measure the success of reform endeavour by 
arguing that the embodiment of rights in these treaties provides the optimal means 
with which to design, implement, monitor and evaluate ongoing judicial reform 
endeavour. At the close of this chapter, I shall provide an example to illustrate the 
application of this conceptual argument. 
To reach this conclusion, I argue that the currently states of both judicial reform and 
evaluation practice are demonstrably deficient. I establish these arguments through 
an analysis of the evaluations of practice which conclude that judicial reform has 
consistently generated disappointing results; this I describe as a 'performance gap' 
between what was intended and what was delivered. Next, through a review of the 
practice of judicial reform, I establish that evaluations are rarely undertaken and are 
more conspicuous by their absence; this I describe as an 'evaluation gap'. Finally, 
through an analysis of the meta-evaluation of those evaluations which were 
conducted, I establish that there are marked deficiencies in their evaluative method; 
this I describe as a 'meta-evaluation gap'. Hence, on analysis, I find that the initial 
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perception of the disappointing performance of judicial reform discerned in the 
literature is in fact muddied by the scarcity and limited quality of these evaluations. 
Ultimately, I conclude that deficiency in evaluative effort has contributed to the finding 
of perceived deficiency in performance. 
In order to reach these findings, I argue from a survey of practice that there is still a 
lack of disciplinary consensus over 'whaf to evaluate in judicial reform and 'how' to 
evaluate it. Despite the rhetorical shift towards managing for results, seen in the 
previous chapter, it is clear that there still remains considerable philosophic, 
conceptual and technical difficulties in selecting appropriate performance indicators, 
developing consensus over the design of monitoring frameworks, demonstrating 
causal relationships, establishing attribution and demonstrating results in judicial 
reform. 
This lack of consensus over 'whaf and 'how' to evaluate judicial reform is showcased 
through a survey of the proliferation in performance monitoring, spurred by the MDGs 
and the Paris Principles discussed earlier. I analyse these frameworks and find 
considerable diversity of purpose, approach, focus and methodology. I then argue 
that this explosion of frameworks - which variously monitor justice, the rule of law 
and governance, among others - has substituted the earlier insufficiency of data with 
a new challenge of selecting which, if any, framework may be useful for the purpose 
of evaluating judicial reform endeavour. 
I critique the current investment in performance monitoring to establish the following 
two key propositions. First, most frameworks adopt relatively 'thin' formalistic 
conceptions of reform to answer the 'whaf question by measuring justice in terms of 
its efficiency because of the difficulties in measuring the substantive, qualitative 
aspects of justice. I find that these frameworks generally display a propensity of 'thin' 
measures of institutional efficiency such as delay, and institutional characteristics 
such as independence. An analysis of these measures reveals that many are 
inferential at best of the qualitative dimensions of justice and are deficient in this 
crucial sense. What is generally missing are any 'thick' measures of the qualitative or 
substantive dimensions of justice in promoting fairness and equity. Second, in 
relation to answering the 'how' question, I find that many of these frameworks use 
qualitative methodologies which rely on subjective assessments of the performance 
of courts to aggregate the perceptions of stakeholders, which are rarely triangulated 
with other data. I argue that when analysed, the commentary on these methodologies 
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reveals a range of substantial concerns about their conceptual integrity, validity and 
utility, and exposes their deficiency. 
Next, I will establish that the actual practice of evaluating judicial reform is 
characterised by its omission (the 'evaluation gap'), and by its demonstrable 
deficiency (the 'meta-evaluation gap'). These findings of evaluative deficiency are 
significant because they qualify the initial hypothesis posited in the academic 
commentary discussed in Part 1 of this thesis of a performance deficiency, which 
serves as the proxy for reform failure. 
In effect, I argue that despite the massive recent investment and the current 
proliferation of performance monitoring, the evidence indicates that we are as yet no 
closer to either evaluating or demonstrating effectiveness in judicial reform. I arrive 
at this sobering conclusion by finding that the existing answers to both key questions 
(what and how) are deficient. 
To redress this unsatisfactory situation, I close this chapter by offering my best-
reasoned efforts to contribute to the discourse by plugging these major gaps of 
theory and practice which continue to hinder the demonstration of success. This 
conclusion is essentially conceptual; it draws on the evidence of a convergence in 
the discourse on the rule of law and human rights which was established in Part 1 of 
this thesis, and provides a future path for the ongoing development of a normatively-
based systematic evaluation approach to judicial reform endeavour. 
2 Measuring performance 
In this chapter, I build on the earlier discussion where I established that managing-
for-development-results was a management construct comprising the three 
distinctive elements of logical framework, indicators and performance monitoring 
frameworks. I critiqued the 'logframe' as reductionist and of limited use as an 
evaluation tool in the development context. I now extend and sharpen the focus of 
analysis to examine the other two elements of MfDR, being indicators and 
performance monitoring frameworks, as they apply to the evaluation of judicial 
reform. I then critique both of these elements in preparation for undertaking an 
assessment of both the practice of judicial reform and the practice of evaluating 
judicial reform. 
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a Indicators 
Understanding the concept of an indicator is a necessary prelude to this ongoing 
analysis of how to measure success in judicial reform. An indicator is generally 
defined as a gauge or meter of a specified kind, where a meter is a device which 
measures and records the quantity degree or rate of something.440 Within the 
development context, the OECD defines an indicator as a quantitative or qualitative 
factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means of measuring 
achievement, identifying the changes connected to an intervention, or helping to 
assess the performance of a development actor.441 De Vries refines this definition by 
describing a statistical indicator as a single number - often a ratio, sometimes a 
composite of more than one ratio - that tries to capture a more or less complex 
reality and is, by its nature, a simplification of reality, sometimes a real 'construct'.442 
Others describe it as a proxy, being data which produces simple and reliable 
information describing a change, an outcome, an activity or an input.443 
In this thesis, I argue that indicators are metrics which provide a proxy technical 
measure of some development reality which rests on a conceptual foundation that 
requires clarity of definition, context and purpose to be meaningful and useful. I also 
argue that the selection of indicators is crucial to the relevance and utility of 
performance monitoring frameworks because they determine the answer to the 
question of 'what• to be measured. As we shall shortly see, in the new era of 
managing-for-development-results, there is no longer any shortage of measures. The 
current challenge is to determine the relative adequacy, relevance and utility of 
available indicators from the proliferation of monitoring frameworks of safety (crime), 
investment friendliness (doing business or competitiveness), human dignity and 
opportunity (rights), or state efficacy (governance), among others. 
Metrics are endemic to evaluation because they provide the measures by which 
assessments may be undertaken systematically. The issue of selection is therefore 
crucial. In earlier discussion, I have already demonstrated that measuring the 
incidence of poverty has long been a preoccupation of development because it is 
indicative of the overall success of endeavour. In the past, poverty has been 
44
° Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10111 Ed, 1999, Oxford University Press, New York, 721 and 896 respectively. For 
other definitions, see also: UNDP 2004, Sources for Democratic Governance Indicators, UNDP Bureau for 
Development Policy, New York. 
«t OECD, above n 329. 
442 De Vries, W 2001, 'Meaningful Measures: Indicators on Progress, Progress on Indicators,' International Statistical 
Review, vol. 69, no. 2, pp. 313·331, 315. 
443 Europaid, Why And When Are Context Indicators Used?, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation/methodology/egevalltools/too ind def en.htm> at 4 December 2009. 
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variously conceptualised, most often using financial measures, notably the aggregate 
financial metrics of GOP and GNP. More recently, the Gini-coefficient and Lorenz 
curve have been used as proxy economistic measures of the equitable distribution of 
resources across a population, notably in the World Development Report 2006, UN 
Human Development Reports and studies of the Asian Development Bank.444 This 
trend has built in part on Sen's conceptions of opportunity, capability and well-being 
which were considered in Part 1 of this thesis. The relevance of this discussion is to 
highlight the crucial significance of selecting the right metrics to measure the success 
of judicial reform endeavour and thereby the improvement of justice. 
Selection of the right metric, or indicator, is often difficult and potentially contentious. 
Given that indicators are by axiom proxy measures of a larger reality, there is an 
imperative to ensure that these indicators adequately and effectively represent that 
larger reality. Part of the challenge of selecting proxy measures is to ensure the 
provision of technically robust data in terms of their validity and reliability to represent 
the realities under measurement. Another part of this challenge arises from metrics 
serving important but different political and technical roles. In addition to being 
technically valid and reliable, indicators must tell a strong, simple story. For example, 
de Vries points out that the design of the Human Development Index (HOI) was 
politically significant in creating a single index of well-being as an alternative measure 
for the prevailing financial metric of GOP. While HOI has at various times been 
criticised for reasons of statistical validity, scientific soundness and methodology, it 
has nonetheless had a considerable political impact in reframing the development 
discourse.445 
Attaining a consensus over indicators to measure poverty has been notoriously 
difficult. Alkire argues that attaining this consensus was the principal achievement of 
the UN's MDGs.446 De Vries goes further to highlight their political as well as 
technical function: 
444 The Gini coefficient of inequality is commonly used by economists to measure poverty, distribution and thereby 
inequality. The coefficient varies between 0, which reflects complete equality and 1, which indicates complete 
inequality (one person has all the income or consumption, all others have none). Graphically, the Gini coefficient can 
be easily represented by the area between the Lorenz curve (which maps the cumulative income share against the 
distribution of the population) and the line of equality. Measuring Inequality 2009, World Bank, 
<http:/lqo.worldbank.org/NPDJ208SUO> at 26 November 2009; and also the Asian Development Bank: ADS, 
Inequality in Asia, Manila: 2007, 6; http://www.adb.ora/Documents/Books/Key lndicators/2007/0df/lneguality~in~Asia­
Highlights.pdf (last visited: 26.11.09) 
445 De Vries, W, above n 442 316. 
446 Alkire, S 2003, 'A Conceptual Framework for Human Security,' Working Paper No. 2, Centre for Research on 
Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, Oxford; Alkire S 2007, 'The Missing Dimension of Poverty Data: An 
Introduction,' Working Paper, Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, Oxford; see also, above, n 358. 
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[MDG) indicators are a powerful tool for building the political will needed to 
lift one billion people out of abject poverty by 2015. They provide a focus 
and stark clarity to shock governments into addressing poverty and civil 
society into demanding this. Easily understood indicators are also needed 
to mobilise public opinion in donor countries, whose citizens have become 
cynical about aid, to support international development and to persuade 
them that it can work and can reduce poverty.447 
It is important to recognise that the political and technical requirements of indicators 
rnay not always align because indicators may tell a strong but incomplete and 
potentially misleading story. To address some of these challenges, it is generally 
recognised that indicators should conform to certain characteristics of principles, 
often acknowledged to include criteria such as relevance, validity, specificity, 
reliability, sensitivity, measurability, usability and cost-effectiveness. To make an 
evaluation framework for indicators more manageable, de Vries suggests 
compressing the criteria to just four characteristics: technically sound, 
understandable, relevant and cost-effective- which he abbreviated as 'TURC'.446 
b Quality or quantity of justice? 
The selection of indicators for complex and often abstract qualitative notions such 
'good governance,' which often embodies judicial reform, is no less difficult and is 
potentially as contentious as it is for poverty because of its duality of technical and 
political purposes. This is evident in the World Bank's World Governance Indicators 
(WGI) which purport to measure good governance, and are fraught with the twin 
challenges of technical reliability and validity on the one hand, and political clarity and 
simplicity on the other. Measuring the inherently abstract notion of qualitative 
concepts such as good governance or judicial reform is complex. While WGI has 
been remarkably successful 'politically' in bringing the measurability of good 
governance to prominence over the past decade, it will shortly be seen that 
addressing both purposes has been not just complex but potentially 'technically' 
controversial. This challenge arises in part from a lack of consensus over the 
definition and nature of good governance, causing Landman to stress the need for 
conceptual clarity. The existence of different definitions of these terms necessarily 
means the existence of different measures of these concepts.449 This challenge is 
447 De Vries, W, above n 442 316, endorsing: Williams, T. & Bradford Smith, K. (2000). Statistics to shape the 21st 
century: the role of indicators, paper for Conference of Commonwealth Statisticians, Gabarone, May 2000. 
448 Ibid, 320. An alternative acronym which I have found useful and readily used in development settings is: 'SMART' 
~fecific, measurable, accurate, reliable and time-bound). 
Landman, T & Hausermann, J 2003, Map-making and analysis of the main international initiatives on developing 
indicators on democracy and good governance, Final Report, University of Essex Human Rights Centre, 3. See also: 
World Bank 1992, Development and Good Governance, World Bank, Washington D.C. 
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further compounded by disjunctions between the four disciplines of political science, 
law, economics and statistics, for example: 
[P]olitical scientists have been engaged in what they consider to be the 
measurement of human rights, frequently without any real reference to the 
international law of human rights. Similarly, the human rights community 
has, from its inception, been dedicated to monitoring human rights 
violations and governmental performance. But it is only within the last 
decade that the tools of statistics have been introduced into human rights 
monitoring. There still remains a considerable lacuna in human rights 
measurement .... 450 
As we shall shortly see, reaching a consensus in measuring justice and judicial 
reform is yet to be achieved. A considerable range of challenges are associated with 
indicators for justice. These include their sheer volume, the lack of information on 
how similar indicators are related, competing demands, the proliferation of 
internationally formulated indicator sets, ad hoc data collection for diverse purposes, 
differences in the definition and underlying concepts, data sources and methodology 
that lead to different numerical values. Lying at the heart of this challenge is a 
surprising uncertainty about what a justice system should actually do or look like. 
Reiling and Hammergren have recently attempted to develop a checklist for the 
purpose of conducting justice sector assessments, and conclude that they could not 
produce checklist of standards to be ticked off because such standards do not exist: 
[T]here is no consensus, in the global justice community or among justice 
scholars, on what this model should look like. 451 
Finding the right balance of indicators is very difficult. In practice, no single indicator 
allows for a comprehensive measurement of judicial reform; using one indicator can 
produce a false assessment, but too many can overwhelm local capacity and create 
confusion. Moreover, developing consensus over measures for the quality of justice 
is notoriously more difficult than for its efficiency. For these reason, frameworks 
usually cluster indicators to measure quantitative aspects of judicial or related reform, 
which may then create problems of overburdening available capacity.452 
450 Landman, T &Hausermann, J, ibid, 34. 
451 Reiling, D, Hammergren, l & Di Giovanni, A 2007, Justice Sector Assessments - A Handbook, World Bank, 
Washington D.C. 9. 
452 UNOP 2004, Governance Indicators: A Users Guide, United Nations Development Programme Bureau for 
Development Policy, New York. For these reasons, many commentators advocate combining qualitative and 
quantitative indicators - see, for example: Rao, V & Woolcock, M, 2003, 'Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches in Program Evaluation,' in Bourguignon F & Pereira da Silva, L {Eds ), The Impact of Economic PoUcies 
on Poverty and Income Distribution, World Bank, Washington DC, pp. 165-190. 
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In my experience, the selection of indicators in the arena of judicial reform is far from 
straightforward and is often contentious. In the past, statistics on crime and court 
delay have commonly been selected as key measures of performance; other 
common measures are of case disposal as an indicator of court efficiency. Yet, as we 
have already seen in Part 1 of this thesis, many argue that these 'thin' indicators fail 
to capture any of the 'thick' or qualitative dimensions of justice which are less 
tangible and harder to measure. 453 While calls for a few 'key' performance indicators 
are common, this is often difficult to put into practice. For example, in the PNG 
experience which is case-studied in Part 3 of this thesis, 2-3 key indicators were 
initially expected. Once the reform plan had been designed, more that 150 specific 
metrics were proposed. A final balance was reached in a judicial scorecard of 75 
indicators, which required substantial capacity-building to support.454 
Thus, the scope of challenge in nominating indicators for judicial reform is 
philosophic, conceptual, technical and operational. At the philosophic level, there is 
the endemic challenge of refining and rationalising the competing purposes for 
judicial reform, and how it is to be measured. At the conceptual level, there is the 
endlessly vexing task of selecting which measures are legitimate and sufficient 
proxies - both technically and politically - to adequately represent often highly 
qualitative notions associated with judicial reform. At the technical level, there are the 
usual range of challenges of validity and reliability discussed in the preceding 
chapter. At the operational level, there are the practical constraints of accessing 
sufficient data in a development setting on a regular and sustainable basis.455 
The. manifold challenges of answering the core questions of 'what' and 'how' to 
measure judicial reform are only now starting to be addressed systematically in the 
development arena. However, as I will demonstrate in the next section, they are yet 
to be resolved. 
c Monitoring frameworks 
With this understanding of the nature and function of indicators, I now turn to an 
assessment of the international frameworks of indicators that have been constructed 
over recent years to systematically measure judicial and related reforms. I survey 
and analyse a selection of the best known and most comprehensive performance 
453 Above, n 91, onwards. 
454 Below, at Chapter 8. 
455 De Vries, W, above n 442. 
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monitoring frameworks. This analysis showcases the state of global practice in 
addressing the core questions of 'what' to measure and 'how' to measure it in judicial 
reform. 
I will argue that these frameworks have been of limited evaluative utility to date. They 
generally provide a systematic means of monitoring performance, and an internally-
standardised means of cataloguing data. But this survey will establish that most of 
these frameworks predominantly focus on monitoring 'thin' procedural aspects of 
reform endeavour, and are incomplete and inferential at best in measuring qualitative 
improvement to justice. Typically, they monitor delay, the provision of training, and 
organisational indicators such as budget. On occasion, indicators relating to 
independence or transparency are measured. But, more usually, these frameworks 
exclude any 'thick' or substantive measures of improving justice because it is 
considerably more difficult, and thereby more contentious, to devise standardised 
measures of the qualitative or substantive aspects of justice. Few frameworks are 
integrated to designated reform goals, and there is no consensus on how to resolve 
the ever-increasing proliferation of diverse monitoring approaches. 
In recent years, considerable resources have been invested in developing monitoring 
frameworks in the arenas of governance, and legal and judicial reform, as a 
predictable consequence of the imperative to demonstrate improved results as we 
have seen in the previous chapter. Over the past five years, in particular, there has 
been a proliferation of performance monitoring frameworks in judicial and related 
reform endeavours as part of managing for performance results, ostensibly to supply 
the data required to improve aid effectiveness. These frameworks have become 
popular in international development assistance as a means of systematically 
measuring development effectiveness.456 Despite this proliferation, the situation of 
statistical frameworks remains ungainly and is characterised, as de Vries observes, 
by frequent overlap, gaps, duplication and divergence: 
Regardless of possible real differences in scope and purpose between the 
various indicator sets, it is very difficult, from the outside, not to get the 
impression that so far there has been a lack of interest in co-ordination as 
well. This applies at both the technical and the policy levels. 457 
456 For example: the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), and the Human Development Index (HOI) in 
the UN system; and the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
iPRSP) in the World Bank Group. 
57 De Vries, W, above n 442 329. 
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As we shall see, these frameworks monitor aspects of judicial reform for a variety of 
purposes. These purposes include promoting global knowledge about justice and 
safety; advocating change in justice and safety; steering investment in the justice 
sector; measuring the progress of specific initiatives to improve safety and justice; 
promoting accountability; formulating policies and evaluating programs; and 
coordinating the work of different institutions in the justice sector. As recently 
observed, there is now a glut of performance frameworks and performance 
indicators: 
The world today is swimming in indicators of justice, safety, and the rule of 
law . . . . There are also global or nearly global indices of freedom, 
governance, human rights, inequality, poverty, economic stability, political 
violence, and human development, all of which contain or depend upon 
sometimes valuable information about justice and safety in societies across 
the world.458 
This global proliferation of monitoring frameworks exists at two levels. The first 
focuses measurement directly on indicators of justice and judicial reform at the 
institutional level, and the second focuses on some associated notion of the rule of 
law or good governance at the state level. 
In Annex A, I provide a declarative survey of seventeen prominent global monitoring 
initiatives. These frameworks are categorised as being at court-/eve/ and at 
government-level relating to governance and the rule of law459 This survey is useful 
in illuminating the scope and diversity of those initiatives, providing a comparative 
analysis of their purposes and demonstrating the nature and range of data collection 
methodologies. The survey will then provide the foundation for my ongoing critique of 
global practice for the purpose of establishing the following two propositions: first, 
most frameworks adopt relatively 'thin', formalistic conceptions of reform to answer 
the 'what' question by measuring procedures of justice; second, they answer the 
'how' question by surveying the perceptions of various stakeholders. I will conclude 
this analysis by arguing that both are deficient, and propose that this practice should 
458 Indicators of Safety and Justice: Their Design, Implementation and Use in Developing Countn·es, summary of a 
Wori<shop held at Harvard University, 13-15 March 2008. 
<http://www.hks.harvard.edu/criminaliustice/publications/justice indicators workshop 2008.pdf> at 26 November 
2009. 
-459 Annex A. These frameworks comprise: 
(a). Court-level frameworks of measurement (x7): ABA-CEELI - Judicial Reform Index; Vera's indicators for the 
justice sector; IFES Rule of Law Tool; European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice; Productivity Commission 
Reports on Government Services, Australia; Judicial Quality: The Netherlands - RechtspraaQ; International 
Framework for Court Excellence. 
(b) Government~level frameworks of measurement (x9): Bertes/mann Transformation Index; Freedom House's 
World Survey; Global Integrity Index; Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer and Bribe Payers 
Index; Transparency International 'Diagnostic Checklist for Assessing Safeguards against Judicial Corruption'; World 
Governance Assessment; The World Bank's 'Doing Business:· Data Gob; World Governance Indicators. 
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include 'thick' substantive outcomes of justice which are visibly measurable, and can 
be SUIJ\)Ot\ed b'j other data. 
d Critique of frameworks 
While by no means exhaustive, this survey and critique of a sampling of monitoring 
frameworks at both the court and government levels provides the evidentiary basis 
for establishing a number of propositions which are relevant to my arguments about 
'whaf and 'how' to measure justice and more specifically judicial reform endeavour. 
First, it demonstrates that core elements of any notion of justice and judicial reform 
may be variously defined and conceptualised using a range of measures, data and 
measuring methodologies which depend on their specific purpose and context. 
Second, it demonstrates that the universe of justice monitoring frameworks is highly 
heterogeneous both conceptually and in its methodological approach and that, 
consequently, despite the overwhelming in-pouring of data and measures over the 
past decade, there is as yet no consensus over orthodoxy of approach or measures. 
More detailed analysis of these frameworks reveals that they generally focus on 
measuring the efficiency of judicial performance, or institutional characteristics either 
at the court level or as part of a macro-level framework of good governance. Often 
they use performance indicators that selectively measure the 'thin' aspects of judicial 
efficiency- notably rates of court access, disposal and delay- to assess the quantity 
of justice, and often by inference, its quality, as in the example of the Productivity 
Commission of Australia. Other indicators measure aspects of judicial quality through 
the 'thin' conceptions of justice and procedural formalism. Indicators frequently 
measure judicial independence, due process and the existence of laws, procedures 
and codes as a means, again by inference, to assess notions of fairness and equality 
of trial: for example, RechtspraaQ and the IFES Rule of Law tool. Occasionally these 
frameworks adopt a more holistic perspective, for example: the Judicial Reform 
Index, Vera Institute's justice sector indicators, the US Courtoo/s, DataGob or the 
European Efficiency of Justice initiative. Such frameworks are encyclopaedic 
endeavours requiring massive resources to generate volumes of data which risk 
exceeding the available data and technical and financial capacities of both 
developing jurisdictions and donors. Beyond indicators of performance, other 
indicators measure institutional characteristics, notably independence, the selection 
and training of judges, and measures of integrity associated with the drive for good 
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governance such as transparency and accountability. Other macro-level frameworks 
measure aspects of justice which comprise good governance and the rule of law as 
variously defined, notably: the World Governance Indicators, the Freedom House 
survey, and Transparency's judicial integrity checklist. Occasionally, these 
frameworks are linked to external measures of substantive justice, such as crime 
victimisation rates, human rights improvements or poverty alleviation. Of those 
surveyed, the ABA-CEELI pilots are now the oldest and among the most thorough, 
enabling comparative measurement and a trend analysis of performance, 
longitudinally (across time) and latitudinally (across countries). However, profound 
technical challenges of data comparability between systems have been observed in 
the example of the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice experience, as 
elsewhere, which raises far-reaching questions about the legitimacy and utility of the 
emerging reliance on highly reductive aggregated rating scales to measure justice. 
This analysis also illuminates the range of data collection methodologies and sources 
of data for monitoring purposes. Most, but by no means all, of the existing initiatives 
rely on the perceptions of key informants - that is aggregated subjective 
assessments of performance of the courts -from a range of key informants, judges, 
court users, representatives of civil society, business and media. Rarely, if ever, are 
these subjective perceptions triangulated with objective available from official or civil 
society data sources. 
From this survey of endeavour over the past decade, I argue that the discourse is 
evidently no nearer to overcoming the challenges of measurement, while 
appreciation of its complexities has doubtless grown. It is increasingly clear that with 
the attempt to monitor and evaluate all aspects of judicial reform, the challenges 
grow inexorably, leading to what may soon be seen as an epidemic of confusing 
performance data. In the experience of this writer, these broad conceptualisations of 
justice and judicial reform demand massive resources which readily exceed the 
available data, capacity and/or financial resources. As Reiling and Hammergren have 
observed, this problem arises owing to the lack of consensus about what a judicial 
reform model should look like -which takes us back to our initial analysis of purpose 
in Chapter 2 of this thesis.460 Additionally, there is an acute tension between 
selecting measures which ensure an adequately nuanced description of the complex 
multidimensional aspects of justice, and the practical imperative to keep data 
collection simple, feasible and sustainable. This is all the more so in developing 
460 Reiling, D. Hammergren, L & Oi Giovanni, A, above n 451, 9. 
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environments where robust pressures militate against diverting scant resources from 
service delivery to monitoring functions. 
In essence, I argue that the explosive growth in performance monitoring has not as 
yet taken the discourse any closer to evaluating effectiveness, the stated objective of 
all results-based management endeavour spurred by the MDGs and the Paris 
Principles. Over the past decade, very considerable intellectual, technical and 
operational resources have demonstrably been devoted to the task of supplying the 
data necessary to monitor and evaluate performance. As foreshadowed in the 
critique contained in the previous chapter, however, there appears to be no 
relationship between these functions: lots of monitoring means lots of monitoring. It 
does not necessarily assure any improvements to performance. Moreover, in the last 
chapter, we have already seen that there is already evidence that it may have 
perverse outcomes, causing the diversion of scant resources and attention from the 
more critical evaluative function to easier, more mechanistic monitoring. Possibly, 
this may explain the ongoing lacuna of evaluative evidence. 
More specifically, I argue that this survey highlights the evaluative consequences of 
the multiplicity and diversity of purposes which have been variously conceptualised 
for economic, political, social and human purposes, established in Part 1 of this 
thesis. Each framework performs a distinctive function, monitoring aspects of justice, 
judicial reform, the rule of law and good governance in different ways. This reflects 
the dispersion of theoretical justifications for this endeavour, and the ensuing 
fragmentation of rationale for these frameworks. Consequently, these frameworks 
focus on selecting data which are relevant to measuring some relationship between 
judicial reform and promoting economic development, upholding the rights of poor 
people, reducing poverty, improving community security, enabling dispute resolution, 
protecting human rights, enhancing criminal justice, harmonising international 
regulatory standards, or protection from bureaucratic caprice. 
In effect, this proliferation of monitoring frameworks substitutes the pre-Paris problem 
of insufficiency of data with the new post-Paris challenge of selecting which - if any -
framework may be useful for the purpose of evaluating judicial reform endeavour. 
This challenge is confounded by a plethora of confusing, conflicting and often 
irrelevant data. This observation is not to suggest that these frameworks are 
useless, but rather that they are only one step in the ongoing and incomplete journey 
toward generating evaluative evidence of success in judicial reform. At the heart of 
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the challenge of measurement is the tension to balance clarity with simplicity.461 This 
challenge is not met by adding ever more measures which only compounds the 
challenge in developing environments by overwhelming capacity. 
In summary, I argue that the endorsement of the MDG goals in 2000 and the Paris 
Principles in 2005, has spurred a concerted investment in the creation of 
performance monitoring frameworks for international development in general, giving 
rise to a variety of frameworks for measuring justice, judicial reform, governance and 
the rule of law. These initiatives are characterised by: 
i. heterogeneous conceptions of justice and judicial reform 
ii. diversity of focus in what is to be measured 
iii. discrepant indicators of performance 
iv. contention over data sources and methodologies 
v. scant regard for the Paris Principles on harmonisation and coordination. 
Of most direct importance to this thesis, there is no evidence yet available of 
improvements to justice or judicial reform attributable to reform endeavours. It could 
credibly be argued that more time may be required to design, develop, test and 
implement these frameworks and to take systematic baseline measures. This is 
nonetheless a sobering observation to make after more than a decade of massive 
international endeavour to demonstrably improve justice. 
In the next section, I turn beyond the monitoring frameworks to complete this 
assessment by considering the spectrum of evidence otherwise available on the 
effectiveness of judicial reform. 
3 Synthesis- gaps in performance and evaluation 
In this section, I move on to establish that the evaluation of judicial reform is deficient 
because it is rarely undertaken, and when it is there is a discrepancy between what 
that evaluation is and what it should be. 
In Chapter 3, I have already provided an analysis of the commentary in the literature 
which evaluated the performance of judicial reform. A synthesis of these perceptions 
of reform endeavour was that performance was variously described as being 
461 See critique in Annex A. 
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sobering, less than promised, elusive, in crisis, impotent, inconclusive, less than 
spectacular and in serious doubt.462 As we have seen, those evaluations, and the 
commentary in the literature that builds on them, have consistently expressed 
disappointment at the lack of visible results. This commentary then synthesised a 
range of deficiencies which may in essence be classified as a lack of robust reform 
theory and established rationale; an overarching lack of knowledge across all levels 
of development assessment, monitoring, evaluation, and research; and a lack of 
empirical method and rigour. In effect, this commentary establishes what I term the 
'performance gap' in judicial reform. This gap describes the discrepancy between the 
expert expectations of those contributing to the literature and the consensus of their 
perceptions of performance. 
The focus of the ensuing discussion is not to revisit that commentary, but rather to 
move on by extending the analysis with a view to appraising the evaluative integrity 
of those perceptions. 
I now argue that this evaluative commentary of disappointment outlined in the 
literature has been muddied by the limited quality of a number of these evaluations. 
In effect, until the subject analysis in this thesis, the extent to which this widely-held 
perception of disappointment is affected by evaluative as much as reform effort has 
never been discerned. More specifically, I argue that this deficiency in evaluative 
effort qualifies the perception of disappointment in the performance of judicial reform. 
This is not to refute that judicial reform may have performed disappointingly, nor is it 
to impugn the assessments outlined in the literature. Rather, as a matter of dialectic, 
it is to illuminate that this perception of disappointment has rested on an edifice of 
limited evaluation. As a result, the qualified nature of this evaluative commentary 
must in turn qualify its assessment of disappointing performance; in effect, I conclude 
that an 'evaluation gap' critically affects the finding of a 'performance gap' in judicial 
reform within the existing academic discourse. 
From this rather messy situation, I argue that there is a need to first disentangle the 
respective performance deficiencies of reform endeavour and evaluative endeavour. 
This will require improvements in the evaluation approach to address the 'how' 
question; but as we have already seen, it is first necessary to clarify what judicial 
"
62 Above, at page 82. An evaluation synthesis summarizes the results of evaluations studies or similar programs or 
policies, with a focus on results. This is to be compared with meta-evaluation which is described as evaluating the 
evaluation based on the profession's standards and principles. World Bank & Carleton University 2007, Module 7, 
International Program in Development Evaluation, (IPDET). 325-327. 
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reform is supposed to do to address the 'what' question of this thesis. This takes me 
back to the foundational argument in Part 1 of this thesis. Here, I have established 
that the answer to the 'what• question is that judicial reform should aim to improve 
justice and, at its essence, be concerned with promoting fairness and equity. Justice 
is a fundamental element of social well-being. This purpose has its own constitutive 
justification. Reducing this to the practical, I argue that judicial reform should be 
reframed to address this purpose of promoting fairness and equity. Evaluation should 
then measure the extent to which this endeavour implements the universally agreed 
norms of international human rights law - spanning as they do political, civil, 
economic, social and cultural rights. This will provide a systematic, normatively based 
evaluation process. 
To appraise the evaluative foundations of this widely-held perception of 
disappointment in the performance of reform endeavour in the academic 
commentary, I now undertake a meta-evaluation, i.e. an evaluation of the various 
synthesis evaluations of that performance. 
a 'Scholars in self-estrangement' 
As we have already seen in Chapter 2, the first major evaluation of judicial reform 
endeavour was made in 1974 by Trubek and Galanter in their critique of the law and 
development movement of US assistance to Latin America in the 1960-70s, which 
has been seminal to the discourse.463 Trubek, earlier an exponent of that movement, 
argued that the movement rested on simplistic theoretical assumptions and a faith in 
spill-overs which were unfounded. It is now evident that this critique was influential in 
the ensuing demise of this phase of law and development, though equally that 
synthesis might now have some difficulty passing muster by today's standards of 
development evaluation. If appraised in terms of the principles and standards 
outlined in the previous chapter, this evaluation might be unlikely to satisfy 
requirements either for positivist evidence or constructivist participation, which 
highlights the evolving and dynamic nature of development evaluation approach. 
463 Trubek, D & Galanter, above n 27; Trubek, D 1996, 'Law and Development: Then and Now', American Society of 
lntemational Law Proceeings, Vol. 90, 223-226; and Trubek, D, 2003, 'The ~Rule of Law" in Development Assistance: 
Past, Present, and Future', paper, http:/lwww.law.wisc.edu/facstaff/trubek/Ruleoflaw.pdf, at February 2010. See 
also: Trubek, 0 2006, 'The Third Moment in Law and Development Theory and the Emergence of a new Critical 
Perspective', in Trubek, D & Santos, A (eds), The New Law and Economic Development, Cambridge University 
Press, New York, pp.1-18, 7. 
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b Blair and Hansen - 'rule of law' under the spotlight 
The next major synthesis was conducted by the OECD-DAC in 1997, and embodied 
an earlier evaluation by Blair and Hansen of USAID's thematic endeavour in 
promoting the rule of law in six developing countries.464 
The authors of this evaluation provided an analysis of reform endeavour based on 
criteria for promoting 'better justice.' Better justice is to be found in systems 
characterized by legitimacy in the perception of a country's citizens. Other criteria 
included accountability to the citizenry; freedom of speech; due process, particularly 
in the area of human rights; autonomy, equity or fairness; and effectiveness in using 
resources. They identified the needs in rule of law endeavour which they 
conceptualised into an analytical framework for determining minimal favourable 
preconditions to support the rule of law. These were: sufficient support for reform 
among the political elite; existence of reformist constituencies; level of judicial 
independence; level of judicial probity, freedom of speech, and donor leverage and 
influence.465 In reviewing the experience in practice, they found that undertaking a 
structural reform strategy was 'the boldest and most difficult rule of law strategy' and 
presented a formidable challenge, because legal rules emanate from political 
sources outside the judicial system.'66 They found that judicial capacity building was 
essential, but that this required new approaches: 
Much of the analysis in this report suggests that a paradigm featuring a 
"technical fix" or engineering approach to institutional change is 
inappropriate for understanding and prescribing the process of rule of law 
reform. Rather, an approach that leans heavily on the insights of political 
economy and emphasises constituency and coalition building would be 
more suitable for envisaging and designing rule of law strategies. In 
essence, USAID officers need to think politically, rather than 
bureaucratically, in approaching rule of law reform (sic.)467 
Despite the age of this evaluation, the full significance and implications of this 
analysis are yet to be fully grasped by the emerging discourse on judicial evaluation, 
struggling as it is to find its path. Opening the scope of evaluation to the political-
economy dimensions of reform, i.e. the executive and arguably the macro-level of 
464 OECD·DAC, 1997, Evaluation of Programs promoting Participatory Development and Good Government, 
Synthesis Report, Development Assistance Committee, OECD, Paris, 28-38. This chapter based upon: Blair & 
Hansen, above n 33. 
465 Blair & Hansen, ibid 13. 
466 OECD, above n 464, 33. 
467 Blair & Hansen, above n 33, 51. 
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governance, significantly compounds the conceptual and technical challenges 
already being addressed. Whether this is feasible will be considered shortly. 
c Nature of evaluative commentary 
As already observed in Part 1 of this thesis, Messick then launched the current 
discourse on the effectiveness of judicial effectiveness in 1999 when he argued that 
many unanswered questions surrounded the emerging focus on reforming judiciaries. 
He observed a lack of any theory on the impact of law and development, described 
the causal relationship between judicial reform and development as a series of on-
and-off connections, and called for more rigorous econometric research of what he 
termed 'the rule of law hypothesis.' 468 In an effort to take forward a more conceptual 
analysis of reform endeavour, he proposed that indicators of performance are 
required to measure the four key functions of justice systems. He proposed that 
these functions are to deter wrongful conduct, facilitate voluntary transactions, 
resolve private disputes, and redress governmental abuses of power. In relation to 
the courts, he argued that data should be collected to support performance indicators 
on independence and accountability, selection and competence of personnel, 
efficiency, and access.469 
In 2003, this analysis of the evaluative criteria for judicial reform was taken forward 
by Toope who proposed a holistic framework of indicators of a healthy legal system. 
These should include accountability, anti-corruption, efficacy, equality before the law, 
equality of access, independence, internal values (such as transparency, fairness 
consistency, predictability), legitimacy, stability, non-retrospectivity, timeliness and 
reasonable parameters. 470 The value of this major contribution to the discourse is its 
more adequate conceptualisation of justice. For the first time, Toope moves beyond 
the prevailing 'thin' descriptors of procedural efficiency to grapple with the more 
difficult qualitative dimensions of substantive justice. This embodies a 'thick' 
conceptualisation of justice which includes notions of equality and fairness. 
468 Messick, above n 35, 128. See also: Messick, R 2002, 'Judicial Reform: The Why, the What and the How', Paper 
delivered at the Conference on Strategies for Modernizing the Judicial Sector in the Arab World March 15-17, 
Marrakech, Morocco. 
469 Much of this data was gathered in a 60 plus country survey conducted for the 1997 World Development Report. 
Messick, R, Key Functions of Legal Systems with Suggested Performance Measures, (World Bank, date unknown), 
<http://WWVoJ.gsdrc.org/go/display/documenUiegacyid/282> at 26 November 2009. 
470 Toope, S 2003, 'legal and Judicial Reform through Development Assistance: Some lessons,' McGill Law 
Journal, vol. 48, pp. 357-417, 376. Toope separately moves on to argue the need for a normatively based approach 
to reform: Toope, S & Brunee, J 2006, 'Norms, Institutions and UN Reform: The Responsibility to Protect', Journal of 
International Law & International Relations, vol. 2,121-137. See also in relation to discussion on the paradigm war in 
evaluation in Part 2: Toope, S & Brunee, J 2001, 'International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional 
Theory of International Law, 39 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 19, 19-74. 
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As we have already seen, the World Bank has for the most part adopted a classically 
'thin' approach to judicial and legal reform.471 This is illustrated by Dakolias who 
postulates five further 'core' principles: efficiency, broadly defined as the capacity of a 
judicial system to provide judicial services to litigants at reasonable cost and speed; 
quality, defined as being predictability, appropriateness and competence; integrity, 
broadly implying independence, impartiality and accountability; transparency which 
relates to procedural formality and disclosure; and access, to overcome barriers to 
asserting individual and property rights. Oddly, though, none of these formulations 
acknowledges or seeks to conform to the OECD principles and criteria.472 In 
developing mechanisms to evaluate rule of law progress, Dakolias argues that one 
should consider what kinds of outcomes the public expects, the logical question 
being: what does success mean? She defines the rule of law as prevailing when 
government is bound by the law, every person is treated equally under the law, the 
human dignity of each individual is recognised and protected by law, and justice is 
accessible to all. Significantly, she acknowledges that multilateral and bilateral 
organisations have entered the field with 'different and sometimes ill-defined' 
objectives.473 She reviews endeavour to evaluate reforms to call for increased 
monitoring data, analysis and evaluation to take stock of rule of law reform 
experience. But, she opines that rule of law projects are 'particularly tough to 
measure' due to the length of time required to see results, the differences between 
legal systems, and the difficulty of measuring results that cannot be directly 
translated into economic terms.'74 
Finally, though not altogether usefully, Oxner dismisses the challenge of evaluating 
the qualitative performance of judges in the context of continuing training as 
'attempting to measure immeasurables.'475 
This commentary on the evaluation of judicial reform, as distinct from the 
performance of judicial reform, indicates its evolving nature, as various 
commentators start to grapple with the challenges of systematic measurement. 
Evidently, consideration of these issues has only recently commenced within the 
471 Above, n 56, onwards. 
472 Dakolias, M 2005, 'Methods for Monitoring and Evaluating the Rule of Law', Applying the "Sectoral Approach" to 
the Legal and Judicial Domain: C/LC's 2dh Anniversary Conference, Centre for International Legal Cooperation, 
Leiden, pp. 9-26, 21. See also: Oakolias, M, 1999, 'Court Performance Around the World: A Comparative 
Perspective', Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal, vol. 2, pp. 87-142; Dakolias, above n 84. 
473 Citing: World Bank 2004, Initiatives in Legal and Judicial Reform, World Bank, Washington D.C, 2. Dakolias, M, 
2005. ibid, 9. 
47
" Dakolias M, 2005, ibid, 11. 
475 Oxner, S 2005, 'Continuing Judicial Education, Integrity and Competence', International Conference & Showcase 
on Judicial Reforms, Commonwealth Judicial Education Institute, 16-17. 
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discourse, and considerable distance remains to be traversed before a coherent 
approach is articulated and agreed upon. 
4 Deficiency in evaluative practice -the 'evaluation gap' in judicial reform 
My principal critique of the practice of evaluating judicial reform is quite simply that it 
is rarely done. In effect, there is what I term an 'evaluation gap' in judicial reform. 
This argument is supported at three levels: by my own experience in practice, by the 
commentary in the literature, and by the meta-evaluation of practice. 
a Omission and the missing middle 
First, it is my experience of a decade and a half of judicial reform practice that 
evaluations are overwhelmingly process- rather than impact-focused. They assess 
the congruence between project targets and outputs. While I demonstrate in Part 3 of 
this thesis that this is no longer invariably the case, it certainly remains the prevailing 
reality of evaluation practice.476 Globally to date, there is no documented evidence of 
any evaluation of the impact of judicial reform. While many aspects of judicial reform 
are doubtless difficult to evaluate, as already noted by Oxner, this does not justify the 
dearth of evaluation in practice. Reform effectiveness can be measured in a number 
of ways, for example by inference, bridging the problem of what McMahon describes 
as 'the missing middle'. 417 
To redress this chronic evaluation gap, I have variously contributed to the literature 
on the need to improve the evaluation of judicial and legal reform endeavours over 
the past decade and a half. In doing so, I have argued for an integrated or 'mixed-
method' approach of qualitative and quantitative measures to more systematically 
triangulate performance indicators to measure the effectiveness of reform activities. I 
have formulated methodologies to measuring the impact and effectiveness of judicial 
reform projects and judicial education, in particular, using the publication of judges' 
bench books as a case study.478 Additionally, building on my analysis of the judicial 
reform experience in PNG outlined in Chapter 9 of this thesis, I have separately 
476 See Part 3 of this thesis, case studies on ADB and AusAID, in Chapters 8 and 9, respectively. 
477 McMahon E 2001, 'Assessing USAID's Assistance for Democratic Development: Is it Quantity versus Quality?' 
Evaluation vol. 7. no. 4. pp.453-467. 463. 
478 Armytage,L1998, Devising Measures to Evaluate Judicial Reform Projects, 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/EvaluatingJudicialReformProiects.odf> 
at 26 November 2009. See also: Arrnytage, L 1996, Educating Judges, Kluwer Law International, LondonJBoston, in 
particular, Chapter 8. Also: Armytage, L 1995, 'Evaluating the Impact of Judicial Education', Journal of Judicial 
Administration, val. 4, no. 3, pp. 143-170, 155; which are endorsed by Toomey, L 2007, Measuring the Impact of 
Judicial Training, International Network to Promote the Rule of Law, <http://www.inprol.org/files/CR07005.pdf> at 26 
November 2009. 
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argued, similarly to Rao and Woolcock, that there is a need to develop an integrated 
framework that links and measures both the performance of justice and the 
contribution of development assistance in promoting that performance.479 Up until this 
point, these contributions have been offered by me as a practitioner in the field. They 
represent my grappling with the real world challenges of demonstrating meaningful 
results in a highly complex endeavour that has lacked the wherewithal to do so, 
beyond the banality of demonstrating conformity to logframes. It is to be hoped that 
this thesis will now offer more substantive contributions to redressing this persisting 
evaluation gap. 
b Hammergren: the 'fireman's syndrome' 
Second, many commentators confirm and remark on the lack of evaluations of 
judicial reform - as distinct from project monitoring which, as I argued in the previous 
chapter, tends to eclipse funding for evaluation.480 This critique is exemplified by 
Hammergren who has written prolifically on the need to adopt a more rigorous, 
diagnostic and knowledge-based approach to judicial performance.'81 She calls for 
the adoption of a more comprehensive knowledge-based approach to judicial reform. 
While judicial reform is a new discipline, it is not so new as to escape questions 
about its intellectual and practical value. Judicial reform has fallen short, and what 
needs to be done is 'obvious:' donors need to get more serious about articulating 
their strategies and evaluating results.'82 There is a need for improved knowledge 
management across the project spectrum: assessment, monitoring, evaluation, and 
research.'83 In relation to conducting assessments, she observes that no or 
inadequate assessments are generally conducted: 
479 See: PNG case-study in Part 3 of this thesis, and Annytage, l & Miller, S 2008, 'Legal and Judicial Reform 
Performance Monitoring: the PNG Approach', European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 20, no.1, pp. 141-
157. Also: Rao, V & Woolcock, M, 2003, 'Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches in Program 
Evaluation,' in Bourguignon F & Pereira da SUva, L (Eds), The Impact of Economic Policies on Poverty and Income 
Distribution, World Bank, Washington DC, pp. 165-190. 
See also: Armytage, L 2006, 'Monitoring Performance of Legal and Judicial Reform in International Development 
Assistance - Early Lessons from Port Moresby & Phnom Penh', paper presented to the International Bar Association 
Chicago Showcase, Judicial Reform: Economic Development and the Rule of Law, Chicago, 18 September; 
http:Jiwww.qsdrc.ora/go/display&tvoe=Document&id=2970, at 3 February 2010. 
400 See above n 372. 
481 Hammergren, L 2003, 'International Assistance to Latin American Justice Programs: Towards an Agenda for 
Refonning the Reformers' in Jensen, E & Heller, T (Eds), Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the 
Rule of Law, Stanford University Press, California, pp. 290-335. See also: Hammergren, above n 18; Hammergren, 
L 2000, 'Fifteen Years of Judicial Reform in LA: Where we are and why we haven't made more progress,' 
USAID/G/DG Global Center for Democracy and Governance), 6: 
<httpwww.pogar.orgpublicationsjudiciarvlinn21atin.odf> at 3 January 2009; Hammergren, L 2002, 'Reforming 
Courts: The Role of Empirical Research', PREM Notes no. 65, March, Wor1d Bank; Hammergren, L, Diagnosing 
Judicial Performance: Towards a tool to help guide judicial reform programs. (undated} 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/hammergrenJudiciaiPerf.pdf> 
at 26 November 2009. 
482 Hammergren, L 2003, ibid, 321. 
483 Hammergren L, 2002, 'Assessments, Monitoring, Evaluation, and Research: Improving the Knowledge Base for 
Judicial Reform Programs', 1 and 21, 
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[l]t is a matter of record that the (World) Bank and other donors do initiate 
reform work without a sector assessment to guide it. The diagnosis is 
guided entirely ~what people think about the system with little effort to test 
this empirically. 
In relation to monitoring and evaluation, she observes that until recently 'monitoring 
of judicial reforms was conspicuous by its near absence.485 When it was done, the 
emphasis was on tracking inputs or outputs delivered, not the impact on overall goals 
and objectives.486 Improving this situation now confronts a range of organisational 
and political obstacles, including what she terms the 'fireman's syndrome.' By this 
she means: do not admit there are problems as this will cut off the supply of funds for 
everyone. Those violating this rule are likely to find themselves excluded from further 
participation - which she notes even extends behind closed doors within the World 
Bank.487 
As we have already seen in Part 1 of this thesis, Carothers is a similarly trenchant 
critic of the quality of evaluation in both arenas of democratisation and legal and 
judicial reform, which he notes have suffered from inadequate evaluations for 
decades. Aid providers seem determined to repeat their mistakes, suffering from 
what he describes as the 'false dream of evaluative science,' observing that definitive 
evaluations are not possible and are inevitably subjective. 488 Not only is the 
evaluation effort informal and haphazard, but the causal conundrum is formidable, 
and there are no established criteria for measuring success. He argues that donor 
evaluation systems involve increasingly impenetrable Byzantine apparatus which is 
generally narrowly focused on project performance. While conceding that managing 
evaluation systems forces planners to think carefully about what they are trying to do, 
they are generally of dubious value: 
USAID devoted an enormous amount of time and energy to setting up the 
monitoring component of the managing for results system. . . . On the 
http://www.pogar.org/publications/judiciarv/linn1/knowledge.odf at 17 December 2009; See also: Buscaglia, E & 
Dakolias, M 1996, Judicial Reform in Latin American Courts: The Experience in Argentina and Ecuador, World Bank 
Technical Paper no. 350, World Bank, Washington D.C; Ratliff, W & Buscaglia, E 1997, 'Judicial Reform: the 
Neglected Priority in Latin America, NAFTA Revisited: Expectations and Realities', Annals American Academy of 
Politics and Social Science vol. 550, pp. 59-71; and; Buscaglia, E & Dakolias, M 1999, Comparative International 
Study of Court Performance Indicators - A Descriptive and Analytical Account, Legal & Judicial Reform Unit, World 
Bank, Washington D.C., 1. 
484 Hammergren L, 2002, ibid, 2, 
http://www.oogar.org/publications/judiciarv/linn1/knowledge.pdf at 17 December 2009; above n 481. 
465 Hammergren L, 2002, 'Performance Indicators for Judicial Reform Projects,'1: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.ora/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/Hammergrenperformance.pdf 
at 9 December 2009. 
486 Hammergren L, 2002, above n 483 2 and12. 
487 Hammergren, above n 103 309. 
486 Carothers, above n 98, 298. 
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whole, however, the effort to assess the impact of democracy (or rule of 
law) programs by using highly reductionistic indicators is a deeply flawed 
undertaking that is consuming vast resources, producing little useful 
insight or knowledge, and introducing serious distortions into the designing 
and implementing of such aid489 
This wan state of evaluation continues to be documented. As recently as 2006, 
Samuels described the striking lack of systematic results-based evaluations of rule of 
laws projects as 'depressing.'490 
5 Meta-evaluation - the double gap in evaluation 
Finally, I support the argument that evaluation practice is deficient by reference to the 
meta-evaluation of that practice. When evaluation is undertaken, it usually lacks 
rigour. In effect, there is what I term a 'meta-evaluation gap' in judicial reform. Meta-
evaluation means the evaluation of evaluation. The OECD defines this term to 
denote the evaluation of an evaluation to judge its quality and/or assess the 
performance of the evaluators 491 The World Bank similarly describes meta-
evaluation as being concerned with evaluating the practice of evaluation, based on 
the profession's standards and principles.492 
In this section, I assess the evidence of five meta-evaluations of the evaluation of 
judicial reform endeavour. These were conducted by the US General Accounting 
Office, McMahon, Norton, Gupta and Kleinfeld, and Bollen and Paxton. I will use this 
evidence to establish a number of propositions. First, despite the emergence of a 
rhetorical consensus to focus on results and effectiveness at the international level 
over the past decade, this has yet to transpire into practice. As we have already 
seen, donors continue to focus on monitoring and evaluating the delivery of 
outputs.493 Second, the evaluation of judicial reform confronts a range of difficulties 
which continue to impede effective evaluation of this endeavour. These include the 
ongoing fixation on the logframe approach despite its demonstrable shortcomings as 
an evaluative tool, deficiency in the availability and reliability of data, and ongoing 
contention over methodology. 
489 lbid 290-291. 
490 Samuels, K 2006, 'Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Countries: Operational Initiatives and Lessons Learnt', 
Social Development Papers, No. 37, October, World Bank, Washington D.C., 16. 
491 OECD, above n 329. 
492 Wor1d Bank & Carteton University, above n 462, 325-327. 
493 Above, n 431, and surrounding. 
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In 2001, the General Accounting Office (GOA) evaluated the US government's rule of 
law assistance efforts in the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. It 
found that after nearly a decade of effort and more than $200 million worth of 
assistance, the program had difficulty establishing and fostering the rule of law in the 
region and 'had limited impact so far.'494 It identified specific weaknesses in 
developing strategies for achieving impact and sustainability, and in conducting 
performance monitoring and evaluation. It also found that the agencies should design 
projects with greater emphasis on assessing impact and evaluating results using 
verifiable measures: 
[N]one of the U.S. agencies, including the U.S. Agency for International 
Development, have effective monitoring and evaluation systems in place 
to assess fully the longer-term results and sustainability of their efforts and 
reorient their projects based on a thorough understanding of the lessons 
learned.495 
Without indicators or measures of the results of its individual projects, GOA found it 
difficult to draw connections between the outputs produced and the outcomes 
reported: 
For 6 of the 11 major projects we reviewed . . . available project 
documentation indicated that project implementers reported project results 
almost exclusively in terms of outputs .... (Only 2 of these projects) have 
been independently evaluated to assess their impact and sustainability.496 
At about the same time, McMahon undertook a meta-evaluation of USAID's 
democratic governance projects to address the questions: Is international assistance 
effective? and How do we know how well we're doing? He found a number of 
methodological and procedural deficiencies. These included the need to institute 
structural reforms to enhance the independence of the evaluation process, 
disaggregating approaches to assessing the impact of programming, focussing on 
priority countries, and expanding the use of integrative methodologies. 497 He noted 
that most USAID personnel 'accept, grudgingly or otherwise, the need for a more 
rigorous approach,' introduced by the Government Performance Results Act. This 
had imposed a results-oriented project management approach, requiring strategic 
objectives for each goal, identification of mid-level intermediate results, and reporting 
494 United States General Accounting Office (GAO) above n 20. Between 1992-2000, this funding totalled $216 
millions, allocated to the following countries in millions: Russia $77 35 (35%), Ukraine $25 12 (12%), Georgia $8 4, 
Armenia $6 3, All other $36 16, Multiple countries $64 30, Total $216 100. Funds were allocated through four 
aaencies: USAID 49%, Justice 25%, State 22%, Treasury 4%, 9. 
49~ Ibid 4 
496 1bid: 37-36. 
497 McMahon, above n 477. 
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of results on an annual basis.498 He also called for improved methodologies to 
address the ongoing challenges of establishing attribution.499 
Norton then conducted a survey of development evaluation to review the application 
of the OECD-DAC's principles and criteria to the evaluation of judicial and legal 
reform programs.500 Significantly, he found that the 'science of legal reform 
evaluation was at a nascent stage,' that required the formulation of a meaningful 
methodology to measure reform impact, and called for a shift in approach noting that 
'outcome evaluation remains essential.'501 
The evaluation of some ninety-five World Bank legal and judicial reform projects 
valued at US$10.8 billion were then meta-evaluated by Gupta and Kleinfeld in 21 
European and Central Asian countries between 1990 and 2001. They noted that 
these evaluations suggested that Bank objectives for legal reform were not met, but 
found that there was relatively little information pertaining to the effectiveness of 
those projects. What information was available suggested that the desired impact 
had often not been achieved. But, much more significantly, the authors were unable 
to assess the appropriateness of monitoring mechanisms in judicial reforms because: 
[l]t was unclear which goods the Bank desired from judicial systems: 
efficient justice, or consistent and predictable judgments, or judgments 
based on law, or judgments that are enforced, or a combination of some 
or all of these. 502 
Finally, Bollen and Paxton reviewed a sample of 240 evaluations of the USAID 
democracy and governance programming, including some rule of law projects, over 
the past thirty years to find the need for major improvement. They found, among 
other problems, a lack of methodological accuracy as the result of which 'USAID 
evaluations fail to show with a reasonable degree of certainty that the changes 
observed would not have occurred in the absence of USAID.'503 These evaluations 
typically lacked an appropriate research design, measures of inputs and outputs, and 
498 Ibid, 464. See also: USAID 1998, Handbook of Democracy and Governance Indicators USAID, Center for 
Democracy and Governance, Washington D.C. 
499 McMahon, ibid, 463-5. Attribution is defined by OECD as the ascription of a causal link between observed (or 
expected to be observed} changes and a specific intervention. Attribution refers to that which is to be credited for the 
observed changes or results achieved; it represents the extent to which observed development effects can be 
attributed. OECD, above n 329. 
500 <http://www.oecd.orgtdocumenU22/0 2340.en 2649 34435 2086550 1 1 1 1.00.html> 
at 26 November 2009. For detailed discussion, see chapter 6. 
501 Norton, J, above n 341,1472. 
502 Gupta P, Kleinfeld, R, & Salinas, G 2002, Legal and Judicial Reform in Europe and Central Asia, World Bank, 
Washington D.C, 11. 
503 Bollen, K, Paxton, P & Morishima, R 2005, 'Assessing International Evaluations: An Example From USAID's 
Democracy and Governance Program', American Journal of Evaluation, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 189-203, 199. 
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controls for confounding variables to justify sound assessments of whether an 
intervention accomplished its goals. Only 25% of the team members had evaluation 
expertise, causing these shortcomings and raising serious questions about the 
validity and utility of their findings.504 
In sum, the meta-evaluation of evaluation practice in judicial reform consistently 
establishes substantial deficiencies in that evaluative practice. On the basis of this 
analysis, I have demonstrated the existence of both an 'evaluation gap' and a 'meta-
evaluation gap' in judicial reform - i.e. evaluation is rarely conducted, and when it is, 
it is done deficiently. The significance of these findings is that they qualify the initial 
hypothesis of a 'performance gap' found in the widely-held perception in the literature 
of disappointment over the performance of judicial reform. 
6 Filling the gaps- two proposals for evaluating judicial reform 
In this section, I move beyond the various unresolved challenges considered in this 
analysis, and propose a conceptual means of redressing evaluative deficits in 
assessing the merit or worth of judicial reform endeavour. Building on my earlier 
contributions to the literature outlined above, I now offer my best-reasoned efforts to 
contribute to the discourse by plugging the gaps of theory and practice of 
development evaluation which have been identified. This proposal rests on two 
foundational arguments which address both of the key questions relating to the 'whaf 
and the 'how' of evaluation. 
First, in addressing the 'whaf question, I resume the argument made in Part 1 of this 
thesis that the overarching purpose of judicial reform should be the promotion of 
justice to provide fairness and equity. I have argued that the troubling evidence of 
disappointing performance established in Part 1 impels the addition of a more 'thick' 
conception of justice and judicial reform which focuses on promoting substantive 
normatively-based conceptions of fairness and equity - to supplement the prevalent 
emphasis on procedural notions of efficiency to answer the 'what' question. Thus, to 
address the diagnosed deficiency in the existing answer to the 'what' question of 
judicial reform approach, I now put the conceptual proposition that both 'thin' and 
'thick' conceptions of justice are required in any adequate answer to the 'whaf 
question of evaluation. Undoubtedly, unclogging the courts of chronic delay is a 
vitally needed example of 'thin' procedural reform. Equally, as we will see in Part 3, 
""Ibid, 199. 
189 
devising a feasible means for the poor to exercise their substantive rights to free 
education, clean water and debt recovery (or whatever) will undoubtedly extend the 
utility of judicial reform in promoting justice and equity. 505 
Second, in addressing the diagnosed deficiency in the existing answer to the 'how' 
question of development evaluation, I now advance a complementary argument 
which will ensure that the results of judicial reform endeavour are systematically 
measurable. I argue that an adequate evaluation of judicial reform endeavour can 
only be provided by reference to a previously-agreed normative framework without 
which evaluative judgments of merit and worth cannot be made. Linking these 
arguments to promote justice requires the measurement of legally recognisable 
rights, rather than economistic metrics. I now argue that only one such framework 
exists in our world; this is to be found in the framework of international human rights 
law. The principal international human rights treaties and covenants are extant and 
already formally-endorsed by most states.506 They are normative, systematic, 
universal in their application and generally actionable as standards of justice on 
which measures of fairness and equity can be firmly grounded. If needed, the 
principal treaties and covenants could be supplemented with other international 
instruments. 507 
a Measurement - a work in progress 
In addressing the 'how' part of the evaluation question, there remains the practical 
challenge of implementing the measurement of these norms. This ongoing challenge 
arises because human rights measurement remains a work in progress. There is still 
a considerable lacuna in human rights measurement, as already noted by Landman 
and Hausermann. 508 Largely for this reason, in Part 1 of this thesis, I adopted the 
commonly adopted financial metric of the Gini coefficient and Lorenz curve which 
measure the even distribution of resources across a population to measure equity. I 
505 See, in particular, case study analysis in Chapter 10. 
506 As we have already seen, Toope advocates the need for a normatively based reform approach, above n 470. The 
principal treaties comprise: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); International Conventton 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment (CAT); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), plus optional protocols; above, n 116. 
507 There are a number of generally recognised international standards, including: Basic Principles on the 
Independence of the Judiciary, 7tt~ Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. 
AICONF.121/22/Rev .1 at 59 ( 1985); Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct. 2002; 
http://www.unodc.org!documents/corruption/publlcations unodc commentarv~e.pdf at 9 December 2009; Basic 
Principles on the Role of Lawyers, am Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, U.N. 
Doc. AICONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990); Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, stt~ Congress on the Prevention of Crime 
and the Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. AICONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 189 (1990); and Basic Principles for the 
Treatment of Prisoners, G.A. res. 45/111. annex. 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 200. U.N. Ooc. A/45149 (1990). 
508 Above. n 449, 34. 
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have subsequently argued however that these financial measures are economistic 
proxies for equitable aspects of poverty and need to be reconceptualised for 
coherence in the legal discourse on rights. 
At the present time, the framework of international human rights provides only a 
threshold of norms for the purpose of measurement. Moreover, this threshold of 
rights is seen as little more than a 'pillar of glass' in the sobering assessment of 
Darrow and Arbour, constituting the weakest part of the UN's edifice of values which 
were endorsed at the World Summit of 2005.509 In that assessment, peace and 
security is the UN's pillar of steel, and development is its pillar of concrete. 510 Despite 
this, I now argue that human rights provide the best available measures of justice. 
The core treaties do undoubtedly secure widespread, if not universal, endorsement 
and compliance. It is the endorsement of and compliance with these rights that 
protects the individual from abuse by the state, and which separates civilised 
societies around the world from Hobbes' description of life in nature as solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish, and short. In Part 1, I have demonstrated that there is some evidence 
of a trend toward a convergence of the rule of law and human rights discourses.511 
Indeed, Landman and Carvalho assert that human rights have now become an 
accepted legal and normative standard and that the present challenge rests in 
developing systematic measures with which to classify, monitor and map their 
implementation. To date, most effort has focused on developing measures on 
government respect for civil and political rights; less has been dedicated to protection 
and fulfilment of these rights, and even less on providing measures of economic and 
social rights.512 
Evidently, this challenge is defined by lacunae in measurement which remain a 
substantial work in progress at both the conceptual and operational levels. Human 
rights can be measured in various ways, as has already been evidenced in the earlier 
survey of monitoring frameworks.513 The UN's Human Development Index and 
annual Human Development Reports provide a possible framework for measurement 
purposes. 514 But we have already seen in Part 1 of this thesis that this Index is the 
509 2005 World Summit Outcome, GA Res 60/1, 601h Sess, Agenda items 46 and 120, (2005). 
510 Darrow, M & Arbour, L 2009, 'The Pillar of Glass: Human Rights in the Development Operations of the United 
Nations,' Amen·can Journal of International Law, vol. 103, 446-501, 497. 
511 See: Chapter 3, page 52 onwards. 
512 Landman, T & Carvalho, E 2010, Measuring Human Rights, Routledge, New York, 43-4. They also present a 
useful but imposing typology of 58 separate human rights protected by international law (at 20). 
513 Eg, Fosse, E 2008, 'The Future of Human Rights Measurement: Towards an International Survey of Rights', 
Measurement & Human Rights Issue Paper, vol. 1, iss. 3, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard Kennedy 
School of Government. 
514 Human Development Reports n.d, UNDP, <http:/!hdr.undp.org/en/> at 26 November 2009. 
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subject of both conceptual and technical criticism. 515 More particularly, there is as yet 
no consensus on a framework of human rights performance based on simple 
objective measures of quantifiable data. 
A range of fundamental issues do clearly remain unresolved to this point. For 
example, should a global index encompass the full range of human rights: civil and 
political rights, and social, economic and cultural rights? At present, there is a 
marked focus on the former in most human rights reports and indexes to the 
exclusion of the latter. Additionally, there are a range of philosophic and conceptual 
difficulties in relying on aggregate rather than individual measures. The undoubted 
convenience of capturing a holistic measurement in a single coefficient such as a 
Gini index comes at a cost that may be too high for many in the human rights 
community. Reinbolt, for example, observes that '(t)here is no similarly recognised 
human right to live in an economically equal society, which is the concept captured 
by an aggregate measure such as a Gini index.'516 Others such as Holland dilate the 
challenges of selecting single measures to combine all the disparate and radically 
different data that maintains accuracy and objectivity in an analytically robust and 
meaningful way. 517 Debate of these issues will require ongoing space and opportunity 
to moderate a consensus. 518 
Given these challenges, how are we to take forward this discourse on 'what' to 
evaluate in judicial reform and 'how' to evaluate it? To answer these questions, I 
note that the UN's Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights is currently 
devising a means of translating the universal human rights standards into indicators 
that are contextually relevant and useful at country level. This work includes devising 
indicators for promoting and monitoring civil and political rights, and economic, social 
and cultural rights. It seeks to translate the narrative on the normative content of 
human rights into selected attributes within the configuration of structural, procedural 
and outcome indicators. This framework proposes a broad range of indicators to a 
spectrum of rights. For example, it proposes measures on the proportion of received 
complaints on the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
515 Above, n 445. 
516 Reinbold, G 2008, 'Human Rights: Reasons for preferring individual measures of inequality to aggregate 
measures', Measurement & Human Rights Issue Paper, vol. 1. iss. 1, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard 
Kennedy School of Government. 
m See, eg, Holland, S 2008, 'Ranking Rights: Problems and Prospects for a Quantitative Global HR Index', 
Measurement & Human Rights Issue Paper, vol. 1, iss. 4, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard Kennedy 
School of Government. 
518 See, additionally, eg: Alston, P & Crawford, J 2000, 'The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Kennedy 0 2002, 'The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the 
problem?', Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 15, pp. 101-125; Goodman, R & Jinks, D 2004, 'How to Influence 
States: Socialisation and International Human Rights Law,' Duke Law Journal, vol. 54, no. 3 621-703. 
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degrading treatment or punishment. In relation to the right to a fair trial, it compares 
the conviction rates of indigent defendants with court-appointed legal representation 
and those of defendants with lawyers of their own choice.519 
It is premature to suggest that this approach is assured of generating a consensus in 
measuring judicial reform. Moreover, it is already apparent that the framework risks 
compounding the existing proliferation of frameworks. Finding the optimal balance 
between selecting proxy indicators which on the one hand are sufficient to 
adequately nuance the complexities of reality and the competing imperative for 
simplicity, clarity and sustainability within existing capacities remains a clear and 
present challenge. That said, I argue that its most compelling strength is the structure 
of its normative foundation which warrants further development and testing in due 
course. 
There is little doubt that significant conceptual and technical challenges will lie in the 
path of developing and implementing the framework of international rights law. Some 
of these have already been highlighted by Landman and Carvalho.520 That said, the 
most immediately important proposition of this thesis is that the value of judicial 
reform should be measured normatively in this framework of treaty-based rights. This 
framework spans the spectrum of civic well-being encapsulated by Aristotle in the 
duty of the polis to the people in each of the civil, political, social, economic and 
cultural dimensions of development. This normative approach will enable the 
systematic measurement of the value and worth of judicial reform enterprise. This is 
a substantial and comprehensive proposition. Once it is endorsed, this will require 
the conceptualisation of a systematic framework of 'thick' and 'thin' rights with 
measurable indicators selected by constituents through local processes. 
At that point, reform initiatives will need to be meticulously linked into a results 
framework at every stage. The current practice is to float them within a broader 
development context where the development logic, links, and accountabilities are so 
vague or inferential that it is technically impossible to monitor causal relationships 
and evaluate critical attribution. As I demonstrate in the case study of PNG in Part 3 
of this thesis, this normative foundation provides half of the evaluative framework. 
The performance monitoring framework approach will however remain incomplete 
519 UN, Report on Indicators for Promoting and Monitoring the Implementation of Human Rights, UN Doc 
HRI/MC/2008/3 (2008). 
520 Landman & Carvalho, above, n 512. 
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until the reform initiative is directly linked to it so that it serves as its results 
framework. 
At that point, the full paraphernalia of the project management approach which has 
been embraced by the development movement as part of the Paris Declaration, will 
need to be re-orientated to integrate with such a framework. In effect, each phase of 
the reform cycle of design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation should link to 
this framework. I have already argued at some length against the dangerously 
seductive convenience of the logical framework approach in the previous chapter. I 
now argue that a further critical deficiency in the logic model is its omission of any 
normatively-based framework with which to measure development effectiveness i.e. 
development outcomes and results which lie beyond the process of efficiently 
delivering activities and outputs. While this may seem a small step, it remains a 
critical gap in the existing paradigm shift of development evaluation. 
I therefore conclude that there is a need to dispense with the logical framework as 
the key tool of development evaluation, and substitute it with this normatively-
grounded performance framework as the new organising paradigm for monitoring 
and evaluating the effectiveness of judicial (and other) reforms. 
b Towards a new judicial reform and evaluation approach - illustrations 
While the formulation of this framework remains a work in progress, it is timely to 
illustrate how it could work. Using Article 14, International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights, as an example, all people are entitled to be tried without undue 
delay.521 This is a normative right- in this instance, the right to due process- which 
could comprise a measure in the framework. It would need to be calibrated using 
local standards on what is acceptable. This local standard of the right to trial might in 
one country be 7 days or in another 3 months, whatever is deemed locally 
appropriate. Calibration of local standards for each normative right is required across 
the entire framework. This is a substantial participatory task that goes beyond the 
conceptual domain of this thesis. 
I will supply a further illustration of the application of this proposition in the case 
studies in Part 3 of this thesis. The experience of judicial reform supporting social 
521 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, [1980) ATS 23, (entered into force on 23 
March 1976) art 14(3)(c). 
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action litigation in the apex courts of India provides a clear example of judicial reform 
endeavour supplying both 'thin' and 'thick' improvements to justice. These 
improvements are visibly measurable in terms of enforcing citizens' rights under the 
Constitution through court judgments against governmental actions relating to fresh 
water and air, a clean environment, education, shelter, health, free legal aid, and 
speedy trial and justice. 522 Additional examples may be readily found elsewhere in 
the provision of reform-supported legal aid to enable the exercise of legal rights. 
These examples should be adapted and localised to different situations. This will 
require the calibration of normative rights to appropriate local standards. The right to 
speedy trial, for example, might be set in one country at 90 days and in another at 
180 days depending on local standards and conditions. What is important is that the 
evidence of these reforms and their results are measurable in terms of impact on 
alleviating poverty, however defined. I have built on the Papua New Guinea 
monitoring and evaluation experience - also separately showcased in Part 3 of this 
thesis - to propose that the exercise of these rights can then be benchmarked and 
improvements measured systematically. This will require the formulation of a reform 
monitoring approach, normatively framed in promoting rights to civil well-being, 
measured before and after the reform intervention. 523 
As we have already seen, developing a comprehensive framework of these rights for 
purposes of systematic measurement remains a work in progress, and is still 
undergoing debate at both the conceptual and technical levels. That said, this 
experience demonstrates that while the provision of evidence of success will involve 
cost and time, it is feasible to build and implement a normative rights-based 
framework with which to evaluate the performance of judicial reform. 
7 Conclusions 
In Part 2 of this thesis, I have analysed the state of development evaluation and 
demonstrated the existence of substantial deficiencies in its practice as applied to 
judicial reform. On the basis of this analysis, I have demonstrated the existence of 
both an 'evaluation gap' and a 'meta-evaluation gap' in judicial reform - that is, 
evaluation is rarely conducted, and when it is, it is done deficiently. These findings 
are significant because they qualify the initial hypothesis of a 'performance gap' 
522 See discussion in Chapter 10. 
523 See discussion in Chapter 9. 
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found in the widely-held perception of disappointment over the performance of 
judicial reform established in Part 1. 
In Chapter 6, I first established that there is a widespread lack of coherence or 
orthodoxy in the current transitional state of development evaluation which renders 
any consensus difficult, as seen in the 'paradigm war' between the positivist and 
constructivist approaches. I then established that the current investment in 
managing-for-development-results has generated numerous frameworks to monitor 
judicial and related reforms involving vast amounts of data on performance but, 
owing to a range of unresolved philosophic, conceptual and technical issues of 
significance, it has as yet taken us no closer to evaluating the effectiveness of this 
endeavour. In effect, an analysis of the state of evaluation has revealed not only a 
lack of development results, but also a lack of development evaluation. There is still 
no consensus over theoretical approach, coherence of methodology, or systematic, 
rigorous practice. 
How then should we evaluate judicial reform? To address this question, I have 
argued that there is a need to first disentangle the respective performance 
deficiencies of reform endeavour and evaluative endeavour. Ultimately, this will 
require improvements in the evaluation approach to address the 'how' question. But 
as we have already seen, it is first necessary to clarify what judicial reform is 
supposed to do to address the 'what' question of this thesis. This has taken us back 
to the foundational argument of this thesis, which I have already argued in Part 1. 
The answer to this 'what' question is that judicial reform should aim to improve justice 
and, at its essence, be concerned with promoting fairness and equity. 
I then resumed this earlier argument for a justice-focused justification for reform 
endeavour by proposing a normative approach to evaluation, based on the 
universally endorsed foundations of international human rights law. While these 
foundations are yet to be built into an operative evaluation framework, I have 
demonstrated in Part 1 that there are emerging signs of convergence between the 
human rights and the rule of law discourses. In essence, I conclude that the human 
rights framework provides an extant, normative and conceptual foundation on which 
to develop a framework of measurable, rights-based indicators of results. This 
framework of treaty-endorsed human rights norms covers the entire spectrum of civil 
well-being, and in due course, will provide a coherent measure of accountability in 
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development endeavour and the wherewithal for a systematic measurement of 
performance. 
In this chapter, I have more specifically argued that any notion of justice and judicial 
reform is difficult to reduce to ready measurements, noting in particular the conflicting 
duality of purposes which is inherent in the design of performance indicators. In the 
Millennium Development Goals and the World Governance Indicators, we see a 
characteristic tension between the political need for simple, clear measures and the 
technical need for validity, integrity and credibility that defy excessive reduction. Thus 
far, finding an appropriate balance between these purposes has eluded the ensuing 
proliferation of monitoring endeavour. 
I have then argued that in spite of the considerable intellectual, technical and 
operational resources devoted to the task of supplying the data necessary to monitor 
and evaluate performance, the discourse is no closer to evaluating effectiveness as 
envisaged by the Paris Principles. I have enumerated an imposing range of 
monitoring frameworks for judicial and related reform endeavour which are based on 
diverse data collection methodologies and divergent sources of data. A survey of 
these frameworks has enabled me to demonstrate that the lack of methodological 
orthodoxy renders the development of any consensus approach to be elusive- if not 
impossible. In addition, there are a range of significant philosophic, conceptual and 
technical deficiencies in this body of monitoring practice. For these reasons, I have 
argued that these frameworks are of only limited value in assessing the effectiveness 
of judicial reform. Additionally, most frameworks selectively measure only 'thin' 
aspects of judicial efficiency, and exclude the substantive 'thick' dimensions of 
judicial reform in promoting fairness and equity. 
As we have seen, lots of monitoring has meant lots of monitoring; but it has not as 
yet led to any improvements in evaluation, performance or the demonstration of 
reform success. Moreover, there are some troubling indications that this substantial 
investment in monitoring has caused a diversion of scant resources and attention 
from the more critical evaluative function. Thus, I have argued that the proliferation of 
monitoring frameworks has substituted the earlier problem of insufficiency of data 
with a plethora of confusing, conflicting and often irrelevant data. This does not 
suggest that these frameworks are useless, but rather that they are only one possible 
step in the ongoing and incomplete quest for evidence of success in judicial reform. 
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I have then moved on to establish that the existing practice of judicial reform 
evaluation is deficient. Meta-evaluation has revealed that this practice is 
characterised by its omission. When evaluation is undertaken, there is considerable 
technical contention over the adequacy and appropriateness of the existing 
evaluative practice. This practice remains predominantly focused on process-based 
output evaluation without any discernible shift in practice to impact evaluation. The 
focus on output monitoring of earlier practice persists despite all of the rhetoric of the 
Paris Principles to the contrary. More foundationally, I have established that there is 
a lack of consensus over the theory and practice of the meta-evaluation of this 
practice, which itself may be described as patchy, and underscores the incomplete 
state of the entire discourse on development evaluation as applicable to judicial 
reform. Within this state, I have confirmed the existence of an 'evaluation gap' within 
the continuing practice of judicial development, and established that the state of 
evaluative effectiveness is itself disappointing. As we have seen, this finding then 
qualifies the initial perception of disappointment, being the hypothesis of failure, in 
reform performance. 
To address these deficiencies, the most immediate and important proposition for this 
part of the thesis has been my argument to ground the measurement of value in 
judicial reform normatively in the framework of international human rights law. This 
framework spans the entire spectrum of civic well-being as encapsulated by Aristotle 
in the duty of the polis to the people. It thereby provides a coherent and 
comprehensive means of enabling the systematic measurement of the value and 
worth of the judicial reform enterprise. Once this substantial and comprehensive 
proposition is endorsed, it will require the conceptualisation of a systematic 
framework of 'thick' and 'thin' rights with measurable indicators to be selected by 
constituents through local processes. While completing this participatory process falls 
beyond the conceptual domain of this thesis, I will illustrate from the actual 
experience of judicial reform in Asia, to be case-studied in Part 3, to validate that 
providing evidence of success in judicial reform is feasible. 
END: PART2. 
* * * 
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PART 3- CASE STUDIES OF THE ASIAN REFORM EXPERIENCE 
Night after night, in the long hours of the pre-dawn, I awake in Port 
Moresby, jolted by panic at the enormity of the justice problems, and what 
at those hours seems the laughable insufficiency of the $100 million to fix 
them. Why is this? Is this normal? Or, am I troubled by something more 
elusive?524 
Introduction to Part 3 
The question to be addressed in this part of the thesis is: what does the actual 
evidence of practice tell us about the nature and effectiveness of judicial reform? 
I present three case studies of the empirical evidence of the contemporary practice of 
judicial reform gathered from across Asia and the Pacific over the past decade and a 
half. Asia is the world's largest and most populous continent comprises some four 
billion people, or sixty per cent of the global population.525 I have selected these case 
studies from this region to capture the different perspectives of this experience. They 
reflect a diversity of contexts, needs, priorities and approaches to the judicial reform 
enterprise. 
I will argue in Part 3 of this thesis that this body of experience illuminates various 
aspects of this enterprise and provides evidence which nuances our understanding of 
the core issues of this thesis. The evidence of practice provided by these case 
studies is significant to this thesis in establishing a number of key propositions. First, 
it reveals the still evolving nature of the judicial reform enterprise. Second, these 
case studies establish that this enterprise has and does create some 'results'. Third, 
it remains much more difficult to find any evidence of 'success' owing to the 
continuing conceptual fuzziness in the purpose and goals of endeavour, and the 
continuing lack of systematic monitoring and evaluation. Finally, there are some 
tentative indications of an emerging capacity to demonstrate developmental 
effectiveness. While this evidence generally conforms to the global literature, building 
as it largely does on the Latin American experience, the recency of endeavour in this 
region indicates a dynamic process of evolution, and highlights the incubation in Asia 
of a paradigmatic shift in reform approach. 
524 Note from my diary, 23 March 2004, Port Moresby, PNG. 
525 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asia> at 31 December 2009. 
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The empirical evidence of these case studies provides the foundation for my 
argument that it is premature to conclude that the judicial reform enterprise has either 
succeeded or failed. I argue that the available evidence establishes deficiencies in 
both the performance of reform endeavours and the evaluation of that endeavour. In 
this situation, it is difficult to discern the extent to which the deficit of evidence of 
success is attributable to a deficit of theoretical justification of approach, a deficit of 
implementation or a deficit of measurement. While deficits of performance and 
measurement are relatively easily addressed, the ambivalence of outcomes creates 
a need for re-examining the theoretical justification for this enterprise. More 
particularly, I argue that this empirical evidence confirms the imperative established 
in Part 1 of this thesis to provide an additional or alternative equitable justification for 
judicial reform. 
a Three case studies 
I have selected three case studies from the 'real world' experience of this author as a 
practitioner and evaluator to marshal a substantial body of evidence from the 
contemporary practice of judicial reform in the Asia Pacific region which has been 
relatively under-studied in the academic discourse. These case studies provide a 
new contribution to the available knowledge and analyses of the judicial reform 
enterprise. The case studies provide insights across a spectrum of issues which are 
directly relevant to addressing the core questions of this thesis. Each case study 
showcases distinct aspects of practice relating to context, needs, institutional 
approach and outcomes, organised thematically for the purpose of developing 
theoretical observations which can then be generalised. 
In undertaking this thesis, I contribute a professional narrative to my heuristic 
journey. The authenticity of this experience provides the basis for my reflexive 
analysis within the construct of the literature framed in other parts of this thesis.526 
The silver thread which weaves through this analysis of experience is my own 
participation. To address this participatory dimension, I will use ethnomethodological 
analysis to interrogate the 'space' between the evaluand, viz. the subject under 
evaluation, and myself as evaluator, using my earlier professional works as 
526 Heuristic inquiry is concerned to address the central question: what is my experience of this phenomenon and the 
essential experience of others who also experience this phenomenon intensely? This is to be compared with (i) 
ethnomethodo/ogy is concerned with the central question of how people make sense of their everyday activities so as 
to behave in socially acceptable ways; and (ii) constructivism which is concerned with the central question of how do 
people in this setting construct reality? What are their reported perceptions, truths, explanations; and what are the 
consequences of those constructions for their behaviours and for those with whom they interact? Patton, above n 7, 
132. 
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counterfactuals for the purpose of constructing evaluative judgments in this thesis. 
These case studies are: 
i. The Asian Development Bank's Law and Policy Reform Program - This 
case study evaluates the overall regional 'law and policy reform' program of 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the major multilateral donor in Asia, 
between 1990 and 2007. It is based on an assessment of all publicly available 
policy and project documents, and includes an evaluation (or meta-
evaluation) of ADB's evaluation in which I provided a literature review. This 
case study of regional assistance is most relevant to the issue of purpose in 
this thesis. 
ii. AusAID's Papua New Guinea Law and Justice Sector Program - This 
case study evaluates the experience of Australia's aid agency (AusAID) in 
supporting bilateral judicial reform in Papua New Guinea through its Law and 
Justice Sector Program between 2003 and 2007. Here I (re)-evaluate the 
PNG experience on the basis of AusAID's documents, with a critical 
ethnomethodological analysis of a desk review which I undertook for the 
donor. This case study is of the greatest relevance to the issue of evaluation 
in this thesis. 
iii. UNDP's Searching for Success: Voices from the Asia Pacific Experience 
- This case study evaluates the experience of a selection of reform 
practitioners from around the region for the purpose of publishing a research 
monograph (Searching for Success: Voices from the Asia Pacific Experience, 
OUP 2009) in which I served as technical editor. Here I (re)-evaluate the 
regional experience on the basis of this documentation, with a critical 
ethnomethodological analysis of my own editorial commentary. This case 
study of individual perspectives is of general relevance to this thesis. 
I have selected this sampling with a view to capturing a range of substantial 
experiences and perspectives which embody sufficient diversity to enable some 
meaningful generalisations from an analysis of the findings. 527 To briefly illustrate this 
substance and diversity, ADB case study embodies the reform experience of Asia's 
largest multilateral donor over the past decade and a half, and includes the world's 
527 While scientific positivistic quantitative methodologies are often directly concerned to establish representativeness 
and generalisation, my more naturalistic qualitative approach is more concerned with obtaining insights from these 
case studies which I will then argue are amenable to generalisation. See: Patton, ibid, 243. 
201 
largest law and justice reform program in Pakistan valued at $350 million. AusAID's 
experience in PNG represents a substantial bilateral reform program, valued at some 
$100 million, rendering it Australia's largest and longest sequenced judicial and legal 
reform project. The UNDP case study compiles diverse experiences of practitioners 
from across the span of the Asia Pacific region over the past decade. 528 
In this part, practical experience is seen as wriggling specimens from real life and 
provides numerous insights for the purpose of comparative analysis with the 
academic commentary in the literature canvassed in Part 1 of this thesis. 
b Methodology 
I adopt a documents-based, inductive, qualitative, case study methodology to gather 
findings from the available evidence of reform endeavours on which to base my 
analysis and conclusions. Because I have participated professionally in this selection 
of experience, I will adopt a critically reflexive ethnomethodological analysis of this 
experience. My involvement as a reform practitioner and evaluator led me to select 
ethnomethodology which Patton defines as a means of making sense of 'ordinary, 
routine details of everyday life'. 529 I outline and justify the methodology for this 
empirical approach in detail, together with the specific circumstances of each case 
study and the particular methodological approach of my participation in Annex B. 530 
For the reasons outlined in that annex, this methodology maximises the ontological 
and epistemological integrity of the research, and its contribution to this thesis. 
c Structure 
The structure of this part will comprise three sections: this introduction to the 
empirical component of this thesis, the body of evidence provided in three separate 
case studies, and my conclusions. 
The middle and major section of this part consists of the three case studies. It will 
adopt a uniform sub-structure. Each case study will comprise four sub-sections: (a) 
an introduction which distils key findings; (b) a background which outlines the specific 
focus, methodology and justification for approach, together with context; (c) detailed 
526 The case studies in Chapters 8 and 9 span the entire dass of judicial refonn in their arenas, the case study in 
Chapter 10 provides a series of selective snapshots gathered by UNDP from the world at large in response to global 
solicitation. 
529 Patton, above n 7, 110. 
530 I outline and justify the methodology for this case study approach in an annex of this thesis. See methodology, in 
Annex B. 
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findings and analysis; and (d) conclusions which relate the findings to the thesis and 
highlight their significance to the core questions of purpose and evaluation. 531 
This approach will provide a clear and compelling research process which conforms 
to the appropriate qualitative research method. This process starts with a description 
of the relevant data or findings to be justified on the basis of their significance to the 
practice of judicial reform. I will then submit these findings for analysis and 
qualitative interpretation in order to make sense of the evidence and elucidate 
meaning in terms of evaluative notions of value or significance. Thus, description will 
be balanced by analysis and interpretation as the basis for my conclusions. 532 
* * * 
531 Each case study is about ten thousand words, three-quarters of which is devoted to findings, analysis and 
conclusions. 
532 Patton. above 7, 467,477 and 503. 
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CHAPTER 8- ADB's JUDICIAL REFORM EXPERIENCE IN ASIA: 1990-2007 
1 Introduction 
This case study assesses the available documents on the experience of the Asian 
Development Bank in undertaking judicial reform as part of its law and policy reform 
program across Asia since 1990. During this period, ADB conducted some four 
hundred technical assistance projects, valued at approximately $420 million, many of 
which involved aspects of judicial and legal reform. These activities have delivered 
some significant outcomes across the region, visible in terms of improvements to 
court performance, training and related benefits, though these outcomes are not yet 
demonstrable in terms of ADB's end-goal of poverty reduction or its intermediate goal 
of improved governance. 
In sum, this case study showcases the journey which ADB, the major multilateral 
donor in Asia, has taken over the past decade and a half in its endeavours to 
promote judicial reform across the region. In particular, it provides empirical evidence 
for the proposition that developing a judicial reform approach has been an unmapped 
endeavour with three interrelated challenges. 
First, ADB has exhibited an institutional ambivalence to judicial reform which is 
apparent in the ambiguities in its policy approach. While providing strong leadership 
in setting governance as a cardinal element of its overall mission to alleviate poverty, 
there is a surprising lacuna in the arena of judicial and legal reform. As a 
consequence, articulation of the justification or rationale for judicial reform has 
shifted, morphed and hybridised discernibly across the period. During this time, this 
justification has varied from economic growth and market enablement through a 
classic neo-liberal conceptualisation of supporting legal frameworks to promote 
private sector investments, privatisation and capital market development, to poverty 
reduction through good governance, with most recently an accent on access to 
justice and pro-poor empowerment. This impressive elasticity in the 
conceptualisation of the purpose of judicial reform has, however, profoundly 
hampered the rationalisation of any coherent and consistent logic for its intended 
approach and has ultimately frustrated efforts to demonstrate success. While the 
importance of judicial reform is recognised, this inability to demonstrate success has 
then constrained this endeavour in the internal competition for funding. 
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Second, this case study reveals an anomalous picture of ADB's overall orientation to 
development effectiveness. On the one hand, there is some proclivity for an 
empirically-grounded knowledge-based approach to reform, and discernible patterns 
of endeavour to improve management-for-development-results. On the other, there is 
evidence which suggests that reform endeavour is being driven by technical inputs 
rather than any more sophisticated political economy analysis of stakeholders power 
and interests, reliance on training as a cure-all, and a focus on monitoring the 
efficient delivery of outputs rather than on evaluating development impact and 
results. 
Third, in the absence of policy at the institutional level, the development of judicial 
reform approach has as a matter of dialectic been at its essence a priori, conviction-
based, intuitive and thus, in a sense, ideological, rather than validated by systematic 
empirical research, or an integrated system of institutional knowledge-formation 
supported by a cycle of methodologically rigorous evaluation. 
For a combination of these reasons, it has been impossible for ADB to demonstrate 
improvements to the quality of justice across the region positivistically, even after an 
extended period of practice. This finding is potentially significant to this thesis 
because it provides empirical evidence that while efforts are made by an organisation 
to justify endeavour in positivist terms, activities are in practice justified 
constructivistically. Moreover, in the constructivist tradition of assessing value and 
worth, this should not necessarily be seen as evidence of development failure; so 
long as this endeavour continues to be seen by its proponents as being on a path 
towards improvement.533 As I shall demonstrate, however, this vision is only on 
occasion clear. 
I outline and justify the methodology for this case study approach in annexes B and 
B.1 of this thesis.534 
2 Background 
The context of the Asian Development Bank's judicial reform experience is provided 
by its charter, or mandate, which is to promote economic growth, cooperation and 
development in the region. 
533 Above, page 152, onwards. 
534 See methodology, in annexes Band 8.1 
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This charter requires ADB to 'foster economic growth and cooperation in the region 
and to contribute to the acceleration of the process of economic development of the 
developing member countries collectively and individually.'535 ADB has a membership 
of 67 countries of which 48 are within the Asia and Pacific region and 19 are 
outside.536 The Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (charter) came 
into force on 22 August 1996. This charter specifies that the primary functions of ADB 
are to promote investment in the region for development purposes, utilise resources 
to finance development of developing member countries (DMCs) which will contribute 
most effectively to harmonious economic growth, assist in the coordination of 
development policies, cooperate with other international and regional development 
bodies such as the UN and World Bank, and to: 
provide technical assistance for the preparation, financing and execution of 
development projects and programs, including the formulation of specific 
project proposals. 537 
The Charter requires that the resources of ADB must be used exclusively to 
implement the purpose and functions outlined above, and prohibits interference in the 
political affairs of any member. It stipulates that only economic considerations will be 
relevant for Bank decisions. 538 
The development role of ADB has evolved and been refined over the period under 
study. In the 1980s, it was conceptualised as primarily promoting economic growth 
with social equity, with a particular concern for employment creation and poverty 
reduction.539 In the 1990s, the overriding objective was refined to promote 
development through the alleviation of poverty through a steady improvement in 
535 Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank, opened for signature 4 December 1965, 571 UNTS 123, art 
1 (entered into force 22 August 1966). <htto://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Charter/charter.pdf> at 23 November 
2009. 
536 Developing member countries are: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia. Cook 
Islands, Fiji Islands, Georgia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kyrgyz Republic, People's 
Democratic Republic of Lao, Malaysia, Maldives, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, 
Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Pakistan, Republic of Palau, Republic of Korea, Papua New Guinea, People's 
Republic of China, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Taipei,_ Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-
Leste, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Viet Nam. <http://www.adb.org/Countries/> and 
<http://www.adb.org/Aboutlmembership.asp> at 23 November 2009. 
537 Charter, opened for signature 4 December 1965, 571 UNTS 123, art 2(iv) (entered into force 22 August 1966). 
"' Ibid, arts 8 and 36(2). 
539 ADB 1983 Study on the Operational Priorities and Plans of the Asian Development Bank for the 1980s. Manila, 
cited in ADB, Review of Lending Foreign Exchange for Local Currency Expenditures on Projects, 
<http://www.adb.org/documents/policies/lending forex/forex200.asp> at 23 November 2009. 
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living standards achieved through increases in income, improvement in social 
conditions, and protection ofthe natural environment.540 
Within this overarching and evolving mandate, ADB has financed a range of judicial 
and legal reform activities in numerous countries across the region. 
3 Findings and analysis 
This section provides a distillation of relevant data and findings from a selection of 
ADB's documentation which is publicly available from its website- www.adb.org. It is 
organised institutionally, thematically and chronologically to outline the evolution of 
the policy framework within which judicial reform was positioned. This will show that 
judicial reform at ADB was initially relatively ad hoc, framed in response to requests 
for assistance from developing member countries. Over time, this response became 
increasingly articulated in terms of the Bank's strategy, notably formulation of 
governance policy and poverty strategy. Within this context, ADB's Office of General 
Counsel instituted an increasingly coherent 'law and policy reform' program in which 
judicial reform became a significant and clearly defined operational niche, which I will 
examine below. 
a Policy framework 
While ADB has undertaken various judicial reform activities from its inception in 
1966, the Bank was conceived during the post-war period of rehabilitation and 
reconstruction, and focused on undertaking major infrastructure projects in its early 
years.541 Over the past decade, in particular, ADB formulated a number of 
organisational policies that have been directly influential in establishing its 
development approach to judicial reform. Of most relevance are ADB's governance 
policy of 1995, and its poverty reduction strategy of 1999. Additionally, the Bank has 
undertaken a number of programmatic and thematic reviews of its operations as part 
of an ongoing process of refining its development approach. Together, these 
documents make up the organisational framework within which ADB's judicial reform 
is situated, and determine the broad parameters, direction and nature of this 
endeavour. 
540 ADS 1989, The Asian Development Bank in the 1990s, Panel Report, ADB. Manila. Cited in: ADB 2001, Moving 
the Poverty Reduction Agenda Forward in Asia and the Pacific: The Longterm Strategic Framework of the ADB 
(1001-2015), ADB, Manila vi. <http:l/www.adb.org/documents/Policies/LTSF/default.asp> at 23 November 2009. 
1 ADB 2009, About Asian Development Bank, <http:J/www.adb.orWaboutlserving-asia.asp> at 23 November 2009. 
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i. Governance policy 
Of foundational significance, ADB's governance policy, Sound Development 
Management, provided the organisational rationale for judicial reform by pronouncing 
that a legal environment conducive to development is essential for all developing 
member countries. For the first time, this policy positioned the notion of governance 
at the core of ADB's mandate. Noting the Bank's prohibition against political activity, 
the policy defined governance in economic terms, as being the institutional 
environment in which citizens interact with themselves and the government, and 
focused on the ingredients for effective economic management: 
A basic issue that arises in relation to governance is the proper role of 
government in economic management. With governments having limited 
access to information, there is a growing consensus that markets generally 
allocate resources more efficiently. 542 
This policy nominated the functions of governments as maintaining macroeconomic 
stability, developing infrastructure, providing public goods, preventing market failure 
and promoting equity.543 It articulated four key dimensions of governance as being 
accountability (building government capacity), participation (participatory 
development processes), predictability (legal frameworks for private sector growth; 
law and development), and transparency (information openness).544 The policy 
postulated the relationship between law and development as follows: 
A legal environment conducive to development is essential for all 
developing member countries. It would cover the traditional concept of the 
rule of law, the existence of a stable and predictable legal system, as well 
as law reform for economic development . .. This legal framework impacts 
the entire process of development and is, therefore, directly relevant to 
efforts for promoting the latter. 545 
It also emphasised strengthening legal frameworks for private sector development: 
Promoting development of the private sector in general and that of the 
financial sector and securities markets in particular, requires an especially 
542 ADB 1999, Governance: Sound Development Management, ADB, Manila, viii. (dated: August 1995; published 
1999) <http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Govemance/govooticy.pdf> 23 November 2009. 
543 The policy defines public goods as being those 'that are jointly demanded and whose consumption by one 
individual does not diminish their availability to others. Education and health care are common examples of public 
g.oods." Ibid 5. 
Ibid viii. 
545 Ibid 38. The policy specifies that improvements in sector policy frameworks, legal training and ADR; transition to 
market-orientated systems, and land tenure in Pacific DMCs; systems to protect private property, regulate transfers, 
register titles, enforcing contracts are nominated as being vital for the promotion of trade and investment, 39-40. 
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strong legal underpinning. This is needed because the system must protect 
private property, regulate transfers, and register titles, so that property can 
be used as collateral, thus enhancing credit and liquidity. The system is 
also required for enforcing contracts, reducing the costs of bankruptcies, 
and setting competition policy.... More generally, the enforceability of 
contracts and agreements is vital for the promotion of investment and 
trade. 546 
To complement and refine this governance policy, ADB then adopted an anti-
corruption policy in 1998, building on the earlier policy of the World Bank. 547 ADB 
addressed three objectives: to promote competitive markets through efficient, 
effective and transparent public administration; to support promising anticorruption 
initiatives; and to ensure the highest ethic standards of project and staff. To attain 
these objectives, the policy called for increased emphasis on strengthening 
institutions that would advance transparency and accountability in developing 
member countries such as regulatory agencies, ombudsman offices and the 
courts. 548 In 2006, this governance approach was refocused to three thematic areas 
-public financial management, procurement, and corruption.549 
ADB's approach to governance came to provide a significant and arguably the most 
consistent rationale for undertaking judicial reform. My analysis of this approach will 
show that the Bank has increasingly conceptualised and justified its approach to 
judicial reform by reference to the foundation of its governance policy, which has its 
origins in the thinking of Max Weber, Douglass North and others of the school of new 
institutional economics, and that judicial reform became a significant means of 
implementing that policy. 550 A major effect of this conceptualisation was to create a 
significant policy-based alignment of ADB with the approach of the World Bank. I 
argue that this alignment is one of a number of key features of ADB's performance. 
Another will shortly be seen to be its tendency to rely on the World Bank for empirical 
research and ensuing policy development.551 However, there are some significant 
divergences in their approach to both empirical research and judicial reform, notably 
in access to justice and empowerment, reflecting the influence of Amartya Sen's 
thinking in particular.552 
546 1bid 40. 
547 World Bank 1997, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank, World Bank, Washington, 
<http://www1.worldbank.orgtpublicsector/anticorruptlcorruptn/coridx.htm> at 23 November 2009. 
s.IA ADS 1998, Anti-Corruption, ADS, Manila, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Anticorruption/anticorruption.odf> at 23 November 2009. 
549 ABO 2006, Second Governance and Antico"uption Action Plan (GACAP II), ADB. Manila, 8; see also: ADB 2000, 
Promoting Good Governance: ADB's Medium Term Action Plan ADB, Manila. 
550 Above, pages 37 onwards, and pages 82 onwards. 
551 While ADB formalised its governance policy prior to the World Bank, the intellectual leadership for many other 
~licy·based initiatives, for example, anti--corruption can be traced to that source. 
52 See detailed analysis of the thinking of North and Sen, framed as one of the core debates of this discourse; 
above, pages 82·91, in particular. 
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ii Poverty strategy 
Several years later, the alleviation of poverty formally became the apex priority in all 
of ADB's development activities. In 1999, ADB adopted Poverty Reduction Strategy: 
Fighting Poverty in Asia and the Pacific, making poverty reduction the Bank's 
overarching goal and principal 'raison d'etre'. The strategy defined poverty broadly 
as: 
[A] deprivation of essential assets and opportunities to which every human 
is entitled .... Beyond income and basic services, individuals and societies 
are also poor - and tend to remain so - if they are not empowered to 
participate in making the decisions that shape their lives ... Such measures 
must also serve as a proxy for other important intan~bles such as feelings 
of powerlessness and lack of freedom to participate.5 
This strategy - which rested on the three pillars of pro-poor sustainable economic 
growth, social development, and sound macroeconomic management and good 
governance - stated that poverty reduction and inequality eradication were a 
humanitarian priority. 554 It promoted economic growth on the rationale that 
developing human and social capital increases political stability, raises productivity 
and enhances international competitiveness, leading to faster growths55 The strategy 
then linked good governance to poverty reduction, stating that the quality of 
governance was critical to poverty reduction: 
Good governance facilitates participatory, pro-poor policies as well as 
sound macroeconomic management. It ensures the transparent use of 
public funds, encourages growth of the private sector, promotes effective 
delivery of public services, and helps to establish the rule of law .... Weak 
governance hurts (the poor) disproportionately.556 
While judicial and law reform were not expressly identified in this strategy, they were 
imported through governance which aimed to promote the rule of law, and thus found 
their ultimate justification in contributing to poverty reduction. 557 However, 
establishing this relationship beyond its universal endorsement in rhetoric has 
553 ADB 1999, Poverty Reduction Strategy: Fighting Poverty in Asia and the Pacific, ADB, Manila, 5, 
<http://www.adb.org/documents/Policies/Poverty Reduction/Poverty Policy.pdf> at 24 November 2009. The strategy 
notes that the World Bank's the "dollar-a-day" poverty line and the UN's Human Development Index and Human 
Poverty Index continue to be used. 
554 lbid 6. 
55!'> Ibid 8. 
556 lbid 12-13. 
557 The strategy does discuss building social capital, and a more inclusive society, through antidiscrimination 
legislation, land reform, security of property and tenure rights, legal recognition of user groups, and accessible justice 
systems. Ibid 11. 
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presented the Bank with an imposing challenge.558 As will clearly be seen later in this 
case study, the problem arises at the stage of evaluation when immense difficulties 
are encountered in showing, through robust, measurable results that this goal of 
poverty alleviation was demonstrably achieved through judicial reform. 
The challenging nature of this formulation of justification for judicial reform is 
compounded by ADB's own empirical research which explores the causal link 
between macroeconomic policy and aid effectiveness in reducing poverty. In contrast 
to the orthodoxy of Burnside and Dollar's earlier findings at the World Bank, 
examined in Part 1 of this thesis, this research indicated that the effectiveness of aid 
in reducing poverty was not contingent on the macro-policy environment, and 
showed 'that much of the conventional wisdom in the field is somewhat Jess robust 
than generally presumed (italics added).' Evidently, as we have already seen in 
Chapter 5, the discourse over the existence and sufficiency of empirical evidence to 
justify the economic/institutionalist reform approach remains actively contested 
between donors as much as between researchers. 559 
iii Long-term strategies 
Building on these foundations, ADB enshrined governance into its Long-Term 
Strategic Framework: 2001-2015, with sustainable economic growth and inclusive 
social development, as its three core strategies. 560 
This strategy was reviewed at its mid-term in 2007 by a specially formed Eminent 
Persons Group (EPG). Their assessment, Towards a New ABO in a New Asia, found 
that tackling issues of economic success was the new challenge for the region, 
558 Demonstrating this contribution is however remains universally elusive. The strategy calls for the monitoring of 
outcomes on its impact on in the proportion of people below the poverty line, illiteracy rates, and gender gaps, but 
acknowfedges that poverty measurement is a complex matter, and offers to help borrowing countries improve their 
capacity to generate timely and reliable data, as well as indicators that are comprehensible and easily used. Ibid 31. 
559 Asra, A, Estrada, G. Kim, Y, and Quibria, M 2005, 'Poverty and Foreign Aid: Evidence from Recent Cross-Country 
Data', working paper no 65, ADB, Manila, 19. See also: Burnside & Dollar, above n 280 864. The discourse over the 
existence and sufficiency of empirical evidence to justify reform approach is however much contested. Chemin, for 
further example, argues that ADS's Access to Justice loan which focused on judicial reform among other elements, 
valued at $350 million or 0.1% of Pakistan's 2002 GOP may have contributed an estimated increase to Pakistan's 
GDP by 0.5% through improved judicial efficiency. Chemin, M 2008, 'The impact of the judiciary on 
entrepreneurship: Evaluation of Pakistan's 'Access to Justice Programme~,' Journal of Public Economics 
doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.05.005 at 24 November 2009. 
560 ADB 2001, above n 540, 14. It postulated that 'inaccessible, unpredictable, and inefficient legal systems that lack 
transparency also discriminate disproportionately against the poor. Similarly, corruption (a clear symptom of bad 
governance) often affects the weakest groups in society the most' at 20. 
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requiring a fundamental change in direction without foregoing what it described as 
'unfinished poverty agendas' .561 These eminent persons so-called found: 
By 2020 we envision a dramatically transformed Asia. It will have 
conquered widespread absolute poverty in most countries, with more than 
90% of its people living in "middle-income" countries.562 
This review led to a radical re-jigging of ADB's strategic approach. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, not everyone in the Bank however shared this euphoric view of 
poverty reduction. Despite Asia's 'stellar' growth in gross domestic product, there 
was a mounting concern that this was masking rapidly rising relative and absolute 
inequalities: 
A more pressing issue for developing Asia is rapidly rising inequalities 
leading to an increasing concern that benefits of its spectacular growth 
have not been equally shared .... What is more disturbing is the increase in 
absolute inequalities as measured by differences in mean consumption of 
the top quintile relative to the bottom quintile .... These increases in the 
absolute gaps between the rich and poor and very visible changes in the 
consumption patterns and lifestyles of the rich are leading to a perceptible 
increase in social and political tensions, undermining social 
cohesiveness. 563 
As a consequence of the policy-rethink precipitated by the EPG process, ADB 
recently approved its new Long-Term Strategic Framework 2008--2020 (Strategy 
2020). This strategy identifies governance and capacity development as one of five 
drivers of change, and provides a strategic framework for mainstreaming legal and 
judicial reform in the Bank's operations. Specifically, support for policy, legal and 
regulatory reform and institutional capacity are now identified as necessary 
conditions for ADB to be effective in three of its five core operational areas -
infrastructure, environment, and finance. Mainstreaming governance, including legal 
and judicial reform, has significant strategic implications. Under this increasingly 
labyrinthine framework, poverty reduction remains its overarching goal, but ADB has 
refocused on three strategic agendas: inclusive growth, environmentally sustainable 
growth, and regional integration. In relation to governance, this framework postulates 
that: 
561 ADB, 2007, Toward a New Asian Development Bank in a New Asia; Report of the Eminent Persons Group to The 
President of the Asian Development Bank, ADB, Manila. 10, <http:l/www.adb.org/Oocuments/Reports/EPG-
Report pdf> at 24 November 2009. 
562 Ibid 1. The EPG found strong growth and macroeconomic stability have led to impressive declines in income 
~verty. While 35% of people in Asia and the Pacific lived on less than $1 a day in 1990, only 19% did in 2003. 
Ali, 1 and Zhuang, J 2007 'Inclusive Growth toward a Prosperous Asia: Policy Implications', working paper no 97, 
ADB.4. 
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The key role of state institutions also often raises the related governance 
challenge of corruption, which many developing member countries face to 
varying degrees .... Fragile countries and situations would benefit greatly 
from good governance and higher levels of transparency - improvements 
that could jump-start their economic development.564 
Evidently, Strategy 2020 represents a significant rebalancing of ADB's strategic 
approach, though it is not necessarily yet apparent what all of the implications of this 
rebalancing will be. On any reckoning, ADB's development policy approach has 
continued to evolve at an organisational level. This approach may be described as 
dynamic - if not volatile - and continues to rearticulate its overall development 
rationale, traversing economic enablement, poverty reduction, governance and 
institutional integrity as justifications. 
While it remains too early to assess the full operational implications of the new 
strategic framework, it is noteworthy to observe that the significance of governance 
has been downgraded in ADS's latest strategic hierarchy. This is apparent both in the 
new 2020 strategy and the Bank's narrower approach to anti-corruption. 565 It may be 
premature to conclude that ADB has reverted to its developmental origins in 
infrastructure and engineering, but this is certainly indicative of tectonic tensions 
within the Bank's hierarchy of organisational priorities. 
These policy changes have successively rained down on the heads of those charged 
at the operational level with implementing reforms to justify their judicial activities first 
in economic terms, then institutionalist and good governance, and most recently 
empowerment. As we shall shortly see, this has required impressive intellectual 
elasticity and caused no end of 'retro-fitting' of policy justification. Significantly, since 
the basic package of reform activities has remained generally constant across this 
period, this is indicative that the articulation of policy has in practice followed the 
reform trail, rather than steered it.566 
The importance of this observation is to highlight that the implementers of judicial 
reform, being lawyers in the Office of General Counsel (OGC), have been obliged to 
work in a manner which has been back-to-front to ADB's formal rhetoric. Moreover, 
these lawyers who designed judicial reform projects acting, as I will shortly argue, a 
"" ADB 2008, Strategy 2020: The Long-term Strategic Framework of the ADB 2080-2020, ADB. Manila. 10. 
<http://WW\-V.adb.oro!Documents/Policies/Strategy2020/default.asp?p=policies> at 24 November 2009. 
565 ABD 2006, Second Governance and Anticorruption Action Plan (GACAP //), ADB, Manila. 
566 See related discussion in Part 1 on history where it is argued that the articulation of the World Bank's approach to 
judicial reform has and remains equally evolutionary, from page 34 onwards. 
213 
priori on what they believed to be important, had to then justify those projects within 
the ever-shifting articulation of the Bank's formal policies. 
b Reform implementation -Office of General Counsel 
The Office of General Counsel (OGC) established and administered what it called the 
Bank's 'law and policy reform' (LPR) program, which included judicial reform. This 
program is significant because it provides evidence that in undertaking judicial and 
related reforms, the OGC acted proactively to both fill ADB's policy gap and provide 
continuity in institutional leadership. This required the OGC to devise and articulate a 
variety of justifications for this endeavour which has most consistently been 
conceptualised as providing a means to implement the Bank's governance policy. 
Since its inception in 1966, the OGC has been primarily responsible for providing 
advice and assistance on legal matters relating to the organisation, administration, 
finance, policies, and operations of ADB and its various operational departments.567 
The OGC responded from time to time to a range of requests to address the needs of 
judicial and legal institutions in developing member countries.568 These requests 
were variously administered by regional operations departments through loans while 
technical assistance for law and policy reform was largely managed by the OGC. 569 
Since the mid-1980s, ADB started to support broader reforms which included law 
reform through loans and technical assistance to a variety of sectors. More specific 
support for reforms in the law and justice arena began with a regional legal training 
project in 1991.570 The first technical assistance advisory project to focus on legal 
frameworks was attached to a program loan in Mongolia in 1993.571 
From the early 1990's, under the leadership of General Counsel Barry Metzger, the 
OGC developed a vision for law and policy reform which articulated a growing 
recognition of the potential importance of judicial and legal reform to operationalise 
567 ADB 2009, Office of the General Counsel <http://WWYoJ.adb.org/OGC/default.asp?p=aml> at 24 November 2009. 
568 ADB 1998, Review of Law and Development Activities of the Asian Development Bank OGC, Manila, 
<http://www.adb.org/Qocuments/Reports/IN42-98 pdf> at 24 November 2009. 569 Thus, championship of law and policy activities exposed OGC to internal criticism for mission-creep. Sharif, H 
2004, 'Role and Responsibilities of the Office of the General Counsel: Legal Framework of ADB Operations', paper 
presented at the Orientation Seminar for DMCs, Manila, 10 November 
<http:l/www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2004/0rientation-DMC-Officials/sharif.pdf> at 24 November. See also: Atay, 
G 2002, 'Legal Aspects of ADB Operations', paper presented at the Orientation Seminar for DMCs, Manila, 19 
November, <http://www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2002/RETA5927/Gulen Atay.pdf> at 24 November 2009. 
570 ADB, 1991 Technical Assistance for Interim Mekong Committee for Legal Training, ADB Manila, 
<http:l/www.adb.orglprojectsJproject.asp?id=25022> at 24 November 2009. 
511 ADB 1993, Technical Assistance to the Government of Mongolia for Developing Mongolia's Legal Framework; 
attached to and cited in ADB 2000, Project Performance Audit Report on the Mongolia Industrial Sector Program 
(Loan 1244-MON) in Mongolia, ADB, Manila, 2, <http://www.adb.org/Documents/PERs/PE563.pdf> at 24 November 
2009. 
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institutional aspects of ADB's new governance policy. By 1995, Metzger 
conceptualised the role of legal and judicial assistance primarily of expanding the 
Bank's activities to help its developing member countries, particularly transitional 
economies, in terms reminiscent of Shihata, to set up appropriate legal frameworks in 
key sectors of their economies: 
Among the most significant challenges facing developing member country 
governments in the region is the development of new regulatory 
frameworks for economies with active public sector, private sector and, in 
many cases, joint public-private sector participants.572 
In 1998, the OGC presented an information paper on its vision for a law and 
development program to the board of ADB which was by that time the largest donor 
of law-related technical assistance in the region.573 This vision was framed to support 
the Bank's recent governance policy by developing legal frameworks as the means of 
promoting greater predictability, transparency, accountability and participation in 
development management in law and justice. The rationale for the program was 
multi-facetted: 
To create a policy legal and regulatory environment that is supportive of 
economic growth and of the socially-orientated objectives of environmental 
protection and the reduction of poverty through, among other things, 
beneficiary participation and enhancement of the status of women. With the 
growing realisation that the role of the private sector is indispensable in 
furthering economic growth, the Bank's law and development activities have 
focused on the development of 1epa1 and regulatory frameworks that 
support private sector development. 57 
This vision called for a more systematic approach to law and development. In place 
of the earlier ad hoc responsive approach, this vision would prioritise capacity-
building and institutional strengthening with an emphasis on continuing education 
and training, comprehensive judicial reform programs, and support for the 
institutional framework of the rule of law.575 
In addition to training, comprehensive judicial reform programs are likely to 
be required in many developing member countries as part of capacity 
building and institutional strengthening, Such judicial reform programs will 
572 Metzger, B 1995, Opening Remarks Seminar on Legal Aspects of Regional Cooperation: Opening Remarks, 
Seminar on Law and Development, Auckland, May, <http://www.adb.org/Oocuments/News/1995/nr1995053.asp> at 
23 November 2009. Also, see, Shihata, above n 53. 
573 ADB, above n 568. See also: ADB 2003, Law and Development Bulletin, ADB, Manila, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Periodicals/Law Bulletin/bulletin03.pdf> at 24 November 2009. 
514 This 'information paper' did not embody a formal ADB policy position; OGC, A Review of the Law and 
Development Activities of the Asian Development Bank, 1998, ii. http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/IN42·98.pdf 
at 4 December 2009. 
575 Ibid, in particular paras 80-82, at 29-31. 
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typically include the introduction of modern court management systems, 
training for judges and other judicial personnel (including court 
administrators), improve court management information systems, the 
encouragement of arbitration and other forms of ADR, substantive and 
procedural law reforms that may address the wellsprings of litigation, and 
investment in the physical and technical infrastructure supporting the 
judiciary. 576 
In this proposal, the OGC justified judicial and legal reforms by supporting the Bank's 
major development objectives of promoting economic growth, reducing poverty, 
improving the status of women, supporting human development and protecting the 
environment. 577 Activities would focus on legal reform for private sector development, 
capacity-building and institutional development in the legal system, protection of the 
environment, legal framework for strengthening social dimensions, and public sector 
reform.578 Training would provide a common ingredient for capacity-building.579 
It is noteworthy that the OGC was already aware of the lack of theoretical justification 
for ADB's formal assertion of the relationship of law and the economy, explicitly 
acknowledging the dearth of scholarship on the subject: 
[T]here is no well developed and generally accepted theoretical model in 
which to place the Bank's or other agencies' law and development 
programming. 580 
The significance of this observation is to establish that the OGC, on behalf of ADB, 
acted on its best initiative to promote judicial and related reforms. These initiatives 
were successively re-dressed in new theoretical justifications as the need arose at 
the organisational policy level. Most significant, however, it internally acknowledged 
that the empirical validation of these justifications was scant from the outset of 
articulating its justification for reform. 
Mitchell's puzzle -the evolving justifications of law and policy reform 
As things transpired, the OGC's proposal for a law and development policy was 
never formally adopted by the board of ADB. Consequently, OGC set about 
576 ADB above n 568. v, and 30. 
577 lbid 5; citing: ADB 1995, Medium-Tenn Strategic Framework 199&-8, ADS, Manila. 
578 From the review population of 110 technical assistance projects, the major areas of Bank activity were in (a) legal 
reform for private sector development (40 projects representing 36%), (b) capacity-building and institutional 
development in the legal system (14 projects representing 13%), protection of the environment (15 projects 
representing 14%), legal framework for strengthening social dimensions (9 projects representing 6%), and public 
sector reform (32 projects representing 29%). Ibid 15. 
579 The review sUiveyed the Bank's numerous law and development activities in program loans, technical assistance 
iTA), regional technical assistance (RETA) and short term technical assistance (SSTA) projects. ~0 Ibid iii. 
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replacing the earlier ad hoc responsive approach by developing its 'law and policy 
reform' program on a de facto basis to implement the governance policy within the 
limits of its existing resources. 
Judicial reform has formed a significant focus in ADB's law and policy reform 
program from the outset. Law and policy reform was defined broadly by the OGC to 
mean reform initiatives that aimed to promote good governance, establish rule of law, 
create a legal and policy environment that fosters sustainable economic growth, and 
protect basic rights and freedoms. 581 These activities focused variously on legislative 
and institutional reforms; promotion of transparency and the right to information; the 
training of lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and other government officials; and capacity 
building to undertake legal and justice sector reforms. 582 In 1997, the OGC 
established an informal Law & Policy Reform Unit to internally manage this program. 
This unit operated without any dedicated resources or staff until 2005. During this 
time, it managed an impressive range of projects, and produced a variety of 
publications and substantive reports. 583 
With the introduction of ADB's poverty strategy in 1999, the justification for 
supporting judicial reform continued to evolve. Judicial reform was now reframed 
towards the overarching goal of poverty alleviation by promoting pro-poor sustainable 
economic growth, social development and human capability, and good governance. 
This justification was then further refined by the OGC to support the goal of poverty 
alleviation by focusing on five priority areas; to strengthen the enabling environment 
for economic growth, empower the poor by raising awareness of their legal rights and 
obligations, enable the poor and other marginalised groups to exercise their legal 
entitlements, support equality of access to justice, and contribute to regional 
cooperation.584 
In 2004, the OGC published an important and illuminating report which reviewed and 
articulated ADB's approach to its law and policy reform activities. By this time, it had 
581 ADB 2009, Law and Policy Reform: Frequently Asked Questions <http://www.adb.org/Law/fags.aso#a4> at 24 
November 2009. 
582 Ibid. 
583 File notes taken by the author at ADB Headquarters in Manila between 20-31 August 2007 of professional 
discussions with senior existing and former members of OGC including: H Sharif, E Fischer, R Glendon, C 
Vandenabeele and V You, among others, in reference to implementation of ADS's program of law and Policy 
Reform: OGC, A Review of the Law and Development Activities of the Asian Development Bank, 1998. The 
~alitative dimensions of this history are not accessible solely from documents published on the Bank's website. 
ADB 2005, Law and Policy Reform in Asia and the Pacific: Ensuring Voice, Opportunity and Justice, ADB, Manila, 
4-5. Curiously, this was reduced to four priorities by Fischer E: strengthening the enabling environment for economic 
growth, legal empowerment of the poor, access to justice, and regional cooperation. Fischer, E 2005, 'Law and Policy 
Reform Initiatives at ADB', paper presented at the Orientation Seminar for DMCs, Manila, 14 September, 
<http:/twww.adb.org/Documents/Events/2005!DMC-Officials-Orientation-Program/ppt-fischer.pdf> at 4 December 
2009. 
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completed some 400 technical assistance and loan projects involving some aspect of 
judicial or legal reform. Then Chief Counsel Arthur Mitchell was candid on the key 
issue of justification: 
Regardless of whether one places emphasis on economic growth, social 
development or governance, it is important to recognise that law helps 
transform policy into reality on the ground (italics added).585 
This report positioned the role of judicial and legal reform in what Mitchell described 
as the 'puzzle' of poverty alleviation. It categorised four priority areas in reform 
activities as falling within ADS's mandate: to strengthen the enabling environment for 
economic growth, empower the poor by raising awareness of their legal rights, 
promote equality of access to justice, and contribute to regional cooperation: 
ADS's definition of poverty reduction recognises that a developing member 
country must have both the capacity to generate income through public and 
private sector endeavours and the policies and laws to ensure that its 
citizens have equal access to "essential assets and opportunities". Legal 
and policy reform represents the building blocks for both pieces of the 
puzzle ... to demonstrate how ADS's activities work at the nexus of the 
interactions between citizens, business and state institutions.... (italics 
added). 586 
In 2005, ADS's President, Haruhiko Kuroda, reformulated these pieces of this 
'puzzle' to justify judicial reform squarely in terms of the role of good governance for 
economic development: 
[O]ne of those keys - perhaps the most important one, because it underlies 
all the others - is good governance (sic). Not just effective or efficient 
governance, but good governance: that system of rules, rule-making, and 
rule-enforcement that regulates the behavior of people and norms of 
society, upholds the law, and delivers timely justice to all - equally and 
fairly.... Many factors contribute to building and maintaining good 
governance ..... Of the many factors, a judiciary that holds the law above 
everything ... and everyone ... is indispensable (sic). Good, consistent 
jurisprudence based on law, as well as predictable and time-efficient 
resolution procedures are necessary for that sense of predictability, 
transparency, and accountability. They teach the investors, Government, 
and government officials how to act and conduct their affairs. With these 
elements, investors can make long-term business plans and manage their 
risks in a more cost-efficient way.587 
585 Some of these 400 projects may have involved relatively small legal and/or judicial reform components. ADB 
2004, Report on the Asian Development Bank's Law and Policy Reform Activities in Support of Poverty Reduction, 
OGC, ADS, Manila, iii. <http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=1000> at 24 November 2009. See 
also: ADB 2005, above, n 584, 3. 
""ADB 2004, ibid, 3. 
587 Kuroda, H 2005, 'Good Governance and the Judiciary', speech delivered at the International Conference & 
Showcase on Judicial Reforms: Strengthening the Judiciaries of the 21st Century, Manila, 29 November, 
<http://www.asianlii.org/asia/other/ADBLPRes/2005/22.html> at 24 November 2009. 
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ii Justification ·an ever increasingly heady mix 
During the same period, Mitchell acknowledged a need to adopt an expanded 
definition of the legal system to address ADB's broader poverty reduction and 
development objectives.588 He described ADB's experience as pointing to a need to 
move away from the traditional, limited and formalistic definitions of the legal system 
which focused on courts, judges, prosecutors, and public defenders, and on activities 
such as litigation, law drafting, and legal aid because they did not adequately 
address the Bank's broader objectives of poverty reduction and development.589 This 
approach extended reform to encompass both formal and informal enforcement 
mechanisms, and recognise legal empowerment as a means of enabling the 
disadvantaged to access justice and use the law. 590 At this point, there is some 
evidence of a trend towards a more pro-poor approach. For example, in 2005 
Mitchell described a more pro-poverty rationale for judicial reform: 
Poor people face many barriers to exercising their human rights. Among 
these barriers are laws and policies that discriminate against poor and 
vulnerable groups, and the inability of these groups to understand the law 
and enforce their rights. Recognising these barriers has resulted in 
programs to improve the poor's access to justice institutions, support 
equality of access to justice, and reduce or eliminate discrimination in the 
courts' application and enforcement of laws and policies. 591 
This hybridising and continual re-branding of the theoretical rationale for judicial 
reform has continued, and reflects both a lack of any unifying empirically-grounded 
validation of the determinants of growth and the ever shifting development policy 
orientations of the Bank. 
As we have seen, judicial reform was initially conceptualised as an economic means 
of strengthening the market through a classic neo-liberal framework to protect the 
institutions of contract and property. As we have seen in Part 1 of this thesis, it 
588 This redefinition was first adopted in 2001 in the Bank's largest law and development activity: ADB 2001, Report 
and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Loan to the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan for the Access to Justice Program, ADB, Manila, 15, 
<http:/lwww.adb.org/Documents/RRPS/PAK!rrp 32023.pdf> at 24 November 2009; See also: ADS 2007, Special 
Evaluation Study on ADB Support to Law and Justice Reform, ADB, Manila, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Evaluation/SES/ADB-Law-Justice-Reform/SES-Law-Justice-Reform.pdf> 
at 24 November 2009. 
589 AOB 2004, Report on the Asian Development Bank's Law and Policy Reform Activities in Support of Poverty 
Reduction, OGC. ADB. Manila, 17. 
590 ADB 2005, above n 584, 5. 
591 Mitchell, A 'Investing in Justice', speech delivered at the International Conference & Showcase on Judicial 
Reforms: Strengthening the Judiciaries of the 21st Century, Manila, 29 November 2005 
<http://www.asianlii.org/asia/other/ADBLPRes/2005/23.html> at 24 November 2009. 
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largely reflected the 'Washington Consensus'-style approach of the World Bank 
which was based in the thinking of Weber and North. More recently, it was recast as 
a means of implementing good governance, another construct largely imported from 
the research of Kauffmann and others at the World Bank Institute, to alleviate poverty 
by promoting good norms or policies, notably accountability, participation, 
predictability and transparency. Over the next decade, the OGC refined the approach 
so that it would be justified by reference to ADB's new four core strategic rationale of 
strengthening an enabling environment for economic growth, empowering the poor, 
supporting access to justice, and contributing to regional and economic 
cooperation.592 While this was framed to conform to ADB's charter, it may be 
discerned that the latest addition to this increasingly heady mix has been the thinking 
of Amartya Sen. As we shall shortly see, this continual shift in the stated purpose for 
judicial reform had significant implications in the Bank's subsequent ability to define 
and demonstrate success in this endeavour. 
What is also noteworthy in this analysis is that despite all this re-dressing, there has 
been no substantial change in either the Bank's ideal approach to judicial reform or 
the content, or what some commentators describe as the 'basic package' of these 
reform activities.593 
iii Reform activities 
ADB's engagement in judicial and legal reform grew steadily from the early 1990s 
and peaked in Pakistan's Access to Justice Program loan, valued at $350 million one 
decade later. 
During this period, the OGC managed a portfolio of law and policy projects. These 
were expanded to include: improving the organisational mechanism of judicial 
systems; building capacity and institutionalising training in courts and related 
agencies; drafting laws and reforming legal frameworks; promoting transparency and 
disseminating legal information; and conducting research and dialogue in strategic 
areas of law and policy reform.594 It designed and implemented a range of technical 
592 These reforms have included supporting the courts, law drafting agencies, prosecution services, poNce and 
prisons; with some support to the bar and civil society to promote access to justice through legal aid, legal literacy 
and promotion of the use of legal rights. Support was usually provided to formal enforcement mechanisms that 
support and protect rights and obligations, and a lesser to extent infonnal mechanisms. File notes taken by the 
author at AOB Headquarters in Manila between 20-31 August 2007 of professional discussions with senior existing 
and former members of OGC including: H Sharif, E Fischer, R Glendon, C Vandenabeele and V You, among others; 
see 1/n: 567. p. 138. 
593 See related discussion on the nature and content of reforms in Chapter 2, page 44 onwards. 
594 ADB 2005, above n 584, 6. 
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assistance activities in key law and policy reform areas, with an emphasis on 
promoting governance and the rule of law. More recently, there has been some 
inclusion of the informal sector, legal empowerment including that of the bar, 
alternative dispute mechanisms and legal aid, and social accountability.595 
The OGC published annual reports of its law and policy reform program between 
1999 and 2005. These annual reports span the range of current issues in legal and 
judicial reform and provide a body of substantive resources of relevance to the Bank, 
developing member countries and academic institutions throughout the region. 596 It 
also published substantive works which cover topics from insolvency to legal 
empowerment, judicial independence, access to justice, legal identity, criminal justice 
and competition regulation. 597 These works are useful in providing insights into 
specific project activities across the region during the period, and have provided an 
analysis of those projects in each annual review.598 
595 ADB 2009, Departments and Offices, <http://wvvw.adb.org/Help/index/D.asp> at 24 November 2009. Also: Sharif, 
above n 569. See also: Atay, G 2002, 'Legal Aspects of ADB Operations', paper presented at the Orientation 
Seminar for DMCs, Manila, 19 November, <http://www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2002/RETA5927/Gulen Atay.pdf> 
at 24 November 2009. 
596 OGC's annual Law and Policy Reform reports 1999-2005: 
Law and Development in ADB: Insolvency (1999) <http://www.adb.org/Documents/Others/Law ADB/I&d-
1999.pdl> 
Law and Development in ADB: Insolvency Law Reform (2000), 
<http://www.adb.org!Documents/Others/Law ADB/Ipr 2000 2 prelims.pdf> 
• Law and Development in ADB: Legal Empowerment: Advancing Good Governance and Poverty Reduction 
(2001) 
<http://www .adb.org/Documents/Others/Law ADB/lpr 2001.001> 
Law and Development in ADB: Guide to Moveable Registries (2002), 
<http://www.adb.ora/documentsJreportslmovables registries/registrv guide.pdf> 
Law and Policy Reform at the ADB: Judicia/Independence (2003); 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Law Policy Pov Red/law and policy.pdf> 
Law and Development in ADB: Challenges in Implementing Access to Justice (2005) 
<http://www.adb.ora/documents/reports/law-oolicy-reform/leaal-reform.pdf> all at 24 November 2009. 
'" See, eg, AOB 2007, Legal Identity for Inclusive - · · ~· ·· ·· ·· · · 
identity/legal-identity. pdf> at 24 November 2009. 
598 Without attempting an exhaustive survey of the full range of the Bank's law and policy activities, it is possible to 
cross-reference a range of Identified projects in the narrative of OGC's annual reviews, with other project-level 
documentation available under the Bank's public information policy on its web-site, specifically, Technical Assistance 
Reports (defined as a recommendation to the Board or President to finance a technical assistance project) at: 
<http:l/www.adb.org/Projects/reoorts.asp?key=reps&vai=TAR> at 25 November 2009; and, Technical Assistance 
Completion Reports (which are prepared within 12 months after project completion, in order to improve planning, 
formulation, and implementation of future projects with the benefit of the project experience) at: 
<http://www.adb.org/Projects/reoorts.asp?key=reps&vai=TCR> at 25 November 2009, including: TA2853 VIE, 31105 
VIE. TA2823 VIE. TA4060 VIE, TA3613 VAN. TA3613 VAN. 312.01 VAN, TA36427 CAMB. TA3577 CAM. TA3790 
BHU. TA2967 MON. TA30539 MON. SSTA2896MALO. TA3389 MALO. 32270 MALO. RETA5640. RETA5731 + 
30150. RETA5895. TRA33274. RETA 5658, RETA5987 + OTH 35038, TA3015 PAK. TA3366 VAN. TA3433 PAK, 
RETA 5967. 32023 PAK, RETA 6188. 
Reference is also made to file notes taken by the author at ADB Headquarters in Manila between 20-31 August 2007 
of professional discussions with senior existing and former members of OGC including: H Sharif, E Fischer, R 
Glendon, C Vandenabeele and V You, among others, in reference to implementation of ADS's program of Law and 
Policy Reform. See also project documentation for 36 projects represents 51.4% of the total of 70 law and policy 
reform projects identified by the OGC in a draft information paper, 2007: 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Evaluation/SES/ADB-Law-Justice-Reform/SES-Law-Justice-Refonn-App1.pdf> 
at 24 November 2009. 
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Analysis of these project activities provides the basis for the following observations: 
with the notable exception of Pakistan's AJP,599 the usual size of ADB's technical 
assistance in law and policy is relatively small when assessed against the Bank's 
overall financial capacity.600 In the early 1990's, the stated justification for these 
projects was predominantly economic and market-strengthening though this later 
evolved to reflect ADB's governance focus; the later justification is an invariable -
though not necessarily cogent - conflation of both. 601 The capacity-building 
approaches of these projects may be classified into five categories: professional, 
institutional, organisational, policy and knowledge management.602 However, the 
most common points of engagement were institutions dedicated to the training of 
judges and/or lawyers, or occasionally ministries of justice and/or the courts - in 
effect, training was a unifying element of engagement strategy across most 
activities. 603 About half of these activities were framed within some form of 
sequenced engagement rather than being one-off.604 Finally, ADB generally 
participated as the sole donor in reform programs rather than in a consortium with 
others.605 
Most recently, law and policy reform has been increasingly 'mainstreamed' into larger 
loan programs administered by operational departments, though it remains to be 
seen what the future holds following ADB's evaluation of this portfolio, as discussed 
below.606 
599 ADB 2001, Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Loan to the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Access to Justice Program, ADB Manila. (Program loans 1897/98-PAK for $330 
million. and TA Loan 1899-PAK for $20 million); <http://www.adb.ora/Documents/RRPS/PAK!rrp 32023.pdf> at 24 
November 2009. 
600 The average size of sampled projects varied from $113,166 (x15, or 41.6%, small-scale TA's), to $674,272 (x11, 
or 30.5%, of regional TA's). to $717,500 (x10, 27.7%, of advisory TA's). 
601 What is remarkable about this is the omission of any justification by reference to the development of human 
capital, and the presesvation of safety and state security which are becoming increasingly prominent in the post 9/11 
~obal discourse. 
These categories were made up as follows: Professional- usually involved intensive foundational short (2-3 week) 
re-training of government lawyers of regional basis; Institutional - capacity-building of regional or national training 
institutions for judges or lawyers involving 6-9 months study-tours and training-of-trainers, research and development 
of substantial training materials, design of curricula, and limited technical support for delivery of initial ongoing 
training activities; interestingly, assistance usually focused at the professional rather than academic levels; 
Organisational - usually need assessments for establishing or restructuring state justice institutions; Policy -
advisory assistance to develop policies, draft new laws, staff training and occasional public education; Knowledge 
management- more recently, involving thematic research, study-tours, conferences, workshops and publications. 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Evaluation/SES!ADB-Law-Justice-Reform/SES-Law-Justice-Refonn-App1.odf> 
5 December 2009. 
603 ABO rarely engaged directly with the bar, civil society entities or the local community in its judicial reform activities, 
with the notable exception of AJP in Pakistan. 
604 19 projects, or 52.7% of sample, comprised TA's in support of loans, SST A's as preparatory TA/RETA's, RET A's 
~nerating localized TA's, and on occasion as follow-up to earlier TA's. 
3 projects, or 8.3% of sample; one other project led to subsequent (unplanned) World Bank engagement. 
606 ADB 2004, Report on the Asian Development Bank's Law and Policy Reform Activities in Support of Poverty 
Reduction, OGC, ADB, Manila, 2, <http://www.adb.ora/Documents/Reports/Law Policy Pov Red/Law Policy.odf> at 
5 December 2009. See discussion on evaluation of judicial reform at p. 148+. 
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In sum, by 2007, ADB had managed an increasingly substantial law and policy 
reform program, consisting of more than four hundred regional, advisory, and small-
scale technical assistance projects in judicial and legal refonm with a total value 
estimated at $420 million. An unquantifiable number of additional law reform and 
training activities were bundled within other loans.607 Directly managed by the OGC, 
some seventy of these projects focused on legal and judicial policy refonm, 
institutional reform and legal empowerment. As we have seen, these were aimed at 
addressing a number of priority areas such as strengthening policy, empowering 
awareness, improving access and contributing to cooperation. An urgent need to 
bring greater programmatic focus to this work was observed.608 
iv Reflections on experience 
Separate to the Bank's formal monitoring and evaluation activities, to be considered 
shortly, an analysis of the available documentation reveals some measure of self-
reflection by the OGC on the quality of the Bank's reform experience. 
The OGC monitored and evaluated its experiences from time to time in a number of 
ways. In terms of assessing the performance of law and development, the OGC 
reported generally high levels of appreciation expressed by developing member 
countries.609 These were consistent with the OGC's internal self-assessments which 
usually self-rated performance as 'successful' or 'very successful' in project 
completion reports. 610 Additionally, officers in the OGC have discerned a culture shift 
on the value of judicial and legal reform in both ADB and developing member 
countries, which has elevated the standing of governance refonm and led to a range 
of improvements in justice systems.611 This is of course not altogether surprising and 
confinms the internal diagnosis of a positive bias across all of ADB's projects.612 
607 While this is described as a 'minimum estimate,' it includes all projects which have any judicial or legal reform 
aspect, and arguably inflates the standing of this endeavour which is dedicated terms is much smaller. ADS's 
evaluation in 2009 categories only 44 dedicated judicial reform projects. ADB 2009, ADB Technical Assistance for 
Justice Reform in Developing Member Countries, lED, ADB, Manila, 11, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/SESIREG/SES·REG·2009·06/SES·REG·2009·06.pdl> at 25 November 2009 - 1/n 
626, below. Precise quantification is difficult where a component of legal or judicial reform is incidentally included in 
other reform programs. ADB 2005, Challenges in Implementing Access to Justice Reforms, OGC, Manila: 7 
<http:t/www.adb.org/documents/reports/law-policy-reform/legal-reform.pdf> at November 2009. 
6U8 File notes taken by the author at ADB Headquarters in Manila between 20-31 August 2007 of professional 
discussions with senior existing and former members of OGC including: H Sharif, E Fischer, R Glendon, C 
Vandenabeele and V You, among others, in reference to ADB 1998, A Review of the Law and Development Activities 
of the Asian Development Bank, OGC, ADB, Manila; and ADB 2004, Report on the Asian Development Bank's Law 
and Policy Reform Activities in Support of Poverty Reduction, OGC, ADB. Manila. 
~P.!~~psd.rc.orqlg~~d2splav&tvoe=Document&id=1000> at 24 November 2009. 
610 Synthesis of publicly available technical assistance completion reports; ADB 2009, Technical Assistance 
Completion Reports, <http://www.adb.org/Projects/reports.asp?key-reps&vai-TCR> at 25 November 2009. 
611 File notes taken by the author at ADB Headquarters in Manila between 20-31 August 2007 of professional 
discussions with senior existing and former members of OGC including: H Sharif, E Fischer, R Glendon, C 
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Closer scrutiny of the available project completion reports reveals markedly variable 
project quality. Significant weaknesses have been identified in the design and 
development logic in the projects' technical assessment frameworks relating to: 
harmonisation of project objectives with institutional goals; specification of 
measurable performance targets; and the collection baseline measures and data on 
results. These weaknesses are confirmed by the Bank's own evaluation department. 
As discussed below, they have impeded any systematic, quantitative assessment of 
outcome or results over more than a decade of activity.613 
Despite these constraints, Mitchell identified a number of experiential lessons about 
supporting the rule of law from as early as 2004. These included the need for a 
functioning judiciary to support those responsible for production to focus their 
attention on economic activity. He observed that the courts alone could not 
satisfactorily address fundamental social tensions without substantive law reform. 
Significantly, he acknowledged the 'rule of law will not by itself cause countries to 
perform better economically but it is one of the prerequisites to creating an enabling 
environment that supports economic growth.'614 
In the following year, then Deputy General Counsel Fischer drew further lessons from 
the OGC's judicial reform experience: 
The key insight behind the shift (in approach) was this: Judicial reforms are 
unlikely to benefit the poorest and most vulnerable sectors if other pillars of 
justice are ignored. Although engaging in judicial reform is often justified by 
the improvements it is expected to make in the market, current trends 
recognize the important role it plays in protecting the rights of the poor ... A 
successful judicial system is a valuable part of the development process, 
not just in the way it may aid in obtaining economic prosperity, but also in 
the way it may protect civil liberties and freedom.615 
Vandenabeele and V You, among others, in reference to implementation of ADB's program of Law and Policy 
Reform. 
612 ADB 2007, Performance of Technical Assistance, OED, ADB, Manila: OED, 37, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/SES/REG/sst-reg-2007-02/SST-REG-2007-02.pd 
slJ A ....... ~007, Special Evaluation Study On Performance of Technicc 
at 25 November 2009. 
Assistance, ADB, Manila vi 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/SES/REG/sst-reg-2007-02/SST-REG-2007-02.pdf> at 25 November 2009. See 
also: ADB 2009, ADB Technical Assistance for Justice Reform in Developing Member Countries, lED, ADB, Manila, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/SES/REG/SES-REG-2009-06/SES-REG-2009-06.pdf> at 25 November 2009. 
614 Mitchell, A 2004, 'The Role and Rule of Law in Asia', speech delivered at the Association of Harvard University 
Alumni Clubs of Asia, Manila, 20 November, 
<http:/lwww.asianlii.org/asia/other/ADBLPRes/2004/S.html> at 25 November 2009. 
615 Fischer, E 2006, 'Lessons Learned from Judicial Reform: The ADB Experience', speech delivered 20 October, 
<http://www.adb.org/Media/Articles/2006/1 0829-speech-Eveline-Fischer/> at 25 November 2009. 
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In the same year, Assistant General Counsel Sharif reported on ADS's largest reform 
experience in Pakistan. He recognised that judicial reform is complex and not 
amenable to any 'quick fix:' 
ADS's experience in pursuit of judicial and legal reforms makes one thing 
very clear: irrespective of the particular entry point, one must tackle the 
whole system.616 
None offered any empirical, measurable evidence to support these claims in terms of 
impact, though Sharif does endorse Armytage to demonstrate improvements in court 
disposals, inferential of enhanced access to justice in Pakistan.617 
c Evaluation of performance 
Over the years, ADB has administered a separate internal monitoring and evaluation 
department. More recently, the Bank has endeavoured to strengthen its internal 
evaluation function performed by the Independent Evaluation Department (lED), 
previously called the Operations Evaluation Department (OED). Significantly, 
however, these endeavours have been limited to appraising the efficiency rather than 
the effectiveness or impact of its reform activities. 
The lED's mission is 'to help ADB become a learning organisation that continuously 
improves its development effectiveness and is accountable to its stakeholders.'618 Its 
work aims to support the Bank's development performance through a process of 
continual improvement in understanding what works, what does not, and what must 
be improved. In recent years, its focus has shifted from assessing whether 
implementation was consistent with initial intentions and the extent to which the 
project achieved expected benefits, to shaping decision-making throughout the 
project cycle. Its core task is the assessment of policies, strategies, country programs 
and projects - including their design, implementation, results, and associated 
business processes - to determine their relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and 
sustainability.619 
616 Sharif, H 2005 'Law and Policy Reform: an Overview,' in ADB, Challenges in Implementing Access to Justice, 
trtsllaw~policy~reformllegal-reform.pdf> at 25 November 2009. 
OGC. ADB. Manila, pp. 9-12, 10; 
<http://www.adb.org/documents/r 
617 Ibid 11. Also: Armvt:aae_ L 2 ~ ~ I, 'Pakistan's Law & Justice Sector Reform Experience - Some Lessons',_Law, 
Social Justice and Global Development Journal, UnWersity of Warwick (LGD) 2003 {2), 
http://elj.warwick.ac.uklqlobal/2003-2/armvtage.html, at 8 February 2010. 
616 ADS 2009, Independent Evaluation Department <http://www.adb.org/IED/default.asp> at 25 November 2009. 
619 ADB 2007, Independent Evaluation at the Asian Development Bank, OED, ADB, Manila 1, 
<htto://www.adb.org/evaluation/documents/lndependentMEvaluation/lndependent-EvaluationMADB.pdf> 
at 25 November 2009. See also: ADB 2007, Learning Lessons in ADB OED, ADB, Manila, 
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Significantly, ADB's evaluation department has observed that there is a long 
feedback loop from approval to the completion of an operation, when development 
results can be assessed: 
It takes 7 years or more to implement projects or programs after Board 
approval and for completion and evaluation reports to be prepared. Thus, 
virtually all projects or programs that were approved in the mid-1990s were 
in various stages of implementation at the turn of the millennium. Indeed, 
many are still under implementation. The completion and evaluation reports 
for most of the projects and programs approved in the 1990s were prepared 
between 2000 and 2005. 620 
What this means is that it may take ADB - or arguably any large donor - a full 
decade from the conceptualisation of a policy or project approach to the evaluation of 
its effectiveness. To illustrate this proposition, the law and development reform 
program which was formalised in 1995 only underwent evaluation in 2007. Its 
evaluation report was only released in September 2009, some fifteen years later.621 
This protracted evaluation lead-time has major organisational implications for the 
management of knowledge at ADB and its responsiveness to the evaluation of its 
accumulating experience. 
ADB has evidently embraced the global migration to managing-for-development-
results enshrined in the Paris Principles, discussed in Part 2 of this thesis.622 As a 
part of this commitment, the Bank has an elaborate system for monitoring and 
evaluation. Much of the Bank's internal evaluation is demonstrably systematic, 
methodical and rigorously self-critical. It is presently planning to refine its operations 
by undertaking fewer evaluations of individual activities in order to focus on broader 
corporate, policy, country, thematic and impact evaluations, and to promote 
knowledge management. It has also endorsed what it describes as the growing 
international recognition of the need for more and more rigorous impact evaluation, 
and aims to conduct one impact evaluation annually, though this remains to be seen 
in future.623 Hence, despite formally embracing results-based management, it is 
<http:/lwww.adb.org/Documents/Reoorts/Learning-Lessons-ADB/Strategic-Framework-2007-2009.pdf> 
at 25 November 2009. 
620 ADB 2007, Independent Evaluation at the Asian Development Bank, Manila, OED, ADB, Manila, 11. 
621 ADB 2009, ADB Technical Assistance for Justice Reform in Developing Member Countries, lED, ADB, Manila, 11. 
<http://www.adb.orgl0ocuments/SES/REG/SES-REG-2009-06/SES-REG-2009-06.pdf> at 25 November 2009; 
below, n 641. Other major donors who may have started earlier, notably the World Bank and USAID, are yet to 
conduct comprehensive thematic evaluations of their judicial and legal reform portfolios. 
622 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability, 
2005.<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf> at 5 December 2009; above, n 353. 
623 ADB 2007, Independent Evaluation at the Asian Development Bank, OED, ADB, Manila, 25, 27, 
http://www.adb.ora/evaluation/documents/lndeoendent-Evaluation!lndependent-Evaluation-ADB.octf 
4 Oecember 2009. 
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observed that ADB as a major donor organisation remains at the cusp of exploring 
impact monitoring and evaluation in relation to its activities. 
The implications of this observation are clearly that it will be many years before ADB 
will have developed and routinised impact evaluation as a regular feature of its 
evaluation practice. In the meantime, its evaluation process will inevitably continue to 
rely on essentially inferential, process-based assessment of performances outputs, 
as it now has for many years. Moreover, the Bank has itself diagnosed an evaluation 
lead-time of about a decade from design to evaluation to redesign, which has 
pronounced implications in terms of implementing any organisational learning cycle. 
Evaluation of technical assistance, generally 
In 2007, ADB reviewed the overall effectiveness of its technical assistance advisory 
projects. These projects, which generically include judicial reform activities, mainly 
involve capacity-building activities focusing on policy reform, agency functioning, 
skills transfer and/or training.624 This review found that 63% of technical assistance 
operations were rated as being at least successful.625 However, this means that 
almost one-third of these projects were found to have not been successful.626 The 
review found a litany of deficiencies.627 It concluded that these advisory projects were 
spread too thinly across multiple sectors, and that staff were under-exposed to policy 
reform, capacity-building and change of management. 628 
62
" Activities categorised as being: general reform (95% ), recommendaUons for policy reform (88% ). 
recommendations for functioning of agency (79%), seek to transfer skills (75%), training staff (74%). ADB 2007, 
Country Studies from the 2007 Special Evaluation Study on Performance of Technical Assistance, OED, ADB, 
Manila, <http://www.adb.ara/Documents/Evaluation/Case·Studies/CS-Countrv-Studies-Analysis/CS-Country-Study-
Analysis.pdf> at 25 November 2009. 
Bill AOB 2007, Independent Evaluation at the Asian Development Bank, OED, ADB. Manila, 24, 
http://WNW.adb.org/evaluation/documentsflndependent-Evaluation/lndependent-Evaluation-AOB.pdf; See also: ADB 
2007, Learning Curves: Performance of Technical Assistance Manila, OED, ADB, Manila, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Evaluation/Leaming-CUJves/SES/LC-Performance-Technicai-Assistance.pdf> 
25 November 2009. 
626 ADB 2007, SES: On Performance of Technical Assistance, ADS, Manila, vi. 
http://www.adb.org/Documents!SES/REG/sst-reg-2007-02/SST-REG-2007-02.pdf 4 December 2009; See also: 
ADB 2007, Country Studies from the 2007 Special Evaluation Study on Performance of Technical Assistance, OED, 
ADB. Manila. 2007.44. 
627 These deficiencies included that projects often lacked clarity in strategic direction and were of mixed design 
quality; their objectives were donor-driven and varied from the attainable to the complex and unrealistic; they were 
generally not owned or country-led, and often designed incrementally as a one-off rather than as part of a long-term 
strategic engagement process, with weak follow-up on the implementation of results and recommendations. 
Additionally, there was an absence of clearly monitorable indicators in many design frameworks. with generally weak 
management, implementation and performance monitoring, and an over-all weak knowledge management with little 
evidence of lessons being incorporated in TA designs. ADB 2007, Country Studies from the 2007 Special Evaluation 
Study on Performance of Technical Assistance, OED, ADB. 42. 
628 ADB 2007, Country Studies from the 2007 Special Evaluation Study on Performance of Technical Assistance, 
OED. ADB, Manila. 3. 25. 
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In the following year, ADB reviewed its project performance management system to 
identify a range of factors that had contributed to determining project success.629 It 
found that the factors most frequently associated with lack of project success were: 
deficient capacity-building and ownership measures during project design; insufficient 
or deficient supervision by ADB during project implementation; less than rigorous 
ADB internal review; and inadequate technical analysis or inappropriate project 
design.630 
ii Additional organisational considerations 
There are a range of additional considerations that have affected the evaluation of 
ADS's reform activities generally. Because these are relevant but tangential to the 
core arguments of this thesis, they are alluded to only to the extent that they affect 
the bank's approach to judicial reforrn. Specifically, they include initiatives to promote 
development effectiveness, integrate capacity-development, develop a political 
economy approach, and enhance institutional commitment to knowledge. 
First, in relation to promoting development effectiveness, there is some evidence that 
highlights an institutional conflict within ADB which arises from its dual identities as a 
financial institution and a development agency.631 In 2003, ADB committed itself to 
improving the effectiveness of its operations through a program of managing-for-
development-results. In 2007, it reviewed its progress in implementing this 
commitment.632 The review described ADB as being in a state of transition with 
awareness being raised, but found that its organisational culture continued to 
emphasise achieving loan approvals, disbursements and loan targets as opposed to 
focusing more actively on development results.633 In effect, lending money trumps 
development effectiveness. 
629 ADB 2003, Special Evaluation Study On Project Petformance Management 9-10, OED. ADB, Manila, 
<http:/lwww.adb.org/documents/ses/rea/sst..oth-2003-29/ses-ppms.pdf> at 25 November 2009. 
6JO ADS 2008, Project Performance and the Project Cycle ADB, Manila, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/SES/REG/SST-REG-2008-38/SST-REG-2008-38.pdf> at 25 November 2009. See 
also: ABO 2008, Learning Curves: Project Performance and the Project Cycle OED, ADB. Manila 
<htto://www.adb.ora/Documents/Evaluation/Learning-Curves/SES/LC-Project-Performance-Project-Cycle.pdf> 
at 25 November 2009. 
631 ADB 2007, Managing for Development Results in the ADB: a preliminary assessment, OED, AOB, Manila, vi: Staff 
survey resufts indicate that there is a common belief among international staff that ADB's culture emphasizes 
achieving loan approvals, disbursements, and lending targets as opposed to focusing more actively on development 
results. http://www.adb.org/Documents/SES/REG/SST -REG-2007 -32/SST -REG-2007 -32.pdf # 160609 
at 5 December 2009. 
632 While ADB's concern to improve development results preceded the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005, 
this declaration evidently regalvanised attention to improving the Bank's overall results-orientation. ADB 2006, 
Managing for Development Results in the ADB: Revised Action Plan ADB, Manila, 1 
r.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Revised-Action-Pian/MfDR-Revised-Action-Pian.pdf> 25 November 2009. 
)7, Managing for Development Results in the ADB: a preliminary assessment, OED, ADB, Manila, v. 11. 
ADB defines MfDR ~as a management approach to improve planning, monitoring and evaluating operations in order 
to achieve and sustain intended development results. It aims to help managers answer three key questions: are we 
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Second, in relation to capacity-development, there is evidence of a dawning 
institutional recognition of the complexity of the development process, and 
acknowledgement of the limits to which it can be organisationally systematised. In 
2007, as part of its effort to improve development effectiveness, ADB assessed its 
capacity-building approach. Defining capacity as the ability of people, organisations 
and society to manage their affairs successfully, it identified capacity-building as one 
of its most intractable challenges, with progress to date being disappointingly slow.634 
It found that there was a heavy emphasis on training as a major element of 
organisational capacity development, though it noted that training was just one way 
of improving performance, and often not of the highest priority.635 In effect, training is 
often excessively relied on as the primary and often only facilitator of change. 
Third, it is evident that ADB is more recently recognising the need for a political 
economy approach to development which addresses the complex interrelationships 
between political and economic institutions and processes, particularly as they relate 
to policy decisions and reforms. 636 There is however a marked lag between this 
diagnosis and project management practice, where reforms have generally continued 
to focus on relatively narrow technical aspects of formal policies, decrees, laws and 
legislation, with consequently only limited contributions to policy reform. 
Fourth, in relation to ADB's commitment to knowledge, there is a tension between its 
formal assertion of a knowledge-based approach to development, and what we have 
seen described by the OGC as its more pragmatic approach in practice. ADB, like 
many donors, often relies directly on the knowledge-generation capacity of the World 
Bank for empirical research, analysis and policy formulation.637 In its Long-Term 
being effective, how do we know we are, and do we use this information to determine future action?B ADB 2006, 
Managing for Development Results in the ADB: Revised Action Plan ADB, Manila, 1 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/Revised-Action-Pian/MfDR-Revised-Action-Pian.pdf> 25 November 2009.; 
MfDR is a management strategy that focuses on using performance information to improve decision-making, using 
practical tools for strategic planning, risk management, progress reporting and outcome evaluation. It stresses using 
intended results rather than inputs (outputs/impacts) as the starting point to managing development, constructing a 
results-chain to guide measuring, monitoring and reporting activities at the planning, implementation and evaluation 
stages. 
634 ADB 2007, Integrating Capacity Development in Country Programs and Operations: Medium-Term Framework 
and Action Plan, ADB, Manila, 2007, 1, 
<http://www.adb.org/documents/policieslinteqrating-capacity-developmentlintegratinq-capacity-development-
2007 .pdf> at 25 November 2009. 
635 Ibid 12. 
636 Abonyi, G 2002, 'Towards a Political Economy Approach to Policy-based Lending', working paper no 14, ADB, 9; 
<http:l/www.adb.org/Documents!ERD/Working Papers/WP014.pdf> at 25 November 2009. 
6:n See eg, ADB, above n 542, vi: 'A number of multilateral organizations have reflected on the elements of 
governance and their relation to development. Insofar as the Bank is concerned, the approach of the World Bank is 
the most relevant. For the World Bank, the essence of governance is sound development management, and the key 
dimensions of governance are public sector management, accountability. the legal framework for development, and 
information and transparency.' also, and: 'Accordingly, and building upon the approach of the World Bank, the Bank 
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Strategic Framework for 2001-2015, it committed itself to becoming a learning 
institution.638 In 2004, it created a knowledge management centre and adopted a 
knowledge management framework to foster a knowledge supportive environment. 
This was designed to ensure results orientation and continued improvements, and to 
enhance operational relevance.639 In a review conducted in 2007, however, it was 
found that these activities had not been linked closely to ADB's core lending and non-
lending processes, and that a learning paradigm shift was required to improve the 
organisational culture, management system, business processes, information 
technology solutions, community of practice, and relations for lesson learning.640 In 
effect, a gap was found between what ADB says and what it does; more particularly, 
the empirically-grounded local knowledge-base for much of its reform activities is 
often tenuous, though in recent years OGC has striven to redress this in certain 
aspects of the law and policy program. 
iii Evaluation of judicial reform 
In 2009, ADB conducted its first formal evaluation of justice reform projects during 
the period 1991-2008.641 This evaluation rated those projects as 'successful' on the 
basis that they had helped to increase awareness of the need to improve legal 
empowerment and access to justice, and to strengthen judicial independence, 
accountability and administration, and had undertaken capacity building for justice 
sector agencies.642 It also assessed them as being 'effective' measured in terms of 
the extent to which they had generally delivered their envisioned outputs. These 
outputs included reports, studies, recommendations, training sessions, studies and 
conferences. 
Nevertheless this evaluation found that justice reform was ad hoc and strategically 
peripheral, lacked both a strategic recognition as a development issue and 
has identified four basic elements of good governance: accountability, participation, predictability, and transparency' 
at vii. Also at 7. 
""ADB 2001. Long Tenn Strategic Framework (2001-2015), ADB, Manila, 16. 
639 ADS 2004, Knowledge Management at ADB, ADS, Manila, 13, 
<http://www.adb.org/Oocuments/Policies/Knowledge-Management/knowledge-management.odf> 29 November 
2009. It defined knowledge as 'understanding the why, what, how, who, when, and where relative to taking some 
action. Knowledge is the product of organization and reasoning applied to raw data,' at 4. 
640 AOB 2007, Learning Lessons in ADB, OED, ADS, Manila, vi, <http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Learning~ 
Lessons~ADB/Strategic-Framework-2007-2009.pdf> 29 November 2009. 
641 ADB 2009, ADB Technical Assistance for Justice Reform in Developing Member Countries, lED, ADB, Manila, 11, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/SES/REG/SES·REG·2009·06/SES-REG·2009·06.odf> at 25 November 2009. The 
evaluation sample comprised 22 of the 44 justice reform projects conducted which provided a total approved amount 
of $19 million for advisory assistance to individual DMCs and $6.6 million for regional studies, conferences, and 
training programs. Of these, 11 lAs were small-scale of $150,000 or less; 33 TAs provided more than $150,000, five 
of which provided more than $1 million. Of the 44 lAs, 33 were processed and administered by OGC and 11 by 
~erational or regional departments. 
2 1bid, i. All of theTAs selected focused on the justice sector. 
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systematic, clearly planned approach to justice reform. Notwithstanding the 
importance of good governance for ADB, assistance to justice reform was smal/.643 It 
also found that the 'quality at entry' of projects and their amenability to evaluation 
were in many cases weak. Projects were generally poorly designed and lacked 
baseline measures. They were particularly weak in defining impacts, outcomes, and 
indicators, and their causal links. Project objectives were sometimes conflated, 
development logic at times confused, and monitoring frameworks consistently 
focused on outputs, with 'negligible evaluative value' beyond monitoring the 
performance of consultants. Because of these weaknesses, the evaluation found 
projects had difficulty in demonstrating measurable evidence of development impact, 
and competed poorly for funding.644 While affirming the importance of justice reform, 
the evaluation stressed a need for a clearer definition of ADB's justice reform 
strategy and operational responsibilities for promoting more efficient justice reform 
activities. Of particular significance, it found that justice reform has been given low 
priority because projects were not designed to demonstrate tangible development 
impacts which could be evaluated: 
Justice reform (projects) must be designed, such that results are relevant and 
measurable; causal links between points in the TA design are explained with 
clear logic; and, provision is made for the gathering of data during execution so 
results may be documented. 645 
In closing this section, mention must be made to the duality of documented evidence 
of the deficiencies of judicial reform endeavours as identified through the lED's 
evaluations, and of the deficiency of those evaluations in their omission of any 
assessment of impact. These findings are generally consistent with the evidence of 
development and evaluative performance established in Parts 1 and 2 of this thesis. 
4 Conclusions of case study 
This case study showcases the journey which ADB, the major multilateral donor in 
Asia, has taken over the past decade and a half, in its endeavour to promote judicial 
reform. This experience of practice provides a range of insights which nuance our 
understanding of the literature in relation to both the purpose and evaluation of 
judicial reform. 
643 Ibid, 23, 26. 
"'Ibid 24. 
645 1bid 26. 
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So, what can be drawn from these experiences for the purpose of building or refining 
our understanding of the theory and practice of judicial reform? 
a Significance for the purpose of judicial reform 
ADB's experience of practice is significant in demonstrating the proposition that 
developing a judicial reform approach has evidently been an unmapped endeavour, 
or continuing journey, with numerous challenges. These challenges have existed at 
the foundational level of conceptualising a consistent, clear and compelling policy 
approach in articulating what judicial reform is supposed to achieve, affecting not 
only what reforms were undertaken, but also how success is to be measured, 
whether in terms of market enablement, good governance, poverty reduction or 
empowerment. These difficulties have been compounded by an historic and 
continuing under-investment in systematic, rigorous evaluation which has in turn 
hindered the ability to measure impact, demonstrate results and inform the ongoing 
refinement of approach. 
I now offer a number of more specific observations from this analysis of ADB's 
approach in order to address the research questions of this thesis. 
First, ADB has exhibited an institutional ambivalence to judicial reform apparent in 
the ambiguities caused by its diverse rationalisations of policy approach - starting 
with market enablement, then poverty alleviation, good governance and, most 
recently, empowerment. While supported by management, law and policy reform 
never held the status of a formal ADB policy.646 At the institutional level, ABO's most 
consistent rationale for judicial reform over the years has been the promotion of good 
governance, variously conceptualised as providing the means to alleviate poverty. 
The justification for judicial reform has, however, shifted discernibly in an effort to 
keep in step with the evolution of institutional policy - notwithstanding that the 
package of reform activities has largely stayed the same - variously from economic 
growth and market enablement through a classic nee-liberal conceptualisation of 
supporting legal frameworks to promote private sector investments, privatisation and 
capital market development, to poverty reduction through good governance, with 
most recently an accent on access to justice and pro-poor empowerment. 
646 Above n 568, and at page 214. The OGC paper on law and development activities of 1998 only held the status of 
a 'Board information paper'; that is, it did not embody a formal ADB policy position. Telephone discussion between 
author and Hamid Sharif, Assistant General Counsel of ADB at that time, on 25 September 2009. 
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Significantly, however, we have most recently noted a discernible contraction in the 
earlier arnbit of the Bank's approach to governance and anti-corruption, which may 
reflect a refocus on what is perceived as ADB's traditional arena of comparative 
advantage in infrastructure. 
During this journey, the organisational status of governance as a development 
priority in ADB has evidently been volatile. After the formulation of its policy in 1995, 
governance has shifted in ADB's policy hierarchy, first elevated in the Long-Term 
Strategic Framework of 2001, and then more recently relegated in the revised Long-
Term Strategy 2020. This has inevitably meant that the status of judicial reform has 
been, and continues presently to be, organisationally uncertain. Meantime, at the 
operational level, the judicial reform has evolved from what the OGC described as an 
ad hoc responsive role to the formulation of a de facto law and policy reform program 
which has been increasingly 'mainstreamed' in broader reform activities in recent 
years, the full implications of which are yet to become apparent. 
Within this dynamic institutional context, it may be argued that ADB's formal 
ambivalence to judicial and legal reform may reflect nothing more than its monolithic 
but unavoidably multifaceted nature. After all, it is a large, complex multilateral 
financial institution with multiple objectives and, on occasion, has competing 
developmental priorities. Clearly, ADB has initiated and exhibited strong policy 
leadership in some respects, most notably in beating a path to formally set 
governance as a cardinal element of its overarching poverty reduction mission.647 
There has, however, also been a disconcerting lacuna of articulated policy in the 
focal arena of judicial and legal reform, though it should be emphasised that this was 
not for want of trying on the OGC's part. There is also evidence that reform activity 
became more systematic and less ad hoc as the result of its governance policy, 
though a close scrutiny of project rationale gives the unavoidable appearance of 
retro-fitting the latest organisational articulation of what, on analysis, was the same 
basic package of activities, usually consisting of court-centric assistance in the forrn 
of capacity-building and training. 
What this evidence suggests is the existence of a process of policy boiler-plating with 
which projects were - usually retrospectively - institutionally dressed to mask 
647 Though this leadership has often seemed to emulate the Wortd Bank; for example, see discussion relating to the 
governance and anticorruption policies, above. 
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Mitchell's 'puzzle', i.e. the acknowledged lack of any coherent theory or compelling, 
empirical foundation for this endeavour. While this trend was necessitated by major 
macro-level reformations of the Bank's policy position during this period, it does 
indicate that in practice the various articulations of the rationale for ADB's law and 
policy reform program were being re-dressed for what was already being done, 
rather than steering it. This is a significant finding because it calls into question the 
utility of the planning-end of the Bank's overarching performance management 
approach, indicating some degree of organisational artifice. 
Second, arising from this observation, I argue that ADB's championship of judicial 
reform has as a matter of dialectic been a priori and conviction-based, rather than 
being knowledge-based, or informed by empirical evidence and the systematic 
evaluation of experience. This is not to suggest that ADB eschewed empirical 
research, but rather that its role was limited and non-determinative. Given the 
existence of concerns over the lack of any coherent theory or empirical validation, 
why did ADB still push on with judicial reform? The answer to this question is that 
ADB established its law and policy reform program in response to the advocacy of 
the OGC that it was important: this is clearly attested by Mitchell and subsequently by 
ADB's own evaluation.648 Driven by the OGC's conviction, the reform process may 
ultimately be empirically validated through the work of Chemin and others, in due 
course. 
The hiatus in ADB's policy leadership enabled, or obliged, the OGC to champion its 
own vision of the importance of judicial reform, impelling the OGC counsel to 
establish and manage the 'law and policy reform' program on top of and beyond their 
normal duties as finance lawyers. In effect, the OGC organised and then dressed 
these activities to conform to the multi-spoked rationale of its reform program as 
articulated in 2004. The strength of this approach was that the OGC filled the gap 
and operated below the organisational radar while awaiting slow policy leadership; its 
weakness was that it always lacked organisational resources and integration. 
Significantly, this observation of what ADB does- as distinct from what it says it does 
- in establishing a law and policy program firmly casts its practice into the 
646 See ADB 2004, Report on the Asian Development Bank's Law and Policy Reform Activities in Support of Poverty 
Reduction, OGC, ADB, Manila, below n 585. Also: file notes taken by the author at ADB Headquarters in Manila 
between 20-31 August 2007 of professional discussions with senior existing and former members of OGC including: 
H Sharif, E Fischer, R Glendon, C Vandenabeele and V You, among others on implementation of ADS's law and 
policy program. 
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constructivist rather than the positivist camp in the 'paradigm war' over how to search 
for impact, effectiveness and success in its judicial reform endeavour.649 
Third, an analysis of the documented evidence presents a strangely mixed, even 
internally conflicted, picture of ADS's institutional orientation to development 
effectiveness. On the one hand, there is consistent organisational evidence of ADS's 
mounting concerns to improve its development effectiveness. Even before the Paris 
Declaration in 2005, these concerns are discernible in a range of operational 
initiatives to introduce management-for-development-results, improve capacity-
building approaches, and integrate monitoring and evaluation in the project 
performance management system. Additionally, ADB has actively embarked on an 
institution-wide process to enhance various aspects of its operational effectiveness, 
spurred by rigorous critical appraisals of its existing policy-based lending and 
technical assistance portfolios. These call for changes in organisational culture, 
strategy and operating systems to take fundamental account of political economy 
considerations, capacity-building approaches and development results - which 
remain ongoing challenges to be addressed. 
On the other hand, at the organisational level, there has been a surprising lack of 
internal proficiency in capacity-building which is a core tool of technical assistance. 
Only recently has this tool been extended beyond training in the development of 
human capital. Similarly, a more sophisticated political-economy vision of change 
has superseded the purely technical approach. Historically, there has been 
surprisingly little empirically-based research to guide reform endeavours, and ADB is 
only sometimes behaving as a knowledge-based institution, in contrast to the 
generally more knowledge-centred posture of the World Bank. While there is some 
evidence of research driving the development approach, this remains relatively 
limited in an institution which has prided itself on its vision of being a regional 
knowledge institution, since its commitment to this vision in 2001.650 Moreover, the 
Bank's commitment to evaluation, while rhetorically long-standing, has been limited 
to focusing on efficiency rather than impact, and has been internally appraised as 
lacking operational integration, which largely remains the present position. 
649 See discussion on the 'paradigm war' of evaluation, above, page 147 onwards. 
650 For example: ADB conducted a number of preparatory studies before launching its Access to Justice loan in 
Pakistan. Additionally, it has sponsored some empirical research; see, eg, Pistor, K and Wellons, P 1998 9? .. The 
Role of Law and Legs/Institutions in Asian Economic Development 1960-1995, OUP sponsored by ADB, Manila; 
ADB 2002, Towards a Political Economy Approach to Policy-based Lending, working paper series no 14, ADB, 
<http:l/www.adb.org/Documents/ERD/Working Papers/WP014.pdf> at 29 November 2009; and more recently, 
empirical studies on access to justice, legal empowerment and legal identity, among other issues. 
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At first blush, these features are anomalies in development approach. But, perhaps 
this should not be unsurprising when it is remembered that the charter explicitly 
prescribes that ADB is first and foremost a financial organisation with a 
developmental mandate - and not a development organisation with financial 
resources.651 
Most significant, what this evidence of practice demonstrates is that, contrary to 
rhetoric, development effectiveness is not necessarily of the highest priority at ADB, 
Asia's largest donor or, for that matter, perhaps any other donor. The evidence 
indicates that a range of organisational priorities may constantly compete internally. 
Within the ADB monolith, advocates for development effectiveness, just like the 
advocates for judicial reform, must stake their cause against competing claims, 
sometimes making organisational headway and sometimes not. As we have seen, 
the bank's recent evaluation has provided a rare public insight of this phenomenon 
which has rendered judicial reform internally uncompetitive for funding.652 In other 
words, there is a constant contest over competing priorities within an institution which 
may occasionally spill into the light of day. More usually, this state of affairs is 
concealed and could explain the sometimes erratic, somewhat lumpy, nature of the 
institutional journey towards judicial reform. 
b Significance for the evaluation of judicial reform 
Addressing the question of evaluation, clearly the most significant aspect of ADS's 
experience is the recent, tentative emergence of evidence of an empirically-validated 
relationship between judicial reform activity and economic growth. As we have seen 
in the findings of Chemin, there is some evidence which suggests that improvements 
in Pakistan's gross domestic product may be attributed to expediting case disposal in 
courts resulting from ADS's Access to Justice Program. These findings are very 
recent, as yet unsupported, and their significance remains untested. Once fully peer 
reviewed, they may offer a potentially significant contribution of empirical evidence to 
address Mitchell's 'puzzle' over the theoretical justification that reforming justice 
promotes economic growth.653 
651 This might explain, for example, why this author was evacuated from managing an existing judicial reform project 
in Pakistan in 2002, under threat of a nuclear stand-off with India, while 'emergency-only' missions were despatched 
from Manila to sustain ongoing negotiations for the Bank's upcoming $350million access to justice program loan. 
652 Hammergren refers to a similar analysis of an internal contest over competing causes within the World Bank. 
Hammergren 2007, above n 103, 309 and 313-5. 
653 See earlier analysis of empirical evidence in Chapter 5, above n 318, in relation to validating elements of the 
foundational theories of Max Weber and Douglass North in the schools of new institutional economics and new 
comparative economics. 
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In the interim, as we have already seen, ADB's recent evaluation of its law and policy 
reform program provides a significant but qualified opportunity to review this 
endeavour. ADB's approach to evaluation remains disconcertingly constrained by its 
insistent focus on efficiency which seems preoccupied by organisational arcana and 
no longer altogether fit for purpose. While there are clearly numerous layers of 
monitoring oversight, from project to country levels, ADB has still not invested in 
undertaking impact evaluation in any systematic manner. Most recently, it has 
acknowledged a need to do so, but only on a limited basis of one per year, with none 
foreseeable in judicial reform. Starkly, this means that ADB remains unable to 
evaluate the impact of its law and policy endeavour while the methodologies for the 
existing thematic evaluation relies on qualitative, technical and stakeholder 
assessment - as is the case with most donors. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion in 
the post-Paris era of development effectiveness that, by continuing to avoid making 
any serious commitment to assessing impact, ADB's reform management system is 
now deficient in relation to evaluation. 
As we have seen, ADB relies on its project performance management system to 
plan, implement, monitor and evaluate its assistance. This approach largely 
replicates the logical framework approach that has been popular with most 
development agencies which at its essence is a routinised, efficiency-based 
assessment that aligns actual outcomes with proposed targets. The Bank has 
historically also relied on an elaborate system of procedures for process-based 
monitoring and evaluation to guide its endeavours. This has been based largely on 
the OECD's best practice approach to evaluation using relevance, effectiveness, 
efficiency, and sustainability as the criteria, . and systematically surveying 
stakeholders and staff perceptions to formulate quantitative assessments.654 
My analysis of this monitoring and evaluation practice has revealed variable 
performance quality. There is also a characteristically positive bias, or suspension of 
critical self-evaluation, over the operational aspects of ADB's technical assistance 
including its judicial reform activities. We have seen that the overall performance of 
the Bank's technical assistance has been internally evaluated as being limited and 
qualified. We have also seen from ADB's evaluation department that the project 
performance management process, within which evaluation is an important element, 
requires long lead-times of up to a decade between activity design and evaluation. 
Accordingly, ADB's institutional capacity to evaluate and respond to its project 
654 See related discussion in Chapter 6 on development evaluation, above, viz. n 345 and surrounding. 
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experience is immensely slow, like turning a super-tanker in the high seas. This has 
meant that in the absence of systematic evaluative feedback to guide ongoing 
operations, the OGC has had no choice but to reflect on its experiences in a less 
formalised or rigorous manner. 
Consequently, ABO had remained unable to evaluate the impact of its judicial reform 
investment since its inception. Most recently, its own evaluation attests to the 
importance of judicial reform but does not offer any evidence of its contribution to its 
goals of poverty alleviation, good governance or civil empowerment. The review of 
available project records has demonstrated that ADB has delivered some significant 
development outcomes throughout the region in its law and policy reform program 
over fifteen years. This analysis indicates consistent evidence of a substantial array 
of operational activities and technical outputs which are visible variously in the form 
of policy development, new laws, empirical research, judicial and legal training, 
organisational and efficiency improvements in courts notably in delay reduction, 
technical publications and institutional reorganisation. Many, if not most, of these 
activities were useful and positively appreciated by key informants in developing 
member countries.655 Moreover, it is reasonable be surmise that the rates of judicial 
and legal development across the region would have been measurably impeded 
without the OGC's support. This, however, does not indicate development 
effectiveness. Disappointingly, it is difficult to translate these outcomes into results or 
impacts which can be measured in terms of contribution to the higher goals of 
poverty reduction, enhanced governance and improved justice for the people. 
Judicial reform at ADB has consistently focused on providing technical assistance to 
support the institutional operation of courts, mainly through capacity-building and 
training. While this assistance has been increasingly active, it has also been a 
relatively small or niche investment within the overall portfolio of ADB's activities.656 
Hence, it must be acknowledged that the potential development impact of judicial 
reform has been limited. 
655 These findings aggregate available technical assistance completion reports, supplemented with file records of 
discussions of this researcher with key stakeholders in developing member countries in 2007 and senior members of 
OGC. For the purposes of this review, a sample of Technical Assistance Completion Reports (TACRs) available at 
htto:l/www.adb.org/Projects/reports.asp?kev-reps&vai=TCR at 5 Oecemmber 2009, including: TA2853 VIE, 31105 
VIE, TA2823 VIE, TA4060 VIE, TA3613 VAN, TA3613 VAN, 312.D1 VAN, TA36427 CAMB, TA3577 CAM, TA3790 
BHU, TA2967 MON, TA30539 MON. SSTA2896MALO, TA3389 MALO, 32270 MALO, RETA5640, RETA5731 + 
30150, RETA5895, TRA33274, RETA 5658, RETA5987 + OTH 35038, TA3015 PAK, TA3366 VAN, TA3433 PAK, 
RETA 5967, 32023 PAK, RETA 6188. 
656 With the exception of Pakistan's Access to Justice Program $350 million loan, all other law and policy reform 
activities- including judicial reform- over the past fifteen years have been valued at approximately $70 million. 
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Finally, the OGC's conceptualisation of the rationale for judicial reform has had an 
unintended effect. While it has demonstrated an impressive elasticity in repositioning 
the law and policy reform program within ADB's ever shifting policy-frame, this has 
hampered the articulation of any consistent development approach. The ever shifting 
logic in planning and in due course justifying the attainment of development 
objectives as part of the Bank's performance management system has inadvertently 
foiled subsequent evaluative efforts to readily demonstrate success. 
In sum, this case study demonstrates that ADB - like most other donors - has made 
something of a leap of faith in terms of investing in judicial and related reforms for 
over fifteen years. It may now be nearing the point where it can demonstrate some 
impact measured in terms of an empirical relationship between judicial reform and 
economic growth. Until such a point is reached, however, this endeavour is 
vulnerable to mounting concerns over the entrenched and widening inequality gap. 
Despite the elaborate arcana of its monitoring systems, this tenuous state of affairs 
highlights the qualified provenance of ADB's evaluation process as much as it does 
its development effectiveness. 
* * * 
239 
CHAPTER 9- AUSAID'S PROGRAM IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA: 2003-7 
1 Introduction 
This case study is significant to this thesis because it presents empirical evidence 
from AusAID's practice of judicial reform in Papua New Guinea (PNG) between 2003 
and 2007. It contributes important additions to the literature, and illuminates our 
understanding of complex issues pertaining to the effectiveness of judicial reform and 
the means of evaluating it. 
Firstly, this case study highlights the difficulties of restructuring development 
assistance systems, such as large aid programs, to adopt a pro-poor focus to the 
purpose of refonn. This is centrally relevant to the overarching debate which posits 
the prevalence of a 'thin', pro-market efficiency model of reform against a 'thick', pro-
poor rights promoting model, as outlined in Part 1 of this thesis. The PNG 
experience clearly illustrates that, despite explicit mandating of a restorative justice 
approach focused on adopting a pro-poor, 'bottom-up' approach to assisting the 
traditional or informal justice sector, there was a marked reversion toward 
conventional, 'top-down' state-centric activities such as developing case 
management systems, training clerks, renovating court infrastructure and so on. I 
argue that this was due to a variety of reasons: the relative ease of engaging with the 
formal sector; limits of absorptive capacity in the informal sector; the unavoidably 
supply-driven systemic nature of governmental development assistance needing to 
find avenues to 'spend the money'; and perhaps also the inherent tendency of aid to 
formalise traditional community processes for accountability and procedural 
purposes. The evidence indicates that the reform process addressed those of its 
objectives which were easiest to accomplish, and there were few available 
mechanisms to adjust the direction of that process. In effect, this case study 
demonstrates that it was much harder than initially expected to implement the 
mandated restorative justice vision. 
Second, this case study highlights the challenges of committing substantial resources 
and timeframes to demonstrate impact. This is of central relevance to the contest 
between the quantitative positivist approach and the participatory constructivist 
approach in demonstrating results, as discussed in Part 2 of this thesis. In Papua 
New Guinea, outputs were clearly visible as were glimmerings of sector performance 
change. But, after four years of development activities costing some $90 million plus 
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a further $6 million for monitoring and evaluation, there was still no available 
evidence of causal attribution between this assistance and improved results. While 
the signs were potentially promising, the quest for evidence of impact remains 
elusive. Disappointingly, however, it was impossible to clearly discern whether this 
lack of evidence reflected a lack of impact or a lack of evidence of impact. 
I outline and justify the methodology for this case study approach in annexes B and 
B2 of this thesis.657 This case study is substantiated, in part, by documents which are 
confidential to the Government of Australia.658 
2 Background 
Australia's assistance to PNG's law and justice sector commenced in 1988, with 
policing assistance to the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary. This assistance 
subsequently expanded to the other agencies in the sector including the courts. In 
2002, Australia's overall aid totalled $988 million, of which $197 million was allocated 
to PNG.659 PNG was the largest single recipient of Australian aid.660 It was also the 
largest recipient of all aid in the Oceania region. In 2001/2002, $20 million was 
provided through five projects in the key law and justice agencies and the 
Ombudsman Commission, which represented about 10% of the aid program to PNG 
and Australian assistance. According to Director General, Bruce Davis, AusAID's 
objective in this arena was 'more effective law and order and a safer region.'661 
AusAID's thematic investment in legal and judicial development has increased 
markedly over recent years.662 Over the period of this assessment, AusAID spent 
approximately $114 million on the Law and Justice Sector Program (LJSP).663 
657 See Annexes: B and 8.2. 
658 See Annex C. These documents are additional to those listed in the bibliography. They are held by AusAID and 
this author. They have been made available for the purposes of this thesis through a research agreement entered 
between AusAID and the University of Sydney dated 4 June 2009, and are available for inspection by examiners if/as 
required. 
659 OECD 2009, Query Wizard For International Development Statistics, 
<http://stats.oecd.org/gwids/#?x=2&y=6&f=3:51 4:1.1 :2.5:3.7:1&g=3:51+4:1 +1 :2 3+5:3+ 7:1 +2:1. 136+6:2002> at 28 
November 2009. A note on currency: this thesis denotes currency in US dollars ($-USD), unless otherwise 
specified; OECD reports in USD, while AusAID reports in AUD; at the time of writing (14.09.08), the rate of exchange 
was 0.84. As both currencies float, this exchange is historically constantly shifting. 
660 AusAID 2006, StatiStical Summary 2004-5: Australia :S lntematiOnal Development Cooperation, AusAID. Canberra. 
661 Davis, B 2004, 'The Pacific and Papua New Guinea: Sustaining Reform', speech delivered at the Australian 
Institute of International Affairs, 5 March. 
662 AusAID's investment in legal and judicial development has increased markedly over recent years: (2002/3) 25m; 
(200314) 94m; (200415) 110m. AusAID 2006, Statistical Summart: 2004-2005, Australia"s International Development 
Cooperation. AusAID, Canberra. 
663 Between 2003-8, the AusAID investment to LJSP was budgeted at AUD150m, and JAG at AUD11m in all 
AUD161m over 6 years- equivalent to an average rate of exchange during this period of USD114m and USD8.4m. a 
total of USD122.4m. http:l/www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates at 2 January 2010. During the equivalent 
period, the next largest investments were in the Solomon Islands $116m between 2005-9; Cambodia $18m between 
2002-7; Fiji 16m 2002-6; Samoa 2004-9 $13.5m; Vanuatu $9.5m 2001-5. Armytage, L 2007. "Annex 2", AusAID 
Assistance to Papua New Guinea's Law and Justice Sector (2003-2007): Lessons Learned - Desk Review; see 
below: n 656. 
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The context of Australia's approach to supporting judicial and legal reform in PNG 
during the period of this case study was outlined in AusAID's concept paper of 2002. 
This paper reviewed Australia's strong historical, political, commercial and economic 
ties with PNG, its closest neighbour, and provided the justification for the LJSP on 
the basis that PNG suffered from a serious, chronic and deteriorating law and order 
situation.664 Many parts of Papua New Guinea are dangerous, in particular the 
capital Port Moresby, where terminally violent crime is routinely reported in the daily 
papers.665 
This concept paper was foundational to Australia's ongoing assistance which it 
described as providing support in the implementation of PNG's National Law and 
Justice Policy 2000-2005, discussed later in this case study.666 The LJSP was 
introduced to trial program-based support to the law and justice sector in place of the 
earlier modality of agency-based institutional capacity-building.667 It specified that the 
goal for the LJSP was 'to promote the rule of law in Papua New Guinea in order to 
realise PNG's broader development goals,' and that its purpose was 'to assist the 
Government of Papua New Guinea in strengthening the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the formal law and justice system, and support the informal system as an 
alternative avenue for the redress of disputes, consistent with the PNG National Law 
and Justice Po/icy.'668 It identified a range of strategic issues for both governments to 
address such as: adopting a sector-wide approach; affordability; articulating 
outcomes and measuring impact; reform and policy engagement; incentive or 
performance-based approach; PNG ownership and coordination.669 This would 
require the lightest possible 'footprint' across all areas of assistance. The concept 
paper also specified that the assistance was expected to deliver direct benefits to the 
664 AusAID 2002, Concept Paper for a Law and Justice Sector Program, AusAID, Canberra, 1. The Economist's 
Intelligence Unit ranked the capital Port Moresby last as the world's most unsafe city on its 'business trip index' in 
both 2002 and 2006: The Economic Intelligence Unit 2006, Business Trip Index 
<htto://www.economist.com/media/pdf/BUSINESS TRIP INDEX.pdf; and, Vancouver and Melbourne Top City 
League 2002, BBC News, <http:/Jnews.bbc.co.uk/2/hilbusiness/2299119.stm> both at 28 November 2009. 
665 See: sample of PNG newspaper clippings, in Annex D. 
666 The National Law & Justice Policy and Plan of Action 2000, Government of Papua New Guinea Law and Justice 
Sector <http:/lwww.lawandjustice.gov.pg/www/html/50-overview.asp> 28 November 2009. 
667 Support has previously been delivered to the courts- being the National Judicial Service (NJS) and the Magisterial 
Services (MS)- separately through AusAID's PNG Legal Capacity Building Project, between August 1999 to July 
2003. Hassall & Associates, PNG Legal Capacity Building Project: Project Completion Report, August 2003. 
668 AusAID 2002, Concept Paper for a Law and Justice Sector Program, AusAID, Canberra, 11. The objectives of 
LJSP were to: (i) foster a sectoral approach to law and justice by targeting agreed sector priorities and by 
encouraging coordination at the policy, planning, budgeting and operational levels; (ii) increase the effectiveness of 
law and justice agencies in delivering their key constitutional and statutory obligations; (iii) support line and central 
government agencies to pursue efficiencies in administrative costs and in the delivery of these core law and justice 
services, in the context of a limited resource envelope; (iv) promote the informal justice system as an alternative to 
the formal system in appropriate circumstances and facilitate partnerships between agencies and civil society; (v) 
promote crime prevention and restorative justice through the formal system; and (vi) integrate issues of government-
wide and cross sectoral importance into AusAID's law and justice sector programs induding: affordability, public-
sector reform, gender, violence against women and children, human rights and HIV/AIDs. 
669 AusAID 2002, Concept Paper for a Law and Justice Sector Program, AusAID, Canberra, 8-9. 
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poor through improved law and justice services while leading to longer-term and 
indirect benefits through an improved environment for investment and growth, and 
enhanced safety and security.670 
This concept paper built on a review conducted in 2000 which advocated a gradual 
change in the mode of delivery. It recommended a combination of agency-project 
and sector-program approaches with a strong focus on measuring impact and 
achieving outcomes to make up for the lack of any preceding impact evaluation.671 
As part of this approach, the Australian and PNG governments adopted a sectoral 
approach to law and justice. They were interested in assessing the contribution of the 
aid program in implementing the National Law and Justice Policy, discussed below. 
Australian support was provided through two mechanisms: the Law and Justice 
Sector Program (LJSP) to manage the delivery of support, and the Justice Advisory 
Group (JAG) to provide technical and management advice on planning and 
monitoring performance. 
Within this context, this case study provides an assessment of a substantial example 
of development assistance in judicial and related reform, valued at $122.4 million, 
representing AusAID's largest and longest direct investment in judicial and legal 
reform.672 The concept paper provided what may be seen as AusAID's best shot at 
designing an approach to judicial reform in PNG. This approach consolidated 
AusAID's twenty years of reform experience in that country. The transition to the 
new sector-based program approach was described in the concept paper as being a 
'trial,' reflecting lengthy analyses of earlier experience. Within this context, this case 
study presents the LJSP experience as an exemplar of a major initiative in judicial 
and legal reform. 
3 Findings and analysis 
This section provides the key findings from the available documentary evidence of 
this reform practice. 673 It is organised thematically by first presenting a summary of 
relevant data, followed by an analysis of significant findings contained in that data. 
These findings are relevant to three significant themes in this thesis: the journey to 
670 Ibid 12-13. 
671 Ibid 4. 
672 Above n 663. 
673 See Annex C; and above n 658. 
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aid effectiveness; managing-for-development-results; and strategic approaches. This 
section then provides the foundation for the final conclusions which I will offer to 
address the research questions of this thesis. 
a Journey to aid effectiveness - ownership, capacity and change 
First, at the thematic level, this case study provides evidence of the existence of 
three substantial challenges that AusAID confronted in executing its commitment to 
promoting PNG ownership of the reform process. As we shall see, these challenges 
related in particular to ownership, capacity-building and change management. 
In relation to ownership, the threshold of AusAID's engagement in rested on a 
commitment to supporting the implementation of PNG's National Law and Justice 
Policy. As part of implementing this commitment, AusAID delegated oversight of the 
substantial development budget to local mechanisms without providing 
commensurate capacity-building to enable that ownership. It will be seen that these 
mechanisms were demonstrably unable to manage that process. This created a 
substantial gap in the oversight of AusAID's development budget. This deficit was 
exposed in the monitoring process, though it was not immediately addressed. 
The documents revealed that the establishment and sustained operation of the 
National Coordinating Mechanism (NCM), supported by the Law and Justice 
Technical Working Group (LJTWG) provided leadership and demonstrated a visible 
commitment to the ownership of the legal and judicial development process in PNG. 
This was evidenced in regular meetings that demonstrated inter-organisational 
behavioural change at the sector level. These meetings were generally productive 
as a mechanism for policy formulation, management and oversight of 
administration.674 
However, a number of challenges remained. The most significant of these related to 
counterpart capacity which, as we will see, was often cited in the LJSP 
documentation as being a constraint affecting the pace and scope of activities. The 
LJSP explicitly diagnosed this challenge in the Annual Program Plan for 2007 where 
it described the existing constraints of the NCM: 
The (Sector Strategic Framework) SSF is an ambitious plan. But it needs 
someone to drive it. The principal driver is the NCM through the LJSWG. 
'" JAG, 2004- 2006. Six-Monthly Reports. 
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However, at Madang in June 2005 the LJSWG recognised that they do not 
have the time or the resources to do all that is required. Its members have 
full-time jobs in agencies. . . . As we have found in 2006 this is a slow 
process. 675 
Additionally, the LJSP added in its narrative in the Annual Program Plan for 2006: 
The NCM and the LJSWG are not prepared to exercise executive powers 
to allocate funding or determine priorities. This is understandable given 
that the agencies are separate departments and the chief executives are 
naturally unwilling to impose their views on a fellow chief executive ... 
NCM Leadership. A major weakness seems to be that, as the LJSWG 
members recognised at their Madang Retreat, it is very difficult culturally 
for the agencies to get out of their own agency mindset and to bring 
forward a collective sector approach. 676 
The Law and Justice Sector Secretariat (LJSS) was established largely to address 
this lack of capacity and what the LJSP has described as 'cultural context' .677 But, 
initial indications from the documents suggested that the LJSS was itself limited in its 
established capacity and was struggling to find its feet to develop momentum.678 
It was noted from the documents that a number of initiatives were taken to strengthen 
the capacity-building approach. For example, annual program plans identified 
numerous training courses provided to agency staff and, on occasion, members of 
the community.679 An analysis of periodic reports also provided evidence of a range 
of other measures. These included strategic planning; placement of advisors; 
procedural reforms for the courts; support for leadership; business planning and 
budgeting; financial management; human resources management; infrastructure 
improvements; provision of IT and vehicles; and training, among others.680 
This documentation also indicated that the Law and Justice Sector Program in PNG 
was not sustainable without considerable ongoing donor assistance. However, this 
diagnosis was not matched with commensurate support, notably in building 
675 LJSP 2007, Annual Program Plan, Government of Papua New Guinea, AusAID, 30 .. 
676 Ibid 18. 
677 1bid 18; among others. 
678See, eg, 'It is acknowledged that it will take time for the LJSS to build capacity to undertake this role. LJSP and the 
JAG have roles in building the capacity of the unit. The Director of the LJSS will work closely with the Deputy 
Secretary (PIP) DNPRD and the FAS and AS responsible for Law and Justice. This will be a relationship that 
requires careful support from LJSP.' LJSP 2006, Annual Report, Government of Papua New Guinea, AusAID, 38, 
among others. 
679 For example, LJSP reported that: 'The program of education for clerks and other court officers continued during 
the reporting period. Various aspects of the courts functions are being targeted in an ongoing effort to improve their 
effectiveness. The capacity of clerks and officers in data collection, dissemination and compilation will continue to be 
addressed. Training will be rolled out in specific provinces during the second half of 2006.' LJSP 2006, Six-Monthly 
Report, Government of Papua New Guinea, AusAID, 2, and; 
'Important to maintaining an effective national correction system is the need to have trained, disciplined officers. The 
Mandatory Annual Refresher Training has proved an excellent training program and has now been conducted in all 
institutions. 638 staff received over 40 hours refresher training each.' Ibid 3. 
680 See, eg, ibid 2M6, among other periodic performance reports. 
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leadership capacity. My analysis of periodic reports revealed that the sustainability of 
the aid program depended on additional capacity-building measures. As indicated in 
the Annual Program Plan for 2006, this was particularly the case with the key body, 
the Law and Justice Sector Secretariat. The planning documents stressed that 
nowhere was the need for capacity-building more important than in the critical LJSS 
which was serving as the focal point for overseeing and administering the sector.681 
The LJSP's own appraisal that counterpart capacity was determining the pace of 
change made it clear that the LJSP's capacity-building approach had not yet attained 
its goals after four years.682 In particular, this documentation revealed the risk of the 
LJSS, as the capacity-hub of sector assistance, becoming overwhelmed by the range 
of responsibilities and functions delegated to it by the NCM and the Law and Justice 
Sector Working Group (LJSWG). 
The documents indicated that this aspect of capacity-building presented the LJSP 
with a major challenge: it had to maintain its advisory role on the one hand, but on 
the other not allow its technical advisors to do the job themselves. The LJSP 
emphasised its acknowledgement of this distinction in the Annual Program Plan for 
2006: 'while the Program can facilitate appropriate opportunities for discussion and 
ideas for consideration, it is not appropriate for the Program to usurp the LJSWG or 
NCM executive role.'683 This is a critical distinction but, in practice, the line often 
became blurred. It would be na"ive to underestimate the unrelenting institutional 
pressure on both aid agencies and their contractors to deliver results. 
This issue of capacity-building is symptomatic of a more fundamental question 
relating to the goals of the aid program in supporting the sector: is it more important 
for the aid program to develop capacity or to generate visible results? In spite of the 
significance of this distinction, there was no evidence in any of the documentation 
about the process or parameters of capacity-building. Nor was there any evidence of 
a strategy to gradually build up from dependency to sustainability. 
In conclusion, this experience revealed a discernible impediment to progress in the 
existence of what may be describes as a 'locked black box' over the crucial issue of 
capacity-building. Even after four years of concerted engagement, this box was yet to 
be properly opened and sorted. This impediment was then exacerbated by 
681 LJSP 2006, Annual Program Plan, Government of Papua New Guinea, AusAID, 37 onwards, among many others. 
682 AusAID 2006, PNG Law & Justice Sector Review and Contribution Analysis, AusAID, 4. 
683 LJSP 2006, Annual Program Plan, Government of Papua New Guinea, AusAID, 29. 
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demonstrable confusion over how to facilitate the convergence of notions of 
ownership and change management, as we shall see below. 
b Managing-for-development-results 
Second, at the thematic level, this case study showcases the significance of 
planning, and linking it to monitoring and evaluation, highlights the considerable 
resources and time required to ensure that planning is adequate for the purposes of 
promoting aid effectiveness. 
Planning 
The available documents described the formulation of the Sector Strategic 
Framework (SSF) and stated that the vision of the sector was '[a) just safe and 
secure society for all'.684 The SSF integrated with agencies' corporate plans to 
provide the architecture to direct, harmonise and coordinate sector performance 
generally and development activities in particular. Each annual performance plan 
then aimed to support the attainment of the goals and objectives in the forthcoming 
suite of activities supported by AusAID.685 It also linked with the sector's companion 
Performance Monitoring Framework (PMF) to ensure consistency, coherence and 
relevance in sector/program performance monitoring and evaluation.686 This required 
considerable time and resources, and represented a major output of both the LJSP 
and the JAG. Particularisation of performance targets was provided in the annexes to 
each annual performance plan. A pronounced feature of these targets was the use of 
general descriptors such as 'enhanced', 'increased', and 'improved' indicia of 
performance.687 
The first observation from an assessment of this planning is that it appeared to be 
comprehensive in its scope. Closer analysis however revealed that it was 
characteristically abstract in its specifications. Performance targets and indicators in 
684 See inventory of documents in Annex C, in particular: chart of sector framework in lJSP 2006, Annual Program 
Plan, Government of Papua New Guinea, AusAID, 5: among other numerous other references. This vision was 
supported by five goals: (1) Improved policing, safety and crime prevention; (2) Improved access to justice and just 
results; (3) Improved reconciliation, reintegration and deterrence; (4) Improved accountability and reduced 
corruption; (5) Improved ability to provide law and justice services. Numerous development activities then support 
implementation of each goal. 
685 LJSP 2005-2007, Annual Program Plans, Government of Papua New Guinea, AusAID. 
686 As Armytage & Miller observe: 'The central feature of the PMF is its relationship with the SSF, which 'identifies a 
vision, and set of goals, strategies and priorities identified by the Law and Justice Sector to guide and integrate 
efforts to develop a more just, safe and secure society in Papua New Guinea'. Armytage, L & Miller, S 2008, 'Legal 
and Judicial Reform Performance Monitoring: the PNG Approach', European Journal of Development Research, vol. 
20. no. 1. pp.141 -157. 145. 
687 See. for example: LJSP 2006 & 2007, 'Annex A: Logical Framework, Performance Indicators', Annual Program 
Plan, Government of Papua New Guinea, AusAID. 
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the sector and the LJSP planning documents were quite general. They lacked any 
specification of how much the indicia would be 'enhanced', 'increased' or 'improved', 
or when. As a result, these non-specific indicators were of limited value as measures, 
capable only of specifying binary measures of yes/no's, rather than better calibrated 
measures. It has already been argued in this thesis that for planning indicators to 
work they must be either 'SMART' or 'TURC'. 688 The significance of this analysis is 
that much of this planning work was at best superficial in its value and, under closer 
scrutiny. of restricted utility in informing the monitoring and evaluation functions of 
AusAID's project management cycle. 689 In effect, it engendered a false assurance of 
precision in managing development effectiveness which consequently contributed to 
the insufficiency of reform outcomes, to be discussed below. 
The second observation arising from my analysis of the documentation relates to the 
scope of activities forecast in each annual program plan and, in due course, reviewed 
in quarterly, six-monthly and annual reports. This revealed that the scope of the 
LJSP's activities remained wide and quite eclectic across the sector: from renovating 
courts and providing computers and boats for village courts, to supplying materials 
for bunk beds for prisoners; HIV/AIDS training; and supplying vehicles for 
correctional services to freight and courier allowances for the sector secretariat.690 
This is partly due to the substantial size of the LJSP, and to the perceived desirability 
of retaining continuity of support with earlier agency-based projects.691 The program 
manager for the LJSP was evidently aware of the risk of managing an excessively 
wide scope of activities and had tried to prioritise and 'filter' the activity proposals.692 
Notwithstanding, a discernible risk of support being spread too thinly remained, and 
was exacerbated by 'big ticket' items of infrastructure eclipsing lesser needs.693 The 
loss of programmatic focus was consistently confirmed by reviews of related 
programs.694 The tendency of sector-based programming to spread the focus of 
688 Specific, measurable, accurate, reliable and time-bound. See discussion of alternative acronym 'TURC' for criteria: 
technically sound, understandable, relevant and cost-effective, above n 448. 
689 As for many donors, the project management cycle is AusAID's key management tool for development 
effectiveness, comprising an integrated results-based approach to planning, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation; see related discussion in Chapter 6 from p 93 onwards. 
690 LJSP 2006, 'Annex C: Program Activities by Agency' Annual Program Plan 2007, Government of Papua New 
Guinea, AusAID. 
691 See, eg, 'The LJSP design process has taken place within a strong GoPNG policy framework .... A significant 
feature of this process has been the close interaction between the Design T earn and the GoPNG senior managers 
who developed the National Law and Justice Policy and Plan of Action ('the Policy'), and who form the Law and 
Justice Sector Working Group (L&JSWG). This has provided a strong continuity of effort, understanding and 
commitment to LJSP within the GoPNG.' (italics added). LJSP 2005, Program Design Document, 1. 
692 See, eg, LJSP 2005, Annual Program Plan, Government of Papua New Guinea, AusAID, 14 
693 Infrastructure for courts and prisons was the largest head of discretionary expenditure accounting for 36% of 
budget, or 77million kina in capital works, mainly on building and renovating courts and prisons; LJSP 2006, 'Annex 
C: Program Activities by Agency' Annual Program Plan 2007, Government of Papua New Guinea, AusAID. 
s9of For example: AusAID's PNG Education Capacity Building Program- Medium Term Review, dated 13.09.05, 8, 14 
and 20; and, AusAID's PNG Education Capacity Building Program - Medium Term Review, dated 13. 09. 05, 44. 
These reports were not included in the inventory at Annex C, for reasons of confidentiality. 
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engagement more widely than the available resources could manage was thus 
revealed, and may explain why the contribution analysis was unable to identify 
evidence of outcome-level results, as discussed below. 
The third observation relates to the formulation of the development budget which lay 
at the heart of each annual program plan, providing the blueprint for aid program 
expenditure. Approval of annual program plans formally authorised the allocation of 
development funds. As we have already seen, the LJSP had diagnosed an inability 
among the local leaders to exercise what it described as executive powers to allocate 
funding or determine priorities. This was because it was very difficult 'culturally' for 
the agencies to get out of their own mindset and to bring forward a collective sector 
approach.695 What this narrative did not elaborate, perhaps for the sake of 
diplomacy, were the reasons for the lack of effective oversight, direction, or quality 
control by either the National Coordinating Mechanism or Law and Justice Sector 
Working Group. This weakness, combined with the 'lightest possible footprint' and 
the LJSP's concern over avoiding 'usurping the NCM executive role' supplied the 
ingredients for a discernible risk of loss of oversight of the AusAID development 
budget. 696 
Finally, the LJSP experience provides evidence of competing development goals. It 
is an interesting case study of the new 'whole of government' approach whose most 
compelling advantage is the prospect of donor policy integration, but whose major 
weakness is its vulnerability to extraneous considerations. The Australia-Papua New 
Guinea Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP) showcased this phenomenon. The 
ECP mobilised up to 250 Australian Federal Police to patrol the streets of Port 
Moresby at a cost estimated in the press between $760-1,900 million- up to ten 
times more than AusAID's largest ever investment in judicial and legal reform - in 
response to political imperatives to secure stability in Australia's immediate realm of 
influence in the post-9/11 period. In May 2005, PNG's Supreme Court found that 
elements of the ECP program were inconsistent with PNG's Constitution. The Wenge 
decision suspended the policing element of the ECP program indefinitely while the 
future of the entire ECP program was reconsidered in consultation with the PNG 
Government.697 What is revealed here is that this intervention disregarded AusAID's 
695 LJSP 2006, Annual Program Plan 2007, Government of Papua New Guinea, AusAID, 18. 
696 Respectively: AusAID 2002, Concept Paper for a Law and Justice Sector Program, 12; and LJSP 2005, Annual 
Program Plan 2006, Government of Papua New Guinea, AusAID 29. 
697 Special Reference Pursuant to Constitution Section 19; Special Reference by the Morobe Provincial Executive} 
[2005} PGSC 1 (Wenge); http:Jiarchives.pireport.org/archive/2005/June/06-30-ft.htm 
at 29 November 2009; Craig Skehan, 'Australia Troops Illegal, PNG Court Rules'. Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney) 
14 May 2005 
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development research in the lead-up to the LJSP and its endeavours. Many would 
agree that an integrated 'whole of government' approach is theoretically desirable but 
this example highlights the additional challenges of embracing it.698 
In sum, this analysis provides evidence of a breakdown in oversight of the 
development budget process, however prudently it is conducted to ensure a 
balanced mix of local ownership and donor oversight for an effective allocation of 
substantial aid funds. It also illustrates some of the unplanned, and to some extent 
unplannable, aspects of the development process which can often involve very 
significant issues. 
ii Performance monitoring 
This case study is also important in providing evidence of an unprecedented donor 
investment in the capacity to monitor the performance of reform endeavour, and 
presents the first glimmering of significant evidence-based reform outcomes. 
The documents revealed that, from the outset, the LJSP had a marked emphasis on 
investing in performance monitoring and evaluation. As we have seen, the concept 
paper advocated a new emphasis on performance monitoring through the 
establishment of the Justice Advisory Group (JAG). The JAG was established to 
support the development of a sector performance framework as a means of 
improving the effectiveness of the sector, focus donor assistance and measure 
performance and impacts, among other things.699 These objectives were reaffirmed 
in the Midterm Performance Review and Assessment of the JAG in 2005.700 This 
emphasis on performance monitoring was also evidenced in the Performance 
Monitoring Framework (PMF) linked to the Sector Strategic Framework (SSF), which 
required more than three years to design and operationalise.701 
<http://www.smh.eom.au/news/World/AustralianMtroops-itlegai-PNG-court-rules/2005/05/13/1115843371667 .html> 
at 29 November 2009. 
698 Collier remarks similarly on USAID being at the bottom of the US Government's hierarchy. Collier, above n 269, 
12. 
699 AusAID 2002, Concept Paper for a Law & Justice Sector Program, AusAID, Canberra, 6-9. 
700 This assessment described the performance monitoring framework as being the 'core business of a sector based 
monitoring and review group,' and the construction and operationalisation of a sector PMF is a critical and practical 
manifestation of the sector approach. AusAID 2004, Midterm Performance Review and Assessment of the Justice 
Advisory Group, AusAID, 28-31. See also: JAG 2004, Role in PNG's National Law & Justice Program. 
701 Considerable time was required to conceptualise, consult, design and develop the performance monitoring 
framework: JAG 2004, Six-Monthly Report: August, 14; The PMF was developed collaboratively across 2005 and 
finalized for consideration and approval by the NCM in February 2006. JAG 2006, Six-Monthly Report: February to 
July, 10. 
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The SSF, which was strongly influenced by PNG's National Law and Justice Plan, 
nominated 64 key performance indicators. Data of variable quality was initially 
available for 60 of these. Building the capacity of agencies to collect and monitor this 
data proceeded in step with operationalising the framework. 702 Significantly, it was 
only after three years that baseline data for these indicators was gathered and made 
available for measurement_1°3 This enabled trend analysis to start in the following 
years. The use of evidence in decision-making and reporting represented a paradigm 
shift in the way that public sector organisations traditionally planned, budgeted and 
monitored their activities in PNG. I have separately co-described with Miller that this 
was a work in progress, a central feature of which was linkage of the Performance 
Monitoring Framework to the sector's priorities and strategic framework at the central 
level, and corporate plans at the agency level. 704 At that time, we estimated the cost 
of this investment at around 6% of the overall development budget,1°5 
The PMF enabled the Government of PNG (GoPNG) and AusAID to monitor the 
performance of the sector for the first time, and provided a means to assess the 
contribution and effectiveness of development assistance. The sector started to 
publish annual reports of its performance (APRs), commencing with a baseline in 
2004, which were initially structured to address ten priorities.706 In mid-2005, a series 
of crime and crime-perceptions surveys were designed and conducted to provide 
baseline measures in a community crime survey in Port Moresby, Mt Hagen, Lae and 
Bougainville. Other measures included a business survey, a survey of truckers on the 
National Highway, and a telephone survey of civil society in remote communities. 707 
The community crime surveys and the sector annual performance reviews generated 
streams of data that identified changes in 18 of 20 indicators of household 
702 Criteria for selection of indicators included simplicity, meaningfulness. part of core business of the collecting 
agency, continuity for trend analysis, and comparability for reliability. Armytage & Miller provide a case study of 
building capacity to monitor and evaluate legal and judicial reform in PNG during this period, outlining the process of 
designing the sector performance monitoring framework, selection of outcome indicators, collecting data and linkage 
to the sector strategic framework and the national law and justice policy, in a process which they describe as iterative 
and evolving. They review a range of issues relating to developing monitoring capacity, collecting data and data 
quality, incentives, sustainability, resources, timeframe and design approach. Armytage, L & Miller, S 2008, 'Legal 
and Judicial Reform Performance Monitoring: the PNG Approach', European Journal of Development Research, val. 
20, no. 1. pp.141 -157. 
703 JAG, Community (Bougainville, Mt Hagen, Lae, Port Moresby), Business and Highway Surveys (2005: Baseline), 
2005; Annex C. 
704 Armytage, L & Miller, S 2008, 'Legal and Judicial Reform Performance Monitoring: the PNG Approach', European 
Journal of Development Research, val. 20, no. 1, pp.141 - 157, 145. 153. This article was jointly written: both 
authors co-designed the structure; Armytage drafted the introduction and development context; Miller drafted the 
mid-section comprising detailed historical narrative and explanations; both authors contributed to the obsetvations 
and conclusions, and co-settled all drafts. 
705 Ibid, 155. Armytage & Miller estimated costs as follows: 'Providing a cost to the JAG investment in sector 
performance monitoring - and thereby evaluating its own contribution - is not altogether straightfocward, but in 
simple terms if some 40%of the annual budget for JAG (estimated on the basis that some 40% of JAG's work related 
to performance monitoring) is compared with the budget of the Law and Justice Sector Program, then it is estimated 
at around 6% - bracketted text added. 
706 JAG 2004-2006, Annual Sector Performance Reports. 
707 JAG, Community (Bougainville, Mt Hagen, Lae, Port Moresby), Business and Highway Surveys (2005: Baseline), 
2006 and 2007. Annex C. 
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victimisations in two sites (Arawa and Buka) in Bougainville. These changes were 
statistically significant, highlighting differences with Port Moresby where no changes 
were identifiable.708 
These findings were important in a number of ways. They provided the first 
indications of a potentially ground-breaking enhancement in monitoring and 
evaluation capacity. Relevant, reliable and accessible data was now available on 
both the performance of the sector and, additionally, the contribution of assistance to 
improving that performance. This would enable systematic impact monitoring and 
evaluation for the first time. Second, these findings provided limited but actual 
evidence of significant changes in crime victimisation. They also enabled a 
comparative evidence-based analysis of performance at different times or places. 
This evidence demonstrates a significant comparative advantage over the earlier 
approach of efficiency-based monitoring of activity outputs. For this reason, it is 
potentially transformative for monitoring and evaluation purposes. Curiously, 
however, recognition of this significance was not immediately apparent in project 
documentation. The LJSP made no reference to sector performance data on 
improvements in crime victimisation in Bougainville in its annual performance report 
for 2005; nor was it referred to in AusAID's contribution analysis of late 2006, though 
this was for reasons of data collection.709 
This evidence is indicative of the time required for a paradigm shift in results-based 
management as the governing justification for both planning and performance to 
become operationally recognised in practice. 
iii Evaluation, impact, results and contribution 
This case study provides evidence of the comparative strengths and weaknesses of 
building the capacity to monitor and evaluate the performance of judicial and legal 
reforms through a dedicated mechanism. It also demonstrates that substantial 
resources and time are required for reforms to contribute change and show evidence 
of that contribution. 
7
(1,8 Eg, 'Major reductions in crime victimisation occurred in both towns from 2004 to 2006. The 2004 baseline 
research found that household victimisation levels in Arawa and Buka were high and that violent crime featured. 
From 2004 to 2006, 18 of 20 indicators of household crime victimisation showed reductions each year. Twelve of the 
reductions from 2004 to 2006 were statistically significant.' JAG 2007, Bougainville Community Crime Survey 2006, 
1. 
709 Respectively: LJSP 2006, Annual Pet1ormance Reporl 2005, Law and Justice Sector Secretariat, Government of 
Papua New Guinea; and AusAID 2006, PNG Law & Justice Sector Review and Contribution Analysis, AusAID. 
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Reference has already been made to the wide package of activities delivered by the 
LJSP which started in early 2003. Four years later, in December 2006, AusAID 
undertook a 'review and contribution analysis' of those activities in the law and justice 
sector. This review established that the reform efforts had led to some positive 
impacts in what it described as one or two areas (citing average periods of remand, 
reduction in case backlogs and number of escapes). 710 
Significant changes in the operations and practices (sic) of various law and 
justice agencies were identified by the review team .... These changes were 
found to be as a direct result of the sector approach to law and justice 
undertaken by GoPNG over the past three years. The review also found 
that there was a clear contribution between these sectoral changes and the 
support provided by the Australian Government. However, in most cases 
there was no data available for the review team to conclude whether these 
changes at the sector level were having an impact at the real world level 
(for example on speedier and fairer justice, non-violent dispute resolution 
and prevention and detection of corruption). 711 
As the reviewers observed, this did not necessarily mean that other positive impacts 
had not occurred, but rather that anecdotal suggestions could not be substantiated. It 
concluded that: 
[A]t this point in time, there was limited evidence of real world outcomes, 
though where there was evidence of real world outcomes there was no 
doubt that the Australian aid program had made a significant contribution 
towards them. 712 
These findings are very significant for a number of reasons. First, they document the 
existence of change in sector performance using valid and reliable data. As such, 
these findings are noteworthy because they represent the first important step in 
managing-for-development-results. 
Second, they show evidence of a transformation in developing monitoring and 
evaluation capacity. They are indicative of an altogether new capacity to 
demonstrate results, however limited at that time. This new capacity resulted from 
AusAID's increased investment in performance monitoring and evaluation through 
710 AusAID 2006, PNG Law & Justice Sector Review and Contribution Analysis, AusAID 4. 
711 Ibid. 
712 1bid 8. 
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the establishment of the JAG.713 This focused unprecedented resources on 
developing the capacity to monitor and evaluate performance. 
Third and arguably more importantly, they indicate that while it was possible to 
identify some changes after almost four years of reform endeavour, there was still no 
evidence of a relationship between activities and impact at the real world level. More 
specifically, there was no means of establishing development attribution.714 The 
limits of these findings clearly demonstrate the substantial resources and time 
required to first contribute to change and second to demonstrate evidence of that 
contribution. 
Fourth, these findings were timely in highlighting the need to orient all aspects of 
development endeavour on results. This involves both generating results and 
developing the capacity to demonstrate those results, establishing a relationship 
between reforms and impact, and supplying the key element of attribution. 
Significantly, the evidence indicates that further resources were required to affect 
performance change and, critically, to demonstrate the evidence of contribution. 
Fifth, it is unfortunate that the data collection for this assessment omitted 
Bougainville. This meant that reference to the emerging trend data identified in the 
community surveys was excluded. It is all the more curious that no attempt was 
made to analyse the cause for the lack of impact data. The review is ambivalent 
about whether this was due to a lack of performance monitoring or a lack of 
performance. In terms of development effectiveness, the review was oddly opaque 
on this critical issue. This ambivalence continues to remain suspended and 
unresolved until some future date, owing to postponement of the contribution 
analysis.715 
The omission of impact data is a matter for comment, as the lack of evidence of 
outcomes does not compare favourably with similar development projects where 
713 
'[l]n the context where 'previous monitoring and evaluation has focused in the main on the efficiency of achieving 
contracted outputs ... [t)he JAG which will report to both Governments on sector and AusAID program performance 
and advise on constraints to the effective functioning of the sector. The JAG will play a role in supporting GOPNG 
efforts to define sector outcomes and indicators drawing on information coming out of the above preparatory studies. 
AusAID 2002, Concept Paper for a Law and Justice Sector Program, AusAID, Canberra, 6-7. See also: Armytage, l 
2007, AusAJD Assistance to Papua New Guinea's Law and Justice Sector (2003-2007): Lessons Learned- Desk 
Review, 19. 
714 The costs of LJSP varied annually, but was approximately $25m each year; see for example: LJSP, Annual 
Report 2005, 56: $23,784,382; plus JAG costs of $1,651.355; JAG 2005, Six-Monthly Report: December 2005. It 
should be noted that while the implementation phase of LJSP commenced in 2003, the planning and design phase 
commenced one year ear1ier at the beginning of 2002, almost four years before this review was undertaken in late 
2006. 
715 As at mid-2009, the contribution analysis had not been resumed; source: email advice of Bishop K, AusAID's law 
and justice advisor, 18 September 2009. 
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performance impacts are clearly measurable within shorter timeframes.716 Moreover, 
it is certainly a matter for comment that no performance impact could be identified by 
this review after more than 4 years of development assistance at a cost of some $90 
million.717 Whether this lack of data was indicative of a performance deficit or an 
evaluative deficit was a central question which this review left unanswered. 
AusAID has long been aware of its institutional weaknesses in its performance and 
evaluation approach.718 This is evident in the recent inaugural annual review of 
development effectiveness which found that while most aid activities were well 
managed and achieving some good results, 
it is difficult to demonstrate the links between well-managed activities and 
better outcomes for the poor. To help measure the outcomes of Australian 
aid activities, the quality of monitoring and evaluation needs to be 
improved.719 
If we accept that change was measurable within these timeframes and that other 
projects have demonstrated impact earlier, AusAID must be asked the critical 
question: why was change still not visible at this stage of reform in PNG? The answer 
to this question might be: the change management approach required revision, or 
data collection required improvement, or both. In this crucial sense, this review lost a 
critical opportunity to extend evaluative rigour to the question: is it possible to 
demonstrate attributable results? This omission is in line with the broader institutional 
pattern of deficient evaluation already internally acknowledged by AusAID, above. 
The reasons for the existence of this pattern, which I addressed in Part 2 of this 
thesis, may be found in the conflict of interest that AusAID confronts in its 
organisational function what Hammergren has described as 'the fireman's 
syndrome' - where self-evaluative rigour may be shied away from as being politically 
self-destructive. 720 
716 See, eg: above n 617. 
117 Representing 4/5 of total expenditure at the end of the fourth year for this 5-year program. 
718 In an internal synthesis evaluation over the period 1992·1997, McMaster found a weakness of some of the 
evaluations was the lack of quantitative information on the actual project inputs, outputs and outcomes and a 
comparison of the achieved outcomes with the outcomes predicted in the project appraisal reports. In several 
evaluations, conducting a cost-benefit analysis was difficult because of the lack of available quantitative information 
on which to base the analysis. McMaster, J 1998, Evaluation Findings: A Compilation of AusAID's Evaluation and 
Review Reports 1992-1997. AusAID. Canberra. See also:. AusAID 2005. Rapid Review of Quality-at-Entry (QAE) 
2004: Innovative Activity Design , AusAID, Canberra. 
719 AusAID 2007, Annual Review of Development Effectiveness: Key Findings, AusAID, Canberra. 
720 Above n 487. 
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Whatever the reason, there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that AusAID's 
contribution analysis pulled its punches, resorting to the common call for more time in 
order to avert addressing the more difficult but central questions on aid effectiveness. 
c Strategic approaches 
Third, at the thematic level, there is evidence of a distinctive development tendency 
to preference engagement with the formal sector, and some confusion over capacity-
building. 
Restorative justice and the bias to the formal sector 
The case study provides discernible evidence of an organisational tendency to 
allocate resources to support the agencies of the formal justice sector of central 
government which was demonstrably contrary to PNG's restorative justice mandate. 
As we have already seen, one of the defining features of the new approach to legal 
and judicial reform in PNG was its endorsement of the National Law and Justice 
Policy and Plan of Action (NLJPPA).721 This policy was built on three pillars: 
improved functioning of the formal law and justice agencies to increase the 
effectiveness of the deterrence system; improved sectoral coordination to target 
priorities and enhance operational performance; and an increased focus on crime 
prevention and restorative justice.722 Notwithstanding this explicit endorsement, the 
documentary evidence indicates that only a tokenistic portion of LJSP funds was 
actually spent on activities which may be seen as supporting restorative justice. 
Some of the reasons for this disjunction may be that restorative justice is not a 
readily understood concept and is evidently difficult to support. In the JAG's issues 
paper of 2004, Dinnen defined restorative justice in PNG as being a justice process 
concerned with addressing obligations with problem-solving, and reparation rather 
than blame and punishment; it builds on kinship relationships to connect with 
communities and coordinate justice service delivery in a cooperative manner which is 
721 The purpose of LJSP was explicitly stated to be: 'To assist the Government of Papua New Guinea in 
strengthening the efficiency and effectiveness of the formal law and justice system, and support the informal system 
as an alternative avenue for the redress of disputes, consistent with the PNG National Law and Justice Policy.' 
AusAID 2002, Concept Paper for a Law and Justice Sector Program. AusAID, Canberra, 11. 
722 National Law & Justice Policy and Plan of Action (2000), Government of Papua New Guinea Law and Justice 
Sector <http://www.lawandjustice.gov.pg/www/html/50-overview.asp> 28 November 2009. 
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compatible with custom.723 The sector later defined restorative justice as a process 
that aims to repair the damage caused by a particular offence or dispute rather than 
one which simply focuses on the punishment of offenders. Ideally, it involves direct 
participation by both victims and offenders in the resolution of disputes and 
offences. 724 
This understanding of restorative justice is centrally important for the annual program 
plan. The expenditures for all development activities in the National Law and Justice 
Policy were specified in each annual plan, itemising how the LJSP would allocate its 
financial resources for both the formal and informal sectors during that calendar 
period. An analysis of the most recent plan for the period under study- APP 2007, 
Annex C - revealed that, of the annual program disbursement of 77 million kina, the 
major spending was on capital works - mainly on building and renovating courts and 
prisons (36%); personnel - mainly technical assistance provided by long-term 
technical advisors (29.8%); and training (7.33%). The most visible community-related 
activities were the Yumi Lukautim Mosbi (YLM) community-based youth project in 
Port Moresby (2.37%) and the Community Justice Liaison Unit (CLJU) (6.45%). In 
effect, just 8. 75% of the total program expenditure was directly allocated to readily 
identifiable community-based activities, compared with the 36% allocated to 
infrastructure of formal sector institutions. This reflects a four-fold differential in favour 
of the latter, and to the additional allocation of long-term advisors - most, though not 
all, of whom were posted in agencies of the central government, such as the courts in 
Port Moresby. This trend was consistently reflected in other periodic reports. 725 
This evidence of a fourfold differential in LJSP expenditures between agencies of the 
formal sector and those of the informal sector and community-based entities, is 
manifestly contrary to the overarching spirit of PNG's restorative justice policy 
approach, and highlights the challenge and difficulties of operationalising it. 
The allocation of financial resources is a significant, though not necessarily definitive, 
indicator of how development policy is being implemented. The identification of this 
bias in funding raises the fundamental question of whether the priorities for reform 
7230innen S 2004, 'Working Paper on Restorative Justice and Community-Oriented Approaches to Crime Prevention 
and Dispute Resolution', working paper, JAG, July 2004, 10. 
724 LJSP 2007, Annual Performance Reporl 2006, Law and Justice Sector Secretariat, Government of Papua New 
Guinea , xxii. <http://www.lawandjustice.qov.pg/resources/documents/2006 APR Final Draft.odf> at 29 November 
2009. 
725 LJSP 2006, 'Annex C: Program Activities by Agency' Annual Program Plan 2007, Government of Papua New 
Guinea, AusAID.169; see also, LJSP 2004 Quality at Entry Assessment, Government of Papua New Guinea, 
AusAID, 6 , which noted that 'the LJSP was focusing on the institutional strengthening of the agencies involved in the 
law and justice sector.' 
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activities conformed to the Government of PNG's vision of restorative justice. There 
is probably no formulaic answer to this question. On the one hand, in a highly 
dispersed, remote, traditional society of over 700 language groups where access to 
government services is often virtually non-existent, it can be forcefully argued that 
most resources are required at the village level to support the informal sector. On the 
other, where almost all available recurrent government funding is allocated on 
salaries, the central apparatus of the state is manifestly needy in many respects.726 
An arbitrary allocation of 50% each to the formal and informal sectors offers little 
assurance of providing an appropriate balance, and may not address universally 
endorsed priorities. Additionally, the tendency towards engagement with the formal 
sector might reasonably be expected on the basis that it costs more to build prisons 
and courts than it does to build village courts or establish facilities for community-
based diversionary and rehabilitation schemes. At the same time, there are limits to 
how much the informal, community-based Village Court system can absorb before it 
is transformed, through financial accountability requirements, into its antithesis, a 
formal court, and become an artefact of the formal system. 
It is reasonable to deduce from this financial evidence that AusAID's engagement 
with the informal sector was more difficult than its engagement with the central 
agencies of the formal sector. The evidence indicates that the LJSP was struggling to 
operationalise the vision of restorative justice, and having difficulty in addressing 
what it has described in the program design document as a program element: 
'business as usual is no longer acceptable.'727 In effect, a cardinal element of the 
new restorative justice approach was being under-addressed, and the LJSP was 
unable to break the mould of traditional, state-centric, top-down institutional capacity 
building, as prescribed in AusAID's original concept paper.728 
Further insights on this perverse outcome may be gleaned when the profound nature 
of AusAID's shift in development approach is appreciated. By looking behind the 
facade of AusAID's formal adoption of GoPNG's restorative justice policy, it becomes 
apparent that until very recently, AusAID had traditionally approached justice reform 
as part of 'law and order' in a predominantly instrumentalist conception for promoting 
economic growth, characteristic of the World Banks' approach discussed in Part 1 of 
this thesis. This is explicit from AusAID's discussion of its contribution to PNG in 
726 The AusAID aid budget of approximately AUD300m served as the Government of Papua New Guinea's de facto 
non-recurrent development budget during this period. 
727 LJSP 2005, Program Design Document, Government of Papua New Guinea, AusAID, 18. 
728 Above n 664; see also analysis of the history of judicial reform in chapter 2, from page 24 onwards. 
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2003: 'Public security and the effective operation of a rule of law that protects private 
property and contractual arrangements are essential for supporting socio-economic 
development and economic growth. The law and order problem has been identified 
as a major economic and social development problem and constraint in Papua New 
Guinea for all of the period since independence.'729 This reflects a historic 
preference, or bias, for supporting mainly 'law and order,' or police-based reform, as 
distinct from its new law and justice sector-wide approach. 730 More particularly, there 
is plenty of evidence to show that AusAID has adopted elements of the World Bank's 
'thin' instrumentalist approaches in aligning foundational aspects of its development 
policy. Examples of this can readily be found in its approach to good governance, as 
we have already seen, which reasserts the familiar mantra that sound policies and 
institutions are central to growth and development, and that better governance can 
have a positive impact on the effectiveness of aid.731 
Ultimately, the LJSP's preferential support of the formal sector, despite an explicit 
mandate to the contrary, cannot be dismissed as incidental. Rather, this disjunction is 
significant in illuminating an organisational development philosophy and process 
which were deeply entrenched in a state-centric rather than a pro-poor orientation. 
ii Change management and incentives 
This case study also provides evidence of some confusion in overall change 
management approach which is visible in the lack of any political economy analysis 
of the slow rate of change, and in the existence of a hands-off approach to facilitating 
.change. 
729 AusAID 2003, 'The Contribution of Australian Aid to Papua New Guinea's Development 1975--2000: Provisional 
Conclusions From a Rapid Assessment', Evaluation and Review Series No. 34, 2003, AusAID, Canberra 11. 
730 During this period, Australia provided more than A$240 million in assistance to strengthen law and justice in 
Papua New Guinea, 68% of which has supported the police force. AusAID 2003, 'The Contribution of Australian Aid 
to Papua New Guinea's Development 1975-2000: Provisional Conclusions From a Rapid Assessment', Evaluation 
and Review Series No. 34, 2003, AusAID, Canberra 11. 
731 Historically, AusAID has often relied on research conducted by the World Bank. AusAID 2006, Australian aid: 
Approaches to supporting governance, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID's governance approach is virtually 
indistinguishable from either the World Bank or Asian Development Bank, and emphasises four focal areas for 
assistance, being: improving economic and financial management, strengthening law and justice, increasing public 
sector effectiveness, and developing civil society. See, for example, AusAID's conceptualisation of good governance: 
'A landmark study by the World Bank. Assessing Aid- What Works, What Doesn't and Why (1998), demonstrated 
the crucial role that good governance plays in enhancing the effectiveness of aid . ... One element of good 
governance that is needed for sustained development is an economy that operates in an ethical, accountable and 
appropriately regulated environment, which facilitates competition in the marketplace. Without this, there will be no 
driver for economic growth and sustainable development will not be possible. A dynamic private sector, operating in 
a properly functioning competitive market system, creates jobs and income, generates wealth and helps ensure that 
resources are used efficiently.' AusAID 2000, Good Governance: Guiding Principles for Implementation, AusAID, 
Canberra, 5. 
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As we have already seen, the LJSP reported, on a number of occasions, a need to 
speed up the pace of PNG counterparts, and often commented that progress was 
slow.732 More particularly, the LJSP described constraints which included 'resistance 
to change' on the part of counterparts. 733 
The many reports of slowness and resistance to change warrant analysis. What did 
they signify? First, it may be observed that slowness was not surprising from 
bureaucratic systems which were chronically under-resourced, enervated by poor 
incentive structures, sometimes dysfunctional, and prone to being inertia-bound.'34 
These shortcomings supported the earlier observations on the need for increased 
capacity-building, and signified a critical gap in donor support. But, oddly, there was 
no documented evidence of any discussion on the possible use of performance-
based incentives for either key counterparts or LJSP contractors to address these 
problems. This was a surprising omission, as they gave rise to the possible need to 
review change management strategies. They are also indicative of an inadequate 
analysis of the political economy of change. Such an analysis would address the 
stakeholders' interests in change, notably in the executive and the judiciary. None 
were apparent from the documentation which lacked any rigorous analysis of power, 
barriers to change or incentives which as we have seen in Part 1 characterises the 
approach of DfiD among other donors. 
In sum, what is troubling about this documentation was the wholesale lack of any 
considered reflection or analysis on the possible reasons for the reported slowness of 
pace and resistance to change. If reasons had been suggested, they would have 
been crucially .relevant in improving the approach to change management. This 
omission points to a somewhat limited interpretation of the LJSPs role as a facilitator 
of developmental change, and shows a diffidence or uncertainty about the nature of 
its leadership dimension.735 It is disappointing that this issue was never thrashed out 
either with counterparts or AusAID, as it evidently entrenched the slow rate of 
change, somewhat disingenuously attributed earlier to 'cultural context'. 
732 Eg, 'Progress in 50 percent of the 30 activities, including several major initiatives, has been slower than planned or 
been delayed.' LJSP, LJSP 2004, Six-Monthly Report: January to June 2004, Government of Papua New Guinea, 
AusAID, 2; and, '[T]he Program 'lighHootprint' approach needs to be re-evaluated in light of the slow implementation 
progress.' LJSP 2004, Six-Monthly Report June 2004, Government of Papua New Guinea, AusAID, 4; among many 
others. 
733 Eg, LJSP 2006, Six-Monthly Report: January to June 2006, Government of Papua New Guinea, AusAID, 48. 
734 This was described more diplomatically by LJSP: 'As this was the first attempt at this approach to planning and 
implementation, the slowness is not unexpected.' LJSP 2004, Six-Monthly Report: June 2004, Government of Papua 
New Guinea, AusAID, 2. 
735 The program manager discussed this dilemma in its role in the Annual Program Plan for 2006: while the Program 
can facilitate appropriate opportunities for discussion and ideas for consideration, it is not appropriate for the Program 
to usurp the LJSWG or NCM executive role. LJSP 2005, Annual Program Plan 2006, Government of Papua New 
Guinea, AusAID, 29. 
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4 Conclusions of case study 
This case study of AusAID's assistance in PNG between 2003 and 2007 showcases 
a substantial bilateral judicial reform approach which may serve as an exemplar of 
contemporary practice in the Asia Pacific region. This experience provides a range of 
empirical insights which nuance our understanding of the literature in relation to both 
the purpose and evaluation of judicial reform. So, what conclusions can be drawn 
from this experience, for the purpose of this thesis, to build or refine our 
understanding of the theory and practice of judicial reform? 
a Significance for the purpose of judicial reform 
This case study is significant to this thesis in demonstrating the still evolving nature of 
the judicial reform process and, in particular, a paradigm shift which remains an 
active work in progress. It also illustrates the profound nature and implications of this 
paradigm shift, and the time required to implement change to the prevailing outlook, 
systems, procedures and practices of development engagement. This is evident in a 
number of ways. 
The case study establishes that there was marked progress in shifting the formalities 
of engagement from an agency-based project modality to a sector-based 
programmatic modality. It is however also clear that all the actors - AusAID, the 
GoPNG and the LJSP - struggled to develop the means to refocus from the 
traditional, state-centric, 'top-down' approach to a corresponding 'bottom-up' 
approach to enhance engagement with the community. Despite the existence of a 
clear restorative justice mandate to support the informal sector, a marked preference 
for engagement with the formal sector of the central government persisted. This 
preference for supporting the formal sector in a predominantly tribal society cannot 
be dismissed as incidental; rather, it illuminates a development philosophy and 
process which is deeply imbued with a state-centric rather than a pro-poor 
orientation. 
In relation to the reform process, this case study provides evidence of the dynamic 
nature of judicial reform, and the need to improve development effectiveness. 
Building on an extended history of supporting the police since 1989, it demonstrates 
AusAID's changing approach to judicial and legal reform in PNG, reframed to a 
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sector-based approach in the concept paper of 2002. This is entirely consistent with 
mounting global concerns of development failure discussed in Parts 1 and 2 of this 
thesis. 736 The concept paper provided the pretext to emphasise the preceding 
inability to measure success and the imperative to adjust reform approach. This 
essentially evolving nature of the reform process was then consistently emphasised 
in the annual program plans which stressed the imperative for an iterative and 
responsive approach to program development design. It was also mirrored in 
records relating to the development of the PMF. 
In relation to AusAID's stated purpose for reform, the concept paper specified that 
the LJSP design was expected to deliver direct benefits to the poor through improved 
law and justice services; longer-term indirect benefits through an improved 
environment for investment and growth; and enhanced safety and security. A 
poverty reduction analysis, and gender and poverty case studies were included in the 
preliminary design in the Program Design Document.737 However, there was little 
direct reference made to these studies during the implementation of the LJSP, 
suggesting their inclusion was largely a formality. While a range of projects might 
potentially have benefited the poor as members of the general community, neither 
the implementation phase nor the annual program plans articulated any justification 
for reform measures with the direct and explicit purpose of alleviating poverty or 
promoting the interests of the poor. The LJSP's community engagement program 
was limited to the establishment of the Community Justice Liaison Unit, which was 
tasked to promote access to legal aid among other things, and the establishment of 
the YLM project. In effect, the goals of poverty alleviation and economic growth 
became an abstraction at the project implementation stage where it was much easier 
to focus on the police and courts, ostensibly in an effort to reduce crime and promote 
community safety. While this preference- or bias- is understandable in dangerous 
environments like Port Moresby, it displayed a significant imbalance in approach. 
This should not, however, be seen as a dereliction of implementation on the part of 
the LJSP. Rather, I argue in Part 1 of this thesis, that this is evidence of the tenuous 
rationale of the 'thin' instrumentalist justification of judicial reform which asserts the 
institutionalist mantra that judicial reform is necessary to secure property and title for 
economic growth. On the bumpy arena of development practice in PNG, this 
theoretical justification has demonstrable difficulty in flying. 
736 Above, Chapter 3, at page 39 and surrounding; and Chapter 6, from page 125 onwards. 
737 This analysis concluded: Wherever possible the resolution of crime and conflict should be linked to opportunities 
that address under1ying issues. Income generation, vocational training, and micro-credit are vehicles for ensuring 
sustainable rehabilitation strategies. The bulk of those engaged in so-called raskolism could be diverted from crime 
through the provision of relatively modest socio-economic opportunities. LJSP 2005, Program Design Document. 
Government of Papua New Guinea, AusAID,67-71. 
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Ostensibly AusAID's approach to supporting judicial and related legal reforms in the 
LJSP was explicitly articulated in its concept paper, supporting implementation of 
PNG's National Law and Justice Policy within a broader pro-poor policy framework. 
The reforms were to improve law and justice services; improve the environment for 
investment and security; and enhance safety and security. At this time, AusAID was 
yet to formulate a comprehensive public policy on development assistance, though 
when this was ultimately formulated in a 'white paper' in 2006, it did little more than 
incorporate the existing approach.738 Development intervention was now increasingly 
justified on the basis that effective law and justice systems promote regional security, 
increase international confidence and help attract foreign investment139 
Interestingly, while AusAID is certainly one of the major investors in the World Bank's 
J4P program, it also appears to have adopted a largely 'cut and paste' approach to 
judicial reform which has reflected the instrumentalist, 'thin', neo-liberal efficiency-
focused, pro-market approach of the World Bank to judicial reform, eschewing a 
'thick' or more constitutive 'rights-based' approach which is more characteristic of 
UNDP.740 As we have seen, an analysis of the subsequent program design document 
and annual performance plans revealed a reform scenario characterised by its 
eclectic nature, wide parameters and the risk of lack of strategic focus. Beneath the 
rhetoric, this activity trend was indicative of a lack of any binding internal coherence 
of institutional policy on AusAID's part to clearly justify the specific goals of judicial 
and legal reform. 
In relation to engagement, it was observed that the informal sector received 25% of 
the funding for the formal sector, which is an extraordinary imbalance for an 
overwhelmingly tribal society where some 85% of the population live in remote 
communities largely beyond the reach of government services.741 This experience 
clearly illuminates the latent bias of the reform approach to engage with the more 
accessible agencies of the central government in the capital district of Port Moresby 
in a classic 'top-down' modality. Beyond the rhetoric for inclusive and participatory 
738 AusAID 2006, Australian Aid: Promoting Growth and Stability - a White Paper on the Australian Government's 
Overseas Aid Program. AusAID, Canberra. This White Paper advocated fostering functioning and effective states, 
wherein good governance, conceptualised largely as sound policies and institutions. is seen as central for growth and 
development, at xii. The paper similarly advocated an integrated approach to the law and justice sector: 'A focus on 
law and order will have marginal impact without parallel improvements in the prosecutions, courts and corrections 
systems. The integration of the work of AusAID, Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Attorney-General's 
Department has been central to securing real improvements in law and justice systems. This will continue and will be 
expanded further ... AusAID, the AFP and other agencies spent $138 million in 2004-05 on integrated law and 
~ustice support. This expenditure will increase in future years, 46. 
39 AusAID, Governance (2007) <http:/lwww.ausaid.gov.aulkeyaidfgover.cfm> 29 November 2009. 
740 See analysis of history of donor approaches in Chapter 2 at page 38 and surrounding, and of reinvention in 
Chapter 3 from page 52 onwards. 
741 AusAID 2009, About Papua New Guinea <http://www.ausaid.qov.au/country/pngfpng intro.cfm> at 29 November 
2009. 
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approaches, more particular was the absence of any clearly articulated policy-based 
approach by the donor as to how it sought to engage with the community, and how it 
envisaged engagement to be participatory, and how judicial and legal reform should 
contribute to poverty reduction. In effect, there was a deficit of donor vision or policy. 
This deficit was left to be filled by the consultants amongst their many other usually 
intensely pragmatic priorities to deliver outputs to meet AusAID's monitoring 
requirements for activity implementation. 
In relation to change management, the documentation revealed frequent references 
to the slow pace of implementation and also to resistance to change. But there was a 
troubling lack of analysis of the reasons for this or, more particularly, any evidence of 
political economy perspectives, power analysis or integrated political dimension in 
any of the planning documentation or implementation reports. Over all, formulation of 
the LJSP change management strategies provided few insights into stakeholders' 
powers and interests in change, or what DfiD has described as its 'driver-of-change' 
or political economy analysis.742 Moreover, the documentation displayed a 
disconcerting lacuna in aligning notions of local ownership with the facilitation role of 
the program manager. The consequence of this was to create a perception of a 
reform endeavour struggling to steer through a grey cloud, with much effort being 
expended in the process, but with few analytical tools at its disposal. In effect, there 
were suggestions of a project cycle where it seemed the same demonstrably 
unsuccessful approach from earlier interventions were being reattempted with still 
more effort and resources, but no greater methodological assurance of success, 
pointing to a lack of research and evaluation, or utilisation of their findings. 
As we have seen, this case study highlighted the competing development goals of 
the Government of Australia, evidenced in the Australia-Papua New Guinea 
Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP) and AusAID's Law and Justice Sector 
Program. It is little surprise that Australia's development policy is multi-dimensional, 
742 Above n 156, and surrounding. See earlier discussion in chapter 2. A political economy approach can identify the 
constraints to development imposed by power relations and elite-interest domination .... Instead of focusing on the 
organizational level, this approach focuses on the institutional change required to achieve transformational change. 
This institutional change is usually political, in that changing the way services are provided usually benefits some ... 
at the expense of others (usually those who previously manipulated power and influence to serve elite interests) . ... A 
political economy analysis with a focus on power and interest may well conclude that the government - as protector 
and promoter of elite and powerful interests (and the institutions that defend those interests)- is a contributory factor 
in the slow pace of poverty reduction. Pycroft, C 2006, 'Addressing the Political Dimension of Development.' ADB 
Governance Brief Iss. 14, 4. See also: Oahl-0stergaard, T, Unsworth, S, Robinson, M 2005, Lessons learned on the 
use of Power and Drivers of Change: Analyses in development cooperation, OECD DAC Network on Governance, 
Paris, ii. See also Department For International Development 2005, Drivers of Change: Briefing; and Warrener, 0, 
2004, The Drivers of Change Approach, Synthesis Paper No. 3, Overseas Development Institute, London. See Part 1 
{Purpose) of this thesis. 
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or that 'political' foreign policy imperatives trump development concerns. 743 What is 
more surprising is that the ungainly collision of these objectives is not resolved 
internally as a part of Australia's 'whole of government' approach, rather than being 
embarrassingly displayed through the operation of the PNG judicial process 
ironically, perhaps the best possible evidence of the health of its justice system. 
In relation to the planning approach, a number of observations are required on this 
experience. First, the case study demonstrated that considerable time and resources 
are required to ensure adequate levels of planning. AusAID adopted the logical 
frameworl<. or proiect management approach to development planning which 
pervaded the foundational Program Design Document, the Sector Strategic 
Framework and each subsequent Annual Performance Plan. As has been seen, this 
methodology then extended to the Performance Monitoring Approach for purposes of 
linking planning targets with indicators of outcome. In this sense, the reform process 
was tightly planned. Second, in some contradiction, the linearity of this approach was 
consciously moderated by AusAID requiring designs to be iterative and responsive to 
change. Third, and perhaps most significant from a developmental design 
perspective, it is argued that the creation of the Performance Monitoring Framework 
in PNG presages what may become a profound and arguably unforeseen shift from 
the logframe to a new sector-based performance paradigm. During the period of this 
case study, this remained a work in progress. In due course, it may be anticipated 
that planning will become increasingly driven by a reform management cycle 
informed by a tandem of planning by the Sector Strategic Framework and outcome 
monitoring from the performance framework rather than the donor's discretely 
logframed design approach. The foundations have been laid, though it has been 
noted that time is required for all parties - donors, counterparts and consultants - to 
fully adjust144 
Finally, the evidence reveals a range of anomalies in AusAID's stated approach to 
development which demonstrably impeded progress. For example, as we have seen, 
AusAID committed itself to supporting local ownership of the change process, but 
then delegated oversight of the substantial development budget to local mechanisms 
743 This argument is all the stronger with the visible referencing to Australia's national interest in the White Paper; 
even so. Cirillo argues that Australia's aid program characteristically follows two principal patterns of development 
strategies, first that reflected the thinking in international development circles, first in the 1980s focusing on structural 
adjustment, then following recognition of the importance of state institutions in enabling growth, AusAID adopted the 
'good governance' paradigm. This governance agenda was simultaneously motivated by foreign policy concerns 
which were notably security and economic imperatives. Cirillo, S 2006, 'Australia's governance aid: Evaluating 
evolving norms and objectives', Discussion Paper 06-01, Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government, 
Australian National University Canberra. 
744 See critique of project management approach, above, Chapter 7, from 144 onwards. 
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which were acknowledged to be unable to manage those responsibilities without 
commensurate capacity-building. At its most acute, this led to a systematic 
breakdown of oversight in the budget process, highlighting the unplanned and, to 
some extent, unpredictable nature of the development process. The linear 
dimensions of the logical framework approach as an assurance mechanism are 
invariably exceeded by this unpredictability. Reflecting Hellier's observation on 
donors' approach to the rule of law reform at the close of Chapter 3, reference has 
also been made to the existence of a 'locked black-box' of capacity-building lying at 
the heart of AusAID's change management strategy where convergence of core 
notions of local ownership and change facilitation seem disturbingly elusive. Finally, 
this case study provided evidence of the lack of any political economy analysis of the 
slow rate of change. The hands-off approach to facilitating change was indicative of 
a tension with promoting local ownership which was then permitted to be masked in 
the documentation by rhetoric about 'cultural context'. 
b Significance for the evaluation of judicial reform 
This case study is also significant in demonstrating that AusAID has taken an 
organisationally profound move away from an accountability-based paradigm to 
monitor outputs, toward an effectiveness-based paradigm to monitor and evaluate 
impact and results. The LJSP experience provided dense evidence of this paradigm 
shift. While it was premature to assess the potentially transformative nature of this 
shift, or to ascertain any compelling evidence of results, there was plenty of evidence 
of its implications on changing many aspects of practice. 
An examination of AusAID's monitoring and evaluation practice revealed a 
complicated and even conflicted picture: on the one hand, AusAID oversaw and even 
micro-managed a plethora of multi-levelled periodic reporting from its consultants: 
quarterly, half-yearly and annual performance reports for the sector; monthly, half-
yearly and annual performance reports from both the LJSP and the JAG; the JAG 
annual performance reviews of the LJSP; mid-term reviews of both the LJSP and the 
JAG; and a range of other focused and thematic reviews. This audit-style 
accountability and efficiency monitoring system was designed to ensure that 
AusAID's consultants delivered, on time and within budget, the outputs specified in 
the LJSP logframe. This substantial investment in conventional, project-based, self 
and peer monitoring consumed a significant portion of the available resources but 
was of negligible utility in terms of development effectiveness. It did little more than 
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perversely reinforce what had now been largely outmoded and discredited in 
AusAID's own concept paper which had explicitly identified the lack of any preceding 
critical analysis of impact of Australian assistance to the sector and prescribed a new 
approach. 
On the other hand, there is also clear evidence that AusAID was simultaneously 
committed to redressing this deficiency by investing unprecedented resources in 
developing monitoring and evaluation capacity through the JAG. The case study 
noted the comparative strengths and weaknesses of having a dedicated mechanism 
for such capacity building. This clearly reflected a substantial and unprecedented 
investment in monitoring evaluation, estimated at 6% or some $8.4 million of overall 
program cost. Preliminary evidence showed that capacity in sector performance 
monitoring was being established and, significantly, had started to generate useful 
data streams. At the same time, however, it was evident from JAG's appraisals of 
the LJSP performance reports that more time was required to reorientate from the 
earlier efficiency reporting to performance-based reporting. 
This case study illustrated the still limited capacity of both donors and counterparts to 
systematically evaluate the contribution which reform has made on the performance 
of a law and justice system. A key element in the development of this capacity was 
the design of a Performance Monitoring Framework linked, as it were at the hip, to 
the sector strategic plan. This link enabled development targets and result indicators 
to be integrated from the outset in a continuous loop of targets and results. Additional 
elements included taking baseline measures of selected aspects of sector 
performance at the earliest feasible opportunity as counterfactuals in assessing 
impact. The ongoing collection and refinement of annual performance reporting 
followed and, in due course, enabled trend analysis of performance data. The 
development of local monitoring capacity continued throughout this process. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, there was a slow but steady building of evidence-
based managerial leadership and organisational culture. It was during this period 
that the foundations of a systematic evaluative method were laid. 
In relation to demonstrating development effectiveness, the emerging evidence of the 
LJSP experience in PNG is relevant and potentially ground-breaking. The 2006 
contribution analysis, after almost four years of implementation at a cost of some $90 
million, was unable to identify any 'real world' impacts. The absence of impacts may 
be an indication that implementing visible change requires as much time and cost as 
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building monitoring capacity. As we have seen, there is evidence to suggest that, for 
institutional reasons, this contribution analysis called for more time rather than 
address the more difficult question of why there was no available evidence of 
outcomes. It is additionally significant that data emerging from Bougainville provided 
the first clear evidence of positive trends in major indicators relating to the incidence 
of crime and public confidence in police which, when compared to other sites were 
particular to those localities. At the time, it was not possible to attribute these trends 
to the LJSP on the available data, and assessing the causal issue of contribution was 
postponed to a later date. However, these trends clearly foreshadow the beginnings 
of a new era of impact monitoring and evaluation capacity, based on externally 
verifiable measures of outcome, impact and results on the performance of the sector. 
Considerable challenges, however, remain to be addressed in terms of developing 
local capacity, refining the selection of performance indicators upon which the entire 
edifice for measuring effectiveness is based, and ensuring comprehensive, reliable 
data. The substantial dimensions of the shift to evidence-based monitoring and 
evaluation are undeniable, as is the need to adjust expectations on realistic 
resources and timeframes for the delivery of such evidence. 
c Ethnomethodological insights 
In initially justifying this case study approach which built on an earlier desk review 
undertaken by this author as a consulting evaluator, I emphasised the heuristic 
element of my approach.745 Now at the close of this case study, it is fitting to resume 
a more reflexive voice in this academic analysis of what I now argue is the distinctive 
and added value of the PNG experience. 
In this case study, I have reviewed the PNG reform experience in which I served as 
project director of the JAG. Additionally, I have reviewed my desk review of that 
experience. In doing so, I have undertaken an academic analysis of this reform 
experience on two dimensions, framed in this third, theoretical dimension provided by 
the literature, which has provided me with a range of analytical tools from the global 
discourse on the purpose of judicial reform and the state of development evaluation. 
Significantly, I have now found that this theoretical dimension has changed the way 
in which I have previously perceived the value of this reform experience. For heuristic 
purposes, these changes in my perception are on occasion significant and warrant 
analysis. 
745 Chapter 1 at pages 3 and 15; and Introduction to Part 3, at page 198 and surrounding. 
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First, I reiterate my interest in evaluating the contribution of the Justice Advisory 
Group on which I served between 2003 and 2005. It would be unreasonable to 
expect me to be totally unaffected by participating in this work, and unethical not to 
disclose that interest. That said, I have argued that my participation provided a 
repository of knowledge, insight and understanding which contributed authenticity, 
and consolidated the integrity of the evaluation function. This clearly involved a trade-
off in detachment. By exposing my interest, I have relied on Guba and Lincoln's 
argument that, by staying detached, the evaluator merely ensures that s/he can 
never really understand what is going on. I have now offered an analysis of the value 
and worth of the reform performance which I trust is relevant, credible, perceptive, 
reliable and adequately substantiated for the scrutiny of examiners. 746 
Second, in this case study process, I have been confronted with an adjustment in the 
relationship between myself as a professional evaluator in undertaking AusAID's 
desk review, and now as a PhD student in undertaking this scholarly assessment. 
This adjustment arises from the functional requirements of professional evaluation 
which were framed by a 'client' who required my 'services'. As discussed in Part 2 of 
this thesis, part of the constructivist critique of the positivist approach to evaluation 
addresses the artifice of neutrality and the asymmetry of most development 
partnerships which skew the evaluation function in favour of the donor. This has been 
described by Cracknell as 'the great unmentionable in evaluation theory'. 747 Bluntly 
put, this critique asserts that donors get the evaluations they want through the 
manner in which they frame the issues to be evaluated. 
In undertaking this scholarly assessment of my earlier desk review, I am now 
confronted with the potency of this critique. As a professional working - and seeking 
to continue to work - in the judicial reform arena, I bring expertise. But I am 
additionally expected to provide services that address my client's needs. This 
expectation requires me to understand the purpose, nature and parameters of the 
evaluation. It involves some implicit measure of buying-in, and an internal 
reconciliation over the frarne of reference about what is/not doable and amenable to 
critique. The evaluator is required to delimit his/her bounds of critique: the pragmatics 
of when 'to go in hard' and when 'to go in lightly'. This is an unquantifiable, highly 
746 See methodology in Annex B. As we have seen in part 2 of this thesis, this paradigm of evaluation model refutes 
what is sees as the false assurance of positivist evaluation and provides an alternative approach which substitutes 
notions of internal validity with credibility, external validity with transferability, reliability with dependability and 
objectivity with confirmability; above n 421 and surrounding. 
747 Slhe who determines what is to be evaluated has power; as does the evaluator, whereas the classical evaluand is 
relatively power1ess. Cracknell, above n 422, 88. 
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discretionary 'space', sometimes described as involving 'good judgment'. The 
concept of this 'space' is pivotal to my findings in this and the next case study to be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 10. 
On completing this chapter, I must now acknowledge that this adjustment in the 
context and purpose of the desk review affected my evaluative function. This is 
measurable in accommodations which I now find I may involuntarily have made in the 
desk review at the expense of clinical neutrality. For example, in the desk review, I 
implicitly 'understood' AusAID's imperative to avoid highlighting what could be 
perceived as the futility of investing another $90 million in PNG without visible results. 
An explicit mention of the lack of visible results could have had the effect of killing 
much needed further support - already termed by Hammergen as the fireman's 
syndrome.748 Acknowledging this reflection has confronted me with Cracknell's 
observation that the posture of positivist neutrality is a fiction.749 It also reminds me of 
Patton's observation that, 'to claim the mantle of objectivity in the post-modern age is 
to expose oneself as embarrassingly na"ive.'750 
Hence, I must now acknowledge that it is not only AusAID that pulled its punches in 
its contribution analysis of reform performance for institutional and political reasons. 
This realization has provided me with first-hand evidence of what may be described 
as 'embeddedness', involving the pragmatic suspension of evaluative faculties. In 
my own heuristic journey in undertaking this research, I must now acknowledge the 
application of the constructivist critique that impartial evaluation is either a fiction or 
even not desirable. Evaluating development effectiveness is determined by context 
and purpose. Trade-offs are unavoidable between insight and supposed neutrality. 
Significantly, however, these trade-offs may enrich rather than reduce the findings. 
The implications of this heuristic analysis are that I must now endorse the relative 
utility of the constructivist approach to evaluation in development practice. 
In summing up, this case study of AusAID's experience in judicial reform in PNG 
provides a range of evidentiary insights which contribute to the literature and address 
key questions in this thesis. Most usefully, this case study provides early evidence of 
an emerging capacity to measure reform success. While evidence of intended 
748 Hammergren, above n 487. 
749 Some commentators insist on objectivity and are fierce critics of the participatory approach which does not seem 
to allow any scope for it; others however are willing to substitute objectivity with honesty, critical distance, integrity 
and avoidance of conflict of interest. Cracknell however argues that it is undeniable that evaluators in the past did not 
really possess absolute objectivity in any case owing to pre-conceived ideas and acquired values. It may seem to be 
an illusion that an evaluator can be totally impartial. Cracknell, above n 335, 333-336. 
750 Patton, above n 7, 50. 
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improvement remained elusive, this experience demonstrated that a performance 
monitoring framework approach could be an alternative to the logical framework 
approach to reform management. While early days, this evidence of capacity is 
sufficient to challenge the ogres of attribution and causation which plague the 
empirical discourse as identified in Chapter 5 through the systematic measurement of 
sector performance change and its linkage to reform activities. Consolidating this 
capacity will, however, require substantial technical support, and sufficient time for 
development procedures to adapt and for results to become visible . 
• • • 
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CHAPTER 10- VOICES OF THE ASIA PACIFIC EXPERIENCE 
1 Introduction 
In this third case study, I review a diverse range of experiences in judicial reform 
gathered from across the Asia Pacific region to establish that many countries have 
become actively involved in judicial reform over the past decade. These experiences 
demonstrate a range of initiatives to improve the quality of justice. My analysis 
reveals the existence of a number of common features, or generic challenges, which 
relate in particular to the goals of judicial reform, leadership, independence, capacity 
for change, training, integration, community, donors, data and results. 
In terms of addressing the substantive arguments of this thesis, this evidence of 
practice demonstrates the need for a refinement in the purpose of judicial reform in 
order to untangle the existing conflation of goals some of which are over-ambitious 
and in conflict with each other. Also, to guide ongoing endeavours, there is evidently 
a need for a sharper focus on development results, which is linked to the clarification 
of goals, and a greater investment in data, research, performance monitoring and 
evaluation. In this respect, this case study is useful in empirically validating and 
illuminating much of the discourse in the literature, considered earlier in Part 1 of this 
thesis. 
This case study is also valuable for venturing beyond the existing discourse by 
providing empirical evidence of the application of the constitutive approach to judicial 
reform, which I have proposed in Part 1, to promote justice as fairness and equity. As 
we shall see, this case study highlights the example of the South-Asian judicial 
reform experience in which support for social action litigation - where court 
judgments enforce constitutional rights to fresh water and air, a clean environment, 
education, shelter, health, free legal aid, and speedy trial and justice - makes a 
demonstrable contribution to more equitable poverty-alleviating outcomes. 
In terms of methodology, my earlier professional role as the editor of 'Searching for 
Success in Judicial Reform: Voices from the Asia Pacific Experience' (OUP, 2009) 
forms the threshold for the empirical work of this case study.751 For the purpose of re-
evaluating that earlier experience, I then add an ethnomethodological reflection to my 
751 Armytage L, 'Introduction,' in Armytage L and Metzner L (eds) Searching for Success in Judicial Reform: Voices 
from the Asia Pacific Experience, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2009, 3-42. 
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editorial analysis in order to contribute a distinctively academic dimension to the 
'space' between the evaluand and the evaluator in relation to merit, worth, and 
significance, which are integral to the evaluative function. 
On the basis of this ethnomethodological analysis, this case study establishes the 
existence of the 'space' mentioned above between the evaluand and the evaluator 
on which critical judgements are based. This 'space' is implicit and endogenous to 
the evaluation function. I demonstrate the existence of this 'space' through specific 
differences in my evaluative behaviour as editor and now in this scholarly treatment. 
By using my earlier editorial work as the counterfactual, I demonstrate that the 
difference in this evaluative 'space' is determined by contextual and functional 
considerations. These considerations require the evaluator to exercise discretionary 
judgments which are not readily amenable to systematisation. Significantly, this 
qualitative 'space' often influences the process of evaluating judicial reform and 
thereby contributes to and affects its outcome. 
I outline and justify the methodology for this case study approach in annexes B and 
8.3 of this thesis.752 
2 Background 
This case study assesses the experience of a number of judicial reform practitioners 
from around the Asia Pacific region over the past decade. They were the 
contributing authors in a publishing project funded by UNDP to promote reflection, 
exchange of experience and learning in judicial reform. 753 I participated as technical 
editor in this project, the outcome of which was the monograph: Searching for 
Success in Judicial Reform: Voices from the Asia Pacific Experience, published by 
Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2009. 
The focus of this case study is thereby the diverse judicial reform practice across the 
Asia Pacific region as seen in the contributions of the authors of Searching for 
Success (S4S). In particular, its starting point is the introductory first chapter written 
by this author as editor of that publication. In effect, S4S is the source of the data, but 
it is not the case study itself. The case study is this present analysis of the editorial 
752 See methodology, in Annexes Band 8.3. 
753 Financial assistance was provided by the UNDP Regional Centre Bangkok (RCB), serving as executing agency, 
together with the UN Democracy Fund, AusAIO and some other donors; Mukerjee 0 2009, Evaluation Report: 
Strengthening the APJRF and Developing a Judicial Reform Handbook, UNDP Regional Centre Bangkok. 
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assessment of the authors' contributions, presented in the introductory chapter to 
S4S, with an ethnomethodological reflection of that experience. While my work on 
the introduction to S4S was undertaken as a part of this doctoral research and is thus 
a part of this thesis, this case study goes beyond that introduction in a number of 
significant ways.754 First, it reduces and synthesises my findings in that introduction 
to form the threshold for further analysis provided below. Second, I restructure that 
work by omitting substantial portions and by adding further analysis. Third, I reframe 
and extend my original analysis to go considerably more deeply and beyond the 
scope of that introduction to address the research questions of this thesis in light of 
the detailed review of the literature in Parts 1 and 2. 
With this background, the case study addresses three dimensions of reality for the 
evaluative purpose of ascertaining value or worth. First, it evaluates the reality of 
judicial reform as reported on by the contributors to S4S. Second, it evaluates the 
reality of an analysis of those experiences as contained in the introductory synthesis 
of their contributions. Finally, for the academic purposes of this thesis, it evaluates 
my original editorial assessment. Hence, this case study is a multi-layered 
assessment of diverse judicial reform experiences framed in the triple dimensions of 
the contributing practitioners, and myself in the dual roles of editor and now scholarly 
reviewer. For the purpose of this thesis, the research methodology involves a re-
evaluation of my earlier editorial commentary, together with an ethnomethodological 
reflection. 
S4S was a published output of a project conducted by the Asia Pacific Judicial 
Reforms Forum (APJRF) which is a network of 49 superior courts and justice sector 
agencies across Asia and the Pacific. 755 This forum determined to focus this 
publication on five aspects of judicial reforms: implementation of judicial reform 
initiatives; promoting access to justice; ethics and accountability; case management; 
and judicial education and skills development. 756 The purpose of S4S was to promote 
the development of know-how and to refine understanding of judicial reform through 
754 I was encouraged by my supervisor, Professor David Kinley, to accept the professional assignment to facilitate 
and edit S4S as a part of my ongoing doctoral research because of its general compatibility to the research inquiry of 
this thesis; as a consequence I used that assignment as a relevant and indispensable part of my preparation of this 
case study. I exclusively wrote the Introduction to this publication, and served as Technical Editor; Metzner served 
as Network Facilitator of the constituent body, Asia Pacific Judicial Reform Network; see above n 751. 
755 The APJRT was lead by a board of judges drawn from around the region, chaired by Justice Antonio Carpio of the 
Supreme Court of the Philippines, responsible to oversee and manage project activities, notably production of S4S. 
This board was composed of representatives from the judiciaries of five member states ~ Philippines, China, 
Thailand, Vanuatu and Australia - together the secretariat and RCB. The board was supported by a secretariat, 
chaired by Justice Kenneth Hayne AC of the High Court of Australia, which setved as implementing agency at the 
Federal Court in Sydney. Asia Pacific Judicial Reforms Forum 2009, <http:/lwww.apjrf.com/> at 28 November 2009. 
756 In November 2005, 49 superior courts and justice sector agencies met in Makati in Philippines at the International 
Conference and Showcase on Judicial Reforms which resulted in the creation of the APJRF and adoption of the 
Manila Declaration by over 25 judiciaries as a shared platform for judicial reform in Asia Pacific. 
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a critical reflection of actual experience across the Asia Pacific region. The 
experience of judges, court administrators, lawyers and researchers engaged in 
judicial reform culminated in 848, and will hopefully serve as an incubator for the 
exchange of practical experience across the region.757 
The data on which this case study is based was collected from authors selected from 
across the region as part of this book-writing process. 848 compiled the emerging 
experience of judicial reform practitioners to address the widespread problems of 
exclusion, delay, corruption and incompetence.758 As noted by Hen. Justice Kenneth 
Hayne AC of the High Court of Australia and Justice Antonio Carpio of the Supreme 
Court of the Philippines, it presents a practical guide to reform and development of 
courts across the region. 759 
As technical editor, I co-facilitated the participatory process of reaching a consensus 
among the authors on topics, approach and production. The authors then drafted 
their contributions on which I provided detailed technical and editorial feedback. 
Contributions were settled, peer-reviewed, edited and finalised. I then wrote the 
introduction which synthesised and contextualised the contributions in the global 
literature and presented thematic observations for the readership.760 
3 Findings 
This section first presents a synthesis of selected data from the authors' contributions 
to 848. It will be followed by my editorial analysis of significant findings contained in 
that data, together with an ethnomethodological analysis of my editorial commentary 
for the purpose of this thesis. This three-layered treatment is then drawn on to 
provide the foundation for the conclusions which address the research questions of 
this thesis. 
757 Annyt:age, L 2009, 'Introduction', in Armytage L & Metzner L (eds), Searching for Success in Judicial Reform: 
Voices from the Asia Pacific Experience, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, pp. 3-42, 3. 
758 Authors included: Deputy Chief Justice Prof Dr Paulus Lotulung, Indonesia; Justice Dr Ananda Bhattarai, Nepal; 
Justice Kim Sathavy, Cambodia; Prof Dr Mohan Gopal, India; Prof Myrna Feliciano, Philippines; Ms Ayesha Dias, 
India and Sri Lanka; Ms Zenaida Elepano, Philippines: Ms Anita Jowitt, Vanuatu; Mr Ly Tayseng, Cambodia; Mr Aria 
Suyudi, Indonesia; and Mr Hari Phuyal, Nepal. 
Peer reviewers included: Justice Michael Kirby, Australia; D'ato Param Cumaraswamy, Malaysia; Chancellor 
Ameurfina Herrera, and Fr Ranhilio Aquino, Phillipines; Ms Lynnsay Rongokea, Pacific Islands; Mr Warwick Soden, 
Australia; and Ms Sara Hossain, Bangladesh. 
759 Carpio, A & Hayne K 2009, 'Preface,' in Annytage L & Metzner L (eds), Searching for Success in Judicial Reform: 
Voices from the Asia Pacific Experience, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, pp. ix-x. 
760 The nature of my involvement with contributing authors was analytical rather than judgmental, that is, this role 
involved ensuring that the authors systematically addressed the structural requirements of the style guide for 548 in 
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The organisation of this section adheres to the thematic treatment of the judicial 
reform experience in S4S. The key themes comprised an overview of essential 
elements in securing justice through the development and implementation of reform 
initiatives: case management reform and delay reduction; promotion of access to 
justice through judicial reforms; ethics integrity and judicial accountability; and judicial 
education. Each thematic area addressed the authors' local reform experience in 
Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Vanuatu, 
respectively. 
As will become apparent from my analysis of the authors' experience, a number of 
generic features, or challenges, emerged. These related to the goals of judicial 
reform, leadership, independence, capacity for change, training, integration, 
community, donors, data and results. In the concluding section of this case study, I 
will argue from the findings that various aspects of their experience address the 
central questions of this thesis on the purpose and evaluation of judicial reform. I will 
then also argue from an ethnomethodological perspective that the framing of the 
context and purpose of evaluation affects not just what is assessed, but how its 
meaning and significance are perceived. 
a Securing justice 
In Chapter 1, Gopal surveyed the global judicial reform experience over the past fifty 
years and observed that little consensus existed on the purpose or success of these 
endeavours. He called for a fresh approach. He illustrated this new approach with a 
case study on India's experience which, he argued, has had a marked impact on 
improving the administration of justice. He described this experience as home-grown, 
and explained that it had been developed to enhance justice by adopting a justice-
orientated approach. Here justice is defined as a standard of human existence in 
which human conduct conforms to acceptable standards of freedom, equality, dignity, 
equity and fairness. The goal of the judiciary, and thereby of judicial reform initiatives, 
should be to secure human conduct which is: consistent with these standards; 
embodied in international treaties; and accepted principles of international law. To 
achieve this goal, the content ('what) and methodology ('how} of judicial reform 
programs need to address six variables, or the 'judicial reform hexagon' in Gopal's 
words. These variables are: the role and responsibility of courts; organisational 
efficacy; knowledge of law; judicial method; management systems of courts; and 
access to justice. He reported that this approach, which emphasised that the 
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function of the judicial system was to secure justice - rather than, for example, to 
merely settle disputes fairly, efficiently and promptly as an end in itself - has led to 
the emergence of often highly influential public interest litigation in lndia.761 
b Case management reform and delay reduction 
In Chapter 2, Elepano reviewed the experience of the Philippines in administering 
judicial caseload and addressing the problems of delay. She documented the 
paradigm shift in judicial leadership which has become more interventionist since 
2003. This chapter evaluated a variety of differential case management techniques. 
It concluded that the delay in the disposition of cases could be reduced, but only if 
the court is 'genuinely committed' to ensuring that all the events in the case happen 
in the designated time frames. Elepano portrayed the court as a learning institution, 
committed to critically monitoring its progress and constantly refining its approach. In 
particular, she argued that sustained leadership was essential in managing the 
human dimensions of the change process. In her experience, without sustained 
leadership, the desired change would be resisted by older judges, court personnel 
and litigants who found adjusting to the new timeframes difficult. Other lessons 
included the need to: clearly communicate purpose; provide incentives and sustain 
the motivation of key actors; monitor progress closely and regularly provide 
information on results; and adjust the approach as required. She reported that 
resuming judicial control of the pace of adversarial litigation from lawyers was not an 
easy transition. With a rights-based approach, however, using procedural law as a 
case management tool for the attainment of substantive justice had enhanced 
confidence in court processes performing in a fair and timely fashion. 762 
Next, Lotulung, Suyudi et al reported on the recent Indonesian experience in 
reducing the chronic backlog of old cases by almost one third. They explained that 
this was due to a number of factors: first, improvement in case management was 
given high institutional priority; second, the importance of judicial leadership and the 
contribution of stakeholder participation in the reform process were recognized; third, 
a dual strategy for backlog reduction and new case management was established. 
Earlier experience had shown that adding resources alone was not sustainable. They 
argued that this experience demonstrated that case management can -and should -
761 Gopal, M 2009, 'Development and Implementation of Reform Initiatives to Ensure Effective Judiciaries,' in 
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be simple and cost-effective. It also demonstrated that introducing an information 
management system provided reliable data which provided the judges with the actual 
logistics of service delivery. This had enabled delay to be identified as a visible 
symptom of institutional inefficiency. Monitoring the court's performance in attaining 
time standards and addressing its delay reduction goals then became possible. The 
authors attributed much of the success to the culture change in judicial attitudes 
which had been achieved through regular communication of detailed information on 
court performance, and by providing the judges with an incentive to perform 
competitively with their colleagues.763 
c Promoting access to justice 
In Chapter 3, Jowitt presented two case studies from Vanuatu where courts had 
improved the access of marginalised groups, enabling them to exercise their legal 
and customary rights. She first examined the courts' response to improving access 
for women suffering from violence in the home; she then examined the courts' 
response to improving access for those living in rural areas by renovating the island 
court system and introducing a customary lands tribunal. These reforms met with 
varying success from which the author drew a number of messages for the reader. 
Her study of domestic violence protection orders offered an example of how the 
judiciary had initiated change which promoted the exercise of legal rights in the face 
of a parliament that was reluctant to implement laws protecting women. This 
experience demonstrated that judges had seized the initiative as reform leaders by 
proactively improving the operation of the courts. It also showed that it was critical for 
the judges themselves to recognise the legitimacy of taking a leadership role. 
Establishing the customary land tribunal had mixed results. On the one hand, there 
was further indication that active participation in change management was critical for 
success: customary elders, who otherwise would have distrusted the imposition of 
external mechanisms to replace their traditional responsibilities, participated as 
tribunal members. The police, on the other hand, had not participated, causing 
misgivings in the enforcement of court orders. Where there was a risk of collision 
between customary and formal justice systems, the nature and extent of home-grown 
initiatives and local-ownership in both harmonising and integrating the two systems 
were seen as additional factors in the success of judicial reform endeavours. Finally, 
763 Lotulung, P, Suyudi A, Assegaf, R & Awiati, W 2009, 'Backlog Reduction - The Indonesian Experience,' in 
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Jowitt observed that changes had been more successful in Vanuatu when they were 
demand-driven and sought jointly by the judiciary and the community. 764 
Next, Dias presented two case studies on rights realisation in India and access to 
justice in Sri Lanka to demonstrate that judges were uniquely positioned to 
proactively enable human rights at the national level by applying the standards of 
international human rights treaties. Drawing from the experience of social action 
litigation (SAL) in India, the author stressed that the reform process must aim at not 
only improving access to the courts but also at improving access to justice through 
the courts. The justice system as a whole had to be reformed to enhance the ability 
of courts to secure the accountability of power-wielders. It could then dispense justice 
through social action by victim groups and civil society, and bring about reform by 
implementing the orders and directives issued by the courts. This experience showed 
that successful reforms had been initiated through judicial activism and support from 
civil society. Dias documented examples where SAL had filled significant gaps in the 
legal framework and expanded the concept of right to life under the Constitution 
where the apex courts had issued judgments against governmental actions relating 
to the right to fresh water and air, the right to a clean environment, the right to 
education, the right to shelter, the right to health, the right to free legal aid, and the 
right to speedy trial and justice. This experience highlighted the role of civil society 
participants forming coalitions with the courts to improve access to justice, and their 
contribution to strengthening the sustainability of the reform process through the 
pressure of their advocacy. 765 
d Ethics, integrity and judicial accountability 
In Chapter 4, Phuyal reviewed Nepal's recent experience in strengthening judicial 
integrity and accountability through the establishment of a judicial council. During a 
period of constitutional and political transition, this council had provided the judiciary 
with a mechanism for addressing unethical conduct and protecting it from arbitrary 
interference by the executive. While it was seen as an important step, this 
experience demonstrated that the extent of this new institution's effect on reform was 
limited. He reported on a lack of visionary leadership to ensure judicial integrity, and 
identified a range of measures which could have operationalised the judicial council 
764 Jowitt, A. 'Barriers to Accessing Justice- The Vanuatu Experience,' in Arrnytage L & Metzner l {eds), Searching 
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more successfully. These included: establishing a full-time secretariat and staff and 
building its professional capacity; adoption and implementation of codes of conduct; 
expansion of supervisory jurisdiction to include court staff; broader law reform and 
practical corruption control measures; streamlining complaints and operating 
procedures; and extending training to judges, court staff and the public. Additional 
needs identified by Phuyal were: a long-term planning horizon which could have led 
to a more integrated and comprehensive reform agenda; considerably more time to 
acquire experience and learn lessons in order to refine the approach; and the 
ongoing support of donors to sustain the reform process. 766 
Next, Feliciano recounted the experience of the judicial reform program of the 
Supreme Court of the Philippines which had been designed to improve 
accountability, transparency and complaints procedures. The judiciary of the 
Philippines lacked a code of ethics. In its absence, the courts' procedure to 
investigate complaints of judicial misconduct had encouraged often frivolous and 
vexatious complaints - 95% of which were dismissed without reaching the 
investigation phase - that had diverted resources and aggravated court congestion. 
To address this problem, and the widespread public perception of corruption in the 
judiciary, there is a need to introduce a defined code of ethical standards against 
which judges may be held accountable, and to streamline judicial conduct complaint 
procedures to ensure that administrative cases are heard and decided fairly and 
expeditiously. She added that greater transparency in judicial appointments should 
be instituted by allowing the public to scrutinise the exercise of the political power of 
appointment. Feliciano cited the case of Kilosbayan as a landmark example of 
judicial activism where the judiciary asserted its independence by challenging the 
arbitrary exercise of presidential nominations to the bench. She also considered the 
need to insulate the appointment process from executive interference in light of the 
culturally sensitive tradition of utang na loob, or 'debt of gratitude', where an 
appointed public official is perpetually indebted to the appointing power and whoever 
had endorsed that appointment. 767 
766 Phuyal H 2009, 'The Evolution of the Judicial Council- The Nepal Experience,' in Armytage l & Metzner l (eds), 
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e Judicial education 
In the final chapter, Tayseng and Sathavy reflected on Cambodia's challenges of 
rebuilding the judiciary which had been disembodied by the genocide of the Khmer 
Rouge. They described the profound needs and difficulties in restoring judicial 
competence, and reviewed the steps taken to establish the new Royal School for 
Judges and Prosecutors. The first generation of law-trained novices graduated from 
the 24-month curriculum for judicial orientation in 2005. The school then started to 
develop its program of in-service continuing legal education. The shortage of 
experienced judicial trainers created an imperative for the school to build its own 
capacity by conducting Training-of-Trainer programs. These were described by the 
authors as having been useful but limited owing to their ad hoc nature, the 
insufficiency of funds to pay trainers adequately, and the lack of ongoing support 
from donors. Their experience demonstrated that the resources required to rebuild 
the Cambodian judiciary have been consistently underestimated by the international 
community. While donors had evidently supported training, they had seemed 
reluctant to adopt a longer term perspective for capacity-building or to provide 
sufficient resources to develop core teaching materials. The authors also observed 
that it had been difficult for the school to coordinate donor support: donors often 
changed their experts and staff, making it difficult for the school to repeatedly deal 
with new-comers; the training approaches of one donor often took the training in 
different directions to that of another; the content in different programs sometimes 
overlapped; and trainers from different countries adopted different training 
approaches.768 
Finally, Bhattarai completed this collection with a review of how the National Judicial 
Academy was established in Kathmandu, Nepal. He examined the challenges of 
establishing a new training institution which required assessing the needs for training, 
developing a training faculty from scratch, conducting training-of-trainers programs, 
developing curricula and producing training materials. He pointed out that the Nepali 
political context had given judicial education a dynamic instrumental role in helping a 
transitional society to restore a just, humane and peaceful order, and to start 
rebuilding public confidence in the judiciary as a trustworthy and capable social 
institution. Bhattarai described the perennial difficulties of managing limited 
resources, and having to prioritise in order to avoid becoming stretched too thinly 
768 Tayseng, L & Sathavy, K 2009, 'Judicial Education and Skills Development for Judges and Court Staff- The 
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across overwhelming needs. This experience had led to the recognition of the need 
to refine the Academy's mandate to focus exclusively on training judges. Active 
steps were required to develop genuine local ownership in the program, avoid 
dependence where initiatives had been donor-driven, and to minimise the judges' 
resistance to training which had been seen as externally imposed. These challenges 
were being addressed through the continuing leadership of the Supreme Court which 
steered the program, seconded high-calibre personnel to ensure success, and 
generated support for funding. The author closed by noting that the credibility of the 
training program had grown in step with the improved day-to-day performance of 
judges whom training had helped.769 
4 Editorial and ethnomethodological analysis 
In this section, I provide a two-dimensional analysis of the above findings. This 
analysis provides empirical evidence on a range of issues which are relevant to the 
central questions of this thesis. 
The threshold of this section is my synthesis of the contributions of the authors of 
848. In my capacity as editor of 848, I facilitated coherence and order in the 
diverse experiences of the contributing authors, and provided an editorial 
commentary or evaluation on that body of experience for the purpose of introducing 
that book. From my present perspective of scholarly evaluator, I will now add 
another analytical dimension to that body of experience. As I shall shortly 
demonstrate, the 'space' between the evaluand viz. the authors' contributions and 
the evaluator differs significantly in my dual roles. My earlier editorial role created a 
counterfactual, enabling me to now isolate those aspects of the evaluation function 
which are different and thus determined by context and purpose. The significance of 
this point is that context and purpose have an integral importance in the framing of 
any evaluation and demonstrably influence evaluative outcomes. While this finding 
may initially seem trite, it has a pervasive but often under-appreciated impact on 
interpreting the perceived reality of whether judicial reform has succeeded or failed, 
which we have considered earlier in Parts 1 and 2 of this thesis. 
I start by arguing that my analysis of judicial reform in the Asia Pacific region over the 
past decade, as documented in 848, reveals the existence of eight themes, or 
769 Bhattarai, A 2009, 'Judicial Education and Skills Development for Judges and Court Staff - The Nepal 
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overarching challenges. These challenges are recurrent throughout the S4S 
contributions and may be seen as key themes that warrant ongoing consideration. 
For clarity and ease of comprehension, I analyse these challenges thematically and 
in an order that reflects their functional sequence, but not necessarily their 
importance: reform goals, leadership, community, donors, independence, training 
and capacity-building, data and results. Each theme is found in the chapters 
summarised above, and is sometimes interconnected throughout the authors' 
contributions. 770 
a Goals 
Throughout their contributions, many authors, either directly or indirectly, sought to 
clarify the goals for reform and the nature of the relationship between its purpose and 
results. Often their discussion illuminated the importance of developing a clearer 
consensus on what we are trying to do, how we should set about doing it, and how to 
become more systematic in contributing measurable improvements to justice. This 
focus re-opens the 'big' question: 'what are we trying to achieve in judicial reform?' 
which is often obscured as we set about the business of delivering activities on a 
day-to-day basis. 
As we have just seen, Gopal's contribution from the Indian experience argued for a 
judicial orientation approach which is normatively focused on securing justice by 
improving human conduct as measured in freedom, equality, dignity, equity and 
fairness. In my editorial assessment, this contribution was arguably the most 
substantial and significant because it provided a compelling theory or argument for 
the purpose of reform. I acknowledged this in my commentary, prefaced by noting 
that 'Gop a I argues persuasively .. .'771 At a more practical level, Dias provided 
examples from India and Sri Lanka where the courts enforced substantive 
constitutional rights to fresh air and water, legal aid and a speedy trial, among others. 
From the Philippines, Elephano then advocated a rights-based approach in case 
management which is compatible with this theory. She provided the rationale for 
securing substantive justice by reducing procedural delay to a reasonable time and in 
a fair manner. 
770 The following section draws directly from the analysis outlined in Armytage, L 2009, 'Introduction' in Armytage L & 
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In my editorial role, I commented that this discussion of purpose was significant 
because it would enable a consideration of the distributional dimensions of judicial 
reform which, in my view, have so far been largely overlooked in the literature. The 
implications of this evolution are potentially profound both in terms of addressing the 
challenge of contributing substantive improvements to justice - beyond the existing 
headway in promoting procedural reforms through delay reduction - and in providing 
the means to monitor their success. 
In my present scholarly role, I now observe that Gopal's position conformed to and 
reflected the recent realignment in the theory for judicial reform already identified in 
Part 1 of this thesis. This realignment, which has been seminally influenced by the 
thinking of Nobel laureate, Amartya Sen, is an ongoing process in judicial reform.772 
Those familiar with the global literature will have seen that Gopal's discussion did not 
acknowledge this documented ground-shift, its source or its potential significance in 
reframing the human being - rather than the state, the market or the development 
agency - as the key actor in the reform process. Instead, his discussion was 
grounded in an at times strident critique of the global approach; the Indian 
experience was then presented as a successful remedy. In S4S, I chose not to 
highlight these omissions in his argument. The ethnomethodological significance of 
this difference in my evaluative treatment is that, in my position as editor, I elected to 
avoid contesting or qualifying any of the authors' contributions in a manner which 
may have been seen to detract from their substance. The context of my role, and its 
purpose of showcasing the authors' work, caused me to suspend critical 
commentary. Both of these evaluative roles are legitimate; the difference in 
treatment and outcomes in these roles being determined by their context and 
purpose. 
b Leadership 
In my editorial role, I indicated that the authors identified leadership as one of the 
most significant factors for success: success depended on the extent to which the 
judiciary owned and led the reform process. Dias and Gopal specifically advised that 
this leadership needed to be 'home-grown'. Drawing on her experience in Vanuatu, 
Jowitt went further to comment on the need for the judiciary to recognise the 
legitimacy of assuming a more proactive leadership role. This narration blended with 
a discussion by other authors of what has been seen, over recent years, as the 
772 Sen, A, above n 226; see in particular discussion in Chapter 4, from p 56 onwards. 
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transformative emergence of judicial activism in the Philippines, India and Vanuatu to 
reclaim control of the docket from lawyers. The shift of focus from access to the 
court to access through the courts was highlighted by Dias who saw judicial reform 
as extending beyond the courtroom to secure justice in societal terms. 
In my scholarly role, I have argued earlier in this thesis that judicial reform exists 
within a broader political economy of change. This analytic framework addresses 
issues of power and the vested interests of the judiciary in preserving the status quo 
or promoting change.773 Within this analysis, any discussion of judicial leadership is 
incomplete without a hard-nosed assessment of its own interests; to suspend this 
critical analysis risks appearing na"ive or simplistic. At the least, the analysis should 
explore the need for mechanisms of judicial accountability. So, I now ask myself, why 
was this not discussed in S4S? The explanation for this omission is my editorial 
recognition of the need to encourage judiciaries - which are characteristically reticent 
-to adopt a more proactive role, without qualification. 
The ethnomethodological illumination of this discrepancy now raises other issues for 
scrutiny. For one, there is a doctrinal imperative for the judiciary to insulate itself to 
the point of isolation from society in the ostensible interest of independence, which 
approaches a shibboleth in judicial reform. Other vexing trade-offs then need to be 
addressed in encouraging engagement with other key reform actors, notably the 
executive, the community and donors. I will explore the sensitivities of this more 
proactive engagement shortly below. 
c Community 
In my editorial role, I highlighted the role of the community in judicial reform. Various 
insights on the often complex nature of the role and relationship of courts with non-
state actors and civil society were presented by the authors. Some commented that 
community participation was an essential ingredient to success in judicial reform. Not 
only had they found that the community was central to identifying problems and 
developing solutions, but that it is also critical in sustaining implementation and 
monitoring results. Other authors found that partnerships with the community were 
beneficial in understanding its needs and harnessing community advocacy to sustain 
the momentum of reforms. This was the experience in India, Sri Lanka and Vanuatu 
773 See detailed discussions on political economy analysis, in particular, pages 60-65, and constitutionalism at page 
66 onwards. 
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where civil society groups had successfully formed coalitions with the courts to 
improve access to justice in a 'bottom-up' system. Similarly in Indonesia, success 
was attributed to a reform endeavour in which demand had been driven jointly by the 
judiciary and the community. 
In my scholarly role, I now find myself questioning whether I should have reframed 
this analysis to expose the often intractable difficulties of bringing these eulogised 
community partnerships into play. In practice, it is my experience that these 
partnerships usually confront the nebulous nature of civil society which impedes the 
representation and articulation of the community 'voice.' Major power imbalances are 
also usually revealed in any political economy analysis of relations between those 
occupying esteemed public office, such as judges, and ordinary people which may 
render the potential of such partnerships to be nugatory. These imbalances may 
require so much mediation that 'civil society'. with all of its own paraphernalia of 
vested interests, has to intercede as a proxy actor. Other more banal difficulties are 
no less obstructive. For instance, ordinary people generally opt-out from active 
participation because they are usually under-informed, alienated or disempowered. 
As a result, these collaborations are highly prone to being tokenistic, and sometimes 
result in manipulations of the supposed 'public voice' for a managed outcome. As I 
have observed in Part 2 of this thesis, the new orthodoxy of empowerment and 
participation already gloss over these challenges.774 These are stark omissions. 
The ethnomethodological commentary on this discrepancy in treatment was, on 
reflection, determined by my editorial judgement to suspend exposing the practical 
difficulties of community engagement. Instead, I chose to promote judicial 
engagement by downplaying these not inconsiderable difficulties to avoid them being 
used as a pretext for conservative non-engagement. 
d Donors 
In my editorial role, I found that the authors provided a range of insights on the role of 
donors in judicial reform. They confirmed that donor support had been beneficial and 
was often indispensable; in many cases, reform was impossible without it. But, 
closer analysis showed that this was only half the story. There were also criticisms 
which were obliquely made, doubtless from reluctance to be seen to bite the hand 
774 See, for example: Van Rooij B, Bringing Justice to the Poor- Bottom-up Legal Development Cooperation, 2007, 
69. above. n 133. 
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that feeds. Noting that the literature often hears the louder voice of donors, I 
welcomed the rare opportunity provided by 848 to project these quieter voices of 
reform counterparts. 
In this instance, I find little discrepancy between my scholarly analysis and my 
editorial analysis. This critical analysis of the donor problem remains the central 
conundrum for commentary. Simply put, donors are indispensable to counterpart 
development, but they also influence the process with their own political agendas. 
The authors revealed that the relationship between reform actors and donors was 
one of their more complex challenges. As we have seen, some authors encouraged 
local ownership, and made coded references to 'home-grown' reform being more 
successful than that which was externally imposed. The Indian experience seemed to 
show that when change was focused on stakeholders' needs, reform was more 
sustainable. The Vanuatu experience explicitly demonstrated that changes which 
were seen to be imposed from above or outside were often misunderstood and 
resisted. In Cambodia, donors have evidently been as disruptive as they have been 
helpful, bringing alms but often lacking understanding, and offering programs that 
competed, overlapped and/or pulled in different directions. 
As I indicated in 848, the authors stressed the need for better management of donor 
assistance. This was not a trite diagnosis. Experience had shown them that getting 
the balance right was clearly difficult, and defied template prescription. At the heart 
of this challenge lie many of the concerns sought to be addressed in the Paris 
Principles discussed in Part 2 of this thesis - notably the need to improve 
harmonisation, coordination and local capacity. 775 My further observation is that the 
comments in 848 post-dated the Paris Principles, indicating that these problems 
persists in development practice half a decade after formal recognition of the 
imperative to improve aid effectiveness through more local planning and better donor 
coordination. 
On ethnomethodological reflection, the consistency of my analysis in this instance 
indicates that there were no contextual factors which significantly affected my 
interpretation of the authors' criticisms of donor mismanagement. 
775 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and 
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e Independence 
In my editorial role, I highlighted the theme of independence which emerged in a 
multi-dimensional frame. On the one hand, many authors acknowledged that there 
was a need for engagement with external partners while, on the other, they affirmed 
the need to consolidate judicial independence. I commented that a synthesis of these 
experiences stressed the need for a balance between active engagement and the 
more traditional notion of judicial independence which was often synonymous with 
isolation. 
The practical experience contained in S4S was useful in illuminating how courts had 
strived to preserve their independence through reform endeavours. The authors 
variously addressed the complex and sensitive issue of how judiciaries should 
engage with the executive, donors and the community to manage their reform 
agenda. In the past, judges have tended to step back from contact with those in the 
executive, the community or donors as a means of avoiding compromising their 
independence. Yet, more recently, emerging experience from the region had 
demonstrated that developing and integrating judicial reform plans with broader 
national change agendas had become unavoidable and indeed desirable. In the 
reform context, this was often due to the funding-stream of development assistance 
being channelled through the executive branch. In other words, participation in 
development had the effect of reducing the institutional insularity generally 
associated with independence. Other experiences demonstrated a need for 
judiciaries to manage more nuanced relationships with their reform partners in the 
executive, the community and donors. As editor, I argued that the experiences 
showcased in S4S provided evidence of positive progress in judiciaries developing 
more effective working relationships with the executive as portrayed by Gopal and 
Dias in India and by Sathavy and Tayseng in Cambodia; with the community by 
Jowitt in Vanuatu; and with stakeholders by Lotulung and Suyudi in Indonesia. 
This now leads me to a crucial question: how does the judiciary avoid erosion of its 
independence in this process of engagement? As editor, I had commented that this 
conundrum had not been resolved by the authors though there was a consensus 
over the need for the judiciary to engage in collaborative partnerships for reform.776 
In my current role, my further analysis reveals that the authors did not in fact confront 
776 Armytage, L 2009, 'Introduction' in Armytage l & Metzner L (eds), Searching for Success in Judicial Reform: 
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the above question. For whatever reason, none had reflected on what I, as a 
colleague working in the field, consider to be a centrally problematic issue viz. the 
unintended erosion of judicial independence through the ineluctable pressures of 
increased proximity and exposure to negotiation for convergence in reform agendas. 
How did I elect to deal with this omission? As editor, I chose to frame the treatment of 
this issue as something for possible ongoing consideration by readers in joining-the-
dots in the narratives. In my current scholarly role, I must now add that it is quite 
troubling that none of these leading practitioners identified participation to be 
potentially problematic. They seemed preoccupied with technical considerations and 
oblivious to the more substantial threat to the integrity of the reform process which 
emerged from a political economy analysis of the situation. 
The ethnomethodological significance of this disparity in my evaluative treatment is 
that my scholarly critique is more interrogatory of issues which I discern to be of 
overarching importance. This varies from my earlier election to promote the 
educative aspect of my editorial role which went only so far as to highlight the issues 
to avoid eroding the credibility of the contributions or reframing the discussion 
beyond the set parameters. In effect, as editor, I elected to pass certain 
inadequacies in the content provided by the authors. 
f Training and capacity-building 
In my editorial role, I observed that all authors commented positively on the need for 
training as part of their reform experiences. Development projects almost invariably 
contained training components, including establishing judicial training institutions. 
Many contributors observed that training was frequently used as a cross-cutting 
change management strategy. Analysis also indicated that training was often treated 
as a synonym for 'capacity building,' as noted earlier in this thesis. At the same time, 
some authors reported that training had been disappointing in its effects. Bhattaria, 
for example, commented that training had been insufficient in supporting a range of 
changes, though made no critique of its effectiveness. 
In my scholarly role, I find myself digging deeper to observe that this experience 
reveals quite a conflicted approach to training in reform on the part of both 
practitioners and donors. On the one hand, training is treated de facto as an anodyne 
for most reform needs, yet on the other, it is acknowledged that training can't fix 
everything. For practitioners, this conflict has been caused by refraining from 
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communicating their reservations to avoid being seen to bite the donor's hand, or to 
detract from their own best endeavours. For donors, it has arisen from the conflation 
of training with capacity-building, which is separately discussed.m Some authors 
commented on their experience of capacity building, causing me to reflect on the 
question: what is capacity building, and how is it supported? While this is a question 
on which there has been surprisingly little research in the development context to 
date, it is important. Analysis of Sathavy and Tayseng's experience in Cambodia 
revealed some peculiar insights: for example, donors consistently under-estimated 
the capacity building needs of the Royal School for Judges and Prosecutors, 
providing assistance for infrastructure or course development, but invariably on a 
one-off or unrealistically short time frame. 
The context of my editorial role did not provide an opportunity for me to interrogate 
the causes for this trend, though I did speculate that it might reflect the donors' 
preoccupation with creating sustainability, i.e. avoiding dependency. In my scholarly 
role, I find myself freer to challenge the rigidity of the donor preoccupation with 
'sustainability'. I argue that it is something of a fiction - a shibboleth in the sense of 
being something of a sacred cow - to contemplate development without creating 
dependence. This fiction entrenches a short-term perspective to change 
management which at times is myopic of the time legitimately required to reach 
development objectives. I now find myself asking surely, there is a place for creating 
partnerships between donors and developing countries over time - and even an 
imperative to do so. 
The ethnomethodological commentary on this discrepancy between my two 
evaluative roles reveals that my editorial role was bounded by a functional purpose to 
commend and encourage fragile nascent endeavour, while my present role moves 
beyond that constraint to question the coherence of the underpinning development 
strategy and propose ways in which it could be improved. 
9 Data 
In my editorial role, in particular building from the experiences in Jakarta and Manila, 
I found that the importance of investing in data was another theme which emerged 
from the contributions. The authors reported that building a systematic information 
management strategy had been foundational to reducing backlog by enabling 
777 See discussion above in Chapter 6, eg., n 367; also above in Chapter 8, eg., n 624. 
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analysis of performance data. Judges could then understand the logistics of service 
delivery, possibly for the first time. This then demonstrated the benefits of providing 
accurate information as an ingredient in effective case management. More broadly, 
experience across the region demonstrated increasing recognition of the need to 
invest in research to focus reform endeavours. As an example, judicial training 
schools in Cambodia and Nepal conducted their first training needs assessments. 
In my scholarly role, I find these experiences conform to mounting recognition in the 
literature of the imperative for sound data, methodical research and rigorous 
analysis, which are discussed in Part 2 of this thesis.778 However, having seen many 
expensive computers gathering dust across the region, I am leery of development 
consultants selling the modern snake oil of IT to courts lacking even rudimentary 
management systems in countries lacking dependable power supplies. The 
ethnomethodological commentary on this relatively minor discrepancy is again my 
assessment of the functional editorial role aiming to acknowledge and validate 
existing initiatives. I did not consider my role as editor of S4S to be the threshold from 
which to launch a diatribe - however justified - against the irrefutably wasteful 
supply-driven nature of development assistance. Nor did I see S4S as providing 
template solutions for future endeavours. In effect, the evaluative judgment 
exercised in my editorial role was to dwell on the glass being half full rather than half 
empty, representing another example of context and purpose determining the 
evaluative outcome. 
h Results 
Finally, in my editorial role, I highlighted the evidence of the authors' experience 
which showed that judicial reform endeavours had yielded results: whether in 
opening up the courts to provide justice to the poor, reducing backlog, reaffirming 
independence and accountability through disciplining corruption, or rebuilding 
competence from scratch in post-conflict countries. 
This experience was, however, mixed. Commonly, the authors reported that these 
reforms took time - often much more time than had been expected by donors. In the 
example from Nepal, support was discontinued before capacity had been 
established. In Cambodia, support was fragmented and piecemeal. In Vanuatu, 
some of the changes were obstructed by key actors who had been excluded by the 
776 See discussion in Chapter 7, eg., above nn 481 and 483. 
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process. More significantly, only some reforms in India, Sri Lanka and Vanuatu were 
able to demonstrate any benefits to the poor. In Indonesia, the Supreme Court was 
impelled to reflected on and refine its approach for ongoing improvement. Evidently, 
success was qualified, and the path had been littered with mistakes. The authors 
also reported on a near universal lack of evaluation. Time and again, they remarked 
on the absence of any evaluative feedback. When monitoring did occur, it was 
described as a reporting formality which consumed resources, but was of scant 
practical value to the reform actors. The focus of most of the commentary was on 
the many challenges of delivering activities, rather than on development results. 
That said, some authors did critically assess the effectiveness of their own 
endeavours. For example, they reported that the courts in Indonesia and the 
Philippines had evidently started to grapple with their function as learning institutions, 
establishing systems and procedures to refine their approaches based on formalising 
lessons from their judicial reform experiences. 
In my present scholarly role, I now find that I am impelled to take this analysis further. 
I use this narrative as empirical evidence that in practice monitoring and evaluation of 
judicial reform endeavours are rarely undertaken. This evidence supports a core 
argument of this thesis that monitoring is bureaucratically perfunctory and that 
evaluation is characteristically deficient, established in Part 2. As I demonstrate from 
an analysis of the literature, there is a widely-held perception that these functions 
have chronically been the weak links in judicial reform, yet they are keys to 
addressing the core concern of development effectiveness. Until there is sound 
monitoring and evaluation practice in place, it will remain impossible to distinguish 
between the absence of development results and the absence of evidence- a crucial 
and as yet an under-differentiated distinction in the literature. 
The ethnomethodological commentary on this discrepancy in treatment is frankly my 
assessment to keep my powder dry: in the limited opportunity provide by my editorial 
role, I was unable to explore and interrogate the reasons why donors had not 
addressed their own self interest by investing better in demonstrating their own 
success. Yet an explanation is certainly required. As I explain in Part 2 of this thesis, 
the deficit of evaluation warrants a considerably more detailed analysis than the 
opportunity of the S4S project made possible. As we have already seen in Chapter 7, 
this is described by Hammergren as being 'the fireman's syndrome,' whereby 
evidence of failure is suppressed as being seen to threaten ongoing funding, marking 
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the tension in practice between evaluating for accountability and evaluating for 
learning. 779 
4 Conclusions of case study 
This case study focuses on the diverse experiences of judicial reform practitioners 
across the Asia Pacific region over the past decade. This body of experience attests 
that many countries in the region have become actively involved in judicial reform. 
These endeavours have variously contributed to laying what may be described as 
visible- though as yet incomplete and uneven- foundations in judicial reform. 
This case study provides evidence of a number of generic challenges that are yet to 
be addressed in judicial reform endeavours. As we have seen, these relate to: 
refining goals; promoting more proactive leadership; involving the community; 
balancing independence with engagement; developing more sophisticated 
approaches to integrating training in change management approaches; and 
strengthening evaluation capacity in step with demonstrating improved results. As the 
contributions demonstrate, confusion over goals, under-investment in data, 
operational fragmentation, and focus on outputs rather than results are characteristic 
weaknesses across endeavour which evidently warrant further consideration. 
Within the frame of analysis provided by the bounded nature of this case study, there 
is some risk of oversimplifying both the scope of this endeavour and the complexity 
of challenges addressed in the contributions. Authors' narratives were developed in 
the context of accumulating and analysing selective experiences across the region 
for purposes of publication and consequently did not necessarily claim to be 
comprehensive or exhaustive. Does one size fit all? Evidently not. The authors' 
experiences contained in this case study are indicative of actual practice in judicial 
reform with diverse needs and purposes, context, and the nature of their responses. 
In effect, the authenticity of S4S was in the diversity of its voices. Some 
circumscription is required to avoid the risk of over-generalising when commenting on 
the theory of judicial reform. 
So, what can be gathered from these experiences in order to build or refine our 
understanding of the theory and practice of judicial reform in addressing the key 
questions of this thesis? 
779 See discussion in Chapter 7; above n 487. 
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a Significance for the purpose of judicial reform 
First, in relation to the purpose or nature of judicial reform, this experience provides 
some empirical evidence of success and results in judicial reform. This evidence can 
be measured in terms of opening up the courts to provide justice to the poor; 
reducing backlog; reaffirming independence and accountability through erecting and 
operating mechanisms to discipline corruption; and rebuilding competence from 
scratch in post-conflict countries. This success is, however, mixed and limited, and 
tends to be found more in efficiency-based procedural reform, such as in IT 
innovations and delay reduction. This suggests that it is evidently simpler to focus on 
delivering outputs of technical assistance. It also conforms to global trends as 
documented in the literature, where the performance of judicial reform has generally 
been described as disappointing. At the same time, this experience demonstrates 
that judicial reform remains a dynamic endeavour, evolving and refining with the 
accumulation of experience- slowly and not necessarily lineally. 
In addition, there is evidence from 848 of the need for a refinement of purpose to 
untangle the existing conflation of goals, some of which were found to be over-
ambitious, conflicted and even flawed. At the level of practice, the rationale for 
judicial reform was rarely explicitly articulated, other than in terms of promoting 
improvements to court performance, though one author did critically review the 
confusion and lack of clarity of higher level goals. Most compellingly, a strong case 
was put by a number of authors, in particular from the South-Asian experience, of the 
need to adopt a normatively based approach to judicial reform which focuses on 
improving justice in terms of promoting fairness and equity. In that experience, 
proactive judicial leadership in coalitions with civil society had been demonstrably 
effective. Crucially, it was only in this context that any evidence, however patchy, was 
presented to show that judicial reform could and did focus on the equity gap by 
addressing the distributive dimension of justice and promoting poverty reduction. In 
particular, the India experience of social action litigation narrated by Dias, provided a 
range of specific examples where the courts had enforced orders compelling the 
government to apply the constitutionally mandated rights of the destitute. These 
included rights to fresh water and air, clean environment, education, shelter, health, 
legal aid, speedy trial and justice which measurably contribute to improved social 
wellbeing. Interestingly, these initiatives had been taken in a country where 
international donors have traditionally been held at arm's length. 
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As we have also seen, authors consistently commented on the critical need for 
judicial leadership for the success of judicial reform. They found proactive leadership 
of the judiciary to be central to success in their reform endeavours. In order to sustain 
change, 'home-grown' leadership was necessary in encouraging ownership and 
participation. A nuanced approach was seen as essential since this leadership 
involved the judiciary building relationships with other reform stakeholders in the 
executive, community and with donors. Integrating judicial reform initiatives with 
higher-level national planning called for collaboration, proximity and engagement with 
the executive which evidently sat uneasily with more traditional notions of 
independence. Calibrating an appropriate proximity with the executive required 
considerable sensitivity, and was only on occasion successfully balanced. Similarly, 
it was often not easy for the judiciary to engage closely enough with the community 
to hear its needs while differentiating between the needs for even-handedness and 
insulation from the lobbying of interest groups. Perhaps most challenging was 
balancing its relationship with donors who, on the one hand, have a legitimate 
interest in facilitating reform yet, on the other, risk subsuming local ownership of its 
agenda. 
In practice, judicial reform often focuses on promoting judicial independence. This 
experience highlights the challenges of this reform approach. For understandable 
reasons, the courts have traditionally been leery of engagement with the executive or 
community because of concerns over the risks that this exposure creates. 
Consequently, they are relatively inexperienced at dealing with donors. Aid 
modalities expose judiciaries to power interests within the broader political economy, 
and little consideration has been extended by donors to manage this exposure. Thus, 
a consequence of calling on judiciaries to adopt a more proactive leadership in 
reform will require judiciaries, which are often both uncomfortable and under-
equipped, to confront and engage in the broader political economy of change 
management. This will undoubtedly have significant implications on how judiciaries 
preserve their independence while engaging proactively in reform, and is likely to 
cause tensions that will require sensitive handling in future. 
b Significance for the evaluation of judicial reform 
This case study goes on to confirm the diagnosis in the literature of an ongoing 
'evaluation gap' which exists between the rhetorical commitment of the Paris 
Principles in the new order of development effectiveness, and the continuing under-
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investment in systematic monitoring and evaluation.780 While not altogether 
unexpected, it is problematic that donor practice remains fraught with competition 
and diverse approaches which pull developing countries apart, confusing them, and 
depleting already scant resources. 
As we have already seen from this and related case study experience, the evaluation 
of reform endeavours is more readily measured in efficiency-based outputs than in its 
impact on poverty reduction.781 Evidence is more readily adducible where the 
improvement of institutional efficiency is claimed as the goal, though the chasm 
between the efficient delivery of procedural reforms and the effectiveness of 
development in reducing poverty remains to be crossed. Where all donors claim the 
alleviation of poverty as their overriding goal to attain the Millennium Development 
Goals, it must be observed that, with the exception of the South-Asian experience, 
the evidence of results remains non-existent in the S4S contributions. Even if results 
had been achieved, they could not be demonstrated in the continuing absence of 
systematic measurement in any positivist rendition of evaluation.782 
Thus, it is important to emphasise that the record of this diverse regional experience 
attests to both the near universal absence of results and, simu~aneously, the inability 
to demonstrate results had they existed. The significance of this distinction between 
adequacy of performance and adequacy of evaluation of performance has already 
been established in Part 2 of this thesis. This distinction highlights the significant 
challenges in resolving both the 'what' and 'how' questions.783 Conflating the deficit of 
evidence with the deficit of results frustrates the prayer of the Paris Principles to 
demonstrate improved results because success can only be demonstrated when we 
know 'what' to measure and 'how' to measure them. As we have seen, this is often 
very difficult in practice, notably because it is difficult from the outset to agree what 
constitutes qualitative improvements to justice and how to measure them. 
The experience of S4S embodies and reflects the persistence of the core challenges 
which are addressed in this thesis, and goes some way to providing solutions. 
780 See discussion in Chapter 6 at page 155-6, and in Chapter 7 at pages 181 and surrounding. 
781 See discussion on pertormance indicators for judicial reform in Chapter 7, for example, at. 105-1 08; also related 
discussion in case studies in Chapters 8 and 9. 
782 For example, no contributing authors described any baseline measures being taken in any of the experience 
documents in S4S, rending pre/post or control-group counterfactual assessments of performance improvement 
impossible. 
783 See discussion in Chapter 7. in particular, at page 185 onwards. 
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c Ethnomethodological insights 
In initially justifying this case study approach, I indicated that it would address three 
dimensions of evaluative reality. These dimensions are framed by the contributing 
authors, by myself in my professional capacity as editor of S4S, and in my present 
scholarly role. These dimensions of evaluative reality have been differentiated 
throughout this case study, first in the synthesis of findings and then through the 
comparative ethnomethodological treatment of the analytical commentary.784 
Core to my ethnomethodological approach, it is now timely to consolidate the 
differences which have emerged from this analysis. In closing this case study, I 
assume a more self-critical, reflexive voice to review the major distinctions between 
my earlier commentary as editor of S4S and this more scholarly analysis of reform 
experience. 
As I have demonstrated, in my editorial analysis of the authors' discussion of their 
experiences of the goals of judicial reform, I elected to avoid making assessments 
that might have had the effect of distracting or detracting from their contributions. In 
effect, I exercised a judgment from the context and purpose of my editorial role to 
showcase the authors' work, and elected to avoid contesting or qualifying it. This 
involved suspending my evaluative critique on a discernible number of occasions. 
In my analysis of the S4S discussion on judicial leadership, I elected to focus on the 
importance of judges adopting a proactive stance. This focus delimited an analysis of 
the implications of engaging with other key reform actors such as the community and 
donors. Additionally, the implications of a more proactive engagement in reform on 
prevailing concepts of judicial independence had to be set aside. The nature and 
parameters of my two distinctive evaluative roles dictated a clear difference in entry 
points and priorities. In effect, in S4S, I elected to encourage proactive judicial 
engagement, predicated on my intention to promote opening up the reform process 
to ordinary people, and on my objective to avoid discouraging judicial leadership 
arising from any commentary of its sensitivities, obstacles and risks. 
Interestingly, there was little discrepancy in my analyses on the subject of donors. I 
had highlighted the propensity for donor mismanagement - being part of the problem 
as much as the solution to development - in my editorial analysis. That role had 
784 See above n 529, and Annex B. 
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already provided sufficient opportunity to redress what I perceived as an endemic 
imbalance in the public voice of development partners by showcasing the authors' 
criticisms as national counterparts which I validated from my own experience as 
being credible. 
In relation to judicial independence, my scholarly critique may be seen as being 
harsher. As editor, I had elected to pull some critical punches over the adequacy of 
some aspects of the authors' narrative by preferencing the educative aspect of my 
editorial function. 
Regarding my analysis of the findings on training and capacity-building, it is evident 
that I interpreted my editorial role as being directed by the functional purpose of 
encouraging nascent endeavour. This then led to my refraining from questioning the 
coherence of the underpinning development strategy or going further to propose how 
it could be improved. 
In relation to data, the extent of my analysis was again affected by the functional 
context of my editorial role which led me to focus on acknowledging and validating 
what, in my judgment, were promising initiatives. As editor, I chose not to divert the 
focus from past endeavour to address the next steps of future endeavour. In effect, 
my editorial context and purpose determined my role to portray the reform glass as 
being half full rather than half empty. 
Finally, in relation to results, I elected to circumscribe a fuller analysis of the causes 
for the ongoing under-investment in evaluation, having judged that the context of 
introducing S4S provided insufficient opportunity to address the issue in adequate 
depth. In effect, it was my purpose to suspend a more detailed analysis until 
completing Part 2 of this thesis on the basis that this thesis provided a more suitable 
context to address those issues adequately. 
This ethnomethodological analysis clearly reveals differences in my evaluative 
treatment of the authors' contributions. As outlined above, these differences involved 
judgments being made in my editorial role to highlight certain aspects of these 
contributions for contextual and functional reasons. These reasons were often to 
validate and encourage aspects of that experience which, in my professional 
judgment, were beneficial. At times, it is clear that I felt the authors should have 
taken their analyses further. At other times, they may have suspended critical self-
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reflection, as doubtless have I, however hard I may try. As we are now seeing, my 
present scholarly role has enabled a wider and more critical analysis of issues which 
had not been raised by the contributors to S4S.785 
These differences in my evaluative treatment of the authors' contributions ranged 
from the trivial to the significant. The requirements for making an assessment of 
value and worth varied according to the context and purpose of my roles. These 
judgment calls - supported as they were by guidelines, peer critique and ultimately 
project evaluation788 - are I now argue endogenous to the evaluation role. They 
involved a complex, highly qualitative process which ultimately required me to use 
my best efforts to interpret and address the challenge of the evaluative task. 
In conclusion, this case study has illuminated what I term a discretionary 'space' 
between the evaluand and the evaluator through a sometimes uncomfortable 
ethnomethodological analysis, using my earlier editorial work as the counterfactual. 
This discretionary 'space' is demonstrably influential on both the evaluation process 
and its outcome. For the purposes of this thesis, I now argue that this evidence 
establishes that value judgments are axiomatic to evaluation. It follows that we 
should acknowledge that the evaluation of judicial reform, however much we may try 
to systematise and quantify it, will invariably - irreducibly - remain a discretionary 
assessment. Ultimately, as I have demonstrated, this discretionary 'space' between 
the evaluand and the evaluator determines the difference between seeing the reform 
glass as being half full or half empty. 
5 Summing-up Part 3 
In this part of the thesis, I have presented three case studies from the contemporary 
practice of judicial reform drawn from the Asia and Pacific region over the past 
decade and a half. Each case study provides significant different perspectives on this 
experience, reflecting a diversity of contexts, needs, priorities and approaches to the 
endeavour. 
785 Patton sees pragmatism as being concerned about judging the quality of a study by its intended purposes, 
available resources, procedures followed, and results obtained, all within a particular context and for a particular 
audience. Being pragmatic allows one to eschew methodological orthodoxy in favour of methodological 
appropriateness as the primary criterion for judging methodological quality, recognising that different methods are 
aJ?propriate for different situations. Patton, above n 7, 71/2. 
7 On completion of the project, an independent evaluation was conducted which found that 845 documented the 
"voices" of experiences from the region and that most stakeholders who were interviewed felt S4S had made a 
significant, important and unprecedented contribution to the project objectives activities. Mukerjee D 2009, Evaluation 
Report: Strengthening the APJRF and Developing a Judicial Reform Handbook, UNOP Regional Centre Bangkok, 
26. 
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This body of practical experience has illuminated numerous aspects of this 
endeavour which nuance our understanding, and provides evidence with which to 
address the core issues of this thesis, viz. the purpose and evaluation of judicial 
reform. It is now useful to highlight the key aspects of these experiences for the 
purpose of framing the evidence of practice when reconsidering the theory of judicial 
reform at the conclusion of this thesis. 
The first case study of ADS's regional support of judicial reform between 1990 and 
2007 revealed a substantial array of activities which were apparent in the form of 
policy development, new laws, empirical research, judicial and legal training, 
organisational and efficiency improvements in courts - notably in delay reduction -
technical publications and court reorganisation in many countries across Asia. 
This research has shown that ADB's journey in judicial reform has been exploratory 
and to some extent, unmapped. During this period, the Bank has searched for a 
consistent and compelling policy approach for judicial reform. This approach was 
variously framed as part of its law and policy reform program whose goals were to 
promote market enablement, good governance, poverty reduction and most recently 
empowerment. The Bank acknowledged the absence of any overarching theory or 
empirical validation for its approach, though latterly there is some tentative evidence 
of a positive relationship between reform and the growth of gross domestic product in 
Pakistan. Hence, from the outset, ADB's championship of judicial reform has as a 
matter of dialectic largely been a priori, driven by the conviction that it is important to 
reform justice systems.787 In sum, this case study has established that ADB has 
made something of a leap of faith in terms of investing in judicial and related reforms 
over an extended period across Asia. 
This has caused an ever-shifting understanding or justification for judicial reform. 
Continually changing the goals of endeavour has affected not only how the Bank 
formulated its approach, but has also confused how success is to be measured. This 
confusion over how to demonstrate success has been compounded by an historic 
and continuing under-investment in evaluation. As a result, it has been difficult for 
ADB to demonstrate success. Moreover, perhaps unsurprisingly, my analysis 
revealed a mixed picture of the Bank's approach where the imperative to lend 
761 Knowledge is said to be a priori- prior to experience - when it does not depend for its authority upon the evidence 
of experience, and a posteriori when it does so depend. Kant argued that a priori knowledge concerns only 
necessary truths. Metaphysics purports to provide necessary truths which, as such, can not be based on empirical 
evidence- eg. God exists. Guyer P & Wood A (Eds) 1998, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: 
Critique of Pure Reason (1787), CUP, Cambridge. 
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ultimately trumps the imperative for development effectiveness. The Bank assessed 
its reform activities as being important, successful and effective; and these activities 
have evidently been valued by member countries who perceived them as facilitating 
development across the region. Many of these projects were however poorly 
designed: their objectives were conflated; development logic was at times unclear; 
and monitoring frameworks were consistently weak. Impact was not assessed, and 
the Bank has been unable to demonstrate measurable results in terms of attaining its 
stated objectives. Consequently, judicial reform has become seen internally as 
under-competitive for funding. 
The second case study of AusAID's engagement in Papua New Guinea's Law & 
Justice Sector Program between 2003 and 2007 provided an incubator of practical 
reform experience at the bilateral level. Evidence revealed that during this period, 
AusAID's reform approach underwent a continuing refinement in line with mounting 
global and local disappointment with earlier development effectiveness. This process 
of refinement is significant in two particular respects. 
Firstly, AusAID reframed the focus of its reform approach quite fundamentally, from 
promoting 'law and order' through supporting the police in what has loosely been 
termed a 'top-down' approach, to adopting a more integrated approach to 'law and 
justice' involving more customary notions of restorative justice in a 'bottom-up' 
approach. My analysis of this experience found the existence of a range of 
implementation challenges which revealed that at times AusAID struggled to 
accommodate the full implications of this shift, displaying a quite pronounced bias to 
revert to engaging with agencies of the formal sector. Despite. these challenges, this 
program generated a proliferation of activities that resulted in some changes in the 
law and justice sector. Significantly, after almost four years, AusAID was still unable 
to demonstrate any evidence of impact which could be measured in terms of 
attaining its stated goals of poverty alleviation and economic growth. 
Secondly, in terms of evaluation, this case study was significant in showcasing the 
first steps in a transition from accountability-based monitoring of the efficient delivery 
of activities to an effectiveness-based paradigm of monitoring and evaluating for 
development impact and results. This transition was, however, not clear-cut. On the 
one hand, AusAID maintained its earlier investment in the full paraphernalia of output 
monitoring, despite acknowledging at the policy level its inability to address the 
concerns of development effectiveness. On the other, it supported the creation of a 
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sector Performance Monitoring Framework. Establishing a dedicated monitoring and 
evaluation capacity through the JAG encapsulated this shift. The systematic 
collection of baseline measures then provided the first evidence of crime trends and 
public confidence. While ascertaining evidence of attribution and contribution 
remained elusive, these initiatives nonetheless represented potentially transformative 
steps in establishing the capacity to demonstrate reform effectiveness. Developing 
this capacity has unquestionably been expensive, and it remains to be seen whether 
AusAID will commit to extending this investment. 
In the third case study, the diverse experiences of practitioners across Asia and the 
Pacific were seen through the lens of Searching for Success. The evidence 
indicated over the past decade that judiciaries have responded in a variety of ways to 
enable judicial reform to improve the quality of justice. This body of experience 
provided empirical evidence of some successes in judicial reform, whether measured 
in terms of opening up the courts to provide justice to the poor, reducing backlog, 
reaffirming independence and accountability, or rebuilding competence from scratch 
in post-conflict countries. 
Additionally, this case study provided evidence of the existence of a number of 
challenges which are generic to judicial reform. These challenges related to refining 
goals; promoting more proactive leadership; involving the community; balancing 
independence with engagement; developing more sophisticated approaches to 
integrate training in change management approaches; and strengthening evaluation 
capacity in step with demonstrating improved results. As the contributions 
demonstrated, confusion over goals, under-investment in data, operational 
fragmentation, and the focus on outputs rather than results were characteristic 
weaknesses in approach across the region. Consequently, this case study showed 
that success had been mixed, and tended to be limited to efficiency-based 
procedural reform, such as in information technology innovation and delay reduction. 
Equally significant was the potentially compelling evidence of the need to adopt a 
normatively-based approach to judicial reform which focuses on improving justice in 
terms of promoting fairness and equity . This was illustrated in the South-Asian 
experience where there are indications that judicial reform is promoting a 'thick' 
concept of justice in which poverty is reduced by addressing the distributive 
dimension of the equality gap. The authors of S4S provided specific examples of the 
courts issuing and enforcing judgments against governmental actions to enforce 
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rights to fresh water and air, a clean environment, education, shelter, health, free 
legal aid, and speedy trials. 
This case study also demonstrated that the evidence of effectiveness, measured in 
terms of the attainment of reform goals, remains non-existent across the region, with 
the possible exception of the South-Asian experience. The case study revealed a 
continuing under-investment in systematic monitoring and evaluation, and the 
pervasiveness of the 'evaluation gap' between the rhetoric of development 
effectiveness in the Paris Principles and real world practice, as identified in the 
literature outlined in Parts 1 and 2 of this thesis. These findings show that 
development systems and procedures are yet to implement these commitments to 
invest in monitoring and evaluating performance as the means to demonstrate 
results. They also highlight the extent of work remaining to implement the new 
management-for-development-results approach. In the continuing absence of 
systematic measurement, these findings indicate that even if results had been 
achieved, they could not be plausibly demonstrated. 
6 Generalised findings and observations from practice 
Building on the accumulated evidence of practice gathering in these case studies of 
the Asia reform experience, these empirical findings are significant to this thesis in 
establishing the following generalised propositions: 
First, this evidence consistently demonstrates the exploratory and evolving nature of 
the judicial reform enterprise in the Asia Pacific region. This was evident in all case 
studies. In particular, the practitioners' experience of judicial reform showcased in 
S4S revealed the existence of eight recurrent themes, or overarching challenges, 
that warrant ongoing consideration. As we have repeatedly seen, these challenges 
relate in essence to refining the purpose and goals of reform; the need for proactive 
judicial leadership; engagement with the executive, community and donors, which 
requires a more nuanced approach to consolidating independence; integrating 
training more effectively as part of broader capacity-building approaches; and 
investing in data. Beyond these challenges, there remains the need to complete a 
full reorientation to manage for development results across the spectrum of 
assessment, design, implementation and evaluation of judicial reform endeavours. 
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Second, with the notable exception of South-Asia where there is emerging evidence 
of judicial reform pursuing a more equitable and redistributive function, there is little 
consistent evidence of any clear and overarching poverty and pro-poor focus, despite 
the increasing rhetoric of empowerment to that effect The PNG experience 
illuminated the manifold difficulties for highly bureaucratised state-centric 
development systems to engage readily with the informal sector to promote 
restorative or customary justice. Overall, we have observed that the economic 
growth-based rationale for reform subsumes other goals, usually casting reform in an 
instrumental role of promoting efficiency and 'thin' procedural improvements to justice 
such as delay reduction, as found in the literature. In the continuing absence of 
compelling empirical justification, there is often a pronounced conflation of policy 
objectives. This was epitomised in the increasingly labyrinthine formulations of the 
ADB policy approach. There are also occasional collisions between these goals, as 
we saw with AusAID's 'whole of government' approach in PNG. Importantly, the 
search for compelling conceptual clarity over the purpose or rationale for judicial 
reform is continuing, impelled by the as-yet undimmed conviction in its undoubted 
importance. But, the ongoing empirical equivocation over justification is confusing the 
goals of this endeavour and undermining the coherence of development logic. This 
then frustrates initiatives to set measurable targets for performance and demonstrate 
results which, as we have seen at ADB, is now impeding judicial reform in the 
competition for resources. 
Third, in each case study, there is a consistent pattern of some 'results' which are 
evident as the outcomes of activities. These include a broad range of policy 
development; judicial and related training; organisational and efficiency 
improvements in courts, notably in delay reduction; technical publications; and 
institutional reorganisation and new laws. Arguably, this may give rise to some 
claims of 'success.' But this success is rare, difficult to conceptualise or substantiate, 
and tenuous at best in terms of demonstrably attaining any of the stated goals of 
poverty alleviation, good governance or civil empowerment As yet, the capacity to 
undertake systematic measurement of the performance of reform is embryonic, as 
illuminated in the potentially transformative PNG experience. When monitoring is 
extensively undertaken, the universal experience of practice confirms that it is 
invariably limited to auditing the efficiency of implementation rather than promoting 
effectiveness and improving results. Under investment in evaluation continues to 
remain endemic, except in the example of the PNG case study. With the exception 
of that experience, evaluation of impact remains entirely a matter of donor rhetoric 
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rather than action. This renders the provision of compelling evidence of success 
unlikely in the foreseeable future. The significance of this evidence is to highlight the 
time required to implement the universally endorsed commitments of the Paris 
Principles to improve aid effectiveness, not just relating to evaluation but also to 
improve aid coordination. As evidenced by S4S, in Nepal and Cambodia, this 
remains patchy. In these respects, this qualified picture of both development 
performance and evaluation generally conforms to the global literature. 
In effect, drawing these evidentiary threads together, I now argue that the formative 
and continuing explorations of practice are linked to and driven by the patchy 
evidence of performance. The experimental nature of this enterprise is unavoidable. 
Indeed under these circumstances, it is even desirable as long as it really is 'learning 
by doing.' Unfortunately, so long as the purpose of endeavour continues to disregard 
the evidence of patchy performance, these findings however more likely indicate a 
vicious cycle of dysfunctional practice where disappointing performance becomes 
embedded and repeated. 
This vicious cycle of dysfunctional reform performance is created by what I have 
argued earlier in this thesis is a trifecta of deficiencies. At their core, these 
deficiencies relate to development justification, development performance and 
development evaluation. As demonstrated in Parts 1 and 2, the deficiencies in 
development performance and evaluation can be addressed at the technical level. 
For the deficiency of justification, there is an imperative to revisit the adequacy and 
coherence of the prevailing theory for judicial reform. I will undertake this revisitation 
in the next, final, chapter of this thesis for the purpose of concluding by offering an 
additional or alternative theory which builds on the nascent but significant experience 
emerging from this region of practice. 
Finally, I have demonstrated through an ethnomethodological analysis of my own 
participation in this body of practice that the evaluative quest for value and worth is 
affected by context and purpose. I have identified distinct differences between 
examples of evaluation in practice and as part of this research, using my earlier 
works in these case studies as counterfactuals. This has illuminated the existence of 
a critical 'space' between the evaluand and evaluator. Specifically, first in the PNG 
example, I have demonstrated that not only AusAID but also myself, as desk 
reviewer, independently pulled our punches over vexing issues arising from the 
contribution analysis. Second, the experience in S4S then also revealed differences 
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in the nature of my evaluation. My editorial assessment validated existing 
endeavour, while my scholarly assessment promoted improvement. In effect, this is 
the difference between seeing the reform reality as being a glass half full or a glass 
half empty. Both visions are legitimate; the difference in the evaluation of this 'space' 
being determined by context and purpose.788 
This 'space' between the evaluand and evaluator is rarely visible. It is often eclipsed 
in any meta-analysis of judicial reform evaluation by the more discernible differences 
in paradigmatic and disciplinary approaches, and the absence of counterfactuals. It is 
usually also invisible because it is unarticulated and requires value judgments to be 
made. Yet, as I have shown, this 'space' is a critical, qualitative dimension of 
evaluation which is demonstrably influential in the process of evaluating judicial 
reform and, consequently, in influencing its outcome, ranging from the trivial to the 
significant. 
The heuristic value of this rather uncomfortable analysis is to emphasise that value 
judgments are axiomatic to evaluation and irreducible in the challenge of assessing 
judicial reform. No amount of proceduralising methodology and systematising criteria 
will eliminate their significance. Ultimately, we must each accommodate and 
acknowledge the existence of a small but critical discretionary 'space' which may be 
critical in casting either a positive or negative light on the final evaluation of reform 
endeavour. 
In sum, these case studies provide consistent evidence from the practice of judicial 
reform across the region that, contrary to any misgivings expressed in academic 
commentary, this discretionary 'space' is filled with recognition of the importance of 
reforming justice which is widely held and acted on . 
• • • 
END: PART 3. 
788 This is supported by Patton's argument that research and evaluation approaches can be classified using a 
typology of purpose: basic research to contribute to fundamental knowledge and theory; applied research to 
illuminate a societal concern; summative evaluation to determine program effectiveness; formative evaluation to 
improve a program; and action research to solve a specific problem. Patton, above n 7, 213. 
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CHAPTER 11- CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis, I have examined the performance of judicial reform in international 
development assistance over the past fifty years to argue that this endeavour has not 
yet found its path or demonstrated success. To arrive at these conclusions, I 
critiqued the prevailing theory of judicial reform and found that there is a lack of any 
cogent justification to explain what reform is supposed to do, which I called the 'what' 
question in this thesis. I found that the predominant theory of judicial reform has a 
mainly economic instrumental justification to promote growth, which I have agued is 
both philosophically and empirically insufficient. I then found that there is no 
established consensus on how to measure success, which I called the 'how' 
question. Hence, I have found the perception of disappointment in the academic 
commentary, which I cast as my central hypothesis of failure, has tangled 
deficiencies in performance with deficiencies in evaluation. 
Consequently, and contrary to the chorus of disappointment in the commentary, I 
argue that it is premature to conclude that this endeavour has failed. Instead, I have 
argued that this disappointment, much of which is endorsed in this thesis, is impelling 
a dynamic ongoing process of reinvention. More particularly, there is a dual need to 
revise the theory for reform and the means of evaluating its success. To address the 
'what' question, I have built on evidence from the emerging experience in Asia to 
argue that the purpose of judicial reform should include a constitutive humanistic 
dimension. This should centre on improving justice as fairness and equity, rather 
than simply promoting economic growth or good governance. To address the 'how' 
question, I have argued that the evidence of the success of this endeavour should be 
measured normatively in terms of the attainment of rights using the universally-
endorsed framework of international human rights law. I have then concluded that 
these answers together provide a feasible means of reframing ongoing reform 
endeavours with a reasoned prospect of demonstrating improved performance. In 
effect, this thesis displaces the economistic capture of judicial reform endeavour to 
date, and it restores juridical coherence to the discourse by reframing its theory to 
promoting justice through rights embodied in domestic and international law. 
The contribution of this thesis to the literature is fourfold. First, I have provided a 
critique of the prevailing theory of reform juxtaposed against the empirical literature 
which has supplied only partial evidence of validation. Second, I have meta-
evaluated the evaluation of reform endeavours and found it to be deficient in its 
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coherency across development in general and in its efficacy in assessing judicial 
reform practice in particular. Third, I have presented a substantial new body of 
evidence of reform endeavours across Asia which has to this point been largely 
overlooked in the global literature. Finally, I have consolidated my analyses to 
propose a refinement in the theory for judicial reform, and a conceptual means with 
which to measure ongoing success. 
I started this examination of the sufficiency of the existing approach by reviewing the 
history and commentary of this endeavour over the past half century, extending from 
Latin America in the 1960s to a study of the emerging Asian experience at the 
present time. Judicial reform is still undergoing formation, and it has experienced 
hundred-fold growth over just the past decade or two. While still a niche in 
development overall, it is now a substantial global enterprise involving thousands of 
projects valued in billions of dollars. During this period, there has been a diversity of 
evolving approaches or renderings which emphasise a variety of economic, political, 
social and humanistic justifications. Despite these renderings, there is homogeneity 
in the packaging of predominantly 'thin' procedural reforms, usually promoting 
efficiency through delay reduction, training and related activities. Most significantly, 
my analysis reveals a hegemonic instrumental economic justification grounded in 
western liberal notions of capitalism that has held primacy in these reforms. It also 
found a perception of disappointment with reform endeavours in the academic 
commentary, voiced most recently by Carothers in his critique of the 'rule of law 
revival'. The growing frustration with the existing practice is impelling exploration of 
legal pluralism, customary and traditional systems, possible convergence with the 
human rights literature and an increasingly sophisticated political economy approach. 
What I have argued this means for the ongoing discourse is that justice should be 
admitted to the new development high-table of political economy as the recognised 
means of moderating power and resolving competing interests. In sum, this 
disappointment is spurring ongoing reinvention. 
The hypothesis that judicial reform has not so far been able to demonstrate success, 
by inference that it has failed, was the starting point of this research. I began by 
seeking an understanding of the causes of the perception of disappointment. This led 
me in three directions: philosophical, empirical and literary. First, I explored the 
tenets of classical, Enlightenment and contemporary liberal philosophy to examine 
the coherence of the various theories for reform. These theories focus on the central 
role of the state in its relationship to the market and the provision of public goods 
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which includes justice to its citizens. My analysis revealed that the role of justice, and 
thereby judicial reform, varied according to the justification ascribed. It also clearly 
established the prevalence, or primacy, of the economic, and latterly political, 
theories of the school of new institutional economics. This school builds largely on 
the thinking of Weber and North to cast judicial reform in an instrumental role of 
promoting economic growth and good governance. In effect, I established that the 
justification for judicial reform had been subordinated to the discipline of economics. 
However, this economic theory is now being challenged by a human-centred theory 
which builds on the thinking of Rawls, Dworkin and Sen. It casts the purpose of 
reform in a constitutive role, to improve justice as fairness and equity. This alternative 
theory highlights the rectificatory or distributive role of justice by integrating both the 
'thick' and 'thin' concepts of justice which focus on citizens' rights. I concluded this 
analysis by arguing that reform practice has been riven by a fundamental contest 
between an instrumental, economic-based theory and a constitutive, justice-based 
theory. 
I then moved on to assess the integrity of these theoretical justifications by reference 
to the available empirical evidence on the determinants of development and their 
relationships, in order to ascertain what actually works. After surveying the 
endeavours of the school of new comparative economics, notably the empirical 
findings of Dollar and Kraay, Knack and Keefer, Djankov, Feld and Voigt, La Porta, 
North, Rajan and Rodrik, I found some evidence to validate the precepts of the 
prevailing institutional economics approach. In short, there was consistent evidence 
that economic policies had led to unprecedented, aggregate global growth. But, I also 
found numerous ambiguities and self-acknowledged gaps in the literature which 
confirmed that the empirical inquiry is incomplete and internally contested. This is 
typified in the 'transplantation debate' which led me to argue that domestic demand is 
ultimately more crucial than the particular source of the reforms in question. 
Additionally, I discovered that the empirical inquiry had not explored alternative 
justifications or theories. Much more significantly, once poverty was conceptualised 
as having an equitable dimension, I found clear evidence of an entrenched poverty 
gap and a worsening inequity gap. This was highlighted in the World Bank's World 
Development Report of 2006. The mounting prevalence of inequalities was confirmed 
by the UN's Human Development Reports and in the studies of the Asian 
Development Bank. Equally significant was my finding that the integrity of the 
economic justification was openly contested within the foremost ranks of 
development economics by such experts as Stiglitz, Sachs, Easterly and Collier. This 
309 
finding confirmed the insufficiency of the prevailing economic theory as a justification 
for judicial reform. There were many gaps and ambiguities in the empirical evidence, 
with the central inference of causality remaining problematic and deeply contested. In 
sum, I found that there is no compelling or unequivocal empirical validation for the 
prevailing economic approach; the empirical evidence is incomplete, contested, and 
questioned by its own proponents. 
This conclusion established, as a matter of dialectic, that the justification for reform 
endeavours has from the outset been a priori. This empirical insufficiency creates a 
space in which to explore and test additional theories for reform. Building on the 
preceding theoretical analysis, I proposed that this space be filled with a humanistic 
justification for reform. I argue that the goal of judicial reform should be constitutive 
and focus on the equitable dimension of poverty to promote justice as fairness and 
equity. Equity invests justice with a rectificatory, distributive function to restore rights 
recognised in either domestic or international law when those rights go awry. In this 
crucial sense, promoting justice as fairness is to be distinguished from promoting 
equality or supplanting the executive function. To support the equitable distribution of 
these rights in a manner which promotes justice does not intrude into the executive 
domain of allocating interests through the creation of rights. This argument for equity 
requires a normative framework embodied in law, being the legislative instrument to 
enact policy, which I established in the next part. Before moving there, I reviewed 
the performance of reform endeavours through an analysis of the academic 
commentary on the subject, in particular, the critiques of Trubek, Carothers, Messick, 
Hammergren and Jensen. This commentary illuminated a mounting perception of 
disappointment in the performance of reform endeavours. It provided a number of 
explanations which, of most relevance to this thesis, related to deficiencies in theory, 
knowledge, method and results of those endeavours. I then used this commentary as 
a proxy for the purpose of critiquing the hypothesis that reform has failed to this point. 
In the next part of the thesis, I critiqued and evaluated the validity of this perception 
of disappointment in the commentary. I moved on to address the 'how' question, 
being the parallel issue of assessing the value or worth of judicial reform. I found that 
the mounting perception of deficiency in the performance of reform endeavours -
which I called the 'performance gap' - was on analysis muddied by two other 
deficiencies. I found that there is also a gap in the rhetoric of development evaluation 
in general and in its current practice - which I called the 'evaluation gap'. 
Additionally, evaluation practice in judicial reform is scant and unsettled -which I 
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called the 'meta-evaluation gap'. These findings syllogistically displaced the 
hypothesis of failure by indicating that it is premature to conclude that reform 
endeavours had been deficient. Simultaneously, they highlighted the importance of 
formalising the approach to evaluation in order to enable meaningful assessments to 
be made. 
More specifically, my analysis found that development evaluation is in a transitional 
state. The Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness 2005 has significantly heightened 
the importance of evaluation, reflecting the global consensus to attain the Millennium 
Development Goals of global poverty alleviation by 2015. Evaluation is now a key 
tool in the new managing-for-development-results (MfDR) approach to improving aid 
effectiveness. I also found that the OECD-DAC has provided leadership in 
professionalising the nascent field of development evaluation. However, the 
omission of justice from the MDG's has excluded judicial reform from the ongoing 
systemisation of evaluating development endeavour. There is also consistent 
evidence that any consensus on evaluation purpose, modelling and methodologies 
are inhibited by substantial, unresolved debates. These debates are described in the 
literature as a 'paradigm war' between positivists and constructivists, pitting 
exponents such as Banerjee and Duflo against Guba and Cracknell, respectively. 
There is also evidence of irreconcilable tensions between the competing rationales of 
evaluation for accountability and evaluation as a learning tool. Isolating evaluation in 
the positivist interest to ensuring neutrality has a demonstrably perverse effect of 
embedding performance deficits by inhibiting integrated learning from the project 
management cycle. Closer analysis of these tensions also revealed increasingly 
broadly-held misgivings about the reductive modelling of MfDR which assumes that 
developmental change is predictable, belying all of the complexity of developmental 
reality. It also confirmed that evaluating development impact was rare, difficult, costly 
and slow in practice, despite rhetoric to the contrary. Collectively, I argued that this 
transitional state embodied an 'evaluation gap', or the lack of any established 
orthodoxy in evaluation approach. 
Within this general context, I then looked more closely at the evaluation of judicial 
reform. My analysis revealed the existence of a number of as yet unanswered 
questions about 'what' and 'how' to evaluate this endeavour. Different concepts of 
justice have created differences in what is to be measured. This was evidenced in 
the proliferation of numerous performance monitoring frameworks including the 
Justice Reform Index, Vera, IFES, CEPEJ, RechtspraaQ, Court Excellence, 
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Bertes/mann, Freedom House, Global Integrity, Global Corruption Index, World 
Governance Indicators, and the World Governance Assessment. This proliferation 
has replaced the earlier lack of data with an over-abundance of often irrelevant or 
conflicting data which, despite massive investment from the international 
development community, has as yet taken the discourse no closer to evaluating 
success or failure. My analysis demonstrated that it has been both conceptually and 
technically easier to measure quantitative rather than qualitative aspects. This has 
caused the selection of indicators to focus on 'thin' aspects of efficiency such as case 
processing data, training and IT. In terms of improving the quality of justice, these 
measures of reform are insufficient and often only inferential at best of improving the 
quality of justice. I established that the combination of these features constitute an 
evaluation deficit. Finally, I found that evaluations of judicial reform are rarely 
undertaken in practice and, when they are, they are routinely critiqued as lacking 
methodological rigour. This finding established a meta-evaluation deficit. In sum, I 
concluded that the evidence in the literature of evaluating reform endeavours 
revealed limited evaluation, some evidence of results, but no demonstrable empirical 
evidence of success in terms of meeting the stated goals of poverty alleviation. 
Hence, I concluded that both the theory and practice of evaluating judicial reform are 
insufficient. This finding is significant because it qualifies the initial hypothesis of a 
performance gap, and substantiates my proposition that it is premature to conclude 
that judicial reform has failed. The perceived deficiency has been caused as much 
through evaluation as through the performance of this endeavour. To strengthen the 
means of appraising reform endeavours, I argued that evaluation requires a 
normative basis. Resuming my argument in Part 1, I proposed that the evaluation of 
judicial reform should be framed around the attainment of rights which include both 
'thin' and 'thick' aspects of justice. I emphasised that developing a framework for 
measuring the attainment of rights remains a work-in-progress. The need for further 
convergence with the literature on human rights to systematise an adequate 
evaluative methodology is highlighted in the conceptual work of Alston, Darrow and 
Landman, among others. This methodology should build on the internationally 
endorsed framework of human rights law spanning, as it does, civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights. To be owned and sustainable, these rights need 
to be calibrated locally through participatory processes. While clearly much 
operational work remains to be completed, this will enable a systematic means of 
monitoring and evaluating judicial reform so that it can make a contribution towards 
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promoting justice through the attainment of rights. More significantly, it will herald a 
paradigmatic shift in evaluating reforms to justice. 
In Part 3, I then moved on to present evidence of judicial reform practice in Asia to 
address the question, 'How does the experience of practice contribute to refining our 
understanding of reform endeavours?' I provided this evidence in three case studies, 
each of which evaluated distinctly-bounded aspects of this experience. These 
comprised the multilateral experience of the Asian Development Bank, the bilateral 
experience of AusAID in Papua New Guinea, and the diverse experiences of 
practitioners across Asia Pacific over recent years. This evidence confirmed many of 
the earlier insufficiencies documented in the literature by revealing widespread 
confusion over justification of approach, limited existing capacity for systematic 
measurement, and modest results. Significantly, it also contributed new evidence 
from this region on the means of addressing these shortcomings. 
The Asian Development Bank is the largest donor in Asia, having conducted more 
than 400 projects, including the world's largest single program valued at $350 million 
in Pakistan. My analysis of this experience between 1990 and 2007 indicated that the 
ADB has developed a small but innovative, exploratory and evolving approach with 
justifications which varied from economic growth to good governance and most 
recently empowerment. Its reform assistance is generally state-centred, 'top-down,' 
and focuses on strengthening the courts through improving efficiency and training. 
This analysis revealed that the Bank's investment in this niche, which was neither 
impelled by local research nor refined through systematic evaluation, reflects an 
institutional ambivalence and represents, at its essence, a leap of faith in the 
importance of justice. 
The second case study of AusAID's experience of supporting law and justice reform 
in Papua New Guinea between 2003 and 2007 provided an example of a substantial 
bilateral program which showcased a number of significant features. These included 
a shift from a 'law and order' to a 'law and justice' approach, and illuminated the 
difficulties of implementing a mandated restorative justice vision. It also included an 
unprecedented investment in monitoring and evaluation, linking reform targets with 
results, and developing local capacity to measure performance change. This case 
study provided evidence that judicial reform can be systematically monitored and 
evaluated, though this does require resources and time. Despite finding no evidence 
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of impact after 4 years, these investments were nonetheless potentially significant in 
establishing the foundations for demonstrating reform success. 
Finally, the experience of practitioners gathered from across Asia Pacific in the third 
case study provided some mixed evidence of reform results. These results were 
found mainly in efficiency-based procedural reforms, such as in information 
technology innovation and delay reduction. It also revealed the existence of a range 
of generic challenges in reform endeavours. These challenges related in particular to 
refining goals; promoting more proactive leadership; involving the community; 
balancing independence with engagement; developing more sophisticated 
approaches to integrating training in change management approaches; and 
strengthening evaluation capacity in step with demonstrating improved results. As the 
findings demonstrated, confusion over goals, under-investment in data, operational 
fragmentation, and the focus on outputs rather than results were characteristic 
weaknesses in approach across the region. This case study was most significant in 
supplying evidence of reform endeavours in South Asia which promoted 'thick' 
concepts of justice. In that experience, reforms supported courts in making 
judgments which enforced the rights to fresh water and air, a clean environment, 
education, shelter, health, free legal aid, and speedy trial - significantly, all of which 
measurably impacted on alleviating poverty. 
In sum, these case studies were central to this thesis in illuminating a substantial 
domain of regional practice which has been rarely examined to date. Most of the 
findings supported the perception of disappointing performance and endorsed the 
literature to the extent that practice is exploratory and evolving. There was 
documented evidence of the prevalence of the economic instrumental rationale for 
reform, and a predominance of 'thin' procedural reforms. There was some evidence 
of mixed results, and consistent evidence of a range of persistent conceptual, 
technical and operational challenges. 
More particularly, these case studies are valuable for contributing significant new 
empirical evidence which supporting the four core arguments in this thesis. First, they 
provide specific and consistent evidence from the South Asian experience of 
successes in 'home grown' initiatives which reformed the courts to support the 
exercise of substantive or 'thick' rights. Second, there is emerging evidence from the 
PNG experience of an embryonic capacity to demonstrate success through 
performance monitoring frameworks which enable trend analysis of demonstrable 
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improvements in justice-related indicia directly attributable to reform initiatives. Third, 
it is evident from ADB's evolving rationale over recent years that investing in judicial 
reform has in essence been a priori to this point. In effect, judicial reform has been an 
enterprise in search of both empirical validation and evidence of success. Finally, I 
have demonstrated through a reflexive and at times uncomfortable 
ethnomethodological analysis of my own practice that evaluation irreducibly retains a 
discretionary 'space' in which critical judgments are made on whether the reform 
glass is half full or half empty. Each of these findings is significant; together, they 
consolidate the core argument of this thesis that it is possible to demonstrate 
success in judicial reform endeavours -though this has not occurred to date, may be 
costly and will require ongoing endeavour and time. 
In conclusion, I have argued that the prevailing instrumental theory for judicial reform 
is insufficient, as confirmed by the growing equity gap and mounting perceptions of 
disappointment in the performance of reform endeavours. While these perceptions 
are qualified by deficiencies in evaluation, they create the space and the imperative 
to elevate a humanistic dimension to this theory in order to promote justice as 
fairness and equity. Measurement of the evidence of success in this endeavour 
should be normative, localised and participatory, and built on the attainment of rights 
within the framework of international human rights law. This remains a work-in-
progress. 
Taken together, these proposals will realign justice as fairness and equity to the 
centre of the judicial reform enterprise, and provide a conceptually coherent means 
of systematically evaluating the success of ongoing endeavours to reform justice. 
* * * * * 
END. 
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ANNEX A- FRAMEWORKS OF MEASUREMENT 
1 Measuring justice- court-level measures789 
a ABA-CEELI -Judicial Reform Index 
The first initiative to systematise the measurement of justice and judicial reform 
endeavour was developed by the American Bar Association's Central European and 
Eurasian Law Initiative (ABA-CEELI) in the late 1990s to support transition to the 
'rule of law' of 22 post-soviet economies. 
The purpose of this index is to provide a reliable means of assessing and targeting 
judicial reform programs, and monitoring progress towards establishing more 
accountable, effective and independent judiciaries. Drawing on standards proposed 
by the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and other national and international 
bodies, the index monitors judicial reform and judicial independence through a prism 
of 30 factors which enumerate particular standards relating to six core dimensions: 
quality; education and diversity of judges; judicial powers; financial resources; 
structural safeguards; accountability and transparency; and judicial efficiency. These 
factors, or indicators, are evaluated on the basis of data collected from standardised 
Interviews of judges, lawyers, law professors, government officials, NGO leaders and 
journalists, and an analysis of a country's legal framework on the judiciary.790 
In my assessment, this index is among the most advanced initiatives to measure 
judicial reform. The inherent strength of this approach lies in its systematisation. 
ABA-CEELI has now published a number of national assessments of judicial reform, 
which adopt a standardised reporting template that enables comparative assessment 
and trend analysis over time. Its inherent weakness lies in the conflation or 
aggregation of measures which lack ready transparency and risk reducing complex, 
multidimensional phenomena to mono-dimensional ratings for convenience.791 
789 See critique of monitoring frameworks in Chapter 7. 
790 This index was conceptualised and designed on the basis of comparative legal traditions as well as international 
standards set forth in the U.N. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, the Council of Europe 
Recommendation on Independence of Judges, the European Charter on the Statute for Judges, and the International 
Bar Association Minimum Standards for Judicial Independence. The Judicial Reform Index 2009, American Bar 
Association <http://www.abanet.org/rol/publicationsljudicial reform index.shtml> at 27 November 2009. 
791 From Armenia to Uzbekistan; in addition to other assessments reports on the legal reform index, legislative 
assessments, women's rights, research papers and practice guides: Hosted at: 
<http://www.abanet.org/rot/publications/focal area publications.shtml#judicial reform> at 27 November 2009. 
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b Vera indicators for the justice sector 
In 2003, the Vera Institute of Justice developed what it describes as a 
comprehensive guide for the design of performance indicators across the justice 
sector. The indicators monitor civil safety and security, access to justice, policing, 
ministries of justice supervising prosecution and legal aid, judicial performance, non-
custodial sentencing mechanisms, prisons, accountability mechanisms and non-state 
institutions. 792 
Vera defines an indicator as a measure that helps answer the question of how much, 
or whether, progress is being made toward a certain objective, and adopts the 
basket-of-indicators approach to measuring a single concept193 These indicators 
relate to safety and security, access to justice, policing, ministries of justice 
supervising prosecution and legal aid, judicial performance, non-custodial sentencing 
mechanisms, prisons, accountability mechanisms and non-state institutions. It 
formulated these indicators using criteria related to values including transparency, 
participation, bias (in public administration, franchises, public contracts and 
enforcement), police, judiciary, non-state or informal justice mechanisms, prisons, 
information awareness, accessibility, legal representation and engagement. These 
indicators are applied using a checklist of criteria including validity, balance 
sensitivity, equality, motivation, practicality, ownership and clarity.794 
The Institute has now pilot-tested a set of 60 'rule of law' indicators in four cities in 
India, Nigeria, Chile and the US. These indicators were designed to provide concrete 
measures that are empirically defensible to assess what they described as the 
abstract concept of the 'rule of law' which they defined as: 
a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, 
public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that 
are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, 
and which are consistent with international human rights norms and 
standards ... (and) measures to ensure adherence to the principles of 
supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness 
792 Vera Institute of Justice 2003, Measuring Progress toward Safety and Justice: A Global Guide to the Design of 
Performance Indicators across the Justice Sector, Vera Institute of Justice, New York. See also: Vera Institute of 
Justice 2008, Developing Indicators to Measure the Rule of Law: A Global Approach: A Report to the World Justice 
Project, Vera Institute of Justice, New York. 
793 Vera bases this definition on: USAID 1998, Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators, USAID, 
Washington D.C.; Vera Institute of Justice 2003; ibid, 15. 
794 Vera Institute of Justice; ibid, 16. 
318 
in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-
making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal 
transparency. 795 
As at 2008, this measurement approach is continuing to be refined and remains a 
work in progress. 796 While it is premature to assess this approach, its potential 
strength lies in its multidimensional approach which aims to measure the 
performance of the justice system as an integrated sector rather than the courts or 
the police on a fragmented basis. 
c IFES Rule of Law Tool 
A third approach to the challenge of measuring justice is based squarely on the 
judicial reform experience in Latin America where the International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems (IFES) has developed what it calls a Rule of Law Tool. 
This tool was designed to enhance public trust in the justice system by promoting 
best practices in implementing institutional reforms and developing public support for 
a fair, impartial and effective judicial system. It provides statements of eighteen 
Judicial Integrity Principles which comprise: guarantee of fair trial; independence of 
judges; judicial review; judicial resources; training; security of tenure; enforcement of 
judgments; judicial freedom of expression; qualification and selection; judicial career 
promotion; disciplinary process; immunity from suit; conflict of interest rules; asset 
disclosure; standards of judicial conduct and ethics; transparent court administration; 
access to judicial information; and public access to legal and judicial information. 797 
Henderson explains that this approach was based on lessons learned from judicial 
reform efforts in the Americas which have demonstrated that passing laws and codes 
is relatively easy but implementing them is another story; many judicial and 
enforcement institutions lack the technical expertise, capacity or credibility to 
effectively and fairly enforce and implement the laws; and implementing and 
enforcing laws and policies requires broad public buy-in. This history explains the 
795 Vera Institute of Justice 2008; ibid 3. Based on: UN Secretary-General to the Security Council, The Rule of Law 
and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies. UN Doc S/2004/616 (2004). 
796 Vera Institute of Justice; ibid, 18. 
797 Henderson, K & Autheman, V 2003, 'A Model Framework for a State of the Judiciary Report for the Americas: 
Lessons Learned and Monitoring and Reporting Strategies to Promote the Implementation of the Next Generation of 
Reforms', paper presented at the 3rd Conference on Justice and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Quito, Ecuador, July 24-26, 14. See also: Henderson, K, Autheman, V, Elena, S, Ramirez-Daza, l & Hinojosa, C 
2003, Judicial Transparency Checklist, International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), Washington D.C., 
<http://www.ifes.org/files/rule-of-law/Tool-kit!Transparency Checklist EN.pdf> at 27 November 2009. 
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emphasis on monitoring transparency and accountability reforms designed to 
simultaneously promote judicial independence and a 'rule of law' culture, and making 
quality information accessible to both the judiciary and the public. 798 
Although so far not implemented, the potential strength of this approach is that it 
builds on local circumstances in the light of actual experience; its weakness is, like 
many of these frameworks, that it monitors indicators which are ultimately inferential 
of substantive, measurable improvements to justice. 
d European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice 
In 2003, the Council of Europe established the European Commission for the 
Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ). This commission has embarked on a major statistic-
gathering exercise which in due course seeks to monitor the efficiency of judicial 
systems in 40 European countries through comparative measurement of indicators of 
court performance. In the following year, the commission released its first report of 
what may become baseline data on the basis of the 2002 data. This report 
represents a mammoth effort to develop common tools which standardise and 
document a near encyclopaedic range of more than 100 quantitative and qualitative 
indicators related to the functioning of the courts. These indicators include budgets, 
legal aid, the courts, judicial staff, legal profession, users, information technology, 
treatment of criminal and civil cases, length of proceedings and enforcement. 799 
This initiative is relevant in highlighting many of the profound conceptual, technical 
and operational challenges confronting the establishment of a regional judicial 
measurement project, notably in devising and standardising measures across 
numerous highly divergent justice systems where even basic notions of the role and 
function of judges and lawyers may vary. An earlier attempt to create a Europe-wide 
system of comparable judicial statistics was described by Blankenburg as being 
'disastrous', citing for example, that overall crime rates as they were reported from 
police, prosecution and courts were 'in no way comparable'.800 Albers goes on to 
observe: 
798 Henderson & Autheman, above n 797, 9. 
799 European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) 2006, Report on European judicial systems ~ Edition 
2006 (2004 data): An oveNiew, CEPEJ, Strasbourg. See also: The European Commission for the efficiency of 
Justice 2009, Council of Europe, <http:l/www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepei/default en.asp> at 27 November 2009. 
800 Blankenburg, E n.d, Indicators of growth of the systems of justice in Western Europe of the 
1990s: The legal profession, courts, litigation and budgets, Amsterdam, 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/comparativeData.pdf> at 27 November 2009. 
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By using the terminology of judicial systems a choice is made, not to 
include the police organisations, criminal statistics and detention figures into 
the evaluation scheme . . . By taking into account the principles of a clear 
'system boundary' and 'practical use' an evaluation scheme can be 
formulated, which is built on five elements: judicial organisation, legal 
professionals, public prosecution, legislation and society.801 
A related empirical study of European justice systems conducted for the Dutch 
Judicial Council confirmed that there is a distinct lack of consistent data arising from 
the fact that these judiciary systems are not identical. As a consequence, it 
concluded that it was nearly impossible to compare the performance measures of 
each country's judiciary system.802 
The European experience highlights the practical limits of comparability between 
systems and emphasises the need to adopt a pragmatic approach to avoid making 
the evaluation scheme too big, overwhelming and complicated: 
[l)t is advisable to start the evaluation activities with only the most relevant-
and not the complete - list of indicators. 803 
While not yet operational, the potential strength of this approach is in providing a 
systematic means of comparing aspects of different judicial systems; its immediate 
and apparent weakness lies is the limits to which this can usefully be done where 
systemic differences render comparisons often trite and even meaningless. 
Recognising this weakness is, however, a useful step in any ongoing evaluative 
process. 
e Productivity Commission Reports on Government Services, Australia 
The Productivity Commission produces annual reports on government services for 
the purpose of providing information on the effectiveness and efficiency of those 
services in Australia. The aim of these reports is to provide objective performance 
information to facilitate informed policy judgments. The commission measures judicial 
performance against objectives of effectiveness (how well agencies meet the 
801 Albers, P 2003, Evaluating Judicial Systems: A balance between variety and generalisation, CEPEJ, Strasbourg, 
9. 
802 Blank J and others, Benchmarking in an International Perspective - An International Comparison of the 
Mechanisms and Performance of the Judiciary System, Rotterdam, 2004; 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.om/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/Benchmarking.pdf> 27 November 2009. 
803 Albers, above n 801,19. 
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outcomes of access, appropriateness and/or quality), equity (how well agencies treat 
special needs groups) and efficiency (how well inputs are used to deliver outputs). 
Specific indicators for courts measure cost, return, efficiency, effectiveness, among 
other criteria. Indicators of effectiveness include backlog/timeliness; diversion; 
clearance; indicators of efficiency, and cost per finalisation. 804 
The Commission intones the mantras of new institutional economics and new public 
management which are considered earlier in Chapters 2 and 5 of this thesis, to 
formulate a classic, results-based framework by setting objectives, selecting 
indicators, monitoring outputs and measuring outcomes. These indicators include 
equity (not in a lawyer's distributive sense, but to describe what it terms equity of 
access to services), effectiveness (specifically, how well the outputs of a service 
achieve its stated objectives), and efficiency (specifically, technical efficiency which 
requires that services be produced at the lowest possible cost and measures how 
well services use their resources, or inputs, to produce outputs for the purpose of 
achieving desired outcomes).805 Indicators are then extrapolated to measure justice 
with reference to the services provided by the police, courts administration and 
prisons. These essentially measure cost, return, efficiency, effectiveness and a range 
of other criteria. These measures or indicators may on occasion seem sparse, 
sometimes arbitrary, and often pragmatic, at least to non-economists. Indicators of 
effectiveness include backlog and timeliness; diversion; and clearance. Indicators of 
efficiency are cost per finalisation. 806 
The strength of this example in my argument is that it is emblematic of a thorough 
approach to systemically measuring justice; its weakness is that it uses an economic 
rather than a juridical paradigm of criteria and measures and thereby fails to capture 
any of the qualitative dimensions of justice or substantive measurable outcomes. 
As we have seen, most of these monitoring systems focus on measuring aspects of 
the performance of justice systems, and judicial reform endeavour in terms of their 
efficiency - however measured - for the obvious reason that it is relatively easy to 
measure. A number of frameworks are, however, endeavouring to be less inferential, 
and are grappling with the alternative of measuring the quality of justice, and/or the 
effectiveness of reform efforts, and judges' work within them. 
804 Productivity Commission 2008, Report on Government Setvices, 2008, Canberra, Justice Preface, C.1 and C.2, 
respectively, 
<http://www.pc.qov.au/gsp/reoorts/rogs/2008/introduction> 27 November 2009. 
805 Ibid, 1.4; Approach to performance measurement, 1.1 0. In economic terms efficiency has a number of dimensions: 
technical efficiency, allocative efficiency , and/or dynamic efficiency: ibid at 1.15 - 1.18. 
806 Ibid; Court administration, 7 .1. 
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f Judicial Quality: The Netherlands - RechtspraaQ 
The Dutch Council for the Judiciary operates a system known as RechtspraaQ to 
provide a uniform system for quality improvement across the courts. This system 
comprises a normative framework of court regulations, quality charters and court 
performance measurement. 
This quality monitoring system uses indicators which comprise five core measures: 
(a) impartiality and integrity of judges, including such measures as successful 
challenges of the impartiality of a judge, procedure for allocating cases, complaints 
procedure, perceived impartiality (satisfaction of the litigants and professionals); (b) 
expertise of judges, including perceived expertise (satisfaction of the litigants and 
professionals), preparation by the judge (satisfaction of the litigants and 
professionals), percentage of appeals compared to the total number of final 
judgements, ratio between cases decided by a panel judge and a single judge, policy 
regarding the expertise and experience of judges who preside alone, and methods of 
peer review; (c) treatment and attitude of the judges, including various aspects of 
judicial functioning (satisfaction of the litigants and professionals), allowing litigants to 
have their say during a court session, explaining the case during the court session 
(satisfaction of the litigants), explaining the decision by the court (satisfaction of the 
litigants), comprehensibility of the decision (satisfaction of the litigants); (d) unity and 
equality of law, including use of instruments to promote unity of law, and 
implementing policies to promote unity of law; and (e) speed and timeliness including 
average disposal times, percentage of adjourned proceedings, productivity of the 
judges, starting cases on time (percentage of cases that start more than 10 minutes 
too late). 807 
The council uses a number of measuring instruments which include customer 
appreciation surveys, employee satisfaction surveys and peer review committees, as 
well as other data related for example to the handling of complaints. 
The strength of this approach is, in my argument, that it seeks to systematically 
measure those 'elusive' qualitative dimensions of justice more than any other; its 
807 RechtspraaQ, A Quality System for the courts, 2004, 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/rechtspraagcompletereport.doc> (at 27 
November 2009. See also, Committee for the Evaluation of the Modernisation of the Dutch Judiciary 2006, Justice is 
Quality, The Hague, Netherlands. 
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single weakness, in my argument, remains a lack of linkage of these measures to 
any external normative framework of substantive justice outcomes. 
g International Framework for Court Excellence 
In 2008, an international consortium of judicial organisations including the NCSC, 
Federal Judicial Center, the Subordinate courts of Singapore, and the Australian 
Institute of Judicial Administration started developing the means to monitor a range of 
values that courts apply in carrying out their role. This framework is presently under 
development, though it is already in use in the US, having replaced the earlier Trial 
Court Performance Standards: Courtools, 808 which in turn evolved from the earlier 
Performance Standards and Measurement System. 809 It provides standardised 
performance measures across seven areas of excellence: public trust and 
confidence, court management and leadership, court policies, court proceedings, 
user satisfaction, court resources (human, material and financial), and 
affordable/accessible court services.810 
Once again, while it is premature to assess the strengths and weaknesses of this 
proposed approach, it is relevant in demonstrating the formative nature of the 
ongoing quest for monitoring and evaluating the provision of justice, in this instance, 
on a collaborative international basis. 
The strengths of these standards and measures are that they are comprehensive, 
systematic and amenable to application across all states of the United States with 
their diverse justice systems. For these reasons, monitoring justice is anticipated to 
be considerably more straightforward than is likely to be the case in implementing the 
CEPEJ system across Europe where the diversity of approach is fundamentally 
larger, consisting of both common law and civil systems, with corresponding key 
actors. Its limitation is, once again, that it measures 'thin' aspects of justice and that 
the aggregation of its ratings remains inferential of normative improvements to 
substantive justice. 
Another example of the formative state of developing monitoring frameworks is the 
ongoing endeavour of the United Nations to develop a Rule of Law Index to monitor 
808 National Center for State Courts 2005, Courtools, Trial Court Petformance Measures, National Center for State 
Courts, Williamsburg. 
809 Trial Court Petformance Standards and Measurement System 1997, US Department of Justice, Office of Justice 
Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Washington D.C. 
810 National Center for State Courts 2008, Jntemational Framework for Court Excellence, National Center for State 
Courts, Williamsburg. See also, National Center for State Courts 2005, above n 808. 
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the justice sector generally, with an emphasis on criminal justice and penal law, for 
the purpose of assessing needs for assistance in protecting the 'rule of law' and 
measuring progress when assistance is provided.811 UNODC also recently 
formulated a toolkit to monitor the independence, impartiality and integrity of the 
judiciary. This toolkit proposed a range of criteria which included: a legal framework; 
structure, management authority; fiscal control; judges' qualifications, selection and 
training; conditions of service and tenure; freedom of expression and association; 
integrity; discipline; public accountability and trust; system coordination; and donor 
coordination.812 
2 Measuring justice- government-level measures 
In addition to the court-centric frameworks outlined above, there are a range of 
broader frameworks which monitor justice and judicial reform through the wider lens 
of the 'rule of law'. In particular, there are now numerous governance measurement 
frameworks, the recent growth of which some commentators have described as 
'explosive' and a 'glut'813 
Over the past decade, in particular, international agencies including the World Bank, 
the UN, OECD and other major donors have developed an ever expanding range of 
measurement frameworks and indicator systems which measure a range of 
phenomena relating to poverty, the state, the market, good governance and the 'rule 
of law'. The significance of these frameworks for this thesis is not so much their 
often impressive scope, but the way these frameworks set about to conceptualise 
and systematise the measurement of abstract and complex notions such as justice; 
the manner in which that measurement process is undertaken (usually relying on 
aggregated perception-based subjective data); and the assortment of indicators 
selected as being the key proxies for those notions. 
611 
'Indicators of Safety and Justice: Their Design, Implementation and Use in Developing Countries' 2008, Summary 
of workshop held at Harvard University, 13-15 March, 
<http://www.hks.harvard.edu/criminaljustice/publications/justice indicators workshop 2008.pdf> 
at 27 November 2009. 
812 UNODC 2006, Access to Justice: The Independence, Impartiality and Integrity of the Judiciary- Criminal Justice 
Assessment Toolkit, UN, Vienna, <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal justice/JUOICIARY.odf> at 27 November 2009. 
813 Arndt & Oman, above n 290. Oman separately identified 140 sets of governance indicators; Oman, C 2007, 
'Governance Indicators and Informal Institutions,' in JOtting, J, DrechsJer, D. Bartsch, S & de Soysa, I (eds), Informal 
Institutions: How Social Norms Help or Hinder Development, OECD Development Centre, Paris, pp.1 01 ~ 103, 101. A 
recent workshop at Hardvard describes 'the glut of indicators.' Indicators of Safety and Justice: Their Design, 
Implementation and Use in Developing Countries. summary of a Workshop held at Harvard University, 13-15 March 
2008.3. 
<htto://www.hks.harvard.edu/criminaliustice/publications/justice indicators workshop 2008.odf> at 26 November 
2009. 
325 
A brief survey of these frameworks is relevant in establishing my argument that core 
elements of any notion of justice and judicial reform may be variously defined and 
conceptualised using a range of measures, data and measuring methodologies, 
which depend on their specific purpose and context. This survey demonstrates that 
the universe of justice monitoring frameworks is highly heterogeneous both 
conceptually and in its methodological approach. Consequently, despite the 
overwhelming in-pouring of data and measures over the past decade, there is as yet 
no consensus over the orthodoxy of approach or measures. 
A selective sampling of the 'rule of law' frameworks includes the work of Berteslmann 
Stiftung, Freedom House, Global Integrity, Transparency International, the World 
Bank and the United Nations. While much of this work is tangential to the challenge 
of monitoring judicial reform, it is nonetheless relevant to demonstrate how justice is 
monitored at the macro-level. A core of indicators invariably includes judicial 
independence, 'thin' conceptions of legal formalism such as procedural fairness, and 
integrity, among others. A selection of major frameworks is outlined below: 
a. Berteslmann Transformation Index provides a global framework of 
measures for democracy anchored in the 'rule of law' and a market economy, 
ranking 125 countries in two indices measuring development to democracy 
and a market economy in a status index, and the quality of governance 
among decision makers in a management index. The index measures political 
transformation (including notions of state-ness, political participation, 'rule of 
law', and stability of democratic institutions among others). Of direct 
relevance, the 'rule of law' criteria describe the. check and balance of state 
powers and civil rights, with indicators measuring the extent to which there is 
a working separation of powers, an independent judiciary, legal or political 
penalties for officeholders who abuse their positions, and the guarantee of 
protection and redress for civilliberties.814 
b. Freedom House World Survey is an annual global survey on the state of 
freedom which ranks 193 countries as 'free', 'partly free' or 'not free' using 
criteria which include political rights, civil liberties and the 'rule of law'. The 
'rule of law' is measured through numerous survey questions which relate 
principally to four values: the independence of the judiciary, civic control of 
814 Bertelsmann Siftung 2009, Shaping Change: Strategies of development and transfonnation, 
<http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/11.0.htmi?&L;;:1> at 27 November 2009. 
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law enforcement, protection from political terror, and the guarantee of equal 
treatment before the law.815 
c. Global Integrity Index assesses the access that citizens and businesses 
have to a country's government, their ability to monitor its behaviour, and their 
ability to seek redress and advocate for improved governance. These 
indicators include judicial accountability, and the 'rule of law'. 816 
d. Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer - monitors the 
incidence of corruption around the world. The Corruption Perceptions Index 
ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to 
exist among public officials and politicians. It is a composite index, making 
use of surveys of business people and assessments by country analysts 
which rank 180 countries and draws on 14 different surveys.817 
e. Transparency International Diagnostic Checklist - This checklist for 
assessing safeguards against judicial corruption synthesises international 
standards on judicial independence, accountability and corruption to list five 
minimum criteria for ensuring the existence of a systemically 'clean', 
corruption-free judiciary. The criteria relate to the existence of entrenched 
safeguards for the independence of judges, good conditions of service for 
judges, fair and independent appointment processes, judicial accountability 
and transparency. 818 This checklist builds on a number of monitoring indexes 
produced by Transparency International, including the Corruption Perception 
Index, Bribe Payers Index and Corruption Barometer.819 
f. DataGob surveys some 400 governance indicators in Latin America, the 
Caribbean and other developing regions, including a range of measures for 
the 'rule of law'. These include confidence in the judiciary, control of 
815 Freedom House n.d, Freedom in the World: 2007, 
<at 27 November 2009. 
'" Globalln1egrity 2009, Global Integrity Index. 
<http:Jiwww.globalintegrity.org/documents/Gioballntegritvlndex2008.xls> at 27 November 2009. 
817 Transparency International 2008, Global Corruption Report 2008: Corruption in the Water Sector, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. In addition, Transparency International 2007, Global Corruption Report 2007: 
Corruption in Judicial Systems, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. xxiv. 
81
'Transparency International, n.d, Combatting Corruption in Judicial Systems: Advocacy Toolkit, Transparency 
International, Berlin, <www .transparency.org/contenUdownload/27 437/413264/file/ Judiciary Advocacy T ooiKit.pdf> 
at 27 November 2009. 
819 Transparency lnternational2008, above n 817, xxiv. 
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corruption, corruption perceptions index, crime, integrity of the legal system, 
judicial independence, property rights, and the reliability of police services.820 
g. World Governance Assessment (WGA) provides an important alternative 
approach to Worldwide Governance Indicators (see below) in measuring 
governance based on a different, normative approach to governance which it 
defines as 'the formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that 
regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as well as economic and 
societal actors interact to make decisions.'821 Based on a survey of the 
perceptions of 'well-informed persons', it monitors six arena of governance, 
one of which features the judiciary and its oversight of fairness to ensure that 
rules apply equally to everyone in society. In relation to the judiciary, the 
WGA assesses the perceptions of local experts on the performance of the 
judiciary, using five indicators relating to equal access to justice, due process, 
accountability of judges, incorporation of international human rights norms, 
and predisposition to conflict resolution.822 
h. World Bank's 'Doing Business' - provides another major measurement 
system which is based on an alternative conceptualisation of the 'rule of law' 
which focuses on the function of law to secure and facilitate market dealings. 
It surveys indicators on the environment for doing business in 178 economies 
in order to measure the burden of selected business regulation with reference 
to monitoring indicators which relate to 10 stages of a business's life: starting 
a business, dealing with licenses, employing workers, registering property, 
getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, 
enforcing contracts and closing a business. The technically impressive, user-
friendly database invests this endeavour with a mantle of seductive 
convenience, certainty and authority which may be problematic.823 An internal 
review of Doing Business found seven of the 10 indicators presume that 
lessening regulation is always desirable, which is empirically dubious, and 
820 The indicators available at DataGob come from 30 different sources, including academic institutions, non-
governmental organizations, private firms and multilateral agencies. analyzing changes over time and differences 
across countries; Governance Indicators Database 2009, Inter-American Development Bank and Department for 
International Development. <http:/lwww.iadb.oro/DataGob/> and lOB launches DataGob portal of governance 
indicators 2007, media release, Inter-american Development Bank, 23 April, 
<http://www.iadb.org/news/detail.cfm?language-English&id=3807> both at 27 November 2009. 
821 Hyden, G & Court, J 2002, Governance and Development : World Governance Survey', discussion paper no. 1, 
United Nations University,13. 
822 Hyden, G, Court, J & Mease, K 2003, 'Government and Governance in 16 Developing Countries', discussion 
paper no. 6, Overseas Development Institute; Hyden, G, Court, J & Mease, K 2004, Making Sense of Governance: 
Empirical Evidence from Sixteen Developing Countries, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 191; ibid. See also, 
<http://www.odi.org.uklwga govemancellndex.htm>l at 27 November 2009. 
823 The latest survey, Doing Business 2008 is the fifth in a series of annual reports covering 178 economies: 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/Downloads/> at 27 November 2009. 
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were framed to suggest that reducing regulations was desirable, irrespective 
of their potential benefits.824 Moreover, in an independent evaluation, Davis 
questions the appropriateness of inferences to be drawn about causal 
relationships between the regulatory environment and development-related 
outcomes, and expresses concern that '[t)he limitations of the data and 
analytical tools used ... mean that any recommendations for reform have too 
weak an empirical foundation to be trusted.'825 
i. Worldwide Governance Indicators - Specific reference should be made to 
the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), because they are 
arguably the most comprehensive aggregated indicators that have monitored 
the quality of six dimensions of governance across more than two hundred 
countries since 1996.826 Governance is defined by the lead author, 
Kaufmann, as the set traditions and formal and informal institutions that 
determine how authority is exercised in a particular country for the common 
good.827 These dimensions are: voice and accountability; political stability 
and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; 'rule of 
law'; and control of corruption.828 The 'rule of law' dimension monitors 
perceptions of the extent to which informants have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence.829 
In relation to methodology, the WGI relies on aggregated perception-based 
subjective data.83° Kaufmann defends this methodology by arguing that while there 
are no silver bullets to measure governance, perceptions matter in their own right 
since firms and individuals take actions based on their perceptions: 
824 Wortd Bank 2008, Doing Business: An Independent Evaluation, Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank, 
Washington D.C., xv. 
825 Davis, K & Kruse, M 2007, 'Taking the Measure of Law: The Case of the Doing Business Project,' Law & Social 
Inquiry, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 1095-1119, 1117. 
826 
< httpJfinfo.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/index.aso> at 20 December 2009. 
827 Kaufmann, D 2004, 'Governance Redux: The Empirical Challenge,' World Bank Institute, Washington D.C., 8. 
828 See: World Bank 2008, World Development Indicators 2008, World Bank, Washington D.C. Also: Kaufmann. D, 
Kraay, A & Mastruzzi, M, 2008, Governance Matters VII: Worldwide Governance Indicators for 1996·2007, working 
paper no. 4654, World Bank Institute, DC, 7; World Bank 2007, World Development Indicators, World Bank, 
Washington D.C; also: World Development Indicators 2009, <http:/loo.worldbank.org/UOFSM7 AQ40> at 27 
November 2009. 
829 This is to be contrasted to the notion of Rule of Powerful Man or Woman (the 'ruler'); Kaufmann, 0 2001, 'Misrule 
of Law: Does the Evidence Challenge Conventions in Judiciary and Legal Reforms?', World Bank, Washington D.C. 
830 The WGI is based exdusively on subjective or perceptions·based data on governance reflecting the views of a 
range of stakeholders, induding household and firm survey respondents. and experts working for the private sector, 
NGOs, and public sector agencies. Compiled since 1996, these data measure the quality of six dimensions of 
governance for 213 countries, based on 31 data sources produced by 25 organizations. Kaufmann, D Kraay, A & 
Mastruzzi, M 2009, Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996·2008, World 
Bank, Washington D.C. 
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any specific proxy of governance will itself have measurement error relative 
to the specific concept it seeks to measure, due to intrinsic measurement 
challenges . . . any proxy for governance is by definition an imperfect 
measure of broader concepts of governance.831 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators are predicated on the assumption that over a 
very long period, countries with better governance at the beginning of the period 
grow faster. Over the past decade, the WGI has made an extraordinary visible 
contribution to the challenges of measuring the abstract and complex relationship of 
the 'rule of law', involving as it does measures of judicial performance, good 
governance and economic growth. Kaufmann acknowledges the considerable 
challenge of this endeavour, but defends this conceptual approach and methodology. 
He concedes that the links between judicial reform, the 'rule of law', governance and 
economic outcomes are complex.832 Significantly, he also acknowledges that there is 
little evidence of significant or quantitatively important changes in world averages of 
governance over the past decade.833 
The WGI have been subjected to intense criticism, and these measures are not 
without their controversy.834 Much of this criticism rests on technical misgivings about 
the legitimacy of much of the data on which they rely and there are concerns over 
their misuse. Although Arndt and Oman describe the WGI as probably being the 
most carefully constructed and certainly among the most widely used governance 
indicators, they do identify a range of problems associated with the likelihood of 
correlation of errors among the thirty-seven data sources from which the composite 
WBI indicators are constructed. They argue that there are significant limitations in 
their statistical legitimacy for comparing countries' scores, the lack of comparability 
over time, sample bias, and insufficient transparency.835 As a consequence, they 
express reservations on the central inferences of causality in the relationship 
between governance and growth: 
631 Kaufmann, B & Kraay, A 2007, 'On Measuring Governance: Framing Issues for Debate', presentation to World 
Bank Institute and Development Economics Vice-Presidency of The World Bank Roundtable on Measuring 
Governance,, Washington D.C. 11 January, 2. 
832 Kaufmann, above n 288, 11-26. Kaufmann, 0 2003, Rethinking Governance: Empirical Lessons Challenge 
Orthodoxy, World Bank, Washington D.C., 1. Kaufmann, above n 827Errorl Bookmark not defined., 4. This judicial 
dysfuncUonality constitutes a large 'regressive tax' on the poor estimated to constitute about 6% of monthly income, 
while it was only about 1.3 percent for medium income strata, and less than 0.6% for higher income users of courts. 
832 Kaufmann 0, Kraay, A & Mastruzzi, M 2009, above n 830,23. 
833 Ibid, 23. 
834 Arndt, C & Oman, C 2006, above n 290; and Thomas M 2009, above n 291. 
835 Arndt & Oman, above n 290, 49-58. 
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[C)urrent governance indicators are highly positively correlated with 
measures of current national per capita income. The challenge is to identify 
the directions of causality in the relationship between the quality of 
governance and the level of income in a country . . . (because) the results 
are very sensitive to changes in the econometric model used, the variables 
in the model and its underlying assumptions.836 
Other criticisms relate to the construct validity of these indicators, i.e. whether the 
indicators measure what they purport to measure. Thomas, for example, argues that 
the WGI represent a complex, atheoretical and as yet poorly articulated hypothesis 
for which no evidence has been advanced. In particular, these indicators stand as an 
elaborate, untested hypothesis about the nature of governance and that reliance on 
them for any purpose is consequently premature.837 Others note methodological 
problems arising from the lack of uniformity of data collection across the global 
sample, and difficulties over ranking which blunt their utility.838 More general 
problems arise from the reduction of large amounts of perception data into a single, 
numerical score for a given country in a given year. Oman, for example, notes the 
lack of transparency in the construction of composite indicators, entailing subjective 
interpretation of the governance significance of the observed facts; the scoring 
criteria are opaque because of the diversity and large number of underlying 
indicators they embody; and the substantive meaning of good governance remains 
conceptually undefined. Thus, these indicators can not give guidance as to what 
specifically needs to be changed in order to improve a country's governance: they 
are not 'actionable'. 839 
While Kaufmann steadfastly refutes each and all of these criticisms, it may fairly be 
observed that fundamental conceptual and technical issues relating to the selection 
of indicators and data collection methodologies remain seriously contested.840 
836 1bid 77 
837 Thom~s M, What Do the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure?. European Journal of Development 
Research, July 16, 2009. http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1007527 (last visited: 27 .11.09). 
838 Landman and Hauserman, for example, note a range of methodological problems which include using mixed 
indicators with the effect that the scores are combining 'apples' and 'oranges' and calling them 'pears', and ranking 
difficulties owing to the margin of error being so large that the indices can only differentiate between countries with 
low, middle, and high good governance scores, which blunts their utility. Landman. T & Hausermann. J 2003, Map· 
making and analysis of the main international initiatives on developing indicators on democracy and good 
governance, University of Essex Human Rights Centre, 31. 
9 Oman C, 'Governance Indicators and lnfonnallnstitutions,' 101·103, in JOtting J, Drechsler D, Bartsch Sand de 
Soysa I (eds), Informal Institutions: How Social Norms Help or Hinder Development, OECD Development Centre, 
Paris, 2007, 101. 
84° Kaufmann, 0, Kraay, A & Mastruzzi, M 2007, above n 292. 
331 
3 Challenge - balancing clarity with simplicity 
In this annex, I survey global endeavour in monitoring the performance of justice 
systems and judicial reform. I argue that one of the major challenges in 
conceptualising a performance monitoring framework is the difficulty of balancing 
adequate and meaningful measurements with clarity, simplicity and sustainability 
within the constraints of available resources, data and capacity. 
From the outset of the venture to systematically monitor judicial performance, at the 
World Bank in the mid-1990s, Shihata had conceptualised the key elements for 
evaluating justice systems as including: the legal framework and the role of judges; 
the position of judges in society and the perception of the system of administration of 
justice by the community; the integrity of the justice system; the administration of the 
judicial system; the economic cost of justice in the country; access to justice; 
availability of legal information; legal education and training; the actual functioning of 
legal procedures; physical facilities of courts; the impact of court decision on society; 
and alternative dispute resolution mechanismsM1 
Some years later, this was consolidated in a World Bank justice assessment manual 
which conceptualised the justice sector in terms of: the structure of the judiciary; the 
appointment, career and discipline of judges; independence and impartiality; 
accountability; existence of a judicial council; judicial administration (management, 
personnel, budgets, statistics and infrastructure); enforcement of orders; and 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.842 In a similarly broad conceptualisation, 
Brackton devised a 'judicial report card' framed around foci of judicial independence, 
judicial administration, procedural processes, access to justice and legal and judicial 
education.843 
Another means of diagnosing judicial performance was then provided by 
Hammergren who developed a checklist which measured judicial performance in 
terms of institutional integrity, independence, transparency and accountability. But 
significantly, she described this exercise as being less easily realised than might be 
imagined, citing USAID's eventual publication of some 75 'illustrative' indicators as 
841 Shihata, I 1998, 'The World Bank' in Jarquin, E & Carrillo,F (eds), Justice Delayed: Judicial Reform in Latin 
America. Inter-American Development Bank. New York, pp.117-131. 
842 World Bank 2002, Legal & Judicial Assessment Manual, World Bank, Legal Vice Presidency, Washington D.C. 
843 Hammergren, L 1999, 'Annex 2' of Diagnosing Judicial Performance: Toward a Tool to Help Guide Judicial 
Reform Programs, World Bank, Washington D.C. 
<http:ltsiteresources.worldbank.ora/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/hammergrenJudiciaiPerf.pdf> at 27 November 
2009. 
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an example of the difficulty of balancing meaningful measures on the one hand with 
simplicity and clarity on the other.844 
In 2003, the World Bank described the development of practical and meaningful 
measures of the impact of judicial and legal reform as still in their preliminary stages. 
Monitoring the impact of these reforms is difficult because 'direct measures of the law 
and justice sector performance are deficient in most countries, either not available or 
available only with a serious lag.'845 Significantly, it observed that: 
The measurement of legal and judicial performance requires attention to both 
quantitative and qualitative elements. To date most emphasis has been 
placed on the quantitative side (i.e. efficiency) because of data availability 
and because a lack of efficiency reduces access as well as fairness and 
public trust. However, greater effort will be made to address some of the 
more qualitative issues, since the question of improving law and justice is 
ultimately a qualitative one.846 
In the following year, it reiterated the difficulties of evaluating judicial and legal reform 
projects, particularly in the short term, and emphasised the need to define realistic 
goals that take into account the political economy and social dimensions of those 
reforms. 847 
Reiling and Hammergren then attempted to address these challenges in a handbook 
with which to conduct justice sector assessments. Significantly, they dilate the 
manifold difficulties of this task, and point out that they do not have a checklist of 
standards to be ticked off because such rigorous standards do not exist: 
[T]here is no consensus, in the global justice community or among justice 
scholars, on what this model should look like.848 
They look beyond justice system outputs and outcomes to their impacts on broader 
societal goals such as economic growth, political stability, and poverty reduction, and 
844 Hammergren, L, Diagnosing Judicial Performance: Towards a tool to help guide judicial reform programs, 
(undated) <htto://siteresources.wolidbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/hammerarenJudiciaiPerf.pdf> at 26 
November 2009. 
645 World Bank 2003, Legal and Judicial Reform: Strategic Directions, World Bank, Legal Vice Presidency, 
Washington D.C., 23. 
"' Ibid, 24. 
'"Ibid, 13, 26. 
848 Reiling, D. Hammergren, L & Di Giovanni, A 2007, Justice Sector Assessments · A Handbook, World Bank, 
Washington D.C., 9. 
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observe that most experts now admit a measure of uncertainty. They argue that 
these uncertainties about what they term the justice sector's universal contributions 
militate for a problem-focused approach, drawing on the complaints most commonly 
voiced by the citizens of a specific country, and note that the problems most 
commonly encountered in judicial assessments feature delay, access, and 
corruption. Beyond the usual examination of inputs and case trajectories, they 
propose looking beyond the usual examination of inputs and case trajectories, at 
judicial decisions which provide an essential source of information to evaluate, 
including: results reached, accuracy and consistency of legal analysis, thoroughness 
of factual summaries, and quality of the rationales underlying the decisions. Each 
provides important elements to examine. They do, however, concede that this is one 
of the 'softest' subjective methodologies, which has many detractors and little 
guidance as to how it is best done.849 
From this survey of the World Bank endeavour over the past decade, it is clear that it 
is no nearer to addressing the challenges. Indeed, the complexities may have grown. 
It is increasingly clear that these challenges grow in proportion to the 
conceptualisation of the domain of judicial reform for the purpose of monitoring and 
evaluating all of it aspects, leading to a mounting contagion of performance 
indicators. In the experience of this writer, these broad conceptualisations of justice 
and judicial reform demand massive resources which readily exceed the available 
data, capacity and/or financial resources. 
In closing this section, I argue that there is a core tension between selecting 
measures which ensure an adequately nuanced description of the complex 
multidimensional aspects of justice, and the practical imperative to keep data 
collection simple, feasible and sustainable. This is all the more so in developing 
environments where robust pressures militate against diverting scant resources from 
service delivery to monitoring functions. 
* * * 
849 fbid 57. 
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ANNEX B- PART 3: EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND JUSTIFICATION850 
a Methodological approach 
In the case studies, I adopt what Patton describes as a 'pure', naturalistic, qualitative 
inquiry strategy.851 I use documentary analysis as my principal empirical methodology 
for sourcing qualitative data as the central foundation for a detailed analysis of 
evidence from practice. Reference is made in this thesis to 'the real world of reform 
practice' to describe a method of adducing truth, providing ontological and 
epistemological bases for theory-making and appraisal against the available 
literature.852 My selection of a document-based, analytic approach is supported by 
Punch who describes documents as providing a 'rich vein' of material as a data 
source.853 This approach is similar to a 'grounded theory' methodology, which is 
described by Patton as the most influential paradigm for qualitative research in the 
social sciences today.854 In this inductive methodology, theory is developed 
progressively from the data.855 My initial research approach is open-minded, absent 
of any upfront theory. Grounded-theory analysis thus aims directly at generating 
abstract theory to explain what is central to the data.858 Patton outlines the process of 
research-driven theory-building: 
Theory denotes a set of well-developed categories, such as themes or 
concepts that are systematically interrelated through statements of 
relationships to form a theoretical framework that explains some relevant 
social or other phenomenon. These statements of relationship explain who, 
what, when, where, why, how and with what consequences an event 
650 This annex comprises two sections: first, it ouUines and justifies the general methodology for the empirical 
~proach in part 3 of this thesis; it then outlines and justifies the specific approach in each case study; above n 530. 
1 This approach aims to study real wortd situations as they unfold naturally; it is non-manipulative and non-
controlling of whatever emerges, in contradistinction to experimental or mixed methods. Patton, above n 7, 253. 
652 Ontology is the branch of metaphysics concerned with the nature of being, and is the scientific study of what exists 
in the real world. Epistemology is the philosophy concerned with the theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its 
methods, validity and scope. Concise Oxford Dictionary, 101h Ed, 1999, Oxford University Press, New York. Punch 
defines empirical research as using observation as the foundation of scientific knowledge. Empiricism is a theory of 
knowledge which asserts that knowledge arises from experience, and emphasizes the role of experience and 
evidence, especially sensory perception, in the formation of ideas and the method of developing of knowledge. 
Science is considered to be methodologically empirical in nature, and a central concept of scientific method is that all 
evidence must be empirical, or empirically based, that is, dependent on evidence that is observable by the senses. 
Empirical is a central tenn in scientific research and means something is observable; the central idea being to use 
observable real~wor1d experience as evidence in developing and testing ideas. Hence, scientific statements are 
subject to and derived from experiences or observations. Punch, K 2004, Introduction to Social Research: 
Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, Sage, London, 28. 
853 Ibid 190. 
854 Patton, above n 7, 125. 
855 Inductive analysis involves discovering patterns, themes and categories in data. Findings emerge from the data, 
through the analyst's interactions with the data. This contrasts with deductive analysis where data are analysed 
according to an existing framework. Once the patterns or themes have been established through inductive analysis, 
the final confirmatory stage of qualitative analysis may be deductive in testing and affinning the authenticity and 
a~propriateness of the inductive content analysis. Ibid 453~4. 
' Punch. above n 852. 190; see also 162-166. and 210. 
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occurs. Once concepts are related through statements of relationship into 
an explanatory theoretical framework, the research findings move beyond 
conceptual ordering to theory . . . A theory usually is more than a set of 
findings; it offers an explanation about phenomena.857 
With this understanding, I have selected the case study methodology because it is an 
optimal means of analysing the phenomenon of judicial reform through the thorough 
analyses of individual cases. This qualitative analysis provides an in-depth 
understanding of reform behavior and the factors affecting it, and transforms data 
into findings. Significantly, Patton emphasises that 'no formula exists for that 
transformation' because each qualitative study is unique.858 For this reason, I have 
constructed my own case studies to best portray the reality of contemporary judicial 
reform practice in the Asia Pacific region. 
Qualitative research is defined as empirical research where the data is not 
numeric.859 While this definition focuses on data, it is timely to appreciate that 
qualitative research is a disciplined investigation of the why and how of a 
phenomenon, not just what, where, and when. It is interested in the uniqueness of 
individual cases or classes of behaviour to promote understanding of how and why 
certain phenomena occurred, not just what occurred.860 For this reason, I argue that 
qualitative research is the appropriate methodology to gain insight into the practice of 
judicial reform.'861 I argue in Part 2 of this thesis that some of the contest between the 
qualitative and quantitative approaches to research methodology is paradigmatic but, 
more importantly, the context and purpose determine the appropriate 
methodology. 862 
In practice, case studies are commonly used in qualitative research and analysis 
because they are appropriate and useful. A case study is an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context. Yin defines the 
857 Patton, above n 7, 487. 
858 Ibid 432. 
1159 Punch, above n 852,29. 
860 See, eg, discussion on the qualitative versus quantitative debate in educational evaluation in Armytage, L 1996, 
Educating Judges: Towards a newmodel of continuing judicial eaqming, Kluwer law International, The Hague. 190-
200 .. 
861 Cracknell counsels that the choice of methodology should not be between quantitative and qualitative 
measurement: 'you can put a number on anything if you wish to: it is the interpretation of the number that's important. 
Cracknell. above n 335. 322. 
862 Patton sees these paradigms as essentialty about epistemology, ontology and philosophy of science; the 
discipline of endeavour may account for which paradigm may predominate in any particular case. Patton, above n 7, 
72. Guba and Lincoln argue that participation contributes an unparalleled depth of knowledge, insight and 
understanding to the issues under analysis. They advocate the constructivist approach to social science research 
and evaluation that pits those who may be called the positivists against the constructivists and is concerned with how 
evaluation finds truth and contributes to knowledge. Guba & Lincoln, above n 343, 249. 
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case study as an intensive study that enables in-depth examination of a single 
instance or event: a case. It provides a systematic way of looking at events, 
collecting data, analysing information, and reporting the results which provides the 
researcher with a sharpened understanding of why the instance happened as it did, 
and what might become important to look at more extensively in future research. 
Case studies lend themselves to both generating and testing hypotheses.863 Soy 
endorses Yin, and describes case study research as excelling in promoting an 
understanding of a complex issue or object, and can extend experience or add 
strength to what is already known through previous research. The advantage of case 
studies is that they emphasise detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of 
events or conditions and their relationships. Researchers have used the case study 
research method for many years across a variety of disciplines. Social scientists, in 
particular, have made wide use of this qualitative research method to examine 
contemporary real life situations and provide the basis for the application of ideas 
and extension of methods. In effect, researchers from many disciplines use the case 
study method to build upon theory, to produce new theory, to dispute or challenge 
theory, to explain a situation, to provide a basis to apply solutions to situations, to 
explore or to describe a phenomenon.864 
My selection of the case studies enables an intensive study of the judicial reform 
phenomenon through individual cases in detail, depth and wholeness. The selection 
of three case studies provides a triangulation of data with the effect of strengthening 
the findings that emerge.865 These case studies aim to provide an in-depth 
understanding of key aspects of the judicial reform experience in its actual setting, 
illuminating and recognising its complexity and its context. They offer a holistic focus 
within the bounded unity of each case. This approach conforms with the views of 
Miles and Huberman who argue that the case study is essentially an organisational 
strategy, and a way of organising social data so as to preserve the unitary character 
of the social object being studied.866 For this reason, Punch argues that almost 
anything can serve as a case study which enables a bounded, focused and holistic 
examination to give insight on specific phenomena and to develop or refine a 
theory.867 
863 Yin, R 1984, Case study Research: Design and Methods, Sage, Newbury Park, 153. 
864 Soy, S 1997, 'The case study as a research method' University of Texas at Austin (unpublished) 
<http://www.ischool.utexas.edu/-ssoy/usesusers/1391d1b.htm> at 28 November 2009. 
865 Triangulation strengthens the empirical part of this thesis by combining several sources of data, on the basis that 
no single method or source ever adequately solves the problem of rival causal factors. Patton, above n 7, 247. 
866 Miles, M & Huberman, A 1994, Qualitative Data Analysis, 2nd edn, Sage, California, 152. 
867 Punch, above n 852, 150-153. 
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b Participation in reform practice 
As my diary note at the opening of Part 3 indicates, what impels this research is my 
own discomfort which at times has verged on crises of confidence at the state of 
judicial reform practice. This discomfort is actual, personal, experiential, often intense 
and, on occasion, observable.868 From the outset, I selected the 'personal' voice 
because this thesis is not an esoteric or abstract academic study; it is an earnest 
heuristic journey to rnake sense of my vocation, to build value and worth from my 
years of practice endeavouring to make a difference in some altogether challenging 
parts of the world. I cannot - and do not - pretend to be invisible in this thesis. I am a 
part of these case studies, and do not evade that. I am not detached; I am a 
participant, integral to each of these case studies of practice in varying roles - as a 
practitioner, as an evaluator, as an editor, and now as a scholar. 
By transparently exposing my interest in this real world of practice, I rely on Guba 
and Lincoln's argument that participation contributes depths of knowledge, insight 
and understanding to the issues under analysis. By staying detached, the evaluator 
ensures that s/he can never really understand what is going on. As explained in Part 
2 of this thesis, the constructivist approach directly contests the positivist approach to 
evaluation. It advocates an alternative paradigm and criteria which comprise: 
credibility (instead of internal validity), transferability (instead of external validity), 
dependability (instead of reiiability), and confirmability (instead of objectivity).869 On 
final balance, in each case study, I argue that the insights from my participation 
provide a legitimate trade-off which ultimately offsets any qualification of neutrality. 
In these case studies, I will offer my critical analysis and reasoned argument on the 
value and worth of experience in a manner which I trust is credible, transferable, 
dependable and confirmable for the sharpened scrutiny of examiners. At the same 
time, I will not shirk from doing my utmost to be rigorously self-critical, rational, 
methodical and scholarly in analysing this experience, at times, to my own 
discomfort. To ensure this, I will use ethnomethodological critical self-reflection. 
868 Papua New Guinea is a characteristically dangerous place, where daily newspapers routinely report on extremely 
violent crime in local communities; below, Annex D. 
869 Above, n 421. 
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c Ethnomethodological reflection 
To ensure rigour and integrity to my analysis of practice, I will adopt an 
ethnomethodological approach to critically reflect on my participation. This added 
layer of analysis provides a significant dimension to this research. Ethnomethodology 
is defined by Patton as focusing inquiry on the ordinary, the routine details of 
everyday life. It provides a means of studying the social order by combining the 
phenomenological sensibility with a paramount concern for everyday social 
practice.870 Others, such as Wallace and Woolf, define ethnomethodology as the 
method of members of a group to make sense of their social world.871 
Ethnomethodology thus studies the ordinary methods that people use to realise their 
ordinary actions. 872 These researchers have an interest in observing situations that 
require them to make sense of what is happening, and are concerned to make 
explicit what might be called the tacit knowledge of the group, by bringing it to the 
surface from unconscious routine. Patton observes: 
[T)he findings of an ethnomethodological evaluation study should create a 
programmatic self-awareness that would, in principle at least, facilitate 
program change and improvement. 873 
Some may argue that this approach may infuse subjectivism and erode the 
detachment of the classic positivist research method 874 But others, like Patton, 
directly refute this and argues that distance does not guarantee objectivity; it merely 
guarantees distance: 
To claim the mantle of objectivity in the post-modern age is to expose 
oneself as embarrassingly na"ive.875 
On balance, I now argue that the interests of validity are heightened by the insights 
that participation as a practitioner bring to this study. The interests of reliability are 
preserved through transparency and critical reflexivity.876 Patton affirms that 
610 Patton, above n 7, 110. 
871 Wallace, R & Woolf, A 1980, Contemporary Sociological Theory, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 
263. 
872 Coulon, A 1995, Ethnomethodology, Qualitative Research Methods Series no. 36, Sage, California, 2. See also: 
Garfinkel, H 2002, Ethnomethodology's Program, Rowman and Littlefield, New York. 
873 Patton, above n 7, 112. 
874 Crotty, M 1998, The Foundations of Social Research: meaning and perspective in the research process, Allen & 
Unwin, Sydney, 48. 
875 Patton, above n 7, 50. 
876 Patton describes reflexivity as having entered the qualitative lexicon as a way of emphasising the importance of 
self-awareness, political/cultural consciousness, and ownership of one's perspective. Ibid 65. 
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' I reflexivity of voice and perspective engenders authenticity and trustworthiness on the 
' 
basis of balance: 'complete objectivity being impossible and pure subjectivity 
undermining credibility.'877 Moreover, this approach enables unparalleled observation 
and analysis of new and original data from the 'real life' of development practice, 
from which in due course I will ground a number of conclusions on the 'theory' of 
judicial reform. 
How can we assess the integrity of this research? Punch propounds four criteria for 
evaluating research approach: the set-up of research, empirical procedures, quality 
of data, and validity of findings and conclusions.878 Miles and Huberman propose 
four others: relevance, generalisability, being true to life, feasibility and ethics.879 
However framed, validity and reliability are generally seen as being central to the 
integrity and credibility of empirical research. Validity is primarily concerned with how 
well these data represent the phenomena for which they stand. 880 Validity is defined 
by the OECD-DAC as the extent to which the data collection strategies and 
instruments measure what they purport to measure; and the related concept of 
reliability is defined as the consistency or dependability of data and evaluation 
judgements, with reference to the quality of the instruments, procedures and 
analyses used to collect and interpret evaluation data.881 Validation is one of the 
central issues in qualitative research, and is also known as credibility and/or 
dependability.882 There are many different ways of establishing validity.883 
In this research, I propose to establish validity with reference to evaluative criteria 
which are recognised in the literature, immediately below, and with reference to the 
larger body of literature outlined in depth in Part 2 of this thesis. Adopting, as I do, a 
constructivist approach, Richardson proposes that ethnomethodological evaluation 
be critiqued using five criteria: substantive contribution, aesthetic merit, reflexivity (is 
there adequate self-awareness and self-exposure for the reader to make judgments 
about the point of view), impact, and expression of a reality.884 Patton reframes 
877 Ibid 494. 
878 Punch, above n 852, 250. 
879 Miles & Huberman above n 866, 194. 
880 Punch defines validity in terms of its internal validity- study's research design; whether it is a true reftection of the 
reality studied: whether true reflection of reality; and its external validity- the generalisability of the study's findings, 
can they be transferred to other settings. Punch, above n 852 , 30. 
881 OECD, above n 329. 
882 Four principal criteria of documentary validity are offered in the literature, being: authenticity (original, genuine), 
credibility (accurate), representativeness, meaning {significance). See, for example, Punch, above n 852, 190. 
883 Many of these validation techniques are expounded in Guba, E & lincoln, Y 1985, Naturalistic Inquiry, Sage, 
Beverly Hills, California. 
884 Richardson, L 2000, 'Evaluating Ethnography', Qualitative Inquiry, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 253-255. This is to be 
contrasted with the more traditional science-based or positivist criteria discussed in part 2 of this thesis, classically: 
objectivity to minimise bias, validity procedural rigor, reliability, generalisability or external validity; above n 421. 
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these criteria to emphasise acknowledged subjectivity, trustworthiness and 
authenticity, among others.885 
In sum, I argue that the validity of the proposed methodological approach is 
established using six criteria: first, the data is authentic (i.e. it is genuine) of the 
practice of major donor activity in judicial reform in the Asian region during the past 
decade.; second, the data is credible (i.e. it is accurate at its source); third, the data 
sample is representative (i.e. it is generalisable of general practice and is 
transferable in its implications to the extent that - while not exhaustive - it has been 
selected randomly from major activities without any regard to judgmental criteria 
relating to success or failure; fourth, it has meaning (i.e. it is significant and 
informative of the real world of practice); fifth, taken singly and collectively, the data is 
original to the public domain and provides an immediate contribution to the literature 
in terms of analysis and explanation of newly observable facts on the real world 
practice of judicial development; finally, it 'tells the story' of this author (i.e. it 
embodies my perceptions of reality as both a practitioner and a researcher, and 
impels this doctoral journey towards learning, self-improvement and theory-
building/refinement.) 
For these collective reasons, I argue that the proposed document-based qualitative 
case study approach, interspersed with reflexive ethnomethodological insights of this 
author, maximises the ontological and epistemological integrity of the research, and 
its contribution to this thesis. 
• •• 
685 Patton, M, 2003, 'Qualitative Evaluation Checklist ', 3, Evaluation Checklists Project 
www.wmich.edu/evalctr/checklists, at 20 December 2009. 
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Annex 8.1- Chapter 8: Methodology886 
The first case study assesses the experience of the Asian Development Bank in 
providing technical and related assistance to judicial reform across Asia and the 
Pacific region between 1990 and 2007. 
This case study, and the documents on which it is based, provides the source data 
and findings to address a research question of this thesis: 'What can we learn from 
the experience of judicial reform practice as evidenced in three case studies?' It is 
significant to this thesis because ADB is a major regional multilateral donor with a 
demonstrable focus on judicial reform over an extended period, providing a 
substantial body of experience for the purpose of analysis. The case study focuses 
on the experience of judicial reform practice through the documentation of the ADB's 
experience. This documentation constitutes the most comprehensive and coherent 
extant record of this substantial body of experience. 
This case study builds on research conducted by the author as part of an evaluation 
of the Asian Development Bank's law and policy reform program activities at its 
headquarters in Manila in 2007. This research provided a documents-based historical 
analysis of ADB's institutional and operational approach to judicial reform over the 
past seventeen years across Asia for the purpose of undertaking a review of the 
literature and contextualising ADB's experience within that frame.887 
The primary research methodology for this case study is an analysis of a range of 
policy, operational and evaluative documents all of which are publicly available on 
ADB's website888 The author also brings his own professional knowledge to this 
analysis which is expressly substantiated wherever possible.889 The case study is 
886 In the following sub-sections to this annex, I outline the specific methodology and justification of my empirical 
~preach to each case study; above. page 198 onwards. 
In a contract between the ADB and the author dated 27 July 2007, the tasks of this assignment comprised, inter 
alia: (i) Identify best practice and lessons from international experience through a review of the literature on legal and 
judicial reform (LJR) capacity development, including monitoring and evaluation systems, and legal and judicial 
education approaches; (ii} Review relevant documentation of ADS's technical assistance and loans financing LJR 
capacity development; (iii} Undertake a bottom-up and top-down assessment of selected capacity development 
projects through field missions, discussions with ADS staff, consultants and executing agencies, and validating TA 
completion reports; (iv) Analyze the impact of ADB's capacity development interventtons on ADS's LJR strategy, 
lessons in monitoring and evaluating capacity development for future project design. (v) Prepare a report on findings. 
868 All documents relied on in this case study are publicly available at <http://www.adb.org/> by virtue of ADS's 
Public Communications Policy: <http:l/www.adb.orq!Documents/Policies/PCP/pcp0502.aso#88>, unless otherwise 
specified. These documents fall into a number of categories, being: policy documents; project documents comprising 
Technical Assistance Reports (TARs}, which are available at: 
<http:l/www.adb.ora/Projects/reports.asp?key=reps&vai=TAR> ; and Technical Assistance Completion Reports 
(TACRs), which are available at: <http:l/www.adb.org/Projectslreports.asp?key-reps&vai=TCR>; and evaluation 
reports published by the Operations Evaluation Department, now known as the Independent Evaluation Department, 
which are availabte at: <http:J/www.adb.org/IED/default.asp>, and <http:l/www.adb.org/Evaluation/> all at 29 
November 2009. 
889 The author has consulted professionally to ADB over the past decade in Pakistan, Nepal, Maldives and at 
Headquarters in Manila. On occasion, the candidate provides supplementary references sourced through files notes 
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structured in three segments. The first segment provides a review of relevant 
documentation from the website which broadly falls into categories of policy, projects 
and evaluation. On the basis of data sourced from this review, a number of findings 
are drawn from this experience. Finally, these findings are analysed for the purpose 
of developing conclusions from this empirical evidence with which to address the 
research questions of this thesis. 
Focus of case study 
The focus of this case study is the experience of judicial reform practice which is 
bounded within the documentation of ADS's experience during this period. The 
documentation provides the data for the analysis in this thesis, and the contribution of 
this author to that evaluation, which was focused mainly on providing a literature 
review, served on an interim repository of this data. But that documentation is not this 
case study. This case study is based on those documents and builds beyond the 
author's role in that evaluation with an ethnomethodological reflection of that 
experience to contribute a distinctive new analysis for this thesis. First, my 
contribution to that evaluation comprised a review of the global literature which is not 
a part of this case study. Second, this case study undertakes a new and original 
analysis of this and other documentation available from ADS's website. Third, and 
most importantly, I reframe and extend the analysis in this thesis to go considerably 
more deeply and beyond the scope of any earlier research and analysis to address 
the research questions of this thesis in light of the detailed review of the literature in 
Parts 1 and 2 of this thesis. 
My justification for this qualitative document-based case study approach is 
introduced generally at the beginning of this annex. My specific justification for the 
research approach to this case study is that ADB is the major donor in Asia with an 
established program in judicial reform. Hence, while the source data forming the 
basis of this case study is within the public domain, and may have been used in my 
earlier professional work, this present analysis is the first scholarly assessment of 
that documentation. Consequently, this case study contributes a new analysis of a 
substantial arena of judicial reform to the available knowledge and understanding of 
or correspondence to know-how arising from years of practice consulting for ADB, its project officers and professional 
colleagues. In 2007, the candidate assisted the ADB undertaking a Special Evaluation Study on ADB Support to Law 
and Justice Reform, which is the first thematic evaluation of its legal and judicial reform portfolio. In this role. the 
candidate undertook a literature review, and conducted selective surveying- RSC No. C71662: Special Evaluation: 
(SES): ADB Support to Law & Justice. Any reference to the contents of these surveys is excluded from this case 
study. ADB 2009, ADB Technical Assistance for Justice Reform in Developing Member Countries, lED, ADB. Manila, 
<http://www.adb.orq!Documents/SES/REG/SES·REG·2009-06/SES-REG·2009-06.pdf> at 25 November 2009; 
above n 607. 
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global endeavour. The strength of this approach is that it is authentic and credible; 
-the weakness is that it may be biased to preference the donor's perspective rather 
than that of civil society stakeholders. Ultimately, my justification is pragmatic: the 
insights provided by these documents are unique to a significant example of judicial 
reform practice. Patton affirms that pragmatism is a legitimate basis for evaluation. In 
the real-world of development practice, where access to complete and reliable data is 
invariably constrained, the challenge of the researcher is to make the best of what's 
available.890 Bamberger and others agree.891 
Accordingly, I now argue that this analysis of ADB's substantial repository of practical 
experience will provide the first independently critical scholarly analysis and 
contribution to the literature, available for peer review. This case study analyses and 
interprets the ADB experience of reform practice through the theoretical frame, or 
lens, of this thesis developed in the course of analysing the global literature, rather 
than through ADB's organisational lens for that professional task. This provides a 
broader, deeper and more critical perspective for analysis. It also adopts a reflexive, 
ethnomethodological perspective which elevates the threshold of the critique of this 
experience to the academic level. 892 
Hence, I justify the proposed document-based qualitative inductive method as the 
optimal approach to the ADB case study because it provides a unique opportunity to 
closely critique and understand this substantial body of experience from practice in 
order to contribute empirically-grounded insights to the ongoing evolution of a theory 
for judicial reform. 
This case study will proceed through three steps: first, I select relevant 'findings' from 
reviewing the documentary data sourced from the desk review; second, I then 
immediately undertake an 'analysis' of any significant aspects of these findings in 
each section; third, I then provide a number of 'conclusions' emerging from this 
analysis, which I will argue are of empirical significance to the theory-building aspect 
of this thesis and will, in due course, constitute evidence to address the research 
questions of this thesis. * * * 
890 Patton, above n 7, 71-2. 
891 As seen in the detailed discussion of evaluation in part 2 of this thesis, there is a focused discourse in 
development on the need to distinguish 'real world' evaluation principles and practices to more theoretical 
approaches: see, eg, Bamberger. M. Rugh, J & Mabry, L 2007, 'ReaiWorld Evaluation: Working Under Budget, Time, 
Data and Political Constraints,' Professional Development Workshop 10, 6 November, 23, 
<http://www.realworldevaluation.aro/ReaiWorld Evaluation resour.html> at 4 December 2009; World Bank 2006, 
'Conducting Quality Impact Evaluation under Budget, Time and Data Constraints,' World Bank Independent 
Evaluation Group and the Thematic Group for Poverty Analysis, Monitoring and Impact Evaluation, Washington O.C, 
22; above, n 417. 
692 See discussion on methodology and justification above, Annex B. 
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ii Annex 8.2 - Chapter 9: Methodology893 
The second case study assesses the experience of Australia's Agency for 
International Development (AusAID) in supporting judicial reform in Papua New 
Guinea as part of their Law & Justice Sector Program (LJSP) between 2003 
and2007. 
This case study, and the documents on which it is based, provides the source data 
and findings to address a research question of this thesis: 'What can we Jearn from 
the experience of judicial reform practice as evidenced in three case studies?' It is 
based on research conducted in 2007 as part of a desk review undertaken by this 
author for AusAID for the purpose of identifying lessons learned and providing 
analysis on what has changed and why, to better guide future strategy development 
in AusAID's law and justice sector program/Law & Justice Sector Program in Papua 
New Guinea.694 
The desk review was framed by AusAID as a documentary study at the completion of 
the initial phase of sector-based programmatic support for judicial and legal reform in 
PNG between 2003 and 2007895 The report of this study is held internally by AusAID. 
This report was based on an analysis of almost 100 historical documents drafted by 
the program manager for LJSP, the Justice Advisory Group or AusAID. They were 
selected by AusAID, and are confidential to the Government of Australia.696 Copies of 
these documents are held by the author and were made available for the purposes of 
893 In the following sub-sections to this annex, I outline the specific methodology and justification of my empirical 
a~proach to each case study; above, n 657. 
8 A lesson is generally defined as an instructive occurrence or example or a composition serving an educative 
purpose: Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3n:t Ed., 1987, Clarendon Press, Oxford. In the development context, it 
may be seen as a valuable experience from practice for purposes of ongoing program strategy development, as a 
good work practice, situation or an innovative approach that is identified and shared to promote repeat applicatton. In 
the post-Paris environment on promoting development effectiveness, a lesson may also refer to an adverse practice, 
situation or approach that is identified and shared to avoid recurrence. It always gives a beneficial message to guide 
future action, that is, to improve future work practices, situations and approaches. 
895 Scope of work- inter alia: (3.1}. The consultant will undertake a desk review of documents to be provided by 
AusAID being (i} historical documents drafted by the law and Justice Sector Program (LJSP), the Justice Advisory 
Group (JAG) or AusAID or (ii) comparable reports or evaluations from similar programs funded by AusAID or other 
bodies. (3.2) The consultant must: (i) summarise Mlessons leamecr from the program (ie, what problems/constraints 
were discovered, what solutions were found or proposed?); (ii) draw out specific lessons learned under the following 
headings (in addition to general matters as above): (a) monitoring & evaluation (b) capacity building and (c) 
performance incentives/incentives for reform/change; (iii) provide answers to the following questions: If law and 
justice assistance to PNG were to be redone tomorrow, what would be done differently, knowing what we know now? 
What would be done in the same way? Were the basic models of the LJSP and JAG (including their contractual 
structures) the best ones to achieve the goals of the program (as per the Program Design)? How responsive were 
the LJSP, the JAG and AusAID to the need to change? Did they successfully adopt positive changes as part of the 
iterative process? What lessons can be drawn from comparable non-law and justice programs in PNG and law and 
justice programs elsewhere in the Australian aid program or internationally in so far as they are applicable? (3.3) The 
consultant was heavily involved with the PNG law and justice program from 2002-2004 as Program Director of the 
Justice Advisory Group. While this brings much useful experience of the subject matter, it also creates the possibility 
of conflict of interest. The consultant must strive to remain neutral and independent and to accurately summarize 
lessons learned from the documents provided. Contract between Uniquest P/l on behalf of AusAID and author. 
dated 17 January 2007. 
895 Inventory of documents, below, Annex C. 
896 Above, n 658. 
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this thesis through a research agreement entered between AusAID and the 
University of Sydney, dated 27 May 2009. They are available for inspection by 
examiners if/as required. An inventory of these documents is provided at Annex C. 897 
Focus of case study 
The focus of this case study is the experience of judicial reform practice which is 
bounded by the documentation of the LJSP during this period. The documentation 
provides the data for this thesis, and the desk review of LJSP served as an interim 
repository of that data; but that is not the case study. The case study is my current 
analysis of AusAID's documents and builds beyond the desk review with an 
ethnomethodological reflection of that experience. I provide a distinctive new critique 
of that data for this thesis in a number of ways. First, I synthesise the earlier findings 
of that desk review to form the threshold for further analysis in this thesis. Second, I 
restructure that work by omitting substantial portions of the desk review and by 
adding additional analysis. Finally, I extend the analysis and go considerably more 
deeply and beyond the scope of that desk review to address the research questions 
of this thesis in light of the detailed review of the literature in Parts 1 and 2. 
The research methodology for this case study is a qualitative documentary analysis 
of a broad range of AusAID's internal documentation relating to LJSP during the 
period.898 My justification for this approach is introduced generally at the beginning of 
this annex. My specific justification for this case study is that it provides the optimal 
means to access and analyse data which is otherwise not in the public domain and 
thereby eclipsed from peer review and academic critique. This approach enables the 
illumination and analysis of practice which would otherwise lack the insights provided 
by the donor's documentation. The strengths of this approach are that it is authentic 
and credible within the constructivist tradition of evaluation discussed in detail in Part 
2 of this thesis899 The weaknesses of this approach is that it ostensibly lacks 
detachment, as it involves in part my own earlier work both as director of the Justice 
Advisory Group and as AusAID's desk reviewer. Additionally, it is biased to 
preference the donor's perspective rather than that of the Papua New Guinea 
Government or of civil society stakeholders. As discussed in Part 2 of this thesis, 
897 This Research Agreement was made between Ms Margaret Callan on behalf of the Government of Australia 
(AusAID) and Professor David Kinley on behalf of the University of Sydney, dated 27 May 2009. Also: Inventory of 
documents, below, Annex C. 
898 Part of this case study builds on research for an article co-authored by the candidate: Miller S and Armytage L. 
Legal and judicial reform oerformance monitoring: the PNG approach , European Journal of Development Research, 
Vol. 20, No.1, March 2008, 141·157. 
899 Above. n 421 onwards. 
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adherents of the science-based, positivist tradition of evaluation may be concerned 
about erosion of neutrality. But, on balance, I justify the trade-off of detachment for 
insight on pragmatic grounds. I argue that the insights provided by AusAID's 
documents are uniquely valuable as a repository of empirical evidence of judicial 
reform practice. Pragmatism is a legitimate basis for evaluation, as Patton affirms.900 
As before, I endorse Cracknell's observation that detachment is ultimately a fiction, 
and Guba's invocation that participation provides insight.901 In the real-world of 
development practice, access to complete and reliable data is invariably constrained, 
so the challenge of the researcher is to maximise trade-offs and to make the best of 
what's available. Bamberger and others agree.902 
While there is undoubtedly some prospect that my involvement both as a practitioner 
and a desk reviewer may affect my neutrality, it is timely to note that I was expressly 
selected for the desk review because my involvement in LJSP was seen by the donor 
as 'providing much useful experience of the subject matter'.903 To address the issue 
of neutrality, I was tasked to remain impartial and independent, and to accurately 
summarise lessons learned from the documents provided, in a trade-off of insight for 
neutrality, which is recognised as a merit in the constructivist tradition of 
evaluation.904 The draft desk review was then independently peer reviewed, with 
anonymous feedback supplied, amendments provided, and in due course accepted 
as fit for purpose. 
This case study adopts a reflexive, ethnomethodological analysis of a substantial 
repository of practical experience available for the first time for peer review. It views 
the LJSP work through the theoretical lens of this thesis which was developed in the 
course of examining the global literature, rather than through AusAID's prescriptive 
organisational lens which was required for the desk review. This approach provides a 
broader and deeper critique which elevates the analysis of this experience to the 
academic level.905 
Hence, I justify the proposed document-based qualitative inductive method as the 
optimal approach to the LJSP case study because it provides a unique opportunity 
to closely critique and understand this wriggling specimen of judicial reform practice, 
messy as it may sometimes be, in the constructivist tradition of development 
900 Patton, above n 7, 71-2. 
901 Cracknell, above, n 335. 
902 Bamberger, Rugh, & Mabry, above n 417, and surrounding. 
903 Scope of work, above, n 895. 
904 See eg, Cracknell above n 335; Patton above n 7. 
905 Justifcation of methodology, above, Annex B. 
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evaluation as discussed and justified in Part 2.906 The interests of validity are 
explicitly heightened by the insights that participation as a practitioner bring to the 
study, and that the interest of reliability is preserved through transparency and 
constant critical reflexivity. Moreover, this approach maximises the opportunity to 
contribute empirically-grounded insights to the ongoing evolution of a theory for 
judicial reform. 
This case study will proceed through three steps: first, I select relevant 'findings' from 
reviewing the documentary data from the desk review; second, I undertake an 
'analysis' of any significant aspects of these findings; third, I provide a number of 
'conclusions' emerging from this analysis, which I will argue are of empirical 
significance to the theory-building aspect of this thesis and will, in due course, 
constitute evidence to address the research questions of this thesis. 
* * * 
906 Above. page 151 onwards. 
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iii Annex 8.3- Chapter 10: Methodology907 
The third case study assesses the diverse experience of a number of judicial reform 
practitioners from around the Asia Pacific region over the past decade. 
This case study, and the documents on which it is based, provides the source data 
and findings to address a research question of this thesis: 'What can we Jearn from 
the experience of judicial reform practice as evidenced in three case studies?' The 
contribution of this case study is significant to this thesis in coalescing the varied and 
disparate perspectives of a range of practitioners from across Asia Pacific. These 
participatory perspectives resulted in the publication of a research monograph, 
Success in Judicial Reform: Voices from the Asia Pacific Experience (848).908 
participated as the technical editor of this publication.909 
Focus of case study 
The focus of this case study is the experience of diverse judicial reform practice 
across the Asia Pacific region which is bounded by the contributions of authors in 
S4S, in particular, as it is reframed in the introductory first chapter written by myself 
as editor. S4S is the repository of this data, but it is not the case study. The case 
study is this current critique of the editorial assessment of the 
contributions, undertaken by me in the introduction to 
regional authors' 
S4S, with an 
ethnomethodological reflection of that experience for this thesis. My work in 
researching the introduction to S4S represents my own original scholarly work as a 
part of this doctoral. research, and is an artefact of this thesis.910 This case study 
does, however, go considerably further than the introduction to S4S in a number of 
significant ways. First, it reduces and synthesises my findings in the introduction to 
form the threshold for further analysis. Second, I restructure the work by omitting 
substantial portions of the introduction and by adding additional analysis. Third, I 
extend the analysis in this thesis to go considerably more deeply and beyond the 
scope of that introduction to address the research questions of this thesis in light of 
the detailed review of the literature in Parts 1 and 2. 
907 See above, Chapter 10. 
908 Arrnytage L and Metzner L (eds) Searching for Success in Judicial Reform: Voices from the Asia Pacific 
Experience, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2009. 
909 Financial assistance was provided by the UNDP Regional Centre Bangkok , serving as executing agency, 
together with the UN Democracy Fund, AusAID and some other donors; Muke~ee 0 2009, Evaluation Report: 
Strengthening the APJRF and Developing a Judicial Reform Handbook, UNDP Regional Centre Bangkok. 
910 My supervisor, Professor David Kinley, endorsed my acceptance of this professional assignment to edit S4S as a 
part of my ongoing doctoral research because of its compatibility to the research inquiry of this thesis; consequently, I 
used that assignment as a preparatory part of this case study. 
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Under these circumstances, this case study addresses three dimensions of reality for 
the evaluative purpose of ascertaining value or worth. The first dimension is the 
reality of judicial reform as reported by the contributors in their chapters. The second 
dimension is the reality of my analysis of those experiences as discussed in the 
introductory synthesis of those contributions in 848. The third dimension is this 
scholarly critique of my editorial assessment in the introductory chapter for this 
thesis. Hence, this case study is a multi-layered assessment of diverse experiences 
of judicial reform seen through the triple perspectives of the contributing practitioners, 
and myself in the dual roles of editor and scholarly reviewer. For the purpose of this 
thesis, the research methodology involves a re-evaluation of my earlier editorial 
commentary, together with an ethnomethodological reflection on that editorial 
commentary. 
My justification for this qualitative, document-based case study approach is 
introduced generally at the beginning of this annex. My justification for the specific 
research approach to this case study is two fold. First, it provides further empirical 
evidence which is relevant to the core arguments of this thesis, in particular, to the 
purpose and evaluation of judicial reform. Second, it illuminates the distinctive space 
between the evaluand - the body of the collective experiences of the contributing 
authors - and the evaluator, in this instance myself, where the counterfactual is the 
difference in my roles first as editor of a publication project, and second, as scholarly 
researcher for this thesis. The strengths of this approach are that it offers a singular 
opportunity to illuminate the effect of context and purpose on the nature of the 
evaluative role, and is authentic and credible within the constructivist tradition of 
evaluation, as discussed in detail in Part 2 of this thesis.911 The weakness of this 
approach is of course that it may lack detachment because I am now reviewing my 
own earlier editorial work; unavoidably, I may be biased. While I acknowledge that 
this approach may affect the detachment of the evaluative role from the positivist 
perspective, I argue that this is more than counterbalanced when viewed from the 
constructivist perspective of the researcher in an active participatory role, working 
closely with the authors as key informants of their judicial reform experience. My 
participation provides insight not otherwise in the mix. I further argue that this 
approach satisfies the key criteria for evaluative validity outlined by Punch requiring 
authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning.912 
911 Above, page 151 onwards. 
912 Punch, above n 852, 190 and 235. 
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This justification is ultimately heuristic. The insights provided by my position as a dual 
evaluator, where the subject remains constant, provides a unique opportunity for me 
to explore the impact of the context and purpose on the construction of meaning and 
significance of the evaluation process itself. In this sense, this case study approach 
provides an opportunity to apply and assess Guba and Lincoln's 'fourth generation 
evaluation' approach discussed in Part 2 of this thesis, focusing on what they term 
the hermeneutic dialectic of evaluation.913 This model refutes what is seen as the 
false assurance of the positivist evaluation and provides an alternative approach 
which substitutes notions of internal validity with credibility, external validity with 
transferability, reliability with dependability and objectivity with confirmability.914 
This case study methodology provides a new critical analysis of both a substantial 
repository of practical experience in judicial reform across the region, and a unique 
opportunity for ethnomethodological reflection on both that experience and my 
editorial assessment of that experience. This elevates the threshold of critique to the 
academic level. While some might argue that this approach may infuse subjectivism 
and erode the detachment of the classic positivist research method, I once again 
argue that the interests of validity are heightened by the insights provided by my 
participation as an editor of the published record, and that the interest of validity is 
preserved through transparency and constant critical reflexivity. 
Hence, I justify the proposed document-based, qualitative inductive method as the 
optimal approach to the S4S case study because it maximises the opportunity for this 
thesis to contribute original, empirically-grounded insights to the ongoing evolution of 
a theory for judicial reform. It does this by providing insights on the wriggling 
specimens of judicial reform practice from the regional authors, messy as they may 
sometimes be. This conforms to the constructivist tradition of development evaluation 
discussed and justified in Part 2.915 
As in the earlier case studies, I will proceed through three steps: selecting 'findings' 
from the documentary data; undertaking 'analysis' of those findings; and providing 
'conclusions' which I will argue are of empirical significance as evidence to address 
the research questions of this thesis. 
913 Guba & Lincoln, above n 421, 83-4. 
914 1bid. 
915 Above, page 151 onwards. 
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ANNEX C -CHAPTER 9: AUSAID INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS916 
• 2004 (PHASE II, YEAR 1) 
LAW & JUSTICE SECTOR PROGRAM (LJSP): Annual Program Plan 
2004 Annual Program Plan 
2004 Annual Program Plan: Re-forecast: 03.05.04 
JAG Appraisal: 2004 Annual Program Plan: 25.11.03 
LJSP Reports 
Quarterly Reports 
Quarterly Report: Jul-Sep 04 Annex1_Financial Report 
Quarterly Report: Jui-Sep 04 
Six Monthly Reports 
Six Monthly Reports: Dec 2004 - AusAID comments: 04.04.05 
Six Monthly Reports: Dec 2004 -All Annexes (revised: 09.06.05 
Six Monthly Reports: Dec 2004- Main Text (revised: 09.06.05 
Six Monthly Reports: Jun 2004- (revised 29.10.04) 
Sector Annual Performance Report 
Annual Performance Report (final) 01.06.05 
• 2005 (PHASE II, YEAR 2) 
LJSPAPP 
2005 Annual Program Plan -JAG comments: 04.11.04 
2005 Annual Program Plan - final as approved 
LJSP Reports 
Annual Report 
LJSP 2005 Annual Report- AusAID comments 04.04.06 
LJSP 2005 Annual Report - March 06 
Quarterly Report 
Quarterly Report: Jan-Mar 05 -Annex 1 
Quarterly Report: Jan-Mar 05 - Cover 
Quarterly Report: Jan-Mar 05- Main Text and Annex 2 
Six Monthly Report 
Six Monthly Reports: Jan-Jun 05 - Annexes 1-6 
Six Monthly Reports: Jan-Jun 05 - Main text 
Sector Annual Performance Report 
Sector Annual Performance Report 2005.pdf 
• 2006 (PHASE II, YEAR 3) 
LJSP Annual Program Plan 
2006 Annual Program Plan - Final - AusAID feedback 28.02.06 
2006 Annual Program Plan - Final 
LJSP Reports 
Six Monthly Report 
Six Monthly Reports: Jan - Jun 06 
Six Monthly Reports: Jan-Jun 06 AusAID comments 
Six Monthly Reports: Jan-Jun 06 JAG Appraisal 
916 These documents are confidential to the Government of Australia (AusAID). They have been made available for 
the specific purpose of this thesis through a Research Agreement entered between AusAID and the University of 
Sydney dated 27 May 2009. Copies are held by AusAID and the author, and are available for inspection by 
Examiners if/as required. For this reason, some are additional to the Bibliography, below. 
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Development Budget Guidelines 
JAG Review Report Master 22.02.06 - Final 
• 2007 (PHASE II, YEAR 4) 
LJSP Annual Program Plan 
2007 Annual Program Plan- Draft Annex B 31.10.06 
2007 Annual Program Plan- Draft Annex F 31.10.06 
Annex A - Logframe 
Annex C - Program activities by Agency 
Annex D - Summaries of Activity Costs (2007 AUD) 
Annex E - Facilities Activities 
Annex G - Handover Plan - Updated 
2007 Annual Program Plan - AusAID feedback on draft 
2007 Annual Program Plan 
• COMMUNITY SURVEYS (JAG) 
Business Crime survey 
Business crime survey- Australian Institute of Criminology comments: 
18.07.06 
Business Crime Study - Final Draft: June 06 
Business Survey 2005 - Draft 16.11.05 
Business Crime Study- Final: 31.7.06 
JAG Response to AIC second round of comments 
Business Survey Observations by the JAG: Comments 
Tasking Note Business Survey 
Community Survey Report 
Bougainville 
2005 Bougainville Community Survey 2005 Final 25.03.06 
2006 Bougainville Community Survey 2006 - draft 11.01.07 
Mt Hagan Community Survey 2006 - revised 
Lae Community Survey 2005- final12.05.06 
Port Moresby (NCD) 2005 Community Survey Report- draft 25.03.06 
Port Moresby (NCD) 2006 Community Survey Report- AusAID 20.12.06 
Highlands Highway 2005- final13.03.06 
• JUSTICE ADVISORY GROUP (JAG) REPORTS 
Performance Review Reports & Sustainability Strategy 
Sustainability Matrix- final 21.03.06 
Sustainability Strategy- final 21.03.06 
Sustainability Strategy- Future Directions Paper 02.03.06 
Six Monthly Reports 
Quarterly Report (Aug-Oct 03) 
Six Monthly Report (Jan-Jun 04) 
Six Monthly Report (Jan-Jun 05) 
Six Monthly Report (Jan-Jun 06) 
Six Monthly Report ( Jui-Dec 04) 
Community Based Corrections Report 03.08.04 
Restorative Justice Report 22.07.04 
Restorative Justice Report 22.07.04 
YLM Impact Evaluation Report 06.12.06 
• LAW & JUSTICE- PNG EXPERIENCE +BACKGROUND 
Design docs and peer reviews 
LJSP Program Design Framework 22.08.03 
LJSP Program Design Document 06.04.05 
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LJSP Program Design Document- Poverty Reduction Analysis 
L&J Concept Paper, Issues Paper 
Concept Paper Attachment A 
Concept Paper Attachment B 
Concept Paper Main Text- Nov 2002 
Poverty Reduction and Law & Justice- Desk study, May 2002 
L&J Project Completion Reports 
Attorney-General Department Institutional Strengthening Project 
Activity Completion Report Nov 2003 
Ombudsman Commission Institutional Strengthening Project- Project 
Completion Report, July 2002 
PNG Correction Services - Future Needs Report, Aug 2002 
PNG Legal Capacity-Building Project - Project Completion Report, 
Aug 2003 
Royal PNG Constabulary Phase 3 - Independent Completion Report, 
April2005 
L&J Sector Reviews 
JAG Review of RPNGC strengthening (Pt 1) Sept 03 
JAG Review of RPNGC strengthening (Pt 2) Dec 04 
L&J Reform in PNG (Rowland Paper) Sep 01 
L&J Sector Review 2001 
Mega-summit - SWAp Lessons #06.01.05 
• PNG-AUSTRALIA LAW & JUSTICE PROGRAM 2009 
AusAID-PNG - Capacity Building 
AusAID-PNG - Community & Provincial Engagement 
AusAID-PNG - Infrastructure 
AusAID-PNG - Management Model 
AusAID-PNG - Monitoring and Evaluation 
AusAID-PNG - PALJP Project Design Document 13.08.08 
AusAID-PNG - Planning and Budgeting 
• PNG OTHER SECTOR EXPERIENCE 
PNG Curriculum Reform Implementation Project- Meta-Evaluation Nov 06 
• REPORT 
AusAID Assistance to Papua New Guinea's Law and Justice Sector (2003-
2007): Lessons Learned Desk Review: L Armytage, 02.04.07 . 
• • • 
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ANNEX D- SAMPLE EXTRACTS OF PNG NEWSPAPERS: 2003-4917 
1. Horror Ordeal - An elderly man was brutally murdered at the Tete 
Settlement in Port Moresby yesterday as he tried valiantly to prevent a 
band of armed criminals from raping his wife and daughters. lan Liriope, a 
former employee of the National Broadcasting Commission, was shot 
several times and then chopped up by at least 10 armed men (sic) as his 
wife and teenage daughter watched in horror ... Mr Liriope was shot three 
times in the head and chopped in the neck before his body was burned 
with the house. 918 
2. Young Girl Pack-Raped on Bus as Driver, Crew Watched - Last 
Wednesday, June 16, around 2.30pm, my neighbour and her small 
daughter were about to board a bus bound for Erima at the Gordan 
market. As she boarded the bus, to her horror, there in the back seat was 
a poor and lone Central (Highland) teenage girl being raped by four young 
men. The poor girl could not scream for help because her mouth was 
gagged and she was held down by the four men. My neighbour saw this 
and got out of the bus in fear but did not report the matter for fear of 
reprisals. And guess what the offsider and bus driver did? Nothing! 919 
3. 70 Rapists! - Port Moresby police are investigating reports that a woman 
was pack-raped by up to 70 men at Gerehu early this week ... It is not 
clear what happened but reports, not dismissed by police, say the woman 
was raped by up to 70 men. No arrests have been made yet in relation to 
the attack ... Superintendent Hela also confirmed reports of a student 
from Gerehu High School being raped last Friday. He said the girl was 
taken from the bus stop by about 15 men. She was raped 23 times in the 
night, according to her account of the attack to police. 920 
4. Teacher Dies in Slashing: A female high school teacher was killed 
outside her classroom in Enga last week ... When she stepped out of the 
classroom a man pulled a bush knife from his coat and slashed her neck. 
She died on the spot. 921 
• * * * * 
917 This sample of clippings was taken from daily newspapers in Port Moresby during the course of case study 2, 
chapter 8. It illustrates the observation that many parts of Papua New Guinea are dangerous, in particular, the 
capital, Port Moresby, with extremely violent crime routinely reported in daily papers. 
918 Weekend National, Friday 7 November 2003, 1. 
919 Bruce, M, 'View Point', Papua New Guinea Post Courier, Wednesday, 24 June 2004, 7. 
920 Papua New Guinea Post Courier, Friday 4 July 2003, 1. 
921 Home News, Papua New Guinea Post Courier, Friday 5 December 2003, 5. 
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